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In 2012, the Churches Education Commission in New Zealand stated that around 40% of state 
primary schools provided voluntary religious instruction. A search for the word “religion” in 
the New Zealand Curriculum, at that time, yielded a zero result. The curriculum recognised 
New Zealand’s bicultural heritage and affirmed cultural diversity as a key principle. Yet 
religious diversity was not a curriculum focus.  
The New Zealand Education Act of 1877 established that the primary school curriculum would 
be “entirely of a secular character”. But the Education Act of 1964 stated that, at any time 
during the school day, the school could “close” for religious instruction led by church 
volunteers. This was, and remains, known as Bible-in-Schools (BiS). In consequence of this, 
and subsequent legislation, confessional approaches to religious education appear to have 
been preserved in New Zealand primary schools. My research indicates that the effective 
separation of religion from the mainstream primary school curriculum, through the construct 
of school closure, has precluded both educational scrutiny of BiS programmes and the 
theorisation of religion as an appropriate object of study. This thesis examines policy and 
practice in seven case study primary schools, and draws on interview data with key 
stakeholders at the Ministry of Education, the New Zealand Educational Institute, the 
Churches Education Commission and the Human Rights Commission. It examines the archive 
of primary sources and traces the “history of the present”, identifying constraints on the 
development of religion as a curriculum area. 
Adopting a Foucaultian approach to discourse analysis, genealogy, and governmentality, a 
critical realist theoretical perspective and theory of conceptual knowledge of religion and an 
egalitarian liberal approach to social policy, I demonstrate how dominant societal and 
educational discourses operate to disqualify religion as a curriculum area and concurrently to 
position confessional approaches to culture and religion as educationally progressive. I 
problematise Bible-in-Schools, showing how current practices may leave children exposed to 
teaching which does not respect the right of children and parents to freedom of religions and 
beliefs and is inimical to the protection of diversity. I also suggest that, far from being neutral 
in matters of religion, secular state schools may be engaged in the promotion of a very specific 
liberal religious worldview, which is incompatible with many other religious perspectives. I 
advocate the inclusion of critical education in religions and worldviews within the New 
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Chapter One: “Let’s Talk about Something Else”  
Ours is a political tradition which, through bitter experience, has learnt not 
to make a window into men’s souls. We hold at once a fear and a respect 
for the essence of each other’s beliefs. Our traditions have evolved to 
contain the power of those beliefs. “I won’t tell you that you are wrong; 
just don’t bring it up. Let’s talk about something else”, we say. 
               Hon. Bill English M.P. 1 
Introduction 
The characterisation of religion as a subject to be avoided, by the current Deputy Prime 
Minister, anticipates the findings of the current project on religion in New Zealand’s primary 
schools.2 Early debates about religion in school were defined by a determination to avert any 
attempt at religious establishment, the injustices of which many had sought to avoid through 
emigration.3 The Observer cartoon from October 1912 reflects these concerns.4 In the face of 
rival sectarian opinions, the Minister for Education is advised by the Chief Justice, “Heaton, my 
boy, don’t touch it! Don’t play with edged tools! Let sleeping dogs lie!” My research indicates 
that this “hands-off” policy has continued to inform decision-making processes regarding 
religion in school.5 This is evidenced in practices which promote subject-avoidance regarding 
religions and beliefs and a laissez-faire approach to voluntary Christian religious instruction. 
This thesis seeks to both describe and explain policy and practice regarding education in 
religions and beliefs in New Zealand primary schools, through a survey of archival material and 
case study research undertaken between October 2011 and July 2012. In a direct challenge to 
current policy, I advocate ministerial and educational engagement with matters of religion and 
belief in state schools.6 
                                                          
1
 Bill English, “Chapman Lecture” (paper presented at the University of Auckland, 2 October 2005), Bill 
English website, accessed 29 March 2011, http://www.billenglish.co.nz/index.php?url=archives/32-
Chapman-Lecture.html&serendipity%5Bcview%5D=threaded. 
2
 At the time he was Opposition Education spokesman. English invokes the words of Queen Elizabeth I 
and Protestant/Catholic divisions, but it is likely that he is also alluding to sectarian divisions closer to 
home. 
3
 See Ian Breward, Godless Schools? (Christchurch: Presbyterian Bookroom, 1967), 1-4. 
4
 See Figure 1, page ii: B.L.O., “Bible in Schools: The Minister Interviews the Ministers”, Observer, 
Saturday 5 October 1912. Courtesy of the National Library of New Zealand. Previously published by the 
author in Helen Bradstock, “Religion in New Zealand's State Primary Schools”, Journal of Intercultural 
Studies 36, no. 3 (2015): 341. 
5
 e.g. see pages 82, 87, 90, 96, 100, 105, 117.  
6
 Parts of this thesis originally appeared in Helen Bradstock, “Religious Education, Knowledge and 
Power: Religion as Discursive Construction in New Zealand Primary Schools”, in Identity, Difference and 
Belonging, ed. Dina Mansour, Sebastian Ille, and Andrew Milne (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2014), 
first published by the Inter-Disciplinary Press and in Bradstock, “Religion in New Zealand's State Primary 
Schools”, first published by Routledge. 
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As I show below, discussion of this topic in New Zealand is often impeded by a confusion and 
conflation of terminology. In this thesis I shall use the term religious instruction to refer to 
inculcation of children into religious belief, including religious observances such as prayers and 
worship songs. Religious instruction requires children to make confessions of faith and is 
therefore “confessional”. The term religious education (RE) is used, in the United Kingdom 
context, to refer to education about a variety of religions without expectation of religious 
commitment. In the New Zealand context the expression more often equates to religious 
instruction, which has traditionally been provided by church volunteers during the school day. 
Known as Bible-in-Schools (BiS), the nature and purpose of this teaching is contested. 
However I show in this thesis that, in spite of assertions to the contrary, the teaching and 
resources observed were confessional in nature. In order to minimise confusion of 
terminology I use the term “education about religions and beliefs” to refer to a broader, non-
confessional treatment of religion in school. However, this thesis problematises all these 
terms in its consideration of different approaches. 
My own approach to this subject is informed by my previous experience as a primary school 
teacher, with a subject specialism in religious education, in the United Kingdom. However, the 
thesis does not attempt to draw a direct comparison between educational practices in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom. To do so would have not have enabled me to do justice, 
within the constraints of the thesis, to the range of issues raised by my research data in the 
New Zealand context. It may also have been construed as an attempt to set one “favoured” 
policy against an “unfavourable” policy, or even as an inappropriate attempt at recolonisation 
by an “outsider”. Instead I have attempted to set the issue of religion in schools in New 
Zealand within the context of broader, international educational debates regarding such 
problems as: religion in religiously diverse educational settings; children’s right to freedom of 
religion and belief; the purpose of education and curriculum content; and the role of 
government in education policy. I show how, in the light of these wider discussions, policies 
and practices in both the New Zealand and United Kingdom contexts raise legitimate 
concerns. New Zealand, however, forms the focus of this study because practices 
accommodated within its education system appear to run counter to international 
developments in RE and to the advice disseminated by European institutions on matters of 
religion in school.7  
                                                          
7
 See below, page 146. 
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In any academic thesis compromises must be made. My stated focus on curriculum, and 
broader educational themes, means that it has not been possible to give a thorough historical 
account of Bible-in-Schools, or to provide as much contextualisation of debates and 
discussions as I would have wished, including those around bicultural issues. However, in this 
thesis contextual matters are introduced insofar as they pertain to contemporary policy and 
practice regarding religion in school. In this chapter, I set out a thesis rationale which 
addresses relevant aspects of the New Zealand context. These aspects provide essential 
background to the ensuing discussion and establish both motivation and justification for the 
current research. I follow this with an overview of the thesis chapters. 
Thesis Rationale 
Context of Contemporary Debate 
As a former primary school teacher from the United Kingdom I was intrigued to discover that 
religion was considered a matter not for professional educators, but for church volunteers in 
New Zealand primary schools. Investigating this issue, I encountered multiple forms of 
reasoning which disqualified religion as a legitimate curriculum area. This was in complete 
contrast to the way in which religious education had been theorised within the educational 
setting in which I had received my training.8 These different forms of reasoning have become a 
focus of my thesis as I attempt to explain competing conceptions of religion in school and the 
constraints which appear to be in operation in the New Zealand education context. This has 
necessitated a degree of self-examination during which my own professional suppositions 
have been subjected to scrutiny and amended.  
In March 2012, a year into my research, the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and 
Humanists (NZARH) began a Facebook campaign called Keep Religion out of Schools and 
created a subgroup called the Secular Education Network (SEN) to support parents.9 Their 
campaign has generated much polarised debate in the media, providing a rich source of 
supplementary data for this thesis. Stories detailing coercive and discriminatory practices, 
evangelising and apparent infringement of the right to freedom of religions and beliefs, were 
frequently found on the Facebook pages and websites associated with the campaign.10 They 
                                                          
8
 See below, Table 14, page 144.  
9
 The NZARH were founded in 1927 to promote secular rationalism, campaigning against the Bible in 
Schools League and against prohibition movements. 
10
 NZARH, “Campaigns: Secular Education”, New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists 
website, accessed 11 March 2016, http://www.reason.org.nz/index.php/new-secular-education; SEN, 
“Secular Education Network (N.Z.)”, accessed 11 March 2016, http://religioninschools.co.nz/; SEN, 
“Keep Religion out of School Facebook Page”, accessed 11 March 2016, 
4 
 
established the contestability of current practices by those affected by them. Yet comments 
from the Ministry of Education and the teachers’ union, the New Zealand Educational Institute 
(NZEI), in media interviews, served to close down debate and to render the complaints of 
parents invalid:11 
Ian Leckie, president of the teachers’ union the NZEI said there was no 
need to review the rules of religious instruction in public schools as the 
system was working. “I don’t think anybody intends this as a [religious] 
conversion; it’s more meeting a social need that is being asked for by the 
community” [. . .]. An Education Ministry spokesman said there were no 
plans to amend the legislation.12 
The current project intends to make a constructive contribution to this public debate. It does 
so by examining the views of parents, teachers, principals, BiS volunteers, and other key 
stakeholders, thus illuminating the different ways in which the programme was perceived in 
school contexts at the time of the research. It establishes an educational rationale for religion 
in education, beyond the invocation of an undefined “social need”. This forms the first part of 
my research rationale. 
Context of Law and Education 
In Appendix 1, I provide a timeline of the key events in law and education policy relating to 
religion in New Zealand’s primary schools. At the time of my research, 85% of young people in 
New Zealand attended an unaffiliated (secular) state-funded primary school.13 The Education 
Act of 1877 had established at Clause 84 (2) that teaching in state-funded primary schools 
would be “entirely of a secular character”.14 But the 1964 Education Act had brought a 
widespread system of voluntary religious instruction into education legislation: the “Nelson 
System”. Having been popularised in the Nelson region from the end of the 19th century, the 
Nelson system involved church volunteers going into primary schools to teach 
                                                                                                                                                                         
https://www.facebook.com/KeepReligionOutOfSchoolNZ/?fref=ts; SEN, “Secular Education Network 
Facebook Page”, Secular Education Network, accessed 11 March 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/211000182273935/?fref=ts; Dave Smyth, “Religious Education in 
N.Z. Schools”, accessed 11 March 2016, http://religiouseducation.co.nz/. 
11
 The NZEI was established in 1883 and is now the main education union. It campaigned for a national 
education system, national curriculum, national pay scale and pay parity across education sectors and 
improved working conditions for teachers: NZEI, “About Us: NZEI’s History”, NZEI, accessed 12 March 
2016, http://www.nzei.org.nz/NZEI/About-Us/Aboutus.aspx?&About_Us=7. 
12
 Marika Hill, “Christians Target Schools in 'Mission'“, Sunday Star Times, June 24 2012, accessed 25 
June 2012, http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/education/7159949/Christians-target-schools-in-mission. In 
this thesis I use square brackets and ellipses to indicate that some text or speech is missing from 
quotations, i.e., [. . .]. A word in square brackets, e.g. [and], indicates that the word is added and not in 
the original text. See below, page 59, for interview transcription conventions. 
13
 See below, Table 6Table 6, page 49. 
14
 The Education Act 1877, Clause 84, (2). Published electronically, Victoria University of Wellington 
library, accessed 20 May 2016, http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-Stout83-t11-body-d1.html.  
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undenominational religious instruction classes during the school day.15 Although the 
curriculum was still to be secular,16 Section 78 of the 1964 Act established that, at any time of 
day determined by the Head Teacher and School Committee: 
any class or classes at the school, or the school as a whole may be closed 
[. . .] for a period not exceeding thirty minutes for any class in any week for 
the purposes of religious instruction given by voluntary instructors [. . .] 
and of religious observances.17  
Section 79 established that attendance must be optional and that a parent might ask for their 
child to be withdrawn by making their wishes known in writing to the Head Teacher.18 The 
legislation placed the responsibility for deciding whether a school was to have religious 
instruction with the School Committee.19 The Private Schools Conditional Integration Act of 
1975 amended the 1964 Act to include Section 78A, giving the Minister of Education 
discretion to authorise additional religious instruction in a given school “up to such an amount 
and subject to such conditions as he thinks fit”.20 An additional amendment to Section 78 of 
the 1964 Act, made in 1983, gives provision for up to an hour a week of religious instruction 
but not exceeding 20 hours a year.21 In 2012, the Churches Education Commission (CEC), the 
main provider of religious instruction in state schools, stated that 712—over 40%—of New 
Zealand’s secular state primary schools were running BiS programmes.22  
The Private Schools Conditional Integration Act of 1975 entitled formerly private, church 
schools to integration into the state system and to state funding. Integrated schools were not 
constrained to a secular curriculum and could maintain the “special character” of their 
                                                          
15
 See below, page 79. 
16
 The Education Act 1964, Section 77. Published electronically, Parliamentary Counsel Office, New 
Zealand Government, accessed 20 May 2016, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1964/0135/latest/DLM357868.html. 
17
 Ibid., Section 78. The wording is changed to read “principals” and “school boards”, in place of “Head 
Teacher” and “School Committee” respectively, from 1989. 
18
 Ibid., Section 79.  
19
 But see below, page 93. 
20
 The Education Act 1964, Section 78A. 
21
 Education Amendment Act 1983, Section 11b. Published electronically, Parliamentary Counsel Office, 
New Zealand Government, accessed 20 May 2016, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1983/0057/latest/whole.html. Legislation does not specify 
that the instruction must be Christian. But see below, note 41, on page 202. See also page 206. 
22
 CEC, “Strategic Plan 2013-2015” (Auckland: Churches Education Commission, 2012). The CEC use the 
term CRE (Christian Religious Education) as a descriptor for their classes, but I found that schools 
preferred the term Bible-in-Schools. I use the abbreviation BiS in this thesis. The CEC replaced the NZ 
Council for Christian Education in 1973 as provider of chaplains and religious instruction classes. 
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religious or ideological affiliation.23 Parents must consent to their children participating “in the 
general school programme that gives the school its special character”.24 However, an opt-out 
clause was included:  
[The] school shall be responsive to the sensitivities of pupils and parents of 
different religious or philosophical affiliations, and shall not require any 
such pupil to participate in religious observances and religious instruction 
concerned with particular observances if the parents of that pupil state at 
any time that they do not wish that pupil so to participate.25 
11.5% of New Zealand children attended an integrated school at the time of my research.26  
These statutes and amendments comprise the explicit legislation governing religious 
instruction in New Zealand primary schools. However, later changes to school administration 
appear to have made implicit changes to the ability of secular state schools to promote a 
religious worldview, including religious instruction and observances. The Education Act of 
1989 made provision for Kura Kaupapa Māori schools, designed to provide Māori language 
immersion and culturally responsive curriculum and pedagogy. These included promotion of 
cultural and spiritual beliefs and karakia or prayer.27 Just over 2% of the total school 
population received a Māori-medium education.28 The same legislation permitted the 
establishment of schools with designated character, which may be religious.29 Significantly for 
this project, the 1989 legislation also appears to allow secular state schools to adopt a special 
religious character if stated in the school’s charter.30  
The 1999 curriculum for Health and Physical Education included a Māori model of health. The 
inclusion of a spiritual dimension—taha wairua—has been used to justify a number of 
religious practices in the classroom.31 In 2013 charter schools, known as partnership schools, 
                                                          
23
 The Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, Section 4 (1), 31, 32 (1). Published 
electronically, Parliamentary Counsel Office, New Zealand Government, accessed 20 May 2016, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1975/0129/latest/DLM437347.html.  
24
 Ibid., Section 30. 
25
 Ibid., Section 32 (2). 
26
 See below, Table 6, page 49. These are mostly Catholic but also include a range of other affiliations. 
27
 The Education Act 1989, Section 155. Published electronically, Parliamentary Counsel Office, New 
Zealand Government, accessed 20 May 2016, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0080/latest/DLM175959.html. Karakia are prayers or 
blessings spoken in the Māori language. 
28
 MOE, “Education Counts: Māori Language in Education”, NZ Government, accessed 23 February 2016, 
http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/Māori-education/Māori-in-schooling/6040. 
29
 The Education Act 1989, Section 156.  
30
 Ibid., Section 61 (3) (b) (iii). See below, pages 95, 134, 221. 
31
 MOE, “Health and Physical Education in the New Zealand Curriculum” (Wellington: Learning Media, 
1999), 31. See below, page 99. 
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entered the legislation with the passing of the Education Amendment Act.32 These are state-
funded but do not have to follow the national curriculum. Secular requirements appear to be 
lifted for sponsors with religious affiliations.33 In 2015 there were nine partnership schools, 
serving around 800 pupils or 0.1 % of the school population.34 Around 0.7 % of children were 
home-schooled, many for religious reasons.35 Just under 5% of young people attended a 
private school, 64% of which had a religious affiliation.36  
There was no de jure prohibition on teaching about religions and beliefs in New Zealand 
schools. A Royal Commission on Education—The Currie Review—in 1962 affirmed that “a 
natural, unembarrassed reference to religion and religious history [should] be possible for 
teachers by including mention of religion in appropriate parts of syllabuses”.37 However, as I 
discuss below, a degree of social consensus that the legal construct of school closure effected 
a de facto prohibition on the discussion of religion in school was in evidence.38  
Although Catholic schools taught a “world religions” unit in Year 12, few secular schools 
covered this material. For example, only 1% of 4490 secondary school students who took 
National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) level two Religious Studies unit 90823 
in 2011—the only unit to have a comparative element—were enrolled in secular schools.39 
This is in contrast to the situation in England and Wales where the Religious Studies General 
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 Education Amendment Act 2013, Part 12A. Published electronically, Parliamentary Counsel Office, 
New Zealand Government, accessed 29 May 2016, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0034/latest/DLM4807405.html.  
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 Ibid., Section 158 B (3) (f). 
34
 Information derived from: MOE, “Education Counts: Number of Schools”, NZ Government, accessed 
24 February 2016, 
https://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/schooling/number-of-schools.  
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 M.O.E, “Homeschooling Review” (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2014), 3. See also MOE, 
“Education Counts: Homeschooling”, NZ Government, accessed 24 February 2016, 
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1962), 687.  
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Certificate of Education (GCSE) is widely accessed across the range of school provision.40 While 
there was evident state support for the provision of religious instruction to children in secular, 
integrated, private and home educational settings, there was little outward evidence of 
support for education in religions and beliefs. But there was no research available to verify 
this supposition, as I show below.  
From the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, New Zealand—
along with other Western democratic nation states—has enacted a series of legislative 
measures which seek to ensure the equal rights of its citizens, most notably the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. There are a number of significant 
human rights instruments pertaining to religion in school, for example, Article 14 of UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), 1989: 
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.  
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, 
when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the 
exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child. 41 
At Article 29 paragraph 1.4 of the UNCRC, States Parties agree that a child’s education should 
include “the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of the sexes, and friendship among all peoples, 
national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin”.42 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Section 13 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions 
without interference.” And Section 19 (1): “Everyone has the right to freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993.” 43 But Section 
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the 1944 Education Act. 
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 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Sections 13, 19 (1). Published electronically, Parliamentary 
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Four of the Bill of Rights Act makes it clear that human rights legislation does not override 
existing statute.44  
From my “outsider’s” perspective there was a clear disjunction between human rights 
legislation safeguarding freedom of religions and beliefs, the absence of education in religions 
and beliefs and the accommodation of Christian religious instruction in secular state schools. 
This thesis, therefore, considers the relationship between the human rights of children and 
parents, between Christians and those of other worldviews, and the consequences of these 
competing rights for policy on religion in education. This forms the second part of my research 
rationale. 
Cultural and Religious Context 
Māori make up around 14% of the population of New Zealand.45 New Zealand was colonised 
by the British following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, by representatives of the Crown 
and Māori leaders, in 1840.46 Early years of settlement were characterised by abuses of the 
Treaty by the colonisers regarding land, fishing and forestry rights culminating in land wars 
through the 1860s. In 1877 the Treaty was declared a “nullity” by the Chief Justice, on the 
grounds that it could not be recognised in court, having never been part of the legislation.47 By 
the end of the 19th century, due to both rapid immigration and deleterious government policy, 
the Māori population had diminished from 13% of the population in 1874 to 5% in 1901.48 The 
colony, meanwhile, expanded into land which had often been unscrupulously confiscated or 
unfairly purchased.49 The early 20th century saw native land boards authorised to advance 
money to enable some Māori to purchase and develop farm land. Native schools, originally 
established to “civilise” Māori and teach them English, now sought to make Māori children 
“good farmers and good farmers’ wives”.50 The native schools were brought into local 
education board control, with the aim of integrating, and improving educational opportunities 
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The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, Section 4 (a) (b). See Table 11, page 128 and Table 14, page 144, 
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 SNZ, “Māori census night and usually resident populations, 1911-2013”, Statistics New Zealand, 
accesed 25 February 2016, http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-
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from Cook’s first landing in 1769. See Claudia Orange, The Story of a Treaty (Wellington: Bridget 
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 Cited by Orange, Story of a Treaty: 59. 
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 Ibid., 44-56. 
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for Māori, between 1955-69.51 The urbanisation of Māori communities during the 1960s and 
economic downturn of the 1970s, during which Māori were increasingly marginalised, led to a 
radicalisation of the youth and a period of activism over land rights.52 Dame Whina Cooper’s 
1975 hikoi—a march of 5,000 people delivering a petition signed by 60,000—exemplifies the 
mood of the time. 53 The wider community became increasingly aware of the ongoing effects 
of colonisation on Māori and The Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal was established, in 1975, in 
order for Māori to bring land claims.54 Public policy specialist David Bromell has described how 
ongoing appeals for justice from Māori obtained a new poignancy in the early 1980s when 
liberal New Zealanders were embroiled in international racial politics:  
Following the South African Springbok rugby tour of 1981, Māori activists 
challenged White liberals (myself included) to demonstrate the same 
commitment to racial justice in New Zealand as we had demonstrated to 
the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa.55 
The 1980s saw a Māori renaissance or resurgence in New Zealand, with the introduction of an 
unofficial policy of state biculturalism which sought to restore respect for Māori as tangata 
whenua: the people of the land. It aimed to create a power-sharing partnership between 
Māori and the Crown, and address problems of representation at an institutional level. 
Although biculturalism was never enshrined in law, a wholesale reform of social policy and 
state sector ensued. State departments were given Māori names, te reo Māori was made an 
official language, Treaty principles would inform public policy,56 and many Māori traditions 
such as powhiri (welcomes), poroporoaki (farewells), and karakia (prayers) began to be 
performed at public functions. Māori vocabulary and concepts have become commonplace in 
official documents, policy, and in everyday language. Biculturalism is embedded within the 
New Zealand Curriculum so that “Māori and Pākehā [New Zealanders of European ethnicity] 
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recognise each other as full Treaty partners . . . [and] have the opportunity to acquire 
knowledge of te reo Māori me ōna tikanga [Māori language and culture]”.57 
As a consequence of this colonisation, New Zealand is a country with manifest British and 
Christian cultural origins. This is reflected in the predominance of Christianity in religious 
adherence, the adoption of the Christian calendar and festivals, the National Anthem, 
predominance of Christian places of worship, and the Christian foundation of many schools 
and institutions. It is also reflected in prevalent Western canons of literature, art, and music 
which often draw heavily on themes from the Christian narrative. Christianity is undisputedly 
a dominant cultural referent in New Zealand alongside, and often combined with, Māori 
culture.58 Cultural homogeneity had been a feature of New Zealand society cultivated by 
White New Zealand policies beginning in the 19th Century.59 While Chinese immigration 
flourished during the gold rush period in the 1860s, the New Zealand government was 
generally reluctant to allow non-British immigrants to settle in the colony. The 1920 
Immigration Amendment Bill continued to discourage immigration of non-Britons and 
between 1945 and 1971 of 90,082 new migrants, 76,673 were from Great Britain and 
Ireland.60 
The Immigration Act of 1987 represented a sea-change in policy, bringing increased 
immigration from Pacific Islanders and the Asian countries in particular. Such changes have 
radically altered the cultural landscape in many parts of New Zealand. The 2013 census 
indicated that over a million New Zealanders, a quarter of the population, were born 
overseas.61 Table 1 shows changes in residents’ places of birth, with the figures for China 
multiplying by 20, India by ten and Fiji by eight times between 1981 and 2013.62 This 
immigration is unevenly distributed with 39% of the population of Auckland region born 
overseas, compared to 10% in the Southland region. In Auckland region, where one-third 
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3.0 New Zealand licence. 
12 
 
(33.4%) of New Zealand’s entire population reside, 22% of the population identify as having 
Asian ethnicity, and 14% identify as Pacific Islanders.63 
Table 1: New Zealanders' Overseas Birthplaces 
 
These changes to immigration policy, along with increased secularisation, have radically 
altered the religious demography of New Zealand.64 While Christianity is still the dominant 
religious affiliation, Anglicans are no longer the largest denomination.65 Catholics now make 
up the largest Christian group, of whom over 12% identify as Asian and over 10% with Pacific 
Island ethnicity. But it is the rapid growth of religions other than Christianity which is of 
particular relevance to this thesis rationale. As Figure 2 indicates, the number of people who 
were affiliated to the Sikh religion doubled between 2006 and 2013. In the same period, those 
affiliating to Hinduism grew by almost 40% and those identifying as Muslims increased by 
29%. In the period between 1991 to 2013, Buddhist affiliation multiplied by four-and-a-half 
times. In all these cases the relative youth (and therefore reproductive capacity) of the 
immigrant population may be seen to have contributed to this growth.66  
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Figure 2: Growth of Different Religious Affiliations 
It may be argued that this new religious diversity represents a small percentage of overall 
religious affiliation, is not evenly spread across New Zealand, and that some rural areas 
remain relatively unaffected. But of relevance to this rationale is the fact that 65% of New 
Zealand’s population live in the cities. These are the areas which attract most new immigrants 
and which are therefore most religiously diverse.67 The cities are, in fact, where the majority 
of New Zealand’s children live.68 At the same time, New Zealand is becoming increasingly 
secular. A relatively high percentage of the population, 39%, state that they have no religious 
affiliation. For the first time since the founding of the colony, the census indicates that less 
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1991 1996 2001 2006 2013 
Sikh 2061 2817 5196 9507 19191 
Jewish 3126 4809 6636 6858 6867 
Spiritualism and New Age 5196 9786 16062 19800 18285 
Muslim 6096 13545 23637 36072 46149 
Buddhist 12762 28131 41634 52362 58404 































Figure 3: Religious Affiliation Overview 2013 
These four areas—Māori culture, Christian heritage, the newly visible religious diversity and 
increasing secularity— are the key characteristics of the New Zealand cultural and religious 
context. While Māori culture was promoted and Christian religious instruction was 
accommodated within the education system, other religions and worldviews were not 
explicitly represented in curricula. An absence of education policy or curriculum guidelines 
concerning religious diversity indicated that the integration of religious communities into New 
Zealand schools, and perhaps wider society, was an under-theorised area. The gap between 
immigration policy and education policy seemed evident from my “outsider” perspective. 
Therefore an important focus of this thesis, comprising the third part of my research rationale, 
has been to examine the educational treatment of matters of culture, heritage, belief and 
unbelief in New Zealand’s primary schools. While I recognise that these matters are of great 
sensitivity, it has been important to apply the same critical lens to all four areas because each 
may be shown to impact on the treatment of religious belief within the curriculum. 
 According to the Churches Education Commission policy, “the Christian faith, the Bible and 
the life and teachings of Jesus” were the “most appropriate” aspects of religious education to 
the children of New Zealand.70 This contestable claim seemed an extraordinary basis for 
curriculum policy in a country whose children were increasingly religiously diverse and 
growing up alongside others of varied religious and secular backgrounds. I discuss below the 
implied suggestion that BiS meets a “social need” by serving school communities with high 
levels of Christian belief.  
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Table 2: Regional Religious Affiliation and BiS Coverage 
Ian Leckie’s assertion that BiS meets a “social need” in schools and communities is contestable 
through a comparison of the census statistics for regional religious affiliation with the regional 
figures for school participation in BiS. The premise of Leckie’s statement is that participation in 
BiS is predicated on the religious affiliation of parents. Table 2 shows a comparison of the 
regional religious affiliation, based on 2006 census data, and the CEC’s 2010 data for regional 
BiS coverage.71 It will be noted that the most religiously diverse region, Auckland, had the 
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 Percentages calculated from: SNZ, “Quickstats about Culture and Identity”, Sheet 33, Statistics New 
Zealand, accessed 18 June 2012, 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2006CensusHomePage/QuickStats/quickstats-about-a-
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schools in region 
with CEC-led BiS 
class 
Auckland 9.14 49.89 29.90 11 
Wellington 5.31 51.33 33.94 19 
Waikato 3.60 50.68 33.82 57 
Canterbury and 
West Coast 
2.84 54.40 34.31 43 
BOP (Tauranga) 2.71 53.40 32.10 28 
Nelson and 
Tasman 
2.69 45.36 40.86 29 
Otago 2.62 51.08 36.43 46 
Manawatu 2.53 54.89 31.73 63 
Hawke’s Bay  2.42 57.43 29.30 30 
Northland 2.03 51.83 30.58 46 
Gisborne 1.92 67.13 26.79 55 
Taranaki 1.89 53.48 31.93 30 
Marlborough 1.83 54.26 32.42 33 
Southland 1.30 58.14 31.25 66 
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lowest percentage of BiS classes and the least religiously diverse region, Southland, the 
highest percentage of BiS. This supports a hypothesis that the programme is perceived to be 
more appropriate in less religiously diverse regions and that the “social need” for BiS 
diminishes with increased religious diversity. However, the picture is more complicated and it 
is difficult to demonstrate a direct correlation between religious affiliation and participation in 
BiS. For example, Waikato has one of the higher percentages of religious diversity and a very 
high coverage of BiS. Nelson and Tasman have by far the highest affiliation to “no religion” but 
not the lowest percentage of BiS. Gisborne has the highest Christian affiliation, but not the 
highest BiS participation.  
The CEC did not release figures for national coverage after the SEN began their media 
campaign. However, figures obtained in 2016 , shown in Table 3 below, reveal surprising 
changes in the percentages of schools with BiS programmes since the campaign began.72 It will 
be noted that nationally there was an 11% drop in school participation in BiS over a six-year 
period. In some areas, such as Marlborough and Northland, the CEC appears to have lost over 
half of its participating schools. Yet in Auckland , the base of the SEN and focus of much of the 
campaign on the ground, there has been an enormous rise in participation. Wellington also 
bucks the national trend, with a small increase in participation. If school participation was 
solely predicated on social need one might expect to find census data reflecting a dramatic 
decrease in Christian affiliation in Marlborough and Northland, a large increase in Auckland 
and a modest increase in Wellington. However, in Marlborough there is a relatively small 
decrease of 7% (the national average decrease), from 54% to 47%, in Christian affiliation 
between 2006-2013. Similarly, in Northland there is a decrease from around 52% to 45% 
affiliation to Christian belief, in line with the national average. Christian affiliation in the 
Auckland region has not increased but decreased, from around 50% to 44%. And in Wellington 
a decrease in Christian affiliation, in line with the national average, is also recorded from 51% 
to 44%.73 
                                                                                                                                                                         
School Communities with Excellence. Christian Religious Education and Chaplaincy in N.Z. State 
Schools” (Wellington: Churches Education Commission, 2010), 13. 
72
 Figures for 2010 derived from CEC, “2009/2010 Annual Review”, 13. Unpublished CEC Figures for 
2016 were provided to Michael Grimshaw and supplied to the author in a personal communication. 
73
 Statistics derived from SNS, “Quickstats”. 
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Table 3: Comparison of CEC data 2010-2016 
 
It is possible that the sometimes vitriolic nature of the SEN campaign against the CEC and BiS 
has prompted parents, principals and boards in Auckland to defend what has been seen as a 
“public good” and to ensure its survival by requesting the programme in their school.74 
Increased publicity for the CEC may also have been an unintended consequence of the SEN 
campaign. An additional reason for the rapid increase may be an increase in immigration into 
the Auckland region from ethnic groups with high Christian affiliation after 2013. This cannot 
be statistically evidenced until the after census of 2018. 
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In terms of my thesis rationale, the apparent conflicts between the regional religious 
affiliation data and CEC data led me to further question the legitimacy of BiS as a programme 
premised on social need. The data suggest that parental Christian affiliation may be just one of 
many factors which impact on the way BiS is maintained and reproduced in New Zealand’s 
primary schools. The need to explore the imperatives and constraints which maintain the 
status quo of BiS forms the fourth part of my research rationale. The data on religious 
affiliation in Table 2 supplied me with two distinct research contexts i.e., Auckland and 
Southland: the most and least religiously diverse regions of New Zealand.75 
Research Literature Context 
Views expressed about religion in schools, in newspaper reports, letters pages, on-line parent 
forums and blogs were strongly held and defended. But closer examination of these 
perspectives revealed that assumptions about current practices differed markedly. It seemed 
to me that discussions about religion in school were frequently at cross purposes. BiS was 
supported on often widely differing and contradictory grounds. The terms religious education, 
religious studies, religious instruction and Christian education were used interchangeably in 
social contexts and this was reflected in newspaper reports of the SEN campaign.76Social 
research academics Philip Gendall and Benjamin Healey conducted the most recent research 
on attitudes towards religion in schools as part of The International Social Survey Programme 
based at Massey University, in 2008, as shown in Table 4.77 
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Table 4: ISSP 2008 Data on Religious Education in Schools 
 
It was clear to me that, in the New Zealand context, definitions of the kind used in Table 4 
could not be assumed to have fixed and stable meanings. Conceivably, while one person might 
support “Christian education” in the school curriculum if the teaching was non-confessional, 
another might support it because they wanted their children to have Christian formation 
classes at school. “Introducing religion” might be defined as a non-confessional approach to 
religions and beliefs but, in this New Zealand context, the separation of religion from the 
secular curriculum meant that a confessional stance, led by volunteers, was often presumed.78 
This would change the meaning and participant response completely. Without further 
definitions of the descriptors in the table, the data above may not be reliable and the 
conclusions drawn by the authors seemed questionable: 
[M]ost respondents (60%) would prefer children to have some religious 
education in state primary schools, and half would support some religious 
education in state secondary schools. Among those who support some 
form of curriculum-based religious education in schools, strongest support 
is for teaching about all faiths, not just Christianity [. . .].Thus, while there is 
relatively little support for purely Christian education in state schools, 
there is quite widespread support for children to be taught about religion 
in our schools.79 
An alternative reading of these data is that there was more support for Christian teaching—
combining the figures for voluntary instruction and Christian teaching within the curriculum 
(31%)—than teaching about a variety of religions in school. And this figure is equal to those 
who would rather religion was not dealt with at all at primary school. In other words while just 
less than a third (29%) considered it was important for children to learn about a variety of 
religions in school, almost two thirds did not. This is a rather different conclusion to that 
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drawn by the authors above.80 Equally, at secondary level, only just over one-third of 
participants supported the introduction of religious studies. It is certainly an overstatement to 
suggest that there was “widespread support” for children to be taught about religions at 
either phase of education based on the ISSP data. The Church Life Survey of 1997 had used 
similar terminology to survey this question among church congregations and thus presented 
the same interpretative difficulties.81 
My initial literature search indicated that, while attitudes were certainly being surveyed, the 
data raised as many questions as they provided answers to New Zealanders’ perspectives on 
religion in school. An absence of any consensus around terminology made the assertion that 
BiS met a “social need” problematic. What was needed was a research approach which would 
examine the reasons people gave for supporting or dismissing different policies, in order to 
more fully understand and explain current practice. As I explain in Chapter Three below, this 
precluded a large scale quantitative study and necessitated a more in-depth comparative 
approach.82 A thorough analysis of perspectives on religion in school would identify the 
educational and social issues at stake and provide a vocabulary for future discussion. This 
forms the fifth aspect of my research rationale. 
A further problem, in relation to examining attitudes about religion in school, was the absence 
of information about current practices. Teaching materials for BiS were not publicly available: 
to order them one had to be a registered volunteer attached to a school. While anecdotes 
about BiS were plentiful, there was little research evidence about the programme. However, 
the Biblos research project, funded by The Bible Society, took place in 2006.83 42% of children 
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in the study could not identify one story or passage from the Bible.84 57% of the Year 12 
children could not describe any aspects of modern life that had been influenced by the Bible.85 
Other concerns were that children did not recognise the vocabulary differentiating the 
religious traditions, did not understand the word “worship” and found 39 different ways to 
spell the name of Jesus.86 The research raised questions about the efficacy of the CEC’s 
programme and about the religious literacy of both primary and secondary school pupils in 
New Zealand.87 Religious literacy may be variously defined, but in this thesis I follow a 
definition supplied by Andrew Wright, a critical realist and academic in the field of religious 
education in the United Kingdom: “the ability to take part in an informed, critical, sensitive 
and ideologically aware conversation about the nature of ultimate reality and of their 
relationships to this reality”.88 
There appeared to be no education theses or empirical research on teaching about religions 
and beliefs in New Zealand’ schools, aside from a College of Education thesis written in 1977.89 
The subject of religion in the curriculum appeared to have been overlooked as a research 
focus.90 The research on the teaching of spirituality in the curriculum in primary schools had 
given little consideration to how this might involve teaching about religions and beliefs.91 
There was no obtainable information about what children were being taught about religions 
and beliefs either in BiS lessons, social studies or in spiritual education. An important aspect of 
my research project—comprising the sixth element of my research rationale—would be to 
undertake fieldwork within the school environment, in order to investigate contemporary 
perspectives, policy and practices regarding religion in primary schools.  
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Summary of Research 
I devised an initial research question which would allow me to examine these broad issues: 
1. Is New Zealand’s cultural and religious diversity influencing the practice of, and 
attitudes toward, teaching about religion and spirituality in state and integrated 
primary schools? 
The qualitative approach necessitated an in-depth comparative study in place of a wide-based 
study of school practices in areas of high diversity. I recruited a pilot study school in Dunedin, 
three case study schools in Auckland and three in Southland. I interviewed parents, teachers, 
principals and BiS volunteers, observed BiS lessons, examined school policy documents and 
photographed relevant classroom displays. I examined curriculum materials for BiS and 
Catholic religious education provided by case study schools. In addition, I arranged to 
interview key stakeholders and other participants with relevant perspectives.  
Answering the Research Question and Reframing the Research Focus 
To answer my initial research question, case study and interview data indicated that the 
curriculum and pedagogy of neither BiS, nor religious instruction in Catholic integrated 
schools, was amended for religiously diverse contexts. Christian confessional instruction was 
deemed appropriate for all children present in both Auckland and Southland, regardless of 
religious affiliation, because their parents had not withdrawn them from BiS, or had enrolled 
them in a Catholic school. Additionally, education about religions and beliefs was disqualified 
as an appropriate area of study in both regions. In this regard, the research question is 
answered in the negative. However, research participants in both areas cited increased 
diversity as an additional reason not to treat matters of religion and belief as matters of 
substantive inquiry, but to promote tolerance as a more appropriate focus. Curriculum 
imperatives around the management of increased diversity appeared to limit opportunities for 
young people to acquire knowledge and discernment in matters of religion. An affirmative 
answer may therefore be given to the research question. More detailed research summaries 
are provided in Appendices Three and Four.  
As I describe in Chapter Three below, this ambivalent answer to my initial question prompted 
two further research questions to which the thesis is addressed: 
2. What are the key discursive and institutional constraints which maintain current 
arrangements for voluntary religious instruction and restrict curriculum development 
in the area of religion and beliefs? 
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3. Is there an alternative to current practices consistent with New Zealand’s status as a 
secular, bicultural and religiously plural liberal democracy? 
In answer to these questions, the thesis identifies nine primary and six secondary discourses 
and evidences the ways in which they have impacted, and continue to influence, the subject 
of religion in New Zealand’s primary schools.92 In response to the discursive and material 
constraints identified, and in conversation with the secondary literature, the thesis offers 
critical liberal criteria for education about religion and beliefs in plural democracies,93 and 
proposes critical education in religions and worldviews for the New Zealand educational 
context.94 While the fieldwork is focussed on primary school practice, the examination of 
policy and curriculum documents relating to both stages of education suggests that the same 
discursive constraints operate at secondary school level. For this reason I do not confine my 
conclusions and recommendations to the primary school stage. 
Analysis of Research Data and Source Material 
The assessment of policy, practices and perceptions became the starting point for an iterative 
analysis across interview data, primary source material and secondary literature. Adopting a 
critical realist approach to Foucaultian discourse analysis, I have identified a range of 
discursive, material, institutional and embodied constraints which appear to frame discussion 
on religion in schools in the New Zealand context. In a Foucaultian genealogical survey of 
primary sources, I show how these contingent and historically situated discourses have 
operated to construct the secular curriculum as “nothing to do with religion” (and therefore 
educationally progressive) and confessional religious instruction outside the curriculum as 
“culturally responsive” (and therefore educationally progressive). I show how a specific form 
of secular (neo)-liberal governmentality appeared to limit treatment of religion in the 
curriculum to that which was uncontroversial and, concurrently, to promote BiS as universally 
appropriate liberal values teaching.  
Theorising Education in Religions and Beliefs for the New Zealand Context 
My literature search indicated that practices, policies and legislation regarding religion in 
school had not been the subject of theorisation by New Zealand’s educationalists. My 
research suggests that this has left children exposed to the contingent and conflicting 
discursive imperatives of BiS volunteers, boards of trustees, principals, teachers and 
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governmental interests. These actors always operated in the perceived best interests of the 
child and this research does not seek to lay blame or criticism at the door of hardworking 
education professionals or volunteers. The critique is of the dominant discourses informing 
policy, practice and legislation and constraining the involvement of either the Ministry or 
educationalists in the development of guidelines for the treatment of religion in primary 
schools.95 In order to address these issues I have drawn on Michel Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality, William Galston’s liberal diversity theory, Michael Young’s social theory of 
“powerful knowledge” and Andrew Wright’s conception of critical religious education. Armed 
with this theoretical toolkit I develop a critical realist and egalitarian liberal critique of the 
dominant discursive imperatives operating to constrain development of a curriculum in 
religions and beliefs. Concurrently, I make a case for critical education in religions and 
worldviews in New Zealand schools. 
Distinctive Contribution 
This research makes four distinct contributions to research policy and practice in the New 
Zealand educational context. Firstly, it examines current practices and policies regarding 
treatment of religion in New Zealand primary schools. It therefore provides a new window 
into religious instruction in BiS classes, Catholic religious education and the treatment of 
religion within the broader primary school curriculum. Observations made during case study 
fieldwork and interviews with key stakeholders raise significant questions about current 
arrangements and make an important contribution to future policy formation in this 
contested educational field. Secondly, the research seeks to explain how the current situation 
regarding religion in primary school has arisen and is discursively maintained. The insights 
challenge the apparent immutability of current practices, opening up a wider range of policy 
choices for curriculum planners. Thirdly, the research makes a contribution to a theory of 
education in religions and beliefs within the New Zealand context. I develop a rationale for a 
critical education in religions and worldviews which applies across all levels of schooling. 
Finally, the research makes clear recommendations regarding current practices, policies and 
legislation which could contribute to any future review of either voluntary religious instruction 
or the content of the New Zealand Curriculum. 
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The structure is designed to lead the reader through the process of research, data collection, 
analysis and theorising in which I have been engaged. However this process has not been 
linear, but iterative. So while my data report chapters are situated at the end of the thesis it 
will be evident that the data, and my quest for an explanation for the initial findings, inform 
the choice of methodology, analysis and theory which appear to precede them.  
In Chapter One, I have introduced the focus and rationale for the current research. I have 
provided contextual information, a summary of the research process and an indication of the 
contribution the research makes to the field. In Chapter Two, focussed on methodology, I 
describe the epistemological standpoint of social constructionism, the theoretical perspective 
of critical realism and the methodology of Foucaultian discourse analysis adopted in the 
thesis. Chapter Three describes the research methods by which I recruited my case study 
schools and conducted interviews. In Chapter Four I provide a summary of primary and 
secondary discourses which appear to influence the treatment of religion in New Zealand 
schools. I then offer a genealogical survey of key primary source material pertaining to 
legislation and education policy regarding religion, values, spirituality and cultural diversity. 
Chapter Five—a review and critique of the literature—introduces the theorists whose work 
informs my analysis of current policy and practice. I provide a tabular summary of New 
Zealand and international literature which exemplifies the discourses previously discussed. I 
demonstrate how my applied theory destabilises and problematises dominant discursive 
imperatives constraining the development of religion in schools. Chapters Six and Seven 
constitute my data report. In Chapter Six, I describe the religious instruction practices 
observed in case study schools, and explain how these practices were discursively maintained 
and reproduced. In Chapter Seven, I examine the ways in which education in religions and 
beliefs was disqualified in the case study schools and by key stakeholders. I also describe the 
way that discursive imperatives around the management of diversity appeared to promote a 
particular form of secular (neo)-liberal religious worldview in this context. I critique these 
practices from the critical realist, egalitarian liberal and Foucaultian perspectives previously 
outlined. In Chapter Eight, I present my conclusions and recommendations. The appendices 




Chapter Two: Methodology 
Introduction 
In our educational institution, what (and whose) view of the world are we 
giving to students? Who is benefitting? Who is harmed? What knowledge 
about the world is absent, subjugated, disqualified? Why? [. . .] What else 
could we do here? Is our ability to imagine what else we might do itself 




In Chapter One, I stated that New Zealand primary school children do not routinely learn 
about religions and beliefs but that, in 2012, 41% of state schools provided Christian 
instruction. This is a situation which would be almost inconceivable within the state education 
system which has evolved in England and Wales. The question arises: how does one account 
for such widely differing policies and practices in the field of religious education? How can 
Christian religious instruction in state schools be perceived as a “social need” in one Western 
democratic society and an “inappropriate exercise of power” in another?2 How can one 
explain that, in New Zealand, education in religions and beliefs is conceived as unnecessary 
whereas, in England and Wales, it is considered an educational “entitlement”?3 Such questions 
necessitate a methodological approach which takes account of the way educational practices 
are either legitimised or discredited: an approach which permits analysis of rationalisation 
processes and institutional imperatives. 
French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault (1926-1984) examined the ways in 
which knowledge and power are combined within discourse to create “regimes of truth”. He 
described how some forms of knowledge obtain validity and are normalised, while others are 
disqualified.4 In this chapter I outline the social constructionist epistemology, critical realist 
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theoretical perspective and methodology of Foucaultian discourse analysis upon which this 
thesis is based.5 
Discourse Theory 
Foucault employs the term discourse in his two works of “archaeology”: The Order of Things 
and The Archaeology of Knowledge.6 Foucault explains that, in all forms of social interaction, a 
system of unwritten but definable rules delineates that which may or may not be said, or 
thought, at any given time. These rules may be evidenced within the justifications and 
rationalisations given for social policy and practice, for “‘practices’ don’t exist without a 
certain regime of rationality”.7 Foucault identifies two ways in which a regime of rationality 
may be analysed: “On the one hand, that of codification/prescription (how it forms an 
ensemble of rules, procedures, means to an end etc.), and on the other, that of true or false 
formulation (how it determines a domain of objects about which it is possible to articulate 
true or false propositions).”8 
On this basis it is possible to observe discourses at work in the New Zealand educational 
context by identifying the ways in which “objects” such as religious education or the secular 
curriculum are defined and the kind of statements of fact, or judgements of value, which are 
produced in relation to them. Equally the concomitant rules, policies and practices which are 
advocated, justified and rationalised in relation to these objects, may be observed and 
analysed.  
Discourses, Foucault asserts, are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak”.9 Dominant discourses shape our understanding of the world and frame the ways in 
which society operates. Thus they define what is conceivable and inconceivable within specific 
social contexts. I show in this thesis how dominant discourses set the terms of debates about 
religion in education in New Zealand and constrain pedagogical possibilities in this area. 
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American sociolinguistic academic, James Gee, identifies two kinds of discourse through which 
individuals operate in society.10 He describes a primary discourse defined as the “taken for 
granted understandings of who we [‘people like us’] are, as well as what sort of things we [. . .] 
do, value, and believe”. He then suggests that within the wider context of local and national 
institutions, we encounter a wide range of secondary discourses which we may either acquire 
and utilise or resist. These may cause us to adopt values which are in conflict with other 
discourses to which we subscribe.11 I adopt Gee’s modification of Foucault’s conception of 
discourse in this thesis because my analysis indicates that interviewees frequently draw upon 
secondary educational discourses in support of a position on religion in schools which is 
premised upon a primary discourse. They also express contradictory views as they shift 
between discursive frameworks. 
Knowledge/Power 
In his “genealogical” works Foucault demonstrates how knowledge and power are bound up 
in discourse.12 Some versions of truth or reality are valued and become normative, and others 
are subjugated. But power is emphatically not held only by one group in society. It is at work 
at every level, contesting, resisting, asserting and constraining what constitutes knowledge at 
a given time: “[P]ower-knowledge, the processes and struggles [. . .] of which it is made up, 
[. . .] determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.”13 
The “possible domains of knowledge” are those which are validated and have currency within 
a given time, place and discourse. These are the normative truths about which one may think 
and speak. Foucault shows how institutions and social practices reflect these “normalised” 
versions of reality.14 Policies, practices and forms of knowledge obtain a commonsense quality 
when they conform to the prevailing regime of truth. Foucault sought to problematise notions 
of normality, attempting through genealogical analysis to show that normative truths only 
become so as a matter of contingency. Other versions of reality, truth and knowledge have 
always been possible through alternative discourses which contest and resist dominant 
discursive formulations. His interest was in the “subjugated knowledges” which are 
“disqualified” by prevailing discourses and in the unintended outcomes that might result from 
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the privileging of discourses in institutions.
15
 These conceptions of discourse, power and 
knowledge are fundamental to Foucaultian social constructionist critique and are central to 
my research methodology.  
Governmentality 
Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” emphasises the “disciplinary techniques” which 
individuals, institutions and nation states employ in order to reproduce social behaviour, 
practice and policy.16 The persuasive power of discourse is employed at every level of social 
interaction to either constrain or afford possibilities for action. Foucault describes the 
contradictions of the liberal nation state which, at one level, promotes freedom to live 
without interference from the state, but at another must monitor, regulate and amend the 
behaviour of citizens in order to reproduce behaviours conducive to the furtherance of the 
interests of the nation state.17 These forms of governmentality may be tyrannical and 
oppressive but, alternatively, may have positive outcomes and effects. The mark of an illiberal 
governmentality is its resistance to self-critique and modification: 
The important question here [. . .] is [. . .] whether the system of 
constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to 
transform the system [. . .]. [A] system of constraint becomes truly 
intolerable when the individuals who are affected by it don’t have the 
means of modifying it.18 
 For Foucault, liberalism is: 
a tool for criticising the reality: (1) of a previous governmentality that one 
tries to shed; (2) of a current governmentality that one attempts to reform 
and rationalise by stripping it down; (3) of a governmentality that one 
opposes and whose abuses one tries to limit.19 
However, he recognises that liberalism may be perceived both “as a regulative scheme of 
governmental practice and as the theme of sometimes radical opposition”.20 Foucault 
provides conceptual and methodological tools which I employ in my critique of the social 
construction of religion in New Zealand’s primary schools. While Foucault’s work has been 
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foundational for post-modern and post-structuralist thought, scholars debate the implications 
of social constructionism for social research.21  
Realism and Relativism 
Foucault’s social constructionism problematises notions of truth and reality: “Truth is a thing 
of this world [. . .]. Each society has its own regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that 
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Foucault here appears to exemplify an extreme relativist or perspectivist position.23 Reality, or 
truth, is entirely constructed and has no existence beyond meanings inscribed within 
discourse. Some post-modernists have argued that social constructionism must, on moral 
grounds, entail denial of material reality and the espousal of ontological relativism.24 Others 
have insisted that the question of material reality is bracketed out by social constructionism, 
having little relevance for social research.25 Foucault refutes claims that he denies the reality 
of phenomena.26 On the contrary, his approach provides an account of the way in which social 
reality, institutions and social practices are brought into being and experienced within 
discourse.27 The claim is not that this reality is an illusion, but that it is contingent. It could be 
experienced in a different way under different circumstances, which would be equally real. It 
is the belief that meanings of events and actions are transparent and self-evident; that human 
beings can be grouped and defined according to essential and natural characteristics and 
behaviours; and that institutions are simply organised in common-sense, politically neutral 
ways which is problematised by Foucaultian social constructionism.28  
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The matter of realism and relativism is tackled head-on by British philosopher Roy Bhaskar’s 
critical realist form of social constructionism, which differentiates ontological realism from 
epistemological relativism.29 Bhaskar makes a clear distinction between the world as it exists 
(truth/reality)—the intransitive dimension—and the world as we perceive and experience it—
the transitive dimension.30 Our sense perceptions do not convey ontological reality to us in its 
perfect form, but our perceptions are related to and reference this intransitive dimension. 
Therefore we are not imagining the world around us, but we perceive it in a way which may 
differ in some respects from reality and in a way that may differ to the perceptions of others.31 
This approach recognises that the physical and social structures around us “always already” 
exist in a material sense.32 However, the ways in which we understand and ascribe meaning to 
objects and events, and the ways in which we think about ourselves, are constructed within 
the constraints of discourse. 
Approaches which assume truth and reality to be either fixed and permanent 
(positivism/empiricism) or entirely a matter of perspective (relativism/subjectivism) have, 
Bhaskar asserts, fallen prey to the epistemic fallacy: “[T]he view that statements about being 
can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge.”33 The 
epistemological realist denies the transitive dimension, assuming that sense perceptions 
convey alethic truth.34 The ontological relativist denies the intransitive dimension assuming 
that, because sense perceptions are relative, alethia does not exist except through discourse. I 
show, below, the ways in which the dual epistemology of critical realism permits a more 
critical analysis of educational policy and practice than an ontologically relativist approach. 
Neutrality/Social action 
Related to the realism/relativism debate is the dilemma of whether the epistemological 
relativism intrinsic to social constructionism permits or precludes advocacy in social research. 
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Foucault’s approach appears to have led him, in his academic life, to deny the very possibility 
of social justice and to eschew any advocacy role for the social researcher:35 
What is effectively needed is a ramified, penetrative perception of the 
present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong 
points, positions where instances of power have secured and implanted 
themselves by a system of organisation [. . .]. In other words a topological 
and geological survey of the battlefield—that is the intellectuals’ role. But 
as for saying, “Here is what you must do!”, certainly not.36 
Foucault is anxious not to set up what he calls a “utopian dissociation” in which a real version 
of truth is set against the previous false one.37 Foucaultian analysis is more concerned to 
examine the processes which keep such regimes of truth in place and of the production of 
knowledge within discourses.38  
However, Foucaultian and post-structuralist analysis has been accused of undermining the 
very basis of any political standpoint or identity politics. African American sociologist Patricia 
Hill-Collins, speaking from a black feminist position, rails against the relativism of post-
structuralism and the concomitant crisis of representation which “undercuts African-American 
women’s political activism” and “eschews social policy recommendations”.39 She maintains 
that post-modern critique can be seen as the “new politics of containment” and a “politics of 
impotence” which actually works to reproduce power inequalities.40 American feminist and 
post-structuralist researcher Patti Lather seems to exemplify the problem stated by Hill-
Collins. While she claims that post-structuralist critique does not have to be disempowering or 
impotent, in her own work she operates with an awareness that she is “always already wrong” 
and that her work is “ruined from the start”.41 This is a “methodology of getting lost” defined 
as: “[A] science based less on knowledge than on awareness of epistemic limits where 
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constitutive unknowingness becomes an ethical resource and aporetic suspension becomes an 
ethical practice of undecidability.”42 
It is arguable that Lather wears her post-structuralism rather heavily and her methodology of 
getting lost may simply translate as a thoroughgoing defeatism which must drain the life-
blood from any social research project. In Bhaskar’s terms, Lather appears to suffer from the 
epistemic fallacy in which the transitive and intransitive dimensions are conflated. Her 
ontological relativism precludes the possibility of substantive critique or policy formulation. 
She instead engages in what Bhaskar has termed judgemental relativism: the idea that “all 
beliefs are equally valid in the sense that there are no rational grounds for preferring one to 
another”.43 British philosopher, and critical realist, Andrew Collier has described this as a “not 
drowning but waving” approach in which oppression may be perpetually redescribed in 
incommensurable terms, and therefore reproduced, by social researchers.44 Bhaskar instead 
asserts that “judgemental rationality” is both possible and necessary. Judgements may be 
made in a rational way by discussing and comparing theories and ideas and adopting those 
which “explain more” about social phenomena and by amending judgements in the light of 
new information.45 Critical realist judgements are predicated on a theory or conclusion being 
based on the “best available” description of truth/reality in the light of the evidence. Andrew 
Wright calls this “contingent rationality”: “This is the best sense we can make of reality at 
present, now let’s see if we can achieve anything better.”46 
Following this reasoning, critical realist researchers do not allow their social constructionism 
and epistemological relativism to prevent them from advocating changes in policy and 
practice. While employing Foucaultian analytical techniques, critical psychologist Ian Parker 
actively dissociates himself from those “high post-structuralists” or “Nietzschian 
perspectivists” who “value only the struggle of different versions and forms of resistance in 
which appeals to rational criteria are seen as mere tactics to get one version into a dominant 
position”.47 He suggests that social research must allow the researcher to make judgements 
and recommendations. Similarly, critical psychologist Carla Willig adopts Foucaultian methods, 
but argues for politically engaged, rather than neutral social research: 
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My identification of the need to adopt a critical realist type of analysis of 
the social is not the result of a rejection of ultimate epistemological 
relativism. Rather it is the result of the recognition that we as human 
agents find ourselves within a context in which things are always already 
going on or being done. Within this context it is impossible to abstain from 
involvement since inaction is always a form of action [. . .]. An attempt to 
disengage necessarily serves to consolidate the status quo. This is why the 
postmodernist position so easily slides into political conservatism. [. . .] 
[I]nstead of engaging in futile attempts to disengage, we need to find a way 
of improving our understanding of the social world and our role within it.48 
Thus, when social researchers conclude from the “best available” evidence that existing 
institutional and social structures “facilitate limiting or oppressive positioning and practices” 
there is a concomitant responsibility to “call for alternative formulations” or advocate policy 
change in institutions.49 Failure to do so amounts to complicity in the continuation of such 
practices. I share these scholars’ view that, in line with ethical considerations, social research 
must be permitted to go further than a post-structuralist redescription of the discursive 
“battlefield” and (in)conclusions based upon “constitutive unknowingness” and “aporetic 
suspension”. Accordingly, this project is founded on both epistemological relativism and 
ontological realism. While utilising Foucaultian tools of analysis, it employs judgemental 
rationality rather than judgemental relativism and advocates policy change rather than 
disengagement.  
Analysis of Discourse and the Extra-discursive 
Discourse analysis is a term which covers widely differing methods of data interpretation. 
Critical psychologist Vivien Burr broadly categorises these within micro or macro 
approaches.50 Micro approaches, founded within the field of discursive psychology, are 
primarily subject-centred and language-focussed.51 This approach rejects attempts to describe 
the internal reality of the subject, or the external reality of the social world, beyond the 
interview data.52 In the macro social constructionist tradition, the constructive power of 
language is recognised but the relationship of this to social reality is emphasised, i.e., 
institutional practices and social structures which embed discourses into social practice. 
Norman Fairclough considers that this approach holds in tension the agency of the subject 
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within a discursively constrained material reality and provides a firmer basis for social 
critique.53 This broader analytical approach is consistent with a critical realist theoretical 
perspective and is one which I adopt in this thesis. 
I differentiate the discourse analysis, which I shall employ, from the Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) espoused by those whose approach requires a formal grammatical analysis.54 Although 
we share a broadly macro social constructionist approach and a critical perspective, the CDA 
approach may risk a repositioning of my research focus back towards the individuals 
interviewed and away from education policy which is the object of analysis.55 My approach to 
Foucaultian discourse analysis follows procedural guidelines recommended by Willig.56 My 
analysis attends to: (i) discursive constructions—the way objects such as religious education 
and the secular curriculum are constructed; (ii) discourses—the way these different 
constructions seem to fit within the codes of practice of particular regimes of rationality; (iii) 
action orientation—what is accomplished or reproduced through this interaction; (iv) 
positionings—the different subject positions which were possible and adopted or resisted; (v) 
practice—the implications of this positioning for education policy and practice; and (vi) 
subjectivity—the implications of taking subject positions for the individual on the affective 
level. Taking the Foucaultian analysis a stage further than Willig, I also consider the way that 
discursive imperatives combine within forms of governmentality in educational institutions, 
constraining and affording possibilities for policy and practice. 
Complementing this Foucaultian analysis, the adoption of a critical realist approach permits an 
interrogation of data for “extra-discursive” elements. Critical psychologists John Crombie and 
David J. Nightingale identify three extra-discursive elements which they consider to be 
regularly overlooked by relativist and micro social constructionist research: embodiment, 
materiality and institutional power.57 Although each of these concepts may be understood in 
discursive terms, they are not reducible to discourse. From a critical realist perspective, these 
                                                          
53
 Norman Fairclough, “Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism”, 
Organization Studies 26, no. 6 (2005): 923. 
54
 See Ruth Wodak, “What CDA is About—A Summary of its History, Important Concepts and its 
Developments”, in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: 
Sage, 2001), 8.  
55
 I also distinguish my approach from that of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School who operate 
with a Marxist conception of class-based power structures in contrast to the Foucaultian conception 
described. See Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (New York: Seabury Press, 1982), 244.  
56
 Carla Willig, Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in Theory and Method 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001), 109-12. 
57
 John Crombie and David J. Nightingale, “What's Wrong with Social Constructionism?”, in Social 
Constructionist Psychology, ed. David J Nightingale and John Crombie (Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 1999), 10-13.  
36 
 
aspects may be analysed for the possibilities and constraints which they place on the “social 
constructions by and through which we live our lives”.58 The inclusion of the extra-discursive 
affords further possibility for substantive critique of policy and practice. 
Criticism of a critical realist approach to discourse analysis has been levelled by discursive 
psychologist Susan Speer, who accuses critical realist researchers of applying an “analytic 
double standard”.59 She denies the moral legitimacy of ontological realism suggesting that it 
results in a “cognitivist treatment of language, in which a person’s talk [. . .] is treated as a 
straightforward representation of what they are thinking and feeling” and “an unproblematic 
source of evidence for what happened ‘in the world out there’”. This allows researchers to 
“use their data to support their pre-established notions” about the constraints of extra-
discursive factors on interviewees and to “impose [their] critical, political agendas onto [their] 
data prematurely”.60 Speer adopts a discursive psychology approach to the data, which 
constrains her from making judgements or recommendations about policy. It also predisposes 
her to scepticism about statements made by interviewees. Her approach exemplifies the 
judgemental relativism described by Bhaskar above. Speer appears to imply that her approach 
is more ethical, by dint of its being more “technical” than “political”.61 But, as Willig has 
pointed out, politically neutral research can only reproduce the status quo. This is a political 
position in itself. This thesis therefore operates with a critical realist form of discourse analysis 
which understands language to be used both as a means of expressing reality (as perceived by 
research participants) and also as a way of accomplishing social objectives. Far from being 
mutually exclusive the two levels of analysis are complementary.62  
Genealogy 
Social psychologist Derek Hook and social scientists Sara Mills and Jean Carabine agree that a 
Foucaultian approach requires a wider analysis than that of interview data.63 They advocate a 
search of the “archive” surrounding the object of study. Hook insists that: 
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one needs to reference one’s analytical conclusions to a double 
epistemology; to corroborate findings to extra-textual dimensions, like 
those of space [. . .], time (history), architecture or material forms of 
practice. Analysing text alone should not be seen as an adequate means of 
“getting to grips” with power.64 
With this in mind, my case study approach includes analysis of lesson observations, class 
displays and teaching resources.65 But, importantly, Chapter Four will encompass a 
genealogical approach to the historical data surrounding religion in schools in New Zealand. I 
include data from parliamentary debates, policy documents, newspaper articles and cartoons, 
submissions on government reports, report documents and statements of educational policy. 
This broad-based archival approach provides the context within which to ground analysis of 
interview data produced from fieldwork. 
Carabine summarises Foucault’s genealogical approach as follows: the idea of power as 
operating and circulating at every level of a society; normalisation as one method of deploying 
power; the notion that power/knowledge/discourse are intricately intermeshed; the need to 
account for social context and relations so as to situate the power/knowledge realm; the idea 
that discourses are constitutive; discourses have a normalising role and regulatory outcomes; 
the idea of discourse as uneven, contradictory and contested; the idea that knowledge, truth 
and discourse are all socially constructed and historically specific.66 Such concepts underpin 
the analysis of my archival material. 
Reflexivity 
Critical theorists Joe Kincheloe and Peter McLaren, in 1994, described the need for critical 
researchers to “become aware of the ideological imperatives and epistemological 
presuppositions that inform their research as well as their own subjective, intersubjective and 
normative reference claims”.67 When this trend first arose during the 1990s, critical feminist 
Daphne Patai, here summarised by feminist post-structuralist researcher Wanda Pillow, was 
among those to launch a scathing attack on self-indulgent reflexive practices, excoriating 
“people ‘who stay up nights worrying about representation’ as privileged academics engaged 
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in the erotics of their own language games [. . .] when ‘notwithstanding, babies still have to be 
cared for, shelter sought, meals prepared and eaten’”.68 
Patai’s critique parallels that of Hill-Collins which identifies the post-structuralist/relativist 
viewpoint as one which draws attention away from social reality and inexorably towards the 
researcher and her/his crisis of representation. Aside from the politically neutralising 
outcomes discussed above, Pillow warns that this self-reflexive process appears to operate in 
a way that allows researchers, in some sense, to “transcend their subjectivity and own cultural 
context in a way that releases [them] from the weight of (mis)representations”.69 In this way 
the act of “confession” is followed by “absolution” and the researcher is able to proceed as 
though their work is objective and neutral and that a “God’s-eye view” is indeed available to 
them.70 Pillow advocates a “reflexivity of discomfort” in which reflexivity is used, not to salve 
the researcher’s conscience about the way in which they represent others, to validate their 
own position nor valorise an argument, but to actively destabilise and problematise the 
representations that are made and the knowledge that is produced, for the reader.71 
But, in following her advice, the researcher is surely in danger of descending into a Lather-like 
paralysis in which there is a requirement to prefix one’s thesis with a conscious invalidation of 
the data and the confession that one’s findings are “always already wrong”.72 Again, I contend 
that the critical realist perspective is a helpful moderation to the post-structuralist/relativist 
position on reflexivity. If we accept an ontological reality it is possible to make some claims 
about the way we perceive the world, make judgements and offer a critique from an informed 
perspective. For although, within an epistemological relativism, we acknowledge our 
perceptions are never entirely complete or accurate, they are based on the “best possible” 
understanding of reality as perceived by the researcher within the context of the research. 
Judgements are always open to correction in the light of new information or a new theory 
which better explains the phenomena. Thus judgmental rationality is combined with 
“epistemic humility” in the critical realist approach. As critical realist and religious 
educationalist Trevor Cooling explains: “[M]y personal judgement that an argument is 
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compelling does not mean that it is necessarily compelling for all reasonable people, 
[therefore] epistemic humility recognises a need to temper our own convictions with a dose of 
the hermeneutics of self-suspicion.”73 
I therefore acknowledge the situated and constructed nature of my research and offer a 
statement of reflexive positioning:  
My perspective is of one who operates within discourses which value both 
knowledge about religion and a personal religious quest. I accept that my 
upbringing in the United Kingdom by left-leaning, politically active and 
middle-class parents predisposes me to valorise human rights issues, liberal 
social policy and structural/policy solutions to injustice. My twelve years of 
experience as a primary school teacher in the United Kingdom inform my 
thinking on the issue of religious education in New Zealand. My experience 
of the New Zealand education system is limited to that obtained during the 
period of my doctoral research. I consciously adopt an egalitarian liberal 
and critical realist position as I analyse the discourses at work in policy 
documents and interview transcripts. 
I advocate a position on religion in school which I believe has been subjugated within the New 
Zealand education system and I resist the conclusion that my partiality entirely destabilises my 
data and conclusions. This would serve only to conserve the status quo which I believe should 
be challenged. I acknowledge that others think differently about this matter and I explore 
some of those differences within this thesis. I do not offer a transcendental or God’s-eye view, 
but the perspective of one whose training and predispositions provide both the motivation 
and personal resources for this important piece of social research. 
Conclusion 
The methodological approach outlined in this chapter will enable me to explore the 
power/knowledge relationships at play in the reproduction of Christian religious instruction, 
and the apparent disqualification of education in religions and beliefs, in New Zealand primary 
schools. It will also enable me to make judgements about such policy and to advocate policy 
changes from an egalitarian liberal and a critical realist perspective. In the next chapter I 
describe the rationale for the research question, selection of case study schools and research 
methods.
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Chapter Three: Research Methods 
Introduction 
A prime concern in undertaking this research was to do so in a way which would allow for 
multiple meanings and definitions of terminology in current use, regarding religion in school, 
to be explored. A quantitative approach, utilising a probability sample with a survey or 
questionnaire, may have provided statistically generalisable data. However, as discussed in 
Chapter One above, the absence of an agreed vocabulary with which to discuss religion in 
school, in the New Zealand context, may have seriously compromised the data collected. The 
use of qualitative research tools has facilitated an in-depth analysis of the ways in which 
religious education policy within seven participating primary schools is discursively 
reproduced. This chapter delineates the process and methods by which this qualitative 
research has been undertaken, making explicit the connections between methods and 
methodology. 
Research Validity 
The “scientific holy trinity” of generalisation, validity and reliability are pertinent in both 
quantitative and qualitative research paradigms.1 However, as psychologist and qualitative 
research specialist Steinar Kvale points out, in the qualitative approach: “the emphasis is 
moved from inspection at the end of [the research process] to quality control throughout the 
stages of knowledge production”.2 The New Zealand context raises particular issues regarding 
perceptions of research validity. With this in mind I begin by considering the approach to 
researcher objectivity, kaupapa Māori research and generalisation adopted in this thesis.  
Objectivity 
From the discussion in previous chapters it will be clear that one motivation for undertaking 
this research has been a desire to highlight issues of social justice and human rights with 
regard to New Zealand policy on religious education. I have positioned myself from the outset 
as an egalitarian liberal and critical realist, in order to advocate change in curriculum policy. In 
so doing, I depart from a perceived institutional consensus both on religion in schools and 
perhaps on the nature and purpose of educational research. Subjectivity and researcher bias 
may be perceived to detract from ethical validity, so I need to address the matter of partiality 
and objectivity. 
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American Sociologist Alvin Gouldner argued, in 1968, that “the adoption of an ‘outside’ 
standpoint, far from leading us to ignore the participants’ standpoint, is probably the only way 
in which we can recognise and identify the participants’ standpoint”.3 By adopting an outside 
position in this thesis alternative viewpoints are not ignored but are seen through the lens of 
discourse. Following Gouldner again: “[A]ll standpoints are partisan [. . . ] but aren’t some 
forms of partisanship more liberating than others?”4 This question may be answered with a 
“No” by post-structuralist researchers, as described above.5 However, Gouldner aligns with a 
critical realist approach which insists that rational judgements are possible in research. For 
Gouldner, the objectivity of a sociologist ought to be considered in the same way as that of a 
judge: 
The function of a judge is not to bring parties together, but is, quite simply 
to do justice [. . .].What makes a judgement possessed of justice is not the 
fact that it distributes costs and benefits equally between the parties but, 
rather, that the allocation of benefits and costs is made in conformity with 
some stated normative standard. Justice, in short, is that which is justified 
in terms of some value [. . .]. In one part, then, the objectivity of the judge 
requires his explication of the moral value in terms of which his judgement 
has been rendered.6 
Gouldner’s concept of “normative objectivity” rests on the ability of the researcher to 
recognise and state one’s values and to demonstrate that one’s analysis is consistent with 
these proclaimed values. However, Gouldner insists that objectivity relies on the espousal of 
values which contribute to “a human unity of mankind” and which do not accommodate or 
impose suffering.7 Research which meets these criteria may be seen to be both partisan and 
objective. I share Gouldner’s view that these qualities are not incompatible.8 
As an egalitarian liberal I might state that the values of diversity, inclusion, social justice, 
equity, human rights and the common good, as stated in the New Zealand curriculum, may be 
held as normative for education policy and as a basis for liberal democracy.9 But appeals to 
notions of justice, human rights and moral values as though their meanings were 
unproblematic, do not resolve the objectivity issue when one is operating within a social 
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constructionist epistemology. Each of these curriculum values may be constructed differently, 
with contradictory curriculum implications, when set within a different discursive 
framework.10 Indeed, this thesis problematises the governmental nature of dominant 
interpretations of values and principles of the curriculum document.11 To fulfil Gouldner’s 
criteria, a more nuanced description of normative values will be required. In Chapter Five I 
explore liberal theorist William Galston’s model of “liberal diversity”, which prioritises the 
protection of diversity over the promotion of personal autonomy. I show how establishing the 
protection of diversity as a normative value is consistent with an egalitarian liberal discourse. I 
therefore judge current practices, both in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom, according 
to their capacity to protect diversity. A neutral, God’s-eye view is not available to the social 
researcher, but objective partisanship is attainable, appropriate and makes a necessary 
contribution to policy formation.  
Kaupapa Māori Research 
On the issue of validity, objectivity and the insider/outsider dichotomy it would be important 
to recognise the influence of kaupapa Māori research in New Zealand, as described by Maori 
educationalists such as Russell Bishop, Graham Hingangaroa Smith and Linda Tuhiwai Smith.12 
In response to the traditional, Western deficit model of research into Māori educational 
achievement such scholars would argue strongly for research which is “by Māori, for Māori 
with Māori”13 or, as Marjie Maaka concedes, with the participation of invited others.14 These 
scholars offer a view contrary to Gouldner’s in which the outsider has the clearest line of sight. 
From within this discourse it is the insider who is best placed to conduct research in a 
framework where “Māori language, culture, knowledge and values are accepted in their own 
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right”.15 Such insider research is more likely to provide the answer to Māori educational 
underachievement and therefore in Gouldner’s terms would be “more liberating” for Māori. 
Objective research, from a kaupapa Māori perspective, will be research which is “active in 
pursuit of social and institutional change, that makes space for indigenous knowledge, and 
that has a critical view of power relations and inequality”.16 This is a form of objective 
partisanship with the important difference that only insider researchers are considered to be 
objective and only the insider’s research is valid.  
However, sociologist Martin Tolich notes that the exclusion zone for non-Māori researchers 
has often been interpreted much more widely than the field of Māori-centred research.17 
Writing in 2002, Tolich described the way in which many Pākehā researchers not only felt 
unable to research issues directly pertaining to Māori but, in their general research into New 
Zealand society, discreetly avoided dealing with aspects of Māori culture which may be 
involved in the study, or carefully excluded Māori participants from the population sample.18 
He coined the phrase “Pākehā paralysis” to describe “Pākehā inability to distinguish between 
their role in Māori-centred research and their role in research in a New Zealand society”.19 
Tolich argues forcefully that Pākehā researchers best fulfil their obligation to the Treaty of 
Waitangi by including rather than avoiding Māori issues and participants in their research in 
order that both Treaty partners may benefit from research outcomes.20  
The ethical approval process for research in New Zealand now includes consultation with 
tangata whenua in accordance with a commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi.21 This process 
marks the respect of both the university and the researcher for Māori tino rangatiratanga 
within the terms of the Treaty.22 It functions as a safeguard to both researcher and tangata 
whenua that this research is being conducted within an ethical bicultural framework. I 
therefore follow Tolich and commit to a treatment of these issues consistent with the 
obligations of the Treaty, on the grounds that the findings should benefit all concerned. 
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Case study data are specific to the schools in this study, but where common findings occur in 
widely differing areas of New Zealand, I argue that these findings have applicability across a 
wider number of cases and have implications for New Zealand education policy in general. The 
results are not statistically generalisable, but analytic generalisation is appropriate.23 
Analytic Generalisation 
Analytic generalisation is, in social research specialist Alan Bryman’s words, dependent on the 
“cogency of theoretical reasoning rather than statistical criteria”.24 It therefore operates on an 
entirely different form of logic, in some ways akin to experiments in the physical sciences. As 
qualitative researcher Joseph Maxwell points out: “Physicists don’t draw random samples of 
atoms [. . .] [They] make no claim to statistical representativeness [. . .] but instead assume 
that their results contribute to a general theory of the phenomenon.”25 Such generalisation 
does not pertain to a specific population sample but to theoretical inferences which may have 
applicability beyond the cases studied. In the same way, although no claim is made to 
statistical significance, the findings can be considered to be of substantive significance. 
Applied sociologist and qualitative researcher Michael Patton explains that substantive 
significance relates to: the coherence and consistency of the findings; the way in which the 
research contributes to an understanding of the phenomenon; whether the knowledge 
produced is new or innovative; and whether it makes a useful contribution, for example, to 
policy formation.26  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the broad range of evidence beyond the case study schools, on 
which my findings and theorisation are based, also widens the applicability and significance of 
my thesis conclusions.  
Initial Research Question 
The thesis is framed around three research questions. I began with a preliminary research 
question, upon which the research design was based: 
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1. Is New Zealand’s cultural and religious diversity influencing the practice of, and 
attitudes toward, teaching about religion and spirituality in state and integrated 
primary schools? 
The question allowed me to explore both what participants perceived to be happening in the 
primary schools in the study, with regard to teaching about religion, and the differing 
constructions of—and justifications for—different approaches to teaching about religion. This 
approach is consistent with my critical realist theoretical perspective which allows for the 
study of both reality as perceived by participants, including the extra-discursive dimension, 
alongside analysis of subject positioning and discourse within the regimes of rationality 
evidenced in the data. Underlying the research question stated is an additional theory or 
“hunch”. The tentative proposition for the research question was that one might expect to 
find a greater inclusion of teaching about religions and beliefs within the school curriculum in 
areas of extreme religious diversity. This was not a fully-fledged hypothesis but a suspicion or, 
as case study research specialist Robert Yin states, a preliminary rationale for the focus of 
research.27 It is based on the phenomenon, noted in Chapter Five, that increased immigration 
and religious pluralism in some other liberal democracies have prompted a move towards 
including teaching about diversity of religious belief within the curriculum.28  
I confess that I expected, or even hoped, to find that teachers and principals in these diverse 
areas would be in agreement with my position that education about religion is an appropriate 
and important area of learning. In actual fact this was not the case, as I report in Chapter 
Seven and Appendix 4.29 But where a failed hypothesis in quantitative research may mean a 
return to the drawing board and new research design, in qualitative research it is legitimate 
for new questions and theories to evolve from the data and to change during the research 
process. This inductive approach to theorising is applied here.30 The failure of my initial 
proposition led me to generate new research questions based on this data, and to form 
additional theories about what may be taking place. In line with my critical realist and 
Foucaultian perspective I develop theories which pertain to discursive, material, embodied 
and institutional constraints at work in these settings. 
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Research Design and Reformulation 
The research was conceived as a multiple case study of six schools in two areas of contrasting 
cultural and religious diversity. Each of the six schools constituted a separate case, but the 
data from each have been used comparatively across both schools and regions. A separate 
pilot study in a Dunedin school provided additional comparative data.31  
Yin describes different types of case study, distinguishing between “exploratory”, 
“explanatory” and “descriptive” designs.32 While I began with the intention of an exploratory 
study, my pilot study interview data led me to ask, not just “what is happening here?”, but 
“why and how is this situation occurring?” The case study design began, therefore, with an 
initial exploration phase in which I attempted to uncover the ways in which case study schools 
approached teaching about religions and beliefs, and the reasons they gave for doing so. It 
then progressed into an explanatory phase where through genealogical mapping of the 
archive, discourse and critical realist analysis of interview data, I began to consider discursive 
and structural answers to the questions raised through my exploratory work. Two new 
research questions were formulated to reflect this new focus: 
2. What are the key discursive and institutional constraints which maintain current 
arrangements for voluntary religious instruction and restrict curriculum development 
in the area of religion and beliefs? 
3. Is there an alternative to current practices consistent with New Zealand’s status as a 
secular, bicultural and religiously plural liberal democracy? 
The research addresses the rights and responsibilities of children, parents and the educational 
establishment concerning education in matters of religion and belief. These issues pertain to 
matters of justice, equity and inclusion in the current arrangements for teaching about 
religion and have important implications for future policy. Since my research focus is wider 
than any one school in the study and pertains to educational policy and practice in New 
Zealand more generally, it can be conceived as an instrumental rather than an intrinsic case 
study.33 
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Research Settings and Participants 
In contrast to randomised probability sampling undertaken in large scale quantitative surveys, 
qualitative research typically requires a more targeted or “purposeful” sampling approach. 
While randomised sampling is oriented to statistical generalisation, purposeful sampling is 
oriented towards in-depth understanding derived from cases which are “information rich”.34 
Bryman further defines two levels of sampling, namely sampling of context and sampling of 
participants.35 However, my study required three levels of sampling in each region: the 
context, the schools within each area and the interviewees in each school. I here provide an 
overview of the three-level sampling process utilised in this study. 
Purposive Context Sampling: Extremes of Diversity 
At the context level, following Patton’s descriptors, I applied “extreme case sampling”.36 As 
described above, my research focuses on the influence of cultural and religious diversity on 
attitudes and practices of teaching about religion. Information-rich cases would be regions 
exemplifying contrasting religious diversity: the most diverse and least diverse regions in New 
Zealand. The logic of the extreme case approach, as Patton explains, is that “precisely [. . .] by 
being unusual they can illuminate both the unusual and the typical”.37 One is not, here, 
concerned with generating a representative sample but with investigating practices and 
perspectives at the extremes of diversity in order to make comparisons which may be of more 
general interest. For example, when the same kinds of issues arise in schools at these polar 
extremes of diversity, one may surmise that these issues might also occur in less extreme 
cases and could be considerably more widespread.  
The area of New Zealand with the largest proportion of people affiliated to religions other 
than Christianity, at 11.8%, was Auckland City.38 Since Auckland City varied greatly in diversity 
between regions I decided to select suburbs with 10% or higher affiliation to religions other 
than Christianity for recruitment of schools. This would ensure that the sample was indeed 
extreme in comparison with the national figure of 5.1% for alternative religious affiliation. In 
contrast, the area of New Zealand with the lowest proportion of people affiliated to religions 
other than Christianity was an area of Southland which I shall call Southerton District, at just 
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under 1%. Table 5 indicates levels of religious affiliation in selected Case Study regions.39 The 
names of the selected suburbs have been changed to protect anonymity. It will be noted that 
the Auckland suburbs selected also had lower than the New Zealand average affiliation to 
Christianity, in contrast to the areas of Southland which had a higher than average level of 
Christian affiliation. 
Table 5: Religious Affiliation in Case Study Regions: Extreme Case Sampling 
 
Purposive Case Sampling: School Type 
From the two initial purposive population samples I recruited the schools for the research: the 
second level of sampling. In addition to the careful choice of location, schools of the following 
types were targeted for recruitment in each of the two regions: 
A. State primary school with Bible-in-Schools programme 
B. State primary school without Bible-in-Schools programme 
C. State integrated Catholic primary school 
These school types were selected because they represented contrasting policy positions on 
teaching religion in school. They also represent typical school positions in New Zealand. In this 
sense the selection represents “typical case sampling”.40 The schools in these regions at the 
extremes of religious diversity exemplify common policy positions on teaching religion in 
school, which is the focus of the study. I evidence this statement with reference to the 
following data.  
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Table 6: State Primary School Sector and Affiliation: July 2011 
 
Table 6 indicates New Zealand statistics on primary school affiliation at the time of my 
research.41 It will be noted that Catholic Integrated primary schools, although representing a 
relatively small overall percentage of New Zealand’s primary schools (9.3%) were by far the 
most numerous of the integrated schools and had coverage throughout the country.42 It will 
be further noted that of 2035 schools catering for primary school children 1726 (around 85%) 
were unaffiliated state schools. These schools did not teach religious education as a 
curriculum area, but may have had a volunteer-led religious instruction programme known as 
Bible-in-Schools (BiS). While other Bible programmes existed in state schools, the CEC was the 
main provider.43 As stated above, the CEC 2012 strategic plan stated that 712 state primary 
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schools ran religious instruction programmes.44 Approximately 40% of unaffiliated state 
schools therefore ran BiS programmes in New Zealand at the time the fieldwork was 
undertaken. In this sense the school types A, B and C above exemplified the most common 
options for New Zealand parents, with regard to religious education, and therefore 
represented typical case samples. Private schools have been omitted as they are few in 
number at the primary phase and this study is concerned with the available options for 
parents within the state primary education system. Schools rarely put information about BiS 
programmes on their websites. I was fortunate to have the co-operation of local area BiS 
organisers for information about individual schools in this regard. 
An additional layer of extreme sampling was implemented in the Auckland sample. The 
Ministry of Education (MOE) did not collect data on religious affiliation in schools, but the 
ethnicity data for each school were accessible on its Education Review Office (ERO) report.45 
Census statistics show that the most religiously diverse ethnic group in New Zealand were the 
Asian community, 37% of whom were affiliated to religions other than Christianity.46 I 
therefore approached schools of Types A, B and C in religiously diverse regions of Auckland 
with relatively high Asian ethnicity. I purposefully avoided the selection of schools with large 
Pacific Island populations, whose affiliations were 80% Christian.47  
The school ethnicities in Southerton did not present the same sampling challenges, and most 
schools had over 75% Pākehā/NZ European ethnicity. However, on approaching the BiS 
advisor for the area, I found that it would not be possible to recruit a school of Type B because 
all the state schools in the district had BiS programmes.48 I then relied on information from 
this co-ordinator for information about the nearest schools that did not have BiS. It became 
apparent that I would need to broaden my context sample to include Invercargill City. 
Although slightly more religiously diverse than Southerton the affiliation to religions other 
than Christian, at 1.5%, was still well below the national average of 5.1% (See Table 5). 
Invercargill City therefore met my original criterion of being at the lower extreme of religious 
diversity.  
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Table 7 shows the case study school data on affiliation and ethnicity which informed the 
sampling process. The names of the schools have been changed, using names of native birds 
for unaffiliated schools and alternative saints for Catholic schools, in order to preserve 
anonymity. “Full” primary schools cater for children from Years 1-8 and “contributing” from 
Years 1-6. The decile system in New Zealand reflects the socio-economic status of parents in 
the school locality, based on census information. It is intended to ensure that additional 
funding reaches the schools where it is most needed, and is not a reflection of quality of 
educational provision. A decile one rating reflects high levels of parents who are unemployed, 
are on income benefits, are low-skilled and low-paid workers, who have no formal 
qualifications and children who live in overcrowded homes. Decile ten schools represent the 
other end of the socio-economic scale.49 
Table 7: Case Study School Data 
 
An original intention to recruit schools with similar decile ratings, and comparable school roll 
size proved unrealistic within the constraints of school recruitment. Differences in socio-
economic status and school size therefore need to be acknowledged. 
Purposive Participant Sampling: Key Roles 
The third level of purposive sampling took place at the level of recruitment of interviewees. A 
range of views were sought from people in key roles and associated with each school as 
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indicated in Table 8. Asterisks refer to the people interviewed and lessons observed in each 
school. 
Table 8: Interviewees by Role 
 
The object was to obtain the perspectives of those in key roles who were implementing, or 
affected by, policies on teaching religion in primary schools. This could be described as a form 
of “generic purposive sampling” because the interviewees selected occupied positions 
relevant to my research.50 Importantly, I do not claim here that these perspectives are 
representative of the views of all parents, teachers and principals in New Zealand. 
Nevertheless I maintain that a comparison of perspectives from the polar extremes of New 
Zealand, in terms of religious diversity, can illuminate practices and policies in less extreme 
regions. 
Fieldwork Process 
The time-frame for the case study fieldwork was as follows: Ethical approval granted from the 
University of Otago Human Ethics Committee, July 2011; Pilot Study—October 2011; Case 
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Study School recruitment—0ctober 2011 to February 2012; Fieldwork in Auckland—6-15 
March 2012; Fieldwork in Southland—30 April to 8 May 2012. 
The following stages delineate the fieldwork process: 
1. Schools of types A, B and C meeting all the above criteria were contacted with an 
introductory email and paper letter (Appendix 2A) with Information Sheet, Consent 
Form and a stamped addressed envelope.  
2. No schools in Auckland responded to either the email or paper letters. St Joseph’s 
school in Southerton was unique in sending the consent form back by return. After a 
week, all schools were contacted by telephone. At least three calls were made to each 
school before obtaining a response from the principal. A total of 15 schools were 
approached in Auckland during the recruitment process. In Southland the success rate 
was significantly higher. Of four schools contacted, three agreed to participate. 
3. Having recruited three schools in Auckland and three in Southland, and received their 
signed consent forms, an email was sent to each school principal outlining the time-
frame for my visit and the number and type of interviewees requested. I attached 
sample interview schedules (Appendix 2C) for information. Through the principal, I 
was able to obtain email addresses for the potential interviewees.  
4. Potential interviewees were contacted and, in line with ethical considerations, each 
was sent an information sheet (Appendix 2B), a sample interview schedule (Appendix 
2C) and a consent form (Appendix 2D). Only one potential participant, in Southerton, 
declined to participate after reading this information, citing pressures of work. 
5. Interview times and locations were arranged by email. 
6. Semi-structured interviews were conducted and recorded on school premises after 
consent forms were signed by participants.  
7. Interviews were transcribed and sent back to each interviewee for approval. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted in a school in Dunedin, to which I was able to obtain access 
through a contact. Patton is dismissive of such “convenience sampling”, being “neither 
purposeful nor strategic”.51 However, this sample was also a generic purposive sample chosen 
because—in line with the research focus—Pukeko primary school ran a Bible-in-Schools 
programme and therefore provided additional comparative data in a region with a higher—
although still below national average—affiliation to religions other than Christianity (See Table 
5). 
The principal differences between the pilot study and the case study fieldwork were in the 
ease of access to the school and the flexibility regarding time available. This also made it 
possible for me to attend an assembly practice and observe a Circle Time. I had also been able 
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to meet with both the principal and the staff prior to my fieldwork visits. The pilot study 
indicated that the interview schedule questions would yield interesting and relevant data for 
analysis. Some minor alterations to question order were made following this study, but the 
substance of the questions was not altered. Although opinion is divided about whether pilot 
studies should be included in research reports I concur with medical sociologist Edwin van 
Teijlingen et al. that, since no substantive changes were made to the interview questions or 
research method, this additional comparative data broadens the evidence base for my 
conclusions and makes a constructive contribution to the thesis.52 
Limitations of Sampling 
One aspect of the sampling proved to be problematic and could be interpreted as a limitation 
in the research design. In the recruitment of interviewees I was dependent on school 
principals to make the initial contact with prospective participants. Communications with 
school principals emphasised my desire to speak to people with differing viewpoints, but the 
reality was that the great majority of participants, in both areas, were those supporting the 
status quo.53 Principals, perhaps understandably, seem to have simply accepted the first offers 
of participation. It is possible that they also approached people known to have a Christian 
faith given the high number of interviewees who positioned themselves in this way.54 Even in 
type B schools, with no BiS programme, almost all interviewees spoke in favour of BiS and 
against teaching about religion in schools. Indeed in Korimako Primary school, in Auckland, 
where almost one-third of the school were Muslim and opted out of BiS, it proved impossible 
to recruit an interviewee to give their perspective. The principal informed me that the Muslim 
parents she approached all told her they did not want to appear critical of current 
arrangements or to cause offence within the school community.  
In contrast to quantitative research, where lack of representation within a sample may 
invalidate the data, in qualitative research an awareness of failure can itself become data and 
an appropriate area of enquiry.55 For example, what discourses are in operation constraining 
involvement in this research project? How does the subjugation of voices from the community 
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work to reproduce the status quo? How is this group exercising agency and resisting the 
prevailing discourse? How are others prevented from exercising agency? This does not mean 
that the responsibility to represent minority groups is evaded, but that the constraints under 
which this case study fieldwork is undertaken are noted and incorporated into the analysis.  
Additionally, it will be noted from Table 8 that the BiS lesson observation at this school was 
cancelled at short notice. The BiS coordinator did not think there was a mandate for me to 
observe and record the lesson, as only “about seven” consent forms had been returned from 
the four classes of children to whom they had been issued. I later heard from the principal 
that in fact 75 were returned, belatedly. Although frustrating, this cancellation may be 
considered data, especially when considered alongside the stated concern of all the BiS 
volunteers to avoid doing anything which might upset parents or put the programme in 
jeopardy. In such ways perceived weaknesses or failures can produce further lines of 
questioning which strengthen the research rather than detract from it. 
Interviews and Data Collection 
Interviewing was once thought to be an unproblematic and straightforward method for 
gathering information: that “interviewers collect verbal responses like botanists collect plants 
in nature”.56 However post-modern critique, such as that of education research specialist 
James Scheurich, has raised awareness of the power differentials at play in the interviewer-
participant relationship, the co-constructed nature of the knowledge created in an interview 
context and the fluidity in interpretation of meaning both of interview questions and 
responses.57 For Scheurich, any attempt to capture or categorise the interview interaction is 
futile for “there is no stable reality or meaning that can be represented”.58 However, I have 
argued that from a critical realist stance it is possible to move beyond the state of aporetic 
suspension, which must accompany such a view, and treat the interview data both as a 
representation of reality from the perspective of the interviewee and of the regimes of 
rationality within which reasoning around religious education policy is constructed.59 That is 
not to say that this is the only way to analyse the data or that another form of analysis, asking 
different questions of the data, might not yield results which illuminate different features.60  
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A structured interview, with standardised questions and a neutral and impersonal stance on 
the part of the interviewer, has traditionally been thought to be a scientific and reliable 
approach.61 However, my aim was to elicit rich data from my interviewees, to “capture 
complexities of individual perceptions”, in Patton’s words.62 This being the case, a semi-
structured approach was adopted with open-ended questioning and the flexibility to pursue 
rich lines of questioning as they arose without being constrained by the format of the 
interview schedule.63 
Interviews largely took place on school premises and were limited to an hour.64 The aim of the 
interview was not consensus, but to cover a discursive terrain. I tried to balance good-
humoured conversation with a gentle testing and challenging of positions and assumptions. 
This was not an attempt to persuade interviewees of my position but to record their 
responses to alternative viewpoints. Psychologist Lene Tanggaard takes this approach further 
using the battlefield metaphor of “discourses crossing swords”.65 Rather than “harmonious 
dialogue” the interview is conceived as “a context for negotiations of meaning and even a 
clash of conflicting views”.66 While I would not wish to overplay the combative theme as my 
approach to interviewing was not adversarial, Tanggaard is right to say that the rich data 
generated in the interviews—the point at which the knowledge is produced—is the point at 
which participants are confronted with a viewpoint which is radically different from their own, 
i.e., where opposing discourses meet.67 At this instant interviewees may begin to give reasons, 
justifications and evidences for their views, displaying the discursive imperatives and 
constraints under which they operate. 
Whatever the interplay of dominance and resistance in the actual interview, at the 
interpretation stage, as Kvale notes, the interviewer generally retains “the exclusive privilege 
to interpret and report what the interviewee really meant and to frame what an interviewee 
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says in his or her own theoretical schemes”.68 Others argue that interviewees should have the 
opportunity to enter negotiations over the interpretation which the researcher has applied to 
their words.69 However, I maintain that the social researcher does have a mandate to apply his 
or her own reasoning to the theorising of the data. The purpose of my research is not simply 
to be a mouthpiece to participants in the study, but to examine the ways that discourses 
operate to construct and reproduce policy on religion in schools.70 Following Gouldner’s 
normative objectivity, discussed above, the goal is not to give equal weight to all viewpoints 
but to measure the viewpoints against stated values. This critique is depersonalised by 
retaining a focus on discourse and not on individual participants in my analysis. 
Data Collection Methods 
Consistent with case study research, multiple data collection methods were employed in the 
school contexts.71 Additional to the interviews (recorded and transcribed), documents such as 
school charters and policy statements were collected, photographs taken of class displays, a 
small amount of children’s work was obtained, observations were made of library resources 
and data collected from school websites. I observed three lessons, two of which were BiS 
classes. Audio recordings were made with the consent of parents. Information letters were 
sent home (Appendix 2E) with a consent form to return. This opt-in approach was felt to be 
more ethical than a letter informing parents that the lesson observation was taking place and 
asking them to withdraw their children if they had objections.72  
For Yin the most important advantage of the use of multiple sources is that, in this process of 
“triangulation”, findings may be corroborated through “converging lines of enquiry”.73 
However, Stake adopts a social constructionist perspective on triangulation, assuming that 
multiple meanings and interpretations of events are inevitable. For Stake: “Triangulation 
serves also to clarify meaning by identifying the different ways the case is being seen 
[. . .].Triangulation helps to identify different realities.”74 In line with a critical realist approach, 
triangulation of my research data points not towards a single common understanding of 
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religion in schools, but affirms and corroborates common discursive constructions and 
positionings. It also signals institutional and material constraints on education policy and 
practice. 
In addition to the interviews undertaken within the case study schools the following key 
stakeholders and additional informants were identified and interviewed during 2012. 
Informants 
 Principal of school running BiS and Islam programme, Auckland (March 2012) 
 Muslim parent in Dunedin (August 2012) 
These further informants were identified as having perspectives that had not been 
represented in the case study samples. The principal was interviewed over the telephone and 
the Muslim mother came to my university office. Ethical and consent procedures including 
anonymity were applied as for case study participants. 
Key Stakeholders  
 Peter Harrison—NZ Association of Rationalists and Humanists—Keep Religion out of 
Schools Campaign (March 2012) 
 Neil Laurenson—Catholic Schools Office, Auckland (March 2012) 
 David Mulholland—National Advisor, Churches Education Commission (March 2012) 
 Joris de Bres—Race Relations Commissioner, Human Rights Commission (July 2012) 
 Sonia Glogowski—Ministry of Education spokesperson (July 2012) 
 Ian Leckie—President ,NZ Educational Institute (July 2012) 
 Professor Paul Morris—Victoria University of Wellington/UNESCO chair (July 2012)75 
Participants speaking as a representative of an organisation were given a choice of remaining 
anonymous or giving permission for their attributed comments to be used. All gave consent to 
be named.  
Additional Data 
An unexpected bonus for the accumulation of data in the study has been the campaign to 
“Keep Religion out of School” by the SEN. A good deal of coverage for the subject has been 
generated in newspaper articles, letters pages and local and national radio programmes. 
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Material from online parents’ forums, online newspaper comments sections and Facebook 
group discussions have provided much data for analysis. The constraints of the thesis have 
meant that I have been unable to include much of the material which I have collected in 
support of my research findings, although links to relevant web pages have been provided. 
Data Analysis  
Transcribing 
The interviews were transcribed using HyperTRANSCRIBE software (Version 1.5). A near-
verbatim record was produced using the following conventions: 
[1] = Pause indicating number of seconds 
(L) = Laughs 
Italics = word emphasised  
. . . = hesitation 
““ = someone else’s speech is reported 
I undertook most of the transcribing myself but transcripts that were produced by others were 
checked rigorously against the audio files.76 I have endeavoured to minimise the risk of error 
in transcription by checking all transcripts thoroughly against the sound files and by using 
transcription conventions to regulate the interpretive process of transcription as far as is 
practicable.77 All transcripts were sent to interviewees and small amendments, such as 
misspellings or other minor errors in transcription, were made where requested. 
Coding Process 
In qualitative research coding, analysis and theory-building are part of an iterative process in 
which, in contrast to quantitative research, codes are not fixed from the outset but evolve 
through the data analysis.78 In Foucaultian analysis, as described above, there is an attention 
to history and context.79 This means that the researcher approaches interview data with prior 
knowledge of discursive constructions pertaining to the object of study. Coding is therefore 
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both inductive—being derived from the text under analysis—and deductive—being informed 
by analysis of historical data and theory.80  
The approach to discourse analysis adopted in this thesis is described in Chapter Two. The 
analysis, and therefore the coding, pertains to the identification of discursive constructions, 
discourses, action orientation, positioning, practice and subjectivity. With a critical realist 
perspective the data are also analysed for extra-discursive elements such as embodiment, 
materiality and institutional power.81 I approach the coding of interview data, school 
documentation and online material with knowledge of the way in which the formation of 
policy on the teaching of religion has evolved in New Zealand, and with knowledge of the way 
in which others have categorised positions regarding church-state relations. This inductive and 
deductive approach is described in Chapter Four.82 The corroboration of discursive 
constructions through historical, legal and institution-specific data lends validity to the 
findings and provides a broad basis for analytic generalisation.83 
I began the coding process using HyperRESEARCH (version 3.0). I found this software to be 
excellent for storing and coding files such as recorded lesson observations, photographs, and 
television and radio broadcasts. However, for the interview transcripts, I decided to use 
Microsoft Word’s in-built reviewing features to mark and comment on relevant sections of 
text. These sections were then easily retrieved for use in the case study reports and 
subsequent data chapters. 
Reporting 
The volume of material generated through the fieldwork and other sources was considerable. 
I wrote a report pertaining to each of the seven case study schools. The data was organised 
into three sections mirroring the interview schedule used: Bible-in-schools, spiritual education 
and religions in the curriculum. In line with a critical realist methodology these observations 
were presented both in realist and constructionist terms. The policy, practices and resources 
described by interviewees and/or observed at the school were first delineated. Non-discursive 
elements were outlined, followed by an analysis of prevailing discourses in evidence at the 
school and the counter-discourses which resisted them. A summary of the case study reports 
is provided in Appendix 4. 
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 Yin explains that individual case reports may form an “evidentiary base” for cross-case 
analysis without being included in the final report.84 While acknowledging Stake’s view that a 
comparative report limits the production of knowledge from individual cases, the instrumental 
rather than intrinsic nature of the research predisposes me to a comparative study.85 I present 
this comparative analysis in Chapters Six and Seven. My report reflects the iterative process of 
analysis and theory building which characterise this thesis. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the research design and methods used in this qualitative 
research project. I have shown how my critical realist theoretical perspective informs my 
approach to objectivity and data analysis and described the use of generalisation adopted. In 
the next chapter I outline the discursive terrain, as derived from the analysis of data, primary 
source material and secondary literature. Adopting a Foucaultian genealogical approach to 
primary sources I show how constraints on religion in primary schools are discursively 
reproduced and maintained in the New Zealand context.
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Chapter Four: Discursive Terrain and Genealogical Survey 
Introduction 
All discourses are the products of history [. . .]. It is sometimes helpful to 
say that it is not individuals who speak and act, but rather that historically 
and socially defined discourses speak to each other through individuals. 
The individual instantiates, gives voice and body to a discourse, every time 
he or she acts or speaks, and thus carries it, and ultimately changes it 
through time. 
James Gee1 
Gee’s characterisation of discourses in conversation through time is a helpful way to approach 
the terrain of literature and discourse regarding religion in schools. While individual 
commentators and research participants are central to this thesis as an evidence base, it is the 
historically situated and socially defined discourses which they utilise—with their attendant 
constraints and affordances for policy on religion in schools—which form the basis of my 
analysis. The task of this chapter will be to answer research question two: 
What are the key discursive and institutional constraints which maintain current 
arrangements for voluntary religious instruction and restrict curriculum development 
in the area of religion and beliefs? 
 I outline the range of discourses which appear to have informed educational policy on religion 
in school in New Zealand and evidence these discourses in primary source material. Through 
genealogical analysis I show how discursive constraints and governmental techniques 
reproduce confessional religious instruction and disqualify education in religions and beliefs. 
Charting the Terrain 
In seeking to identify the key discourses which speak to each other through my interview data, 
primary source material and secondary literature pertaining to religion in New Zealand’s 
primary schools, I employ both deductive and inductive analysis of material. In his discussion 
of attitudes towards public expressions of Māori spirituality, legal historian Rex Ahdar 
identifies a number of category types.2 He provides a typology which differentiates between 
the attitudes of conservative and liberal theists and contrasts these with the views of secular 
rationalists, egalitarian liberals and affirmative action liberals. Ahdar tends towards extreme 
characterisation, rather than broad representation, in order to maximise the contrast 
between types, however he does recognise that his typology is not exhaustive of the positions 
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held.3 His depictions are also viewed through the lens of a conservative Christian discourse. 
Ahdar’s was the only model of such attitudinal categorisation within the available literature. 
Recognising a degree of congruity between the perspectives of my research participants 
towards religion in school and Ahdar’s attitudinal analysis, I have adopted some of Ahdar’s 
terminology. My own depictions of the discourses in operation are founded in an egalitarian 
liberal worldview and are open to correction from other perspectives.  
The discourses adapted from Ahdar’s work appear to operate largely, but not entirely, as 
primary discourses within both data and literature.4 My analysis may be described as 
deductive in nature to the extent that I have utilised Ahdar’s analytical framework of primary 
discourses. However, I also inductively identified a range of additional primary and secondary 
educational discourses which impact on religion in schools. This was an iterative process in 
which analysis of interview data, primary sources and secondary literature revealed a range of 
discourses which could then be used to conduct further research and analysis. A discourse 
analysis approach was taken to all the data, as described in Chapter Two.5 The data evidenced 
multiple ways of reasoning about religion in school which revealed quite distinct and 
competing constructions of, for example, religion, secularity, spirituality, diversity and the 
purpose of education. By grouping these ways of reasoning together across the data —at first 
noting references from primary and secondary sources and fieldwork material in groups on 
large A3 sheets— I identified, over a period of around two years, nine primary and six 
secondary operative discourses. Establishing descriptors for the discourses was not a 
straightforward matter and the limitations of the nomenclature chosen should be 
acknowledged. Ahdar’s categorisation was utilised where it reflected the ways of reasoning 
evidenced within the data. However, as I show below, the prefix “authoritarian” or “liberal” 
was sometimes added in order to further differentiate, and more accurately reflect, the 
discourses in evidence.6  
I have adopted, adapted and extended Ahdar’s categories for my discursive framework as 
follows. I adopted Ahdar’s “conservative theist” and “liberal theist” categories, renaming them 
the “conservative Christian” and the “liberal Christian” discourse to reflect the research 
context. My data necessitated differentiation between an “authoritarian secular rationalist” 
and a “liberal secular rationalist” discourse which have different approaches to religion in 




 Following James Gee’s definitions, noted on page 28. 
5
 See above, page 35. 
6
 The authoritarian and liberal demarcation is derived from philosopher Stephen Law, The War for 
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schools. I also distinguish between Ahdar’s “egalitarian liberal” discourse, in which religions 
are treated equally, and the “authoritarian liberal” discourse which seeks to liberalise 
conservative beliefs. I rename Ahdar’s “affirmative action” discourse the “social action liberal” 
discourse to encompass its redistributive and recognitional imperatives, in line with hard and 
soft forms of biculturalism identified in the literature and evidenced in my research.7 Ahdar 
mentions a sixth category which he does not name but describes as those sympathetic to New 
Age spiritualities, including indigenous spiritualities.8 I have included this within the “spiritual 
secularist” discourse. To these primary discourses I add the “evangelising Christian” discourse, 
evident from interview data and primary and secondary sources. My data and literature 
analysis revealed an additional range of discursive imperatives, impacting on the subject of 
religion in schools, to those identified by Ahdar on the subject of Māori spirituality. These are 
embedded in secondary discourses, operating at the institutional level in New Zealand primary 
schools: the neoliberal, legal, human rights, diversity, post-colonial and knowledge age 
discourses. The discourse names were sometimes derived directly from the research 
literature, for example neoliberal, knowledge age, social action liberal, post-colonial and 
diversity, as evidenced in the discussion in Chapter Five. In other cases I have employed new 
terms which were effective descriptors for example, evangelising and spiritual secularist 
discourse. I acknowledge that this plethora of discourses sometimes makes the thesis rather 
unwieldy. However, I would argue that it has been important to do justice to the data by 
identifying and naming the range of discourses observed. 
The advantage of following Ahdar’s typology of attitudes to Māori spirituality was that it 
provided a base from which to develop a more nuanced consideration of the operative 
discourses regarding religion in school. However, I acknowledge the problems inherent in this 
approach. Terms like conservative Christian, liberal Christian and secular rationalist are more 
commonly used —as does Ahdar — to describe fixed worldviews or groups of people. 
However, in this thesis I am using them as descriptors for specific sets of arguments, involving 
discursive constraints and imperatives, regarding policy on religion in school. Individuals in my 
thesis are not defined by the discourses upon which they draw. The perspectives identified do 
not represent a permanent account of the position of scholars or other individuals with regard 
to teaching religion. Rather they provide evidence of historically and socially situated 
occasions when individuals have found it expedient to draw on such a discourse to make their 
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case. They may do so differently on another occasion. However, primary discourses do often 
inform social and religious perspectives at an unconscious level and, when they achieve 
dominance and become embedded in institutions, they may indeed take on a more 
permanent nature and operate to constrain social policy and practice, as I show below. 
 A further problem in the (partial) adoption of a pre-existing analytical framework is that it 
may open the author to the charge of manipulating the data to fit Ahdar’s categories. 
However, this chapter makes clear the ways in which Ahdar’s types have been amended and 
extended in order to reflect the data collected, and the thesis evidences a much broader 
range of discourses than Ahdar’s framework supplies. 
It may also be argued that the discursive approach to analysis of the topic of religion in school 
makes the thesis rather broad in scope, tending towards sometimes superficial, rather than in-
depth historical treatment. Whilst acknowledging these limitations, I maintain that the 
discourse analysis approach has enabled me to focus on contemporary policy and practice, 
identifying the various ways in which “progressive”, newly dominant educational discourses 
serve to maintain historical practices. Constraints on education about religions and beliefs are 
also exposed in a way which would not have been achieved by a traditional historical 
treatment of the subject. In relation to the matter of historical/ contemporary analysis it 
should be noted that, in this thesis, the term conservative Christian is intended to describe a 
set of ideas about the way in which children should be educated in matters of religion. These 
ideas are based on the belief that New Zealand is a Christian country and that children should 
be inducted into this religion as part of their moral, social and educational development. 
These ideas were normative within the Christian social consensus which existed in New 
Zealand from the beginning of the European settlement until at least the late 1960s. It is clear 
that, within this consensus, a wide variety of Christian affiliations and beliefs existed, as 
exemplified by the cartoon from 1912, in Figure 1. This Christian social consensus was not 
characterised by high levels of church attendance among the general population but rather a 
kind of folk piety within which, as religious historian Geoffrey Troughton points out, the 
religious formation of children was the perceived priority.9 The language of “liberal” and 
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“conservative” Christianity is more usually applied from the period after the Second World 
War in New Zealand,10 and the imperative to inculcate children into Christian beliefs would 
not have been perceived as religiously conservative in the 19th and early 20th century. 
However, in the contemporary New Zealand social context it is appropriate to describe such 
views as characteristic of a conservative Christian discourse. Without wishing to use the term 
anachronistically, I do apply it across the historical and contemporary data to show how this 
set of ideas about children and religion—so dominant in the 19th and early 20th century—has 
maintained currency despite the erosion of the Christian social consensus in New Zealand. 
Therefore, when I use the phrase “dominant conservative Christian discourse”, I do not seek 
to categorise the historical or contemporary religious landscape of New Zealand as 
conservative Christian but to describe the prevailing attitudes to religion and education 
exemplified across the data. 
The constraints of this thesis do not permit a full discussion of the discourses identified. I have 
therefore summarised the characteristics of each primary discourse in Table 9, drawing 
attention to the way in which “religion”, “teaching about religion” and the “secular 
curriculum” are discursively constructed and the ensuing discursive imperatives for treatment 
of religion in school. In Table 10, I identify the ways in which the discursive imperatives of 
these secondary, educational discourses constrain, or afford opportunities for, both BiS and 
education in religions and beliefs.11 These implications are discussed more fully in a 
genealogical survey of primary literature below, in the review of literature in Chapter Five and 
within the data analysis in Chapters Six and Seven. 
The discursive terrain outlined is by no means exhaustive and represents only those 
discourses which can most readily be seen to have impacted on policy decisions or to have 
been utilised in debates regarding religion in primary schools. I follow these tables with a 
Foucaultian genealogical survey in which discursive constraints and imperatives are identified 
and evidenced within some key primary educational sources. This genealogy is not offered as 
a “God’s-eye” view, but as a reading of historical documents and events through an egalitarian 
liberal, critical realist and Foucaultian lens.  
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Genealogy: A History of the Present 
In the opening chapter of Discipline and Punish Foucault posed himself the question, why 
write a history of the prison? The answer he gave explains Foucault’s focus of interest in 
employing a genealogical method: “Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if 
one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means 
writing the history of the present.”12 
In this section I aim to follow a genealogical approach to the primary New Zealand literature 
from the 1877 parliamentary debates onwards, focussing on the ways in which the objects of 
religion and religious education are constructed within prevailing discourses at specific 
moments in time. The purpose is not to examine the history of religion in schools for its 
intrinsic interest, as definitive histories have been written.13 Neither is it my intention to 
justify current voluntary arrangements based on longevity or legal legitimacy (a conservative 
Christian position) nor to reproduce a celebratory (authoritarian secular rationalist) reading of 
the Education Act of 1877. In Foucault’s terms either approach would be to write “a history of 
the past in terms of the present,” inscribing both the 1964 and 1877 legislation with an 
unwarranted 21st- century significance. The purpose of this genealogy is to show how 
historically and socially contingent discourses, in New Zealand society and in education, have 
influenced and constrained the development of the curriculum regarding religion in schools. I 
demonstrate some of the factors which led to the passing of the secular clause, the legalising 
of the Nelson System and their ongoing consequences for the treatment of religion in 
education. I consider the ways in which dominant discourses reproduce the status quo and 
disqualify education in religions and beliefs from the curriculum. Following a Foucaultian 
methodology I also ask: what is being accomplished, at the institutional level, by the 
continued reproduction of BiS and disqualification of education in religions and beliefs from 
the curriculum? I suggest that the institutional accommodation of BiS, and concurrent 
resistance to alternative constructions of religious education, are constituents of a secular 
(neo)-liberal governmentality in New Zealand schools, which serve narrow economic interests 
of the nation state. I parenthesise the prefix “neo” because, as will become evident, this 
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governmentality draws on elements of all the liberal discourses described in Table 9, in 
addition to the neoliberal discourse. 
1877 Parliamentary Debates 
The parliamentary debates of 1877 were set in a religiously homogeneous but 
denominationally diverse social context. New Zealand Census returns indicated a 95% 
affiliation to the Christian faith in 1878.14 Seeking to avoid the perceived injustices of the dual 
system of church and state schools established from 1870 in the United Kingdom,15 and 
looking towards Australian examples of “free, compulsory and secular” state education,16 a 
primary concern was to unite the colony with the provision of a national education system, 
paid for by taxes, compulsory and agreeable to all. The issues of religious instruction, the 
provision of daily readings of the Bible and the reciting of the Lord’s Prayer proved to be 
bones of contention, particularly dividing Protestants and Catholics. A balance needed to be 
found between providing for the moral and religious formation of children and allowing for 
the freedom of conscience of teachers and parents who did not subscribe to Protestant 
beliefs.  
Charles C. Bowen, Minister for Education and architect of the Act, took a position reflecting 
the Christian social consensus of the time. Accepting the need to “exclude religious teaching 
from our schools” as a matter of fairness,17 he attempted to mitigate this with the insertion of 
Clause 85, Subsection 3 in the draft legislation, proposing religious exercises at the start of 
each day, which he here justified to the house: 
While it is the duty of the state to take care that all children within its 
borders are educated, and take charge of the secular education of the 
people, it is bound so to use its power that it may in no way tend to blunt 
or deaden that intuitive reverence for a higher power, that indestructible 
hope of immortality, which distinguishes us from the beasts that perish 
[. . .]. I feel certain that it is the desire of nineteen-twentieths of the people 
of this country that the Bible should not be absolutely excluded from public 
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schools [. . . ]. It is proposed in the Bill that school shall be opened every 
morning, at an affixed hour, by the reading of the Bible and the Lord’s 
Prayer; but it is not made necessary that any child should attend at that 
time if his parents should object. I can scarcely conceive that, if men were 
to consider carefully what the effect of such a rule would be, anyone could 
object to it on the ground that it would be an interference with the 
consciences of the people; and I will but ask honourable gentlemen what a 
very serious matter it would be to deprive our children—the children of 
this rising community—of the knowledge of that book which has been an 
education to countless generations of English children, and the language of 
which, unconsciously to ourselves, illustrates our conversation form day to 
day.18 
Within the Christian social census described, it was axiomatic that the children of the colony 
should learn to be reverential towards God and receive knowledge of the Bible and the Lord’s 
Prayer as part of their education. It was almost inconceivable that others should object. These 
views exemplify the conservative Christian discourse on religion in school described in Table 9. 
While Bowen lost the vote on Subsection 3,19 the objections raised during the debates were 
based not upon antireligious or secularising sentiments but on an acute awareness of the 
strength of religious convictions within the community and the “heartburning and ill feeling 
amongst the population” that may result.20 Thus it was argued that if Subsection 3 were 
introduced, Catholic teachers would not be able to teach in state schools either as a matter of 
conscience or because school committees would not appoint them;21 Protestant teachers 
would object to reading the Bible without being able to give further teaching;22 reading aloud 
in a “parrot like way” each day would breed irreverence towards the Bible;23 Catholic and 
Jewish children would be left outside in the cold and rain while this teaching took place;24 
Protestants should object (on behalf of Catholics and Jews) to any infringement of freedom of 
thought;25 Catholic schools would rightly refuse to assimilate into the (Protestant) state 
system;26 Catholic parents would be expected to contribute to a state system at which their 
children could not attend;27 since the state would be funding Protestant religious observances, 
Catholic schools would be justified in claiming funding from general taxation—a “ruinous 
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expense”;28 children should, in any case, receive religious teaching at home and in Sunday 
Schools.29 
Perhaps summing up the feeling of the house, Independent MP Cecil De Lautour stated: 
I do not think there is any objection to religion in the school, but the 
objection is to creeds in the school. There is no man yet bold enough to 
stand up in this house and disavow any sympathy with religion; there is no 
man who would say that children are not to be trained up in religion; but 
we do hold that religion can be taught by the church—can be taught at the 
hearth, and it is not necessary that it should be introduced into the daily 
school.30 
It is clear from the parliamentary debates that it was strength of Christian consensus in New 
Zealand which led to the compromise of the secular clause, rather than authoritarian secular 
rationalist discursive imperatives.31 The intention was that children should receive their 
secular education in the schools and their denominational religious education through their 
families and churches. The Act would certainly have foundered without the deletion of 
subsection three, and the passing of the secular clause at subsection two, of Clause 85.32 
One voice stood apart, in expressing a more separationist perspective. Robert Stout, New 
Zealand Premier and first President of the New Zealand Freethought Association stated: 
I say, as the state is bound only to look after secular education, it should be 
confined to its own sphere [. . .].The state should only look after that 
education which concerns it as a whole; and it cannot be said that it has 
got anything to do with religion at all.33 
In his Presidential address to the Otago Educational Institute in 1879, Stout repeated this 
view: “It is said we are a Christian nation and the Bible is recognised by the state. I deny both 
propositions. As a nation we have nothing to do with religion.”34 
This is an authoritarian secular rationalist position on religion in school, as defined in Table 9;35 
a minority view in the 19th century and not one that appeared to be shared by those who 
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voted for the secular clause at subsection two, or the deletion of subsection three. However, 
as I show below, it appears that with the separation of religion from the secular curriculum in 
1877, two discursive constructions obtained a degree of permanence and self-evidence within 
the education system with far-reaching consequences for the subject discipline of religious 
education: the conservative Christian construction of “religion” as (Protestant) Christianity 
and the authoritarian secular rationalist construction of “secular” as “nothing to do with 
religion”. I suggest that these constructions are not permanent and self-evident but 
contingent on a 19th-century historical, social and legislative context. 
Reception of the 1877 Secular Clause 
Bishop Hadfield told the Wellington Anglican Synod after the passing of the Act: “Unless I have 
greatly mistaken the character of the settlers in New Zealand, there will not be found a 
majority who will long be content that their children should be doomed to instruction in 
Godless schools.”36 
Presbyterian minister Rutherford Waddell vociferously warned that:  
[I]f we take away from the roots of a child’s character the great verities of 
religion which are summed up in the Bible, and which are its natural foods, 
and substitute the bald aridities of secularism, you will look in vain for 
those fruits of the spirit that have raised men above the level of emigrating 
rats and free-loving baboons.37 
For Waddell it was self-evident that a system of secular schooling was placing the morals of 
the nation’s children in jeopardy. These conservative Christian discursive imperatives on 
religion in school, prevalent within the Christian social consensus described above, appear to 
have galvanised enthusiastic but ultimately unsuccessful campaigns by Anglicans and Catholics 
to secure state funding for denominational schools, and by Wesleyans and Presbyterians to 
revoke the secular clause to allow religious exercises in schools. The Bible-in-Schools League, 
established in 1903, made a daily religious instruction class, as part of the curriculum, their 
goal.38 A total of 42 Private Members Bills requesting revocation were placed before 
parliament between 1877 and 1935.39 It is my view that the tug-of-war over the curriculum 
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which took place in this period led to an entrenchment of positions, setting up a binary of 
Christian Religious Instruction versus Secular State Education which established the terms of 
subsequent debate on religion in school. Teachers, represented by the NZEI, opposed any 
impingement on secular education. The possible imposition of religious tests upon teachers 
was to be vehemently resisted.40 The education profession held up the secular clause as the 
defender of its professional integrity and the authoritarian secular rationalist definition of 
“secular”—”nothing to do with religion”—became normalised. 
In Figure 4, a cartoon published in The Observer in 1912 bears the caption “Your conscience or 
your living—A Bible-in-Schools Hold-up”.41 The authoritarian secular rationalist discourse is 
evident in the construction of the secular school teacher as protector of a form of education 
which promotes rational thought and autonomy. The minister of religion, representing the 
Bible-in-Schools League, is constructed as imposing at gun-point a form of religious 
indoctrination involving blind faith and heteronomy. The conceptualisation of education as 
intrinsically separate from religion and indeed, in opposition to its aims, was one which 
obtained currency among academics, politicians and journalists in the latter half of the 20th 
century in New Zealand.42 But it did so within the discursive constructions of “religion in 
school” and “secular education” established within this fractious historical context.  
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Figure 4: “Your Conscience or Your Living” Cartoon, 1912 
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Education historian Colin McGeorge has shown that, notwithstanding the passing of the 1877 
Act, “the schools continued to operate [. . .] in a professedly Christian, predominantly 
Protestant milieu, which saw nothing odd or illegal in a certain amount of traffic between 
secular schooling and revealed religion”.43 McGeorge describes: the large numbers of clerics 
on education boards and school committees; the employment of (Protestant) clerics as 
teachers and head teachers; the common practice of school teachers running Sunday school 
classes; the expectation that clergy would provide prayers and benedictions on formal 
occasions in schools; the large number of references to God and religion in school text books; 
and the posting of the ten commandments on classroom walls.44 This analysis exemplifies the 
Christian social consensus in New Zealand society and the education system at this time, and 
provides evidence of what I have described as dominant conservative Christian discursive 
imperatives informing treatment of religion in school.  
However, the desire for children to receive religious formation was evidently not always 
matched by a commitment from churches and parents to undertake this teaching themselves, 
and the call was repeatedly made by the Bible-in-Schools League, as discussed above, for the 
repeal of the secular clause. In 1934, the NZEI attempted to redraw the lines between the 
secular curriculum and religious instruction in schools: 
The teaching profession is rightly concerned to see that functions are not 
foisted upon it which are beyond the true scope of the school and which 
transcend its proper influence and authority over the individual conscience. 
The indifference of parents and the failure of the churches to accept their 
obligations and to find the means and energy necessary to their 
performance are the cause of this self-defeating willingness to devolve the 
teaching of things sacred upon our secular schools.45 
The prevalence of the conservative Christian discursive imperative concerning the religious 
formation of children, and the authoritarian secular rationalist construction of the secular 
curriculum, go some way to explaining the widespread appeal of the Nelson System which 
gradually became normalised in New Zealand primary schools. This system gave the 
appearance of protecting both the secular clause—and thus the integrity of the teaching 
profession—along with the rights of church volunteers to give religious instruction.  
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The secular clause of the 1877 Education Act Clause 84 (2) had stated: “The school shall be 
kept open five days in each week for at least four hours, two of which in the forenoon and two 
in the afternoon shall be consecutive, and the teaching shall be entirely of a secular 
character.”46 And at subsection (3): “The school buildings may be used on days and at hours 
other than those used for public school purposes upon such terms as the Committee may 
from time to time prescribe.” The Nelson System evolved from a strict interpretation of the 
secular clause commonly attributed to J. H. McKenzie, a Presbyterian minister in Nelson, in 
1897.47 The argument was put that since schools must legally be open for two hours in the 
morning for secular instruction, but were in fact open for three hours each morning, an 
“official” start to the day could be delayed while religious instruction—Bible-in-Schools—took 
place. This could be provided by a teacher, clergyman or church volunteer, without 
contravention of the Act.48 McGeorge notes that this legal loophole was discovered a good 
deal earlier, citing Bishop Harper of Christchurch in 1878.49 E. O. Blamires, organising secretary 
of the Bible-in-Schools League from 1927-1945, insisted that it was, in fact, always the 
intention of Bowen, the Minister for Education, to make this allowance for religious 
instruction, calling it the Bowen (Nelson) System.50 A legal discourse was here co-opted in 
support of the dominant conservative Christian discursive imperative within which the 
nation’s children should be provided with religious instruction. After the election of a Labour 
government which sided with the NZEI, in 1935, the League abandoned its attempts to revoke 
the secular clause and concentrated its efforts on encouraging the churches to maximise 
opportunities available to them through the Nelson System. 
A system of daily worship, as well as religious instruction, seems to have been widely 
implemented through the Nelson System. In 1938, in opposition to these practices, Labour 
Minister of Education Peter Fraser insisted that the common practice of daily devotional 
observances before secular instruction, while within the letter of the law, contravened the 
spirit of the law. A Bill before the Parliamentary Education Committee to this effect appears to 
have been met with a deluge of submissions from around the country and was withdrawn. 
This episode was described with relish by Blamires who says,”[Fraser] could see how the 
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whole country was aroused and wisely he decided to abide by the status quo”, his proposals 
being “out of step with the community as a whole”.51 The Very Rev Dr J. D. Salmond 
commented on the legality of Bible teaching in school: “I think it is a case of what the 
community is willing to sanction outgrowing a legal framework.”52 A community-wide 
Christian social consensus, in which a conservative Christian discourse on religion in school 
was embedded, was again in evidence in education.  
While evangelising imperatives certainly informed this thinking, Troughton’s research also 
highlights the early justification for religious instruction on grounds of training in morality. 
Children would be taught about the life and teaching of Jesus as an aid to their moral 
development.53 In this sense an instrumental or governmental role is discernible, which 
appears to take precedence over religious or educational imperatives. For example, 
Troughton’s analysis of teaching materials used in Sunday Schools, Church schools and Bible-
in-Schools lessons between 1900 and 1940 demonstrates that a certain amount of license was 
taken with the Biblical accounts of Jesus’ childhood in the service of the promotion of 
“civilisation and social order”.54 Jesus was presented as obedient to his parents, helpful 
around the home, industrious in the workshop, kind to animals, a lover of the countryside, 
always said “No” to what was wrong, and was diligent over his homework.55 These stories 
have little or no Biblical foundation, but gave clear moral directives. As Troughton explains: “In 
a context where religion, morality and national prosperity were frequently linked, children’s 
religious identity was a matter of national significance.”56 Troughton’s research shows how 
religious formation explicitly fostered diligence and industry as a means of ensuring both 
societal wellbeing and economic prosperity for the colony. Troughton gives more emphasis to 
the former intention. But the resources he cites evidence an imperative to improve 
productivity alongside the inculcation of religious belief. In Foucaultian terms, religious 
instruction appeared to have been, at least partly, co-opted as a disciplinary technique in the 
economic interests of the nation state. The governmental role of religious instruction at this 
time converged with, but was distinct from, the prevailing social consensus that New Zealand 
should be a Christian country, and evangelising imperatives regarding children’s salvation. It is 
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likely that this emphasis on moral teaching (in line with the social aims of the school), rather 
than contentious religious doctrine, contributed to the willingness of secular schools to 
accommodate such teaching.57 The promotion of children’s compliance to normative morals 
and values in the national economic interest is an ongoing theme in the treatment of religion 
in New Zealand’s schools. It is a constituent of the secular (neo)-liberal governmentality 
identified in this research.  
The Currie Report and 1964 Education Act 
In 1960, the Currie Commission was tasked with reviewing the whole New Zealand education 
system, in particular teacher training, Maori education, secondary education and 
administration. The matter of religion in schools also came within its remit. After two years, 
and receiving “very many and very lengthy submissions”, it concluded that “it seems 
incontrovertible that a majority of New Zealand parents would wish their children to have 
some form of introduction to religion”.58 The report stated that 80% of primary schools were 
already operating a system of Bible-in-Schools at this time.59 The Nelson System appeared to 
have been widely adopted as a solution to the disputes over religion and education which had 
characterised the period between 1877 and 1935. Census returns for 1960 indicated an 89% 
affiliation to Christianity.60 
Considering the matter of the secular clause, the Currie Commission noted that the ongoing 
practice of volunteers leading religious instruction at different times of day, in different 
classes, certainly contravened the requirement of the 1877 Act that secular instruction should 
be given for two consecutive hours before or after lunch.61 Recognising the prevailing Christian 
social consensus (and concurrent conservative Christian discourse on religion in school), the 
Currie Commission recommended not the cessation of the illegal practice, but the 
amendment of the law to make current practices legal. While admitting that “the retention of 
secularity in primary schools can be reconciled only with some difficulty with the legislation of 
facilities for voluntary instructors”, the Commission maintained that such a difficulty could be 
overcome through what is, in effect, an ontological transformation of part of the regular 
school day. They recommended that, at any approved time, a given class full of children may 
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be deemed to be “closed” in order for religious instruction to take place:62 “The essential point 
in the view of the Commission is that the two elements—secular instruction and religious 
instruction—should remain separate and the school as a secular institution be officially and 
unequivocally out of session when pupils are receiving religious instruction.”63 
In line with the submission from the NZEI, the Commission recommended that the secular 
clause be retained. When the Religious Instruction and Observances Act was subsequently 
discussed in parliament the legalising of the Nelson System appears to have had cross-party 
support with no members opposing the amendments to the 1877 Act. However, a strong 
conservative Christian discourse on religion in schools was in evidence which over-ruled the 
Commission’s perhaps more liberal secular rationalist suggestions that parents should opt in, 
rather than out, and that school teachers should not teach religious instruction.64 The Minister 
of Education, Hon W. B. Tennent, explained that the Department considered opting in to be 
“cumbersome and administratively difficult”,65 and that to prevent “devout Christian men and 
women” currently employed as classroom teachers from speaking to the children about the 
Christian faith would be to “violate freedom of conscience” and “fundamentally wrong”.66 
While the latter point was disputed,67 both the Bill, and the conservative Christian discursive 
imperatives exemplified by Tennent were widely affirmed: 
I believe that religion has a very important place in the development of any 
young person. I am satisfied that no young person is able to reach full 
development of character without it. I am certain that this Bill will meet 
with the wishes of the great majority of parents.68 
Tennent and other Members were at pains to set the tone of this debate against the 
sectarianism and secularism which they perceived to have characterised the debates of 1877. 
They emphasised the spirit of ecumenism which now existed and the unity of purpose found 
amongst the Protestant churches, as evidenced by the common syllabus provided by the New 
Zealand Council for Christian Education (NZCCE).69 All agreed that the legislation was neither 
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contentious nor problematic, but merely a formality which would “regularise,” “legalise” and 
render “unassailable” a practice which was “well established,” “customary,” “almost 
universally applied” and indeed “essential” to children’s education.70 Even the opposition of 
the NZEI was restricted to the issue of class teachers delivering religious instruction, in case of 
discrimination. This was dismissed as old-fashioned thinking on the part of the NZEI, by 
National MP Thomas Templeton Murray: “We are not living in 1890, we are living in 1962, and 
we are broader minded men and women.”71  
 From a more critical perspective it may be asked why—if these parliamentarians were so 
confident of the unanimity of the churches, and nation at large, on the importance of religion 
in school—they did not have the courage of their convictions and revoke the secular clause. 
This would surely have been a more honest reflection of the intentions of the 1962 Religious 
Instruction and Observances Act,72 and subsequent 1964 Education Act.73 It would have 
brought the teaching of religion within the remit of educationalists and, in due course, 
exposed curricula to normative educational requirements. However, these “broad-minded 
men” were operating under the constraints of a conservative Christian discourse, with a 
single-minded perception of the formational role of religion in education which had broad 
social consensus. They were also constrained by an authoritarian secular rationalist 
construction of secular education within the education establishment, and a fear of 
undermining the Christian social consensus in New Zealand with a more far-reaching debate 
on the secular clause. They had good reason to be afraid. In spite of the Parliamentarians’ 
assurances of unanimity, the Currie Commission had recognised that it was protestations from 
school boards about the legality of the Nelson System—and threats of legal action to the 
NZCCE—which made the new legislation necessary.74 This makes the statements of the 
Parliamentarians appear somewhat disingenuous. They were, in fact, well aware of opposition 
among some educationalists and parents to Bible-in-Schools. From a Foucaultian perspective, 
the passing of this legislation may be seen as a governmental technique designed to subjugate 
the secular rationalist discursive imperatives behind this opposition and consolidate the 
conservative Christian status quo: the perception of New Zealand as a Christian country and 
the need to inculcate in children Christian beliefs.  
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The legal construct of school closure appears to have been designed more to protect the 
rights of teachers and volunteers to give confessional religious instruction in primary school 
than to preserve the secular character of the education system. It is a construct which was 
entirely contingent upon the historical context of the first half of the 20th century: a context 
characterised by a Christian social consensus within which conservative Christian discursive 
imperatives on religion in school were dominant. But I believe its establishment within law has 
imbued the Nelson System and BiS with the status of a permanent solution to religion in 
education and appears to have rendered it unassailable to the influence of alternative 
educational and egalitarian liberal discursive imperatives which obtained currency from this 
period, in other jurisdictions.75  
The Currie Commission had been clear to differentiate between religious instruction and 
teaching about religion within the curriculum. While discursively constrained from establishing 
“anything so extensive as a new core or School Certificate subject such as religious 
knowledge” it nonetheless recommended “that the term secular be not interpreted to exclude 
reference to religion and religious history in the primary and secondary syllabuses of social 
studies [. . .], and that the limitations of treatment involved be carefully explained.”76 
However, this differentiation of terminology did not enter the legislation and it appears that 
the “limitations of treatment” were subsequently emphasised over the possibilities afforded 
by the curriculum.77 Instead, with the incorporation of the Religious Instruction and 
Observances Act into the Education Act of 1964, the conservative Christian understanding of 
religious instruction—Christian formation—was enshrined in statute. At the same time an 
authoritarian secular rationalist conception of the secular curriculum—having “nothing to do 
with religion”—appeared to be embedded in New Zealand Law. The effective legal separation 
of religion and education, and the consequent ceding of responsibility for religious teaching to 
the churches, has, I argue, had a stultifying effect on the development of education about 
religions and beliefs at both primary and secondary school level in New Zealand. The currency 
of this authoritarian secular rationalist construction of secular may have been furthered by 
academics whose vision of New Zealand as progressive and enlightened was coterminous with 
its rejection of an established church and its protection of the secular education system. 
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Historian John Stenhouse has demonstrated how prominent and influential New Zealand 
academics—such as theologian Lloyd Geering, and historian Keith Sinclair—systematically 
redescribed the history of New Zealand in “secular nationalist” terms from the 1960s 
onwards. In these accounts New Zealand was cast as “the world’s most advanced, 
enlightened, and secular liberal democracy” having wrestled education out of the hands of the 
churches from the earliest times.78 Stenhouse describes this project as a “narrative contract” 
with the nation state.79 He suggests that the appeal of Sinclair and Geering’s “celebratory 
histories” to secular politicians may have lain in their power to “eliminate rival sources of 
intellectual and moral authority” to that of the nation state.80 As Stenhouse points out, the 
influence of such scholars reached far beyond their numerous publications. Many future 
opinion-formers, such as cabinet ministers and journalists, would pass through their hands as 
university students. Stenhouse shows how, by such means, scholars appear to have framed an 
identity for New Zealanders which obtained dominance in the academy, in the media and the 
government.81 Within this “secular salvation story”,82 the positioning of New Zealand as 
educationally progressive appeared to become contingent upon the preservation of the 
secular clause of 1877 and the continued dissociation of education from religion. Stenhouse’s 
analysis of the “secular New Zealand thesis” presents, I believe, an explanatory backdrop to 
past and ongoing resistance within the education academy to education in religions and 
beliefs. It appears to have evolved as a kind of foundation myth for the New Zealand state. As 
historian Jane Simpson notes, the association of secularism with national identity has 
preserved the secular clause as “a semi-sacred object in a sacred symbol system” with “the 
timeless quality once given to ‘Holy Writ’”.83 Competing discursive constructions and 
imperatives fail to persuade—or even to be granted serious consideration—because they 
appear to represent a threat to the narrative of “progressive” New Zealand. The idea of the 
secular narrative in which religion is constructed as a private matter, separate from public life, 
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which does not impinge on a New Zealander’s autonomy or their loyalty to the nation state, is 
intrinsic to the secular (neo)-liberal governmentality identified in my research.  
Liberal Christian Education 
In 1973 the NZCCE was replaced by the CEC, the leadership of which argued from a liberal 
Christian perspective that, with increased pluralism, a role should be found for religious 
teaching in primary schools. The Department of Education, under the influence of the CEC, 
appeared willing to reconsider the importance of the religious dimension in moral and 
spiritual education in primary and secondary schools.84 A liberal Christian discourse appears to 
have obtained some currency at this time allowing both the CEC and the Department of 
Education to conceptualise a construction of religion which was supportive of, rather than in 
opposition to, educational endeavour. However the distinction between teaching about 
religion and adopting religion as part of personal development was not clearly articulated, as I 
show below. 
Director of Education William Renwick, writing in 1975, could see no objection to the inclusion 
of teaching about religion “as a cultural product, as a personal ideal and as one source of 
morality”.85 He saw religion as a personal resource with which children should be equipped as 
part of their education and stated: “If the intention is that religion serve the enlargement of 
understanding, the question is no longer whether, but how.”86 The same year, with little 
fanfare, the Private Schools Conditional Integration Act made it possible for private church 
schools to be integrated into the state-funded system. Soon afterwards the teacher training 
colleges began to make available classes in (Christian) religion for those intending to teach in 
integrated church schools. As part of the 1975 legislation, an amendment was made to the Act 
of 1964. Section 78A made it possible for the Minister to grant secular state schools the right 
to teach more than the half an hour a week of religious instruction provided in the original 
Act. The intentions of this clause have been disputed, but historian Rory Sweetman indicates 
that one of the orchestrators of the legislation was a devout Presbyterian who felt that, within 
an integrated system, state schools should be entitled to increased religious instruction.87 
Whatever its motivation, Section 78A and the Integration Act of 1975 appear to evidence a 
blurring of the boundary between religion and state education in a perhaps less dogmatic and 
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more liberal climate.88 The CEC went to considerable lengths to redescribe religion in school as 
religious education, and to reconstruct “secular” to include openness to a variety of 
worldviews—in line with a liberal Christian discourse—at this time.89 They devised resources 
exploring religious and ethical issues for use in secondary school social studies classes.90 It is 
clear that some in the teaching profession were doubtful about the legality of these resources. 
McGeorge, for example, was scathing about such “illegal” attempts to infiltrate the secular 
curriculum, claiming that the “distinction between teaching religion and teaching about 
religion was first fumbled and then dropped” (emphasis in original).91 
In line with a growing liberal Christian discourse, the Department of Education set up two 
Hogben House conferences in 1974 and 1975 and two further conferences at Lopdell House in 
1976 and 1977 for educationalists, including the CEC, to discuss issues of morality, spirituality 
and religion in both primary and secondary education. A committee was then detailed to 
review these matters in a report chaired by J.G. Johnson, named Growing, Sharing, Learning: 
The Report of the Committee on Health and Social Education.92 The Johnson Report reflected, 
to a large degree, a liberal Christian discourse, co-opting the language of “ultimate concerns” 
and “the spiritual dimension” alongside concerns for “tolerance and understanding of other 
people” and respect for difference in a “pluralistic and multicultural society”.93 It suggested 
that schools could assist children in “seeking meaning and purpose in life” and that “students 
could discuss the tenets of various religions on a comparative basis”.94 But an undergirding 
expectation of religious belief was evident.95 
The authors of the report failed to clearly differentiate religious formation from education 
about religions, and propagated a form of religious universalism regarding religious belief. This 
failure left the report open to attack from both secularists, such as the newly-formed 
Committee for the Defence of Secular Education, and from conservative Christians in the 
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churches.96 Within an authoritarian secular rationalist discourse the motivation behind the 
proposed reconstruction of the term “religion” was viewed with great suspicion. McGeorge 
represented this perspective: “[T]here are arguments which depend on first defining religion 
as widely as possible—e.g. as ‘ultimate concern’. Having stretched the term out of all 
recognition one can then let it snap back in practice to mean ‘religion’ in the ordinary sense of 
the term, or even just Christianity.”97  
From the conservative Christian perspective the introduction of a universal “spiritual 
dimension,” and the lack of specifically Christian teaching, was anathema. Rev. C. W. Haskell, 
in his self-published critique of the Johnson Report, could not conceive of a form of religious 
teaching which watered down Biblical truths and omitted the most important details: “One of 
the most extraordinary facts about the report is its suppression of any mention of Jesus, the 
greatest benefactor of mankind! [. . .] It is surely unthinkable that He can be left out of 
account when pondering educational matters.”98 Haskell rejected out of hand the 
universalising tendencies of the report: “The report suggests that the world's religions have 
common areas. But it is clearly impossible for a religion which believes in a Supreme Being to 
have any basic thing in common with one that does not.”99 In discursive terms, the liberal 
Christian attempt to position religion within the curriculum, and to obtain educational 
currency for broader definitions of religion and secular, was thwarted by influential 
conservative Christian and authoritarian secular rationalist discursive imperatives both in 
education and in wider society.100 
This appears to be the closest that New Zealand’s Department of Education has come to 
including teaching about religions within the curriculum at either primary or secondary school 
level. The failure of the enterprise has its roots in contingent constructions of religion and 
secular embedded in the 1964 Education Act. This legislation meant that attempts to broaden 
the debate about religion and to bring the subject within the curriculum were inevitably led by 
the CEC, rather than by the teaching profession. For teachers, as Brian Turley and Margaret 
Reid Martin— both former General Secretaries of the CEC— pointed out, religion was “one of 
those controversial areas which are sensitive to deal with in school and therefore safest 
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avoided”.101 The resulting attempt to inculcate the nation’s children with a liberal Christian 
worldview by the Johnson Committee appears to have polarised, rather than united, the 
community. The consequences were threefold: debates about religion in schools were 
subsequently avoided for fear of stirring up additional controversy;102 a further entrenchment 
took place of the widespread authoritarian secular rationalist construction of secular 
education as “nothing to do with religion” and dominant conservative Christian construction 
of religious teaching as “confessional religious instruction”, i.e., a reproduction of the status 
quo; the CEC retreated to its role as provider in Bible-in-Schools, and a more conservative 
form of religious instruction was promoted in the nation’s schools, as the disillusioned liberal 
vanguard within the organisation withdrew.103  
Normative Confessional Christian Instruction 
Also indicative of the tussle which was already taking place between liberal and conservative 
Christians within the CEC, in the mid-1970s, were the changes to the CEC’s policy statement. A 
discursive shift from liberal to conservative and evangelising Christian discourses was notable. 
The 1975 draft policy states: 
The Commission sees a specific contribution from churches to lie in the 
field of Religious Education. By Religious Education the Commission means 
learning to understand and appreciate the beliefs by which people live. It is 
appropriate in New Zealand to give particular emphasis to the Christian 
faith because it has been a pervasive emphasis through our cultural 
heritage and history. The Commission recognises that the primary 
responsibility for such Religious Education in these terms can be 
distinguished from the church’s evangelistic and nurturing activities.104 
This may be seen as a liberal Christian attempt to reconstruct the work of the CEC into 
provision of a non-confessional form of liberal religious education in state schools. Amid the 
conservative Christian backlash within the CEC, the Presbyterian Church almost withdrew 
from the Commission.105 The new policy, produced in 1976 after consultation with the 
churches, is still in use and does not appear to have been much revised since its publication:106  
The commission holds that religion holds a central place in human 
experience and that an adequate educational system must include 
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Religious Education. By Religious Education the Commission means 
learning to understand and appreciate the beliefs by which people live as 
an aid to the development of the pupils’ own beliefs and values. While 
acknowledging that there are other views of life that would have a place in 
religious programmes we believe that it is appropriate in New Zealand to 
give particular emphasis to the Christian faith, the Bible, and the life and 
teachings of Jesus, because of their pervasive influence through our 
cultural heritage and history, and their continuing power and relevance.107 
While the first half of the statement may reflect universalising liberal Christian sentiments and 
recognition of differing worldviews, a discursive shift takes place during the remainder of the 
policy. With its emphasis on the children’s personal beliefs, and the inclusion of the power and 
relevance of the Bible, Christian faith and Jesus’ life and teaching, over and above learning 
about cultural heritage, this version of the policy drew on conservative and evangelising 
Christian discourses in a way that the 1975 document did not.108 Intrinsic to this discursive 
shift within the CEC was the change to Religion in Life, an Australian programme produced by 
Access Ministries (formerly the Council for Christian Education in Schools) in Victoria, as its 
new Agreed Syllabus from 1978.109 Public debate about including religion within the 
curriculum appears to have been disqualified either by the conservative Christian discourse or 
by the authoritarian secular rationalist discourse, or both, from this point on. 
An example of this may be seen within Parliamentary debates in 1983, when the CEC 
requested more flexibility in teaching hours. Clause 11A of the Draft Education Amendment 
Bill provided for an extension from half an hour to one hour a week, not to exceed the 20 
hours a year stipulated by the Education Act 1964. In a move perhaps calculated to minimise 
discussion on the subject, Clause 11A was tabled as a supplementary order paper after the 
select committee had finished its hearings and there had been no opportunity for submissions 
in person.110 Certainly Mr Terris, member for Western Hutt, who wished to use the 
opportunity to revisit the recommendations of the Johnson Report and discuss the 
shortcomings of the Nelson System, suggested this had been a deliberate strategy to push the 
clause through without debate: 
Has the Minister a fear? Must healthy debate on religious education 
somehow be contained and kept to a minimum at all costs? Is the Minister 
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afraid that the question of religious education, values education and 
education in human relationships might be thrown open? Recent events 
would give credence to the view that the Minister does not want an 
informed debate on the content of religious education in our schools. That 
is an absurd situation.111 
It seems very likely that the divisive nature of previous debates, couched in the terms set by 
conservative Christian and authoritarian secular rationalist discourses and the ambivalent 
language of the liberal Christian discourse, did result in the somewhat evasive introduction of 
Clause 11A. But a conservative Christian discursive imperative to support the CEC was also in 
evidence.  
In opposition to clause 11A, Mr Marshall cited a submission from the NZEI which was 
concerned to avoid the “possibility of extensive inroads into the school day for religious 
instruction that was at the heart of the secular debates in the latter part of the last 
century”.112 When considered alongside the extra provision for religious instruction made in 
Section 78A, as part of the Private Schools Conditional Integration Act, the Labour Opposition 
agreed with the NZEI that clause 11A was a step too far. Either 78A should be repealed or this 
Clause should be rejected.113 However, for the Minister of Education, Hon M. L. Wellington, 
the matter was self-evident and objection inconceivable: 
The Government’s view is that the maximum period of instruction is 
reasonable on educational grounds. I cannot understand how it could be 
otherwise [. . .]. The Government has made that change because the 
Churches Education Commission which has the responsibility for this 
matter in the broadest sense, reported that it had some practical problems 
[. . .]. The Government has had no difficulty in trying to help out the 
Churches Education Commission. I am surprised that the Opposition has 
difficulty in doing so.114 
These comments are indicative of conservative Christian imperatives which sought to preserve 
the status quo of Bible-in-Schools by both suppressing parliamentary discussion on the matter 
and by disqualifying the concerns of the Opposition and educationalists represented by the 
NZEI. The result, with the passing of the Educational Amendment Act, was the reproduction of 
conservative Christian policy and practice in New Zealand primary schools. The Ministerial 
endorsement of religious instruction as “educational” served to further position Bible-in-
Schools as normative within the education system.  
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The Curriculum Review and Biculturalism 
A Curriculum Review in 1986, instigated by Marshall as the new Labour Minister of Education, 
and written by the Curriculum Development Division (CDD) within the Department of 
Education (in consultation with a wide range of teacher representatives), provides further 
evidence of disqualification of religion from the primary and secondary school curriculum. The 
question was posed, “What should young people learn and experience in schools?” The 
committee, in its draft report of a seven-month long consultation process, made the following 
comment: 
The question of religious teaching was not mentioned often. A small but 
often vigorously expressed response called for the whole school curriculum 
to be based exclusively on the Bible or Christian teachings. Others 
suggested that a more comparative approach to religion ought to be part 
of the school curriculum.115 
In another section entitled “What do you expect of our schools?” the committee rejected both 
these approaches, saying: “Although it has noted the request that schools consider the 
promotion of religious and Christian studies, the Committee believes that State schools should 
remain secular.”116 The report thus conflated the two forms of religious teaching and 
operating within an authoritarian secular rationalist construction of secular—”nothing to do 
with religion”—excluded them from the secular curriculum. A following section on “How 
should schools reflect the many cultures in New Zealand?” made no recommendations on 
teaching about religious diversity.117  
Interestingly the full report, published the following year, changed to a position of support for 
both the secular curriculum and religious instruction in schools, in line with the Education Act 
of 1964. It also acknowledged that “teaching about the religious attitudes, values, and beliefs 
that people hold is already part of the curriculum of some schools”, perhaps in recognition of 
the materials produced by the CEC during Margaret Reid Martin’s tenure.118 The review gave 
no further advice on religion in schools, effectively reproducing the status quo. 
 The Curriculum Review document from 1986 reflected the changes in social attitudes towards 
Māori culture and the discursive shift towards biculturalism in public policy, described 
                                                          
115
 DOE, “The Curriculum Review 1986: A Draft Report Prepared by the Committee to Review the 
Curriculum for Schools” (Wellington: Department of Education, 1986), 29. 
116
 Ibid., 25. 
117
 Ibid., 52-54; DOE, “The Curriculum Review: Report of the Committee to Review the Curriculum for 
Schools”, (Wellington: Committee to Review the Curriculum for Schools, 1987), 13. 
118
 DOE, “The Curriculum Review”, 13. 
91 
 
above.119 The imperative to include Māori language and culture within the curriculum was 
evident:  
The Committee believes that, by emphasising bicultural skills, knowledge, 
attitudes and values, as a major move towards multiculturalism, the new 
design will assist Māori students and those of minority ethnic groups as 
well as extending the cultural repertoire of others. 120  
A social action liberal discourse promoted firstly biculturalism and secondly multiculturalism 
within the curriculum, in order to address ongoing disadvantages for Māori as a consequence 
of colonisation. The aim was to reduce cultural dissonance: a mismatch between the culture 
of the Māori child and that of the curriculum. The document had an extensive section on 
Māori, Pākehā and the Curriculum reflecting the perceived urgency to revise educational 
practices at his time, and a further section asking “How should schools reflect the many 
cultures in New Zealand?”, gave approximately 16 out of 18 pages to consideration of Māori 
culture in education.121 This emphasis was justified pragmatically:  
Children will learn more about themselves if they know a lot about at least 
one other culture. Self-esteem is developed and maintained when children 
see that their culture is recognised and valued in schools [. . .]. 
Multiculturalism will be best achieved through biculturalism. Ease and 
familiarity with one other culture is a very good bridge to achieving ease 
later in many cultures. [. . .] Within a New Zealand setting the culture which 
offers maximum contact, maximum human and material resources, 
maximum experience of a living culture, and uniqueness within a world 
setting is Māori .122 
In the context of social change occurring in New Zealand at this time—the revival of the Treaty 
as founding document and the growing recognition of the historical and ongoing abuses 
suffered by Māori — and prior to the changes in immigration legislation in 1987, it is 
understandable that Māori and Pākehā, as Treaty partners, were presented as normative New 
Zealand cultures in the Curriculum Review draft. The document evidences the way in which 
the dominant social action liberal discourse prioritised Māori culture, in terms of curriculum 
coverage, training and resources, over other cultures and religious beliefs.  
Bicultural education policies obtained cross-party consensus and maintain discursive currency 
in a social context which, as I have shown, is now much more culturally and religiously 
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diverse.123 With an emphasis on social justice for Māori, curriculum policy promoting 
recognition of the Māori knowledge bank and learning styles and cultural relevance of 
curriculum content was, and remains, positioned as educationally progressive.124 I argue 
below that to challenge social action liberal prioritisation of curriculum content in New 
Zealand is considered neither politically correct nor expedient, which effectively renders it 
immune from critique.125 This discourse forms part of the secular (neo)-liberal 
governmentality that I identify in my research in New Zealand schools. 
In the Catholic schools, biculturalism was absorbed into the religious education curriculum. 
Workbooks were redesigned to incorporate Māori language and concepts.126 However, the 
teaching was still primarily that of the Catholic Church and tikanga Māori was interpreted and 
redescribed through this lens. This process, called “inculturation”, was made explicit in the RE 
Curriculum Statement of Catholic Schools: 
The religious education Curriculum endeavours to include the Māori 
perspective so that Māori will seek after a greater knowledge and 
understanding of their Catholic faith so that they can live and express it in a 
Māori way within the church [. . .]. Inculturation “means the intimate 
transformation of authentic cultural values through the integration in 
Christianity and the insertion of Christianity in the various human cultures”. 
Inculturation must be guided by two principles: “compatibility with the 
Gospel and communion with the universal Church”.127 
This approach to teaching Māori culture may be described, in Foucaultian terms, as a 
conservative Christian governmental technique in which cultural practices and beliefs were 
amended and brought into line with Catholic teachings.128 However, as the teaching appeared 
to be culturally responsive, in line with bicultural education policy, it was positioned as 
progressive in Catholic educational terms. 
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Department of Education Guidelines 
The Department of Education distributed circular 1987/6 to all school principals in February 
1987, perhaps as a result of the Curriculum Review consultation.129 This seems to have been 
based on circular E.13/1/52, written to clarify the Department’s position after the Johnson 
Report, in 1979.130 
The circular emphasised that religious instruction was the “responsibility of the school 
committee, after consultation with the principal and after acquainting itself with the view of 
parents of the community”.131 It reminded schools that “[i]t is not the legal responsibility of 
the principal to plan, control, direct, or initiate any religious instruction programme”132 and 
that the school was “in law closed” for religious instruction.133 It reminded school committees 
to “ensure that the instruction and observances continue to be in accordance with what has 
been approved and the instructors do not attempt to usurp the rights of parents and 
guardians in regard to the religious affiliation of their children”.134 It also reminded principals 
to “ensure that parents and guardians of children at their school know that religious 
instruction or observances are taking place in the school and of their right to withdraw their 
children”.135 To a large degree the circular reproduced the binary opposition of secular 
education versus religious instruction consistent with the conservative Christian and 
authoritarian secular rationalist discourses. However, there was recognition of the ambivalent 
status of education about religions and beliefs within the curriculum: “The question that is 
often asked is whether, as part of the school’s official programme during the times when it is 
‘open’, any instruction may be included that deals with religion or religious beliefs. This 
question has never been tested in the courts.”136 
The inclusion of this paragraph is indicative of a widespread concern regarding the legal status 
of this material within the curriculum, consistent with an authoritarian secular rationalist 
construction of secular education. The following section reflected a more liberal secular 
rationalist discourse, citing (and attaching) the relevant sections of the 1962 Currie Report 
which clarified the matter, as described above. This may indicate that the Department of 
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Education perceived that a more authoritarian secular rationalist construction of the secular 
curriculum, in which teaching about religion was disqualified, had currency in schools.  
A further section of this circular explicitly endorsed teaching about religions and beliefs within 
the curriculum, but urged caution: 
It is important that children have the opportunity to know and understand 
other people’s beliefs. But because in schools there are likely to be 
enrolled pupils whose parents differ widely in their religious and ethical 
allegiances, great care must be taken to understand and respect 
differences. In understanding the reasons for different approaches being 
used by different societies, it is important that children are neither 
influenced to accept those religious beliefs nor encouraged to regard them 
as unacceptable.137 
 In the context of the previous debates on religion in schools, the anxiety about influencing 
children in religious matters, and competing curriculum imperatives, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that neither training for teachers nor resources to facilitate this teaching materialised.138 New 
Zealand educationalists were faced with additional discursive imperatives during the 1980s 
which appear to have militated against the development of education in religions and beliefs 
within the curriculum at both primary and secondary level. 
Neoliberal Education Reforms 
After the general election of 1987 a discursive shift took place away from communitarian 
constructions of education and curriculum policy in line with a neoliberal discourse. This 
discourse was informing economic and education policy in the United Kingdom and the United 
States and obtained dominance in New Zealand under a Labour government. 
Changes took place in line with a review of education administration led by businessman Brian 
Picot in 1988.139 The subsequent policy document, Tomorrow’s Schools, set out to instigate 
“the most thoroughgoing changes to the administration of education in our history”.140 This 
Treasury-led initiative effectively reconstructed education from the communitarian model, 
espoused by the CDD and educationalists, into a market model espoused by business leaders. 
The CDD was disbanded along with the Department of Education. This excerpt from a Treasury 
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briefing document from 1987 exemplifies the discursive shift taking place: “In the technical 
sense used by economists, education is not in fact a ‘public good’. [. . .] [E]ducation shares the 
main characteristics of other commodities traded in the marketplace.”141 
Neoliberal discursive imperatives such as an emphasis on personal choice, autonomy and 
entrepreneurialism as the goals of educational endeavour; work-based skills and 
competencies as a basis of curriculum; and economic accountability in school management 
radically altered priorities for schools. The changes were positioned as emancipatory and 
progressive in their ability to provide more choice in education for parents and more flexibility 
for schools. These changes in education had important consequences for religion in New 
Zealand’s education system. 
Tomorrow’s Schools established that schools were to be self-managed by boards of trustees 
who would form partnerships between the institution and community. Each board would be 
responsible for preparing a school charter which outlined the objectives of the institution and 
the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values to be taught, in line with the wishes of the 
community and the teaching staff.142 Key to this was the ability for schools to develop their 
own local character: a point which was emphasised by Minister of Education, Phil Goff, in the 
House when debating the educational reforms:  
Schools will become more innovative and more imaginative. They will be 
able to determine, within national guidelines and standards, their own 
local character. This is the first time in the history of New Zealand’s state 
education system that schools will be able to develop local character and 
focus on the priorities of their communities.143 
This development was set in the neoliberal discursive context of increased parental 
involvement and choice as consumers, as described by the Picot report: “Consumers need to 
be able to directly influence their learning institution by having a say in the running of it or by 
being able to turn to existing alternatives. Only if people are free to choose can a true co-
operative partnership develop between the community and learning institutions.”144 
These reforms did not lead to innovation in education about religions and beliefs in schools, 
but to a re-entrenchment of the status quo. Religious instruction could now be constructed as 
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a matter of parental choice and of reflecting the special character of a school as defined by 
boards of trustees.145 With the right of a school to its own special character apparently 
established in law with the Education Act of 1989,146 confessional and “local” forms of 
religious knowledge were again privileged in education over knowledge of religions and 
beliefs. These were further established as beyond critique from educationalists by dint of 
being both the legitimate choice of parents, culturally responsive and separate from the 
official curriculum. The construction of religion as being primarily concerned with the 
promotion of compliance to normative values, as a route to educational and economic success 
rather than a matter of intrinsic importance, inheres within the neoliberal discourse and is 
implicitly promoted within the reforms. The Act of 1989 left intact the secular clause and legal 
construction of school closure established within the Act of 1964. This may, as Paul Morris 
believes, have been largely a result of conflict avoidance.147 The education reforms of 1989, 
through their continued accommodation and effective endorsement of BiS, thus reproduced a 
conservative Christian construction of religious instruction disqualifying egalitarian liberal 
constructions of education in religions and beliefs.  
Neoliberal educational reforms with an emphasis on accountability, target setting and testing 
have had widespread implications for teacher workload globally. Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) data indicate that some nation states have taken 
measures to mitigate this by providing teacher release time. The OECD data show that, in 
2013, primary school teachers in New Zealand had the fourth highest level of contact time 
with children amongst OECD countries, behind Chile (1129), the Netherlands (930) and France 
(924). At 922 hours of classroom time a year, New Zealand primary school teachers had 200 
more hours in front of children than those in England and 150 more than the OECD average.148 
Since 2005, primary school teachers in England have been entitled to 10% of their weekly 
classroom time as Planning, Preparation and Assessment (PPA) time (2.5 hours or a half-day a 
week for full time teachers).149 In New Zealand the release time entitlement is ten hours per 
term.150 School terms may vary from nine to eleven weeks in length. It will be noted that 
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teachers in England receive more than twice as much non-contact/release time as New 
Zealand teachers. The half-an-hour a week release time provided by Bible-in-Schools 
volunteers was understandably valued by teachers and schools.151 The unofficial provision of 
additional release time through accommodation of BiS may be seen as an institutional 
incentive to maintain the programme in primary schools.  
The unintended outcome of neoliberal educational reforms for religious education policy 
during the 1990s, in terms of self-managing schools, teacher workload and curriculum 
prioritisation, appears to have been the protection of the current system of religious 
instruction from critique or revision. In Foucaultian terms, BiS appears to have been co-opted 
into a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality within the education system. The state continued 
to accommodate BiS as a means of promoting parental choice and community values, 
providing free teacher release time while instilling compliance to social norms in children, in 
the interests of increased productivity. This may help to explain the continued resistance to 
revision of BiS or religion within the curriculum, against international trends. 
Social Studies Curriculum 
Educationalists tasked with drafting the new Social Studies Curriculum (for primary and 
secondary schools) in 1994 commented on the tension between the need for the new 
curriculum to be based on a child-focussed liberal approach and the imperatives of the 
neoliberal reforms exemplified by the Minister’s Policy Advisory Group (PAG):  
The writing team reluctantly accepted PAG instruction that ideas and 
concepts such as spirituality and well-being be removed from resources 
and economic activities achievement objectives. Inside the process, the 
writing team argued against promoting an economic literacy that would 
emphasise economic goals to the detriment of the promotion of national 
harmony.152 
Two contradictory liberal imperatives appeared to be informing the curriculum development 
process. I discuss these imperatives in relation to curriculum policy in Chapter Five.153 
The Social Studies Curriculum, released in 1997, included several references to religious 
beliefs, but in this respect it reflected the social action liberal discursive imperative to 
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promote biculturalism. Thus a section entitled “Summary of Essential Learning about New 
Zealand Society” included: “Māori culture and heritage and the influence of this heritage on 
New Zealand’s social, cultural, political, and religious beliefs and systems; European cultures 
and heritages and the influence of these heritages on New Zealand’s social, cultural, political, 
and religious beliefs and systems”.154 Other cultures were mentioned but not in terms of 
religious beliefs. This may indicate an institutional constraint in operation restricting education 
in religions and beliefs to the two dominant cultures with institutional endorsement.155  
Values in Education 
In 1996 an international UNESCO report, chaired by Jacques Delors, warned that school 
curricula needed to place more emphasis on equipping young people to live together 
harmoniously.156 It re-emphasised a “utopian” role for education, aside from utilitarian and 
economic imperatives, seeing it as “perhaps primarily—an exceptional means of bringing 
about personal development and building relationships among individuals, groups and 
nations”.157 Values were positioned as central to this process. It was against this background 
that Prime Minister Jenny Shipley, at the 1998 UNESCO Values in Education Summit in 
Wellington, made controversial remarks concerning values education. Shipley advocated that 
state education should now reflect the spiritual, cultural and religious perspectives of parents 
and school boards, baldly stating that secular schooling was “an idea whose time has gone”.158 
Her assertion was that education should respond to increased diversity of religions and values 
by allowing school curricula to reflect that diversity in line with parental choice: a market 
model of values teaching. Her assumption that all religious values should receive state support 
resides in a diversity discourse and perhaps a liberal Christian universalism. But Shipley’s 
apparent egalitarian openness to different religious perspectives overlooked the institutional 
advantage of the Churches Education Commission, already operating BiS in around 60% of 
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schools at that time, and the constraints operating on minority religious groups in a Christian 
majority context.159  
The renewed focus on values education at the end of the 20th century, now redescribed by 
Delors as “learning to live together”, appeared to have given BiS renewed validity at a time 
when confessional religious instruction might be thought to be increasingly inappropriate. As 
noted above, during debates in the first half of the 20th century there was a strong 
convergence between the interests of the nation state and those of the promoters of religious 
instruction. The governmentality of the nation state was consonant with the promotion of 
Christian religious instruction in a religiously homogeneous context. I want to suggest that 
here, at the end of the 20th century, there was an identifiable divergence between the secular 
(neo)-liberal governmentality of the nation state—within which the intended reproduction of 
a compliant, liberal, tolerant and therefore productive workforce was achieved through the 
accommodation of BiS within the education system—and the conservative/evangelising 
Christian governmentality operating within the Churches Education Commission.160  
 In endorsing community-based, confessional religion and values teaching, Shipley appeared 
to attribute moral, social and educational legitimacy to BiS, a programme which, as I show in 
Chapter Six, appears to be exempt from educational scrutiny. Values took on greater 
educational importance after the Values in Education summit. The CEC began to publicly 
redescribe its programme as values teaching, and the construction of BiS as uncontroversial, 
generic values teaching has obtained considerable institutional currency.161  
Spiritual Wellbeing in the Curriculum 
In 1999, in line with international trends in spiritual education,162 and a social action liberal 
discursive imperative to promote recognition of Māori culture, the New Zealand Health and 
Physical Education curriculum (again, for primary and secondary schools) included the 
teaching of spiritual wellbeing for the first time. In this document the Māori concept of 
Hauora or wellbeing was presented through a model devised by Māori health specialist Mason 
Durie.163 In this Te Whare Tapa Wha model taha wairua, spiritual wellbeing, was presented 
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metaphorically as one of four walls of a house, the others being physical, mental and 
emotional (combined) and social wellbeing. All four dimensions are required for “strength and 
symmetry”.164 The implication was that a child who was not spiritually well could not be 
wholly well, and therefore that a curriculum that did not attend to a child’s spiritual wellbeing 
was incomplete. The document defined spiritual wellbeing as: “The values and beliefs that 
determine the way people live, the search for meaning and purpose in life, and personal 
identity and self-awareness (For some individuals and communities, spiritual well-being is 
linked to a particular religion; for others, it is not).”165 
The bracketing out of a specifically religious understanding of spirituality, in this way, is 
consistent with a spiritual secularist discourse.166 Religion was not a necessary element of 
spirituality, but an optional extra. Spirituality however, in its secularised form, was 
fundamental to personal wellbeing. There is evidence from the minutes of the PAG working 
on the document that this minimal treatment of religion in the curriculum statement was 
strategic. The meeting notes, summarising the discussion, indicate that religion, and the 
hornets’ nest that it represented, was to be avoided: “Not interested in religions. Can be 
interpreted at cultural levels. Need to be aware of ability of religious groups to promote their 
own values. Implementation of the last curriculum—bus loads of parents in to hijack 
consultation.”167 
Within these notes, community-based religious values were legitimised within education 
through the exercise of parental involvement and choice: a neoliberal discursive imperative. 
The conservative Christian construction of religion as religious instruction was evident, but 
resisted, as an element of the curriculum. Religious relativism, whereby all religious values are 
uncritically validated, was assumed. Culture was constructed as less controversial than 
religion, as a curriculum focus. This may signal a discursive imperative to favour unifying 
cultural experiences, such as celebrations or tikanga Māori, rather than potentially divisive 
religious beliefs. Religious relativism and conflict avoidance are indicative of a diversity 
discourse which was obtaining currency at this time. The opportunity to use spiritual 
                                                          
164




 Richard Egan shows how this definition evolved (after receiving submissions) from that in the draft 
document, which made no reference to religion at all. Richard Egan, “Spirituality/Taha Wairua in New 
Zealand State Schools” (Masters diss., Massey University, 2000), 59. 
167
 PAG, “Minutes for Meeting 3: Friday 18 November 1994” (Wellington: Policy Advisory Group for 
Health and Physical Well-being Curriculum Development, 1994), 8. Obtained under the Official 
Information Act 1982. 
101 
 
education to provide young people with conceptual knowledge of religions and beliefs 
appears to have been discursively disqualified. 
A broadly conservative Christian critique of spiritual education in schools was provided in the 
form of the Education Forum’s submission on the draft Health and Physical Education 
document in 1998:  
[Spirituality] has to do essentially, rather than merely incidentally, with the 
world having been created by God [. . .].Whatever forms the expression of 
human spirituality may take [. . .] it is unacceptably reductionist to use this 
term in complete disregard of this basic religious understanding of life’s 
dependence upon and essential relatedness to, the Creator.168 
The spiritual secularist assumption of the universality of a Māori model of spiritual wellbeing 
provided within the Health and Physical Education document was rejected, not only by 
conservative Christian critics, but by Māori commentators drawing on redistributional rather 
than recognitional imperatives.169 However, the positioning of taha wairua within the 
curriculum further institutionalised biculturalism in education policy.  
No further guidelines were issued about the teaching of spiritual wellbeing. I show in Chapters 
Six and Seven how the absence of guidelines or training for teachers facilitated a wide range 
of contradictory approaches informed by the contingent discursive imperatives of teachers 
and principals, none of which involve education about religions and beliefs.  
Diversity and Inclusion 
The turn of the millennium saw the publication of the ERO report, Multi-cultural Schools in 
New Zealand. The document, which covers both primary and secondary schools, is of interest 
to this genealogy because in 32 pages neither the word “religion” nor “belief” was mentioned. 
The authors explicitly defined themselves against critical or redistributional forms of 
multicultural education implying a neutral approach: “The central focus of this study [. . .] is 
not how schools might deliberately shape the values and attitudes of their students, but the 
practical issues that arise as schools respond to a population that is becoming increasingly 
multi-cultural.”170 But a normative uncritical form of cultural relativism was evident 
throughout the report in line with a diversity discourse and an inclusion agenda: “[A]ll 
students of all cultures—even in a school with a totally Pākehā population—should be imbued 
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with a respect for other cultures.”171 Examples of good practice in multicultural schools 
included celebration, respect and tolerance of cultural difference.172 Furthermore, in line with 
a social action liberal discourse, schools were advised to devise a culturally relevant 
curriculum in order to reduce cultural dissonance which creates a barrier to learning: 
When teaching techniques and curriculum content are more attuned to the 
frames of reference of children of other cultures, the attitude to learning of 
these children can become more positive and their time in class can be 
more productive and efficient. Acknowledging the validity of other cultural 
perspectives can enhance the education of all students, even that of the 
dominant group.173 
With an emphasis on social justice for children of different cultures, this approach to 
curriculum development was positioned as educationally progressive. The consequences of 
these discursive imperatives for religious education were threefold: firstly, religious diversity 
was rendered invisible, being subsumed under the category of culture; secondly, since the 
social action liberal discourse proposed teaching from the perspective of, rather than about, 
different cultures and recognising the validity of cultural knowledge-bases, an uncritical 
respect for cultural traditions was promoted and critical studies were disqualified; thirdly, a 
consequence of aligning the curriculum with the cultural backgrounds of the children was that 
teachers in more culturally homogeneous regions may have legitimately excluded information 
about other cultures/religions from their planning, on the grounds that it was irrelevant.174 In 
this way, the diversity and social action liberal discourses reproduce a status quo of 
confessional religious/cultural instruction and disqualification of education about religions and 
beliefs. Such techniques are again constitutive of a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality, and 
are not a neutral educational approach. 
The events of 11 September 2001, in New York, and 7 July 2005, in London, brought religion 
firmly onto the education agenda of European and other Western nation states.175 An 
egalitarian liberal construct of teaching about religions and beliefs in the curriculum, already 
prevalent in England and Wales, obtained considerable international currency. But a new 
propensity to conflate religious fundamentalism with terrorism, fostered by the British Home 
Office,176 led to the co-option of religious education into a new state project involving the 
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promotion of tolerance and social cohesion (diversity discourse) and including a liberalising 
agenda (authoritarian liberal discourse).177  
These discourses became evident in New Zealand Government initiatives, in response to 
international events and growing cultural and religious diversity. For example, a programme of 
Connecting Diverse Communities was begun, notably with economic goals, in March 2007: 
“Government activity to address social cohesion issues can improve social wellbeing and 
increase economic growth and, at the same time, reduce the risk of future division and social 
unrest.”178 
A New Zealand Alliance of Civilisations (NZAC) report, produced in 2007, expressed the same 
sentiments: 
For New Zealand to remain a cohesive society, it must continue to build 
mutual trust and respect amongst its citizens, work to avoid the emergence 
of inter-communal tensions or intolerance, and guard against the 
emergence of extremism within any community. Without actions by 
government, civil society and local communities to address differences that 
may exist, or to overcome prejudice or alienation, there is a risk that 
diversity may become a source of intolerance, fear, uncertainty and even 
violence, rather than something to celebrate and nurture.179 
Accordingly, one of its objectives was to “build respect and understanding among cultures and 
empower voices of moderation and reconciliation which can help calm cultural and religious 
tensions between nations and peoples”.180 The liberalising imperatives of the diversity and 
authoritarian liberal discourses, through which diversity is managed as a precondition to 
economic growth, are intrinsic to the secular (neo)-liberal governmentality that my research 
identifies. 
The NZAC report also stated its intention to “[s]trengthen the focus of education at school 
levels on faiths, religions and cultures”.181 My research indicates that prevailing societal and 
educational discourses appear to have largely precluded educationalists from developing this 
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aspect of the curriculum and equally from holding the CEC to account.182 Meanwhile, the 
Churches Education Commission has co-opted the educational imperatives of diversity and 
inclusion in support of Christian religious instruction, by incorporating illustrations of children 
of different ethnicities and with disabilities into their course booklets.183  
Egalitarian Liberal Resistance 
Working with Joris de Bres at the Human Rights Commission (HRC), Paul Morris, a professor of 
Religious Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, attempted to effect a discursive shift in 
religious education in schools. Preliminary efforts were directed at the instigation of a review 
of religion in schools informed by Human Rights legislation. Human Rights lawyers drafted a 
report during 2006 and a senior manager at the Ministry, Martin Connelly, reported to the 
Education and Science Select Committee in August. The report drew on legal and human 
rights discourses to advocate a “rights-consistent” approach to religion in schools.184 
Consonant with an egalitarian liberal approach the report legitimised teaching about religions 
and beliefs within the curriculum: “[T]his circular is not concerned with teaching about 
religion—that is, the neutral presentation of information about the current and historical 
place of religion in our society. Teaching about religion is allowed for under both the social 
studies and health and physical education curricula”.185  
A footnote, explaining where in the curriculum religious material may be covered, signalled an 
attempt to destabilise a prevalent authoritarian secular rationalist construction of the secular 
curriculum. The report recommended that, in order to comply with Human Rights legislation 
granting all students freedom of religions and beliefs, primary schools must be neutral in 
matters of religion.186 In summary the report recommended: 1) that only voluntary 
instructors, not school staff, should lead instruction or observance; 2) that whole-of-school 
religious instruction or observances were discontinued; 3) that all religious instruction and 
observances took place in a separate class outside of normal school hours, i.e., lunchtime, 
before school, after school; and 4) that parents should state in writing their consent for 
religious instruction or observance prior to their child’s attendance: an opt-in rather than opt-
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out policy. Such measures, the report argued, would reduce the risk of coercion and exclusion 
inherent in the present system.187 The report went on to problematise the use of karakia and 
religious aspects of tikanga Māori, recommending that boards operate a similar process of 
informed consent in such matters.188 
The report thus presented a challenge to two dominant discourses operating within the 
education system: the conservative Christian discourse within which Bible-in-Schools inheres, 
and the social action liberal discourse within which Māori culture and spirituality is endorsed. 
Vociferous opposition was mounted from the New Zealand Principals’ Federation on the 
grounds that the recommendations were unworkable.189 But a closer examination of the 
complaint reveals that president Pat Newman considered that it was the Human Rights 
recommendations and the secular clause which were unworkable. “[T]he law is an ass around 
this [. . .].The ministry should have moved to resolve contradictions in the law” rather than 
seek to amend school practices. The thrust of Pat Newman’s complaint, reflecting both the 
conservative Christian rationale of teaching Christian cultural heritage and the social action 
discourse privileging Māori culture, is to resist any change and maintain the current system. 
Similarly, a response from Anglican Archbishops Turei and Moxon, heavily invested in a 
conservative Christian regime of rationality, resisted any change in delivery of religious 
instruction or observances.190 It appears that the weight of the opposition to the Ministry’s 
plans, particularly the mobilisation of conservative Christian groups and subsequent loss of 
backbench support, resulted in a Government backdown early in September.191 In interview, 
Morris stated his belief that the controversy caused by this report contributed to the 
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unwillingness of the Ministry to sanction the inclusion of religion in the revised New Zealand 
Curriculum, under review at this time.192  
In conjunction with the HRC, Morris published a Statement on Religious Diversity, in 2007, 
partly with the intention of influencing the curriculum review. In a section on education the 
egalitarian liberal discursive imperative to include religions and beliefs within the curriculum 
was evident, along with an attempt to reconstruct the prevalent authoritarian secular 
rationalist construction of the secular curriculum: 
Schools should teach an understanding of different religious and spiritual 
traditions in a manner that reflects the diversity of their national and local 
community. Education in schools about religious diversity is essential if we 
are to understand New Zealanders, our Asia-Pacific region and the wider 
world in which we live [. . .]. Such an approach is radically different from a 
programme of religious instruction as part of an individual’s formation 
within a particular faith [. . .]. New Zealand legislation (Education Act 1877) 
has been understood by some to prohibit the teaching of religions in 
primary schools, but it does not, of course, relate to the teaching about 
religions and religious diversity at all.193 
The Statement on Religious Diversity drew criticism, during the consultation stage and at its 
launch, from conservative and evangelical Christians who believed it emphasised New 
Zealand’s religious diversity over its Christian and Māori heritage. They rejected its assertion 
that: “New Zealand has no official or established religion”.194 Destiny Church leader, Brian 
Tamaki, organised a march of 800 opponents of the statement at its launch in Waitangi.195 
Religion was once again the cause of public controversy, perhaps contributing to the 
unwillingness of the Ministry to address the issue, and effectively reproducing the status quo 
of religion in education. 
A Diversity Forum organised by the HRC and Morris in 2007 attended by Karen Sewell, 
Secretary for Education, provided another opportunity to attempt change the discursive 
climate. But Sewell simply insisted that it was intended that religion was implicitly included in 
the new curriculum under “cultural diversity”.196 No ministerial guidelines were issued to 
primary or secondary schools, to inform them of this intention. An imperative to avoid conflict 
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and emphasise less contentious cultural celebrations over incommensurable religious 
differences, within a diversity discourse, was evident in Sewell’s approach. 
Subsequent publications and media broadcasts from Morris and the HRC continued to 
position education about religion as legitimate and to reconstruct religious education within 
an egalitarian liberal discourse, differentiating it from religious instruction.197 The most 
significant of these was “Religion in New Zealand Schools: Questions and Concerns”.198 This 
document was intended to clarify misconceptions about religion in schools. It established 
clear definitions of religious observance, religious instruction, and religious education. 
Employing an egalitarian liberal discourse, the document legitimised teaching about religion as 
part of the curriculum defining itself against religious instruction, which “carries an implicit or 
explicit endorsement of a particular faith”: 199 
Religious education, also commonly called religious studies, refers to 
teaching about religion(s) as part of a broader context. An example is the 
role religion has played in politics, culture, art, history or literature. 
Religious education does not require students to engage with the religions 
being studied at a personal level or make choices about accepting those 
beliefs. Religious education can take place as part of the school 
curriculum.200 
It also adopted a human rights discourse to show how rights may be infringed by 
inconsiderate adoption of religious observances and instruction in secular schools.201 
However, the document could not avoid confirming the legal status of religious instruction 
and observances as established in the Education Act of 1964.202 The report appears to have 
been distributed to schools only by email and its launch received little publicity. Although the 
report dealt with important matters of Human Rights and was produced in consultation with 
the Ministry, no mechanism was introduced to ensure that the HRC guidelines were being met 
in practice.203 For example, ERO reports were not required to assess schools’ religious 
instruction procedures against the guidelines. 
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From 2012, the document was frequently cited by the SEN in support of their Keep Religion 
Out of Schools campaign, on Facebook and in newspaper articles. But, because the document 
also confirmed the legality of religious instruction within the secular education system, it 
appeared to provide HRC endorsement of BiS. “Religion in New Zealand Schools” has 
subsequently been used by both the CEC and the Ministry to further legitimise Bible-in-
Schools. It appears that, against the authors’ intentions, the document has served to 
reproduce the status quo.  
Knowledge and the Curriculum 
But, within the sphere of education, an even greater challenge to the introduction of religious 
education as a subject discipline has been taking place since the turn of the millennium: an 
educational discourse within which subject knowledge itself was destabilised and 
competencies, skills, dispositions and personal experiences were constituted as appropriate 
curriculum content. A 1996 OECD report, entitled The Knowledge-Based Economy, had global 
influence and informed the report of the Information Technology Advisory Group, The 
Knowledge Economy, to the New Zealand Government in 1999.204 Asserting that “the 
foundation stones of the knowledge economy are human ingenuity and skill and a 
commitment to innovation through research and development”, the report claimed that 
“know how” and “know-who” were more important than “know-what”, and that knowledge 
obtained by experience was of equivalent value to that gained by formal education.205 Within 
this discourse, obtaining knowledge for its own sake was constructed as “industrial age”, “old 
fashioned” or “20th century” thinking, as opposed to “knowledge age” thinking which 
emphasised real contexts, problem solving, purposeful learning, and collaborative and 
interdisciplinary approaches.206 A later document, produced by the New Zealand Council for 
Educational Research, summarised this regime of rationality in an education context: 
Knowledge is seen as something that does things, as being more energy-
like than matter-like, more like a verb than a noun. Knowledge in the 
Knowledge Age involves creating and using new knowledge to solve 
problems and find solutions to challenges as they arise on a “just in time” 
basis [. . .]. Reproducing existing knowledge can no longer be education’s 
core goal because (a) it is no longer possible to determine exactly which 
knowledge people will need to store up in order to use it in their lives after 
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school, and (b) the “storing up for future use” model of knowledge is no 
longer useful or sufficient for thinking about how knowledge is developed 
and used in the 21st century.207  
There was now an imperative “to orient schooling around exploring the connections—or 
spaces—between people, things and ideas and what can happen there (rather than focusing 
on the people, things or ideas themselves)”.208  
The knowledge age discourse was in evidence in my interview data, disqualifying education in 
religions and beliefs as irrelevant and positioning BiS as promoting relevant cultural 
knowledge and important values and dispositions.209 It appeared to be another constituent of 
the secular (neo)-liberal governmentality operating in New Zealand schools. 
New Zealand Curriculum 2007 
The New Zealand Curriculum 2007 covered the vision, principles, values, key competencies 
and content across eight learning areas for primary and secondary schools.210 It did not 
contain the word “religion”. Spiritual wellbeing was no longer in the learning objectives, being 
found only in the glossary on the back cover of the document. The term Hauora remained in 
the Health and Physical Education (HPE) guidelines but the only elaboration of taha wairua 
offered was in the glossary.211 
Beliefs featured in the HPE curriculum at Level Three, in primary school, under “Personal 
Identity” where children were required to “describe how their own feelings, beliefs, and 
actions, and those of other people, contribute to their personal sense of self worth”.212 
Similarly, at Level Six in the secondary HPE curriculum under “Relationships”, students were to 
“demonstrate an understanding of how individuals and groups affect relationships by 
influencing people’s behaviour, beliefs, decisions and sense of self-worth”.213 At Level Seven 
students should: “analyse the beliefs, attitudes, and practices that reinforce stereotypes and 
role expectations, identifying ways in which these shape people’s choices at individual, group, 
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and societal levels”.214 In none of these instances were beliefs the object of the teaching. The 
learning was focussed on the affective dimension of feelings and relationships and the way 
they contribute or diminish self-worth and choices. This learning was arguably driven by the 
discursive imperatives of: the neoliberal discourse, in which self-actualisation and autonomy 
are educational imperatives; the spiritual secularist discourse, which privileges personal 
experience and relationships over institutional religion; and a diversity discourse, in which all 
beliefs are uncritically valued. These achievement objectives did not preclude, but neither did 
they encourage, discussion of religious beliefs as part of the HPE curriculum. 
There was discussion of cultural beliefs, in relation to conflict, in Social Science objectives at 
Level Seven, and ideological beliefs that shape society at Level Eight.215 An authoritarian liberal 
imperative to amend illiberal beliefs may have been implied. Again, discussion of religious 
beliefs was neither precluded, nor encouraged.  
The curriculum document was infused with the diversity discourse. Diversity was listed as both 
a key Value and a Principle of the curriculum.216 Additionally, one of the Key Competencies 
was “Relating to others”, defined as being “about interacting effectively with a diverse range 
of people in a variety of contexts”.217 In line with this discourse the document made numerous 
references to cultural practices, arts, languages and communities.218 The discursive imperative 
was towards recognition, tolerance and acceptance of difference. There was also evidence of 
an authoritarian liberal discourse which seeks to correct ideas which are intolerant or illiberal. 
For example, at Level Eight of the HPE objectives, under “Identity, Sensitivity and Respect” 
students were to “critically analyse attitudes, values, and behaviours that contribute to 
conflict and identify and describe ways of creating more harmonious relationships”.219 In an 
education context which did not prioritise understanding religious truth claims and 
imperatives, such critical analysis could only take place from the dominant perspective, as no 
other analytical tools had been provided. It is therefore attitudes, values and behaviours 
which conflict with secular (neo)-liberal imperatives which were to be corrected. The analysis 
was not critical (in Foucaultian terms) because its own premise was neither made visible, 
placed under critique, nor held to account. In such ways the curriculum document reproduced 
a secular (neo)-liberal worldview. 
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An emphasis on biculturalism was reflected in one of the current New Zealand Curriculum 
Vision statements: “Our vision is for young people who will work to create an Aotearoa New 
Zealand in which Māori and Pākehā recognise each other as full Treaty partners, and in which 
all cultures are valued for the contributions they bring.”220 A social action liberal discourse 
foregrounded the bicultural relationship. Other cultures were valued for the way they 
contributed to this arrangement. While the curriculum valued diversity, was non-
discriminatory and inclusive, it primarily “acknowledge[d] the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi and the bicultural foundations of Aotearoa New Zealand”.221 The dominant social 
action liberal discursive imperative to promote Māori culture was evident throughout the 
document and may inform schools’ interpretation of the word “culture” as it appears in the 
different subject objectives.222 
The knowledge age discourse was also evident in the structure, design and content of the 
curriculum. Although retaining subject areas and learning objectives, “wherever possible 
schools should aim to design their curriculum so that learning crosses apparent 
boundaries”.223 “Key competencies” were introduced which permeated the curriculum and 
were the “key to learning in every area”. They enabled young people to be problem solvers 
who “actively seek, use, and create knowledge”, who were “enterprising, resourceful, reliable 
and resilient”, and who could “come up with new approaches, ideas and ways of thinking”.224 
A special emphasis was placed on being actively involved in communities. This was not the 
geographic community in which the children lived, but included “family, whanau and school, 
and those based, for example, on a common interest or culture”.225 Curriculum content should 
primarily be chosen to suit students’ needs and interests.226 In this context the curriculum 
“has meaning for students, connects with their wider lives and engages the support of their 
families, whanau and communities”.227 This is in line with a diversity discourse which 
recognises the value of all cultures, a social action liberal discourse which validates cultural 
knowledge bases, and a knowledge age discourse within which cultural and social knowledge 
is considered to be as legitimate a basis for the curriculum as conceptual knowledge.  
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The curriculum was process-, rather than content-driven. Problem solving and innovation 
were emphasised over knowledge acquisition. Combining knowledge age and neoliberal 
imperatives, the curriculum espoused a vision of young people who were “creative, energetic 
and enterprising [. . .] who will seize opportunities offered by new knowledge and 
technologies [. . .] who will be confident, connected, actively involved, and lifelong 
learners”.228 Values were to be “encouraged, modelled, and explored”.229 The exploration took 
place in the context of an accepted values framework. The confessional nature of values 
teaching was reinforced by the expectation that “the specific ways in which these values find 
expression in an individual school will be guided by dialogue between the school and its 
community”,230 reflecting neoliberal discursive imperatives. This may have removed the 
critical element of values teaching and encouraged either a confessional secular (neo)-liberal 
or a confessional religious approach.231  
Curriculum values were described as having “widespread support because it is by holding 
these values and acting on them that we are able to live together and thrive”.232 In this way 
they were presented as neutral, self-evident and unproblematic. The values were excellence; 
innovation, inquiry and curiosity; diversity; equity; community and participation; ecological 
sustainability; integrity; and respect for selves, other and human rights.233 The values aimed to 
be inclusive but in the absence of any exploration of incommensurable religious values—
including widely differing conceptions of human rights—represented in the community, it is 
arguable that they presented a secular (neo)-liberal agenda to which young people were 
expected to conform.234 
Potentially, the New Zealand Curriculum provided numerous opportunities to explore religious 
beliefs and practices. However these opportunities were neither made explicit within the 
curriculum nor in any guidelines provided by the Ministry. On the contrary, multiple 
discursive, institutional and material constraints positioned religion as an inappropriate area 
for examination or critique, apparently disqualifying the subject from the classroom at both 
primary and secondary school level.235  
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Secular Education versus Confessional Christian Instruction 
Concurrently, an evangelising Christian discourse has been evident within the Churches 
Education Commission which remains unchallenged by educationalists, the Ministry or the 
NZEI. In September 2011 David Mulholland, then National Director of CEC, stated in an 
interview for Baptist magazine: 
Churches by and large have not woken up to the fact that this is a mission 
field on our doorstep [. . .].The children are right there and we don’t have 
to supply buildings, seating, lighting or heating. It’s an opportunity we 
should grab hold of [. . .]. We often hear in church about the 10-40 window 
for evangelising people in the world. For me it’s a 9 to 3 window.236  
Similarly Evonne Paddison, CEO of Access Ministries, Australia—provider of the CRE resources 
used in most Bible-in-Schools programmes in New Zealand at the time of my research—
exemplified this discourse when speaking to the Anglican Evangelical Fellowship in 2008: 
We have a God-given open door to children and young people with the 
Gospel. Our federal and state governments allow us to take the Christian 
faith into our schools. We need to go and make disciples […]. We have the 
responsibility to fulfil the great commission of making disciples. We need 
to see our scripture teachers and our chaplains especially as facilitators of 
this. We need to be missional.237   
 In Australia, scholar of politics and religion Marion Maddox examined some of these CRE 
resources, known as “Religion in Life” in that context: 
The tone of ACCESS materials is unequivocally evangelical, not only in that 
it relentlessly pushes the participating students towards cultivating an 
individual faith but, perhaps more importantly, in that a person 
participating in the ACCESS program would come away with the idea that 
Christians believe that being (or becoming) a Christian is the only 
acceptable life choice. [. . .] Despite occasional warnings in the teachers’ 
books to have regard to Christian diversity, “Religion in Life” continuously 
presents a single, evangelical, literalist version of Christianity. My 
conclusion is that “Religion in Life” would, intentionally or not, have the 
effect of conveying to non-evangelical Christian students that their version 
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of Christianity was inadequate and that they should abandon it and adopt 
the “Religion in Life” version.238 
In a review of the same resources, in Australia, educationalist David Zyngier evidences the 
very limited value of the teaching activities in educational terms.239 I argue that the 
redescription, by the educational establishment, of BiS in New Zealand as “good values 
teaching” and concurrent denial of its responsibility to monitor the content of the programme 
“outside” the curriculum, has facilitated the operation of a conservative and evangelising 
governmentality, by the CEC, within New Zealand primary schools.240 The CEC has taken 
advantage of the interest in values in education and included specific New Zealand Curriculum 
values within its programme, thus positioning BiS as educationally sound.241  
In Australia a parent group, Fairness in Religions in School, mobilised in 2011 in opposition to 
evangelistic religious teaching in public schools.242 In New Zealand, the SEN’s campaign began 
in 2012. The SEN promote a largely liberal secular rationalist perspective on religion in schools, 
which opposes religious instruction but concedes religious education may be appropriate at 
high school level.243 But group members have a range of personal views and some have 
expressed more authoritarian secular rationalist ideas on teaching about religion. A prominent 
member stated: “teaching [. . .] religions would take us even further away from being secular 
schools. [. . .] Science, history and other evidence-based studies would be swamped by a sea 
of politically correct fairy tales [. . .]. Do we want to go there?”244 Authoritarian secular 
rationalist constructions of “teaching religion” and “secular” led him to disqualify education in 
religions and beliefs at all levels.  
The SEN has launched a forthright campaign against Bible-in-Schools, leafleting schools, 
sending out press releases with information about cases of parents whose concerns about 
coercion and discrimination have not been taken seriously. Through their social networks they 
have shared templates of letters for boards of trustees, and leaflets for parents, outlining 
problems with religious instruction. This had led to a succession of headlines in newspapers 
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around the country and a number of schools have stopped the programme.245 These headlines 
reinforce the binary opposition of progressive secular education versus regressive religion in 
schools.  
But supporters of religious instruction have also co-opted current educational discourses in 
support of their conservative Christian position. In opposition to the SEN campaign, the 
Anglican Archbishops Moxon and Turei released a letter restating their position: 
If a school’s board of trustees, which is the parents’ elected representative 
body, wants to offer this spirituality and values approach to the Bible 
outside of the school day, it has always seemed to us to be desirable to do 
so—and a perfectly reasonable provision in a democracy and in terms of 
Tomorrows’ Schools. […] This is a long-standing agreement which honors 
the freedom of choice we enjoy in this country, as well as the right of 
parents to influence their children’s spiritual and moral development. We 
honor the work of the hundreds of volunteers who continue, in a loving, 
sensitive and non-manipulative way, to offer access, when asked, to this 
heritage in our schools.246 
The Archbishops co-opted a neoliberal discourse of parental choice, a legal discourse in which 
school-time lessons were “outside of the school day”, a spiritual secularist vocabulary of 
spirituality and values, a human rights discourse of parent rights, and the legitimacy accrued 
from longevity of institutional accommodation, to position BiS as a “perfectly reasonable 
provision”. The Archbishops’ arguments inhered only within a conservative Christian discourse 
within which the complaints of parents about opting out, coercion and discrimination could be 
positioned as unreasonable. 
CEC CEO Simon Greening247 also co-opted a range of discursive strategies in support of a 
conservative Christian confessional religious instruction: an educational egalitarian liberal 
discourse to assert that children need to understand about different beliefs and that the CEC 
teaches children about Christianity; a human rights discourse to emphasise opting out 
arrangements and the rights of other religions to arrange religious instruction; a spiritual 
secularist discourse to state that the programme teaches good Kiwi values; and the 
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institutional power of the state to assert that voluntary instruction is legal and that volunteers 
teach from a syllabus approved by boards of trustees.248  
The CEC has recently stated, in response to the SEN’s criticism of its teaching materials, that 
these are being updated and improved with the introduction of a new programme called Life 
Animated. The spiritual secularist discourse was again co-opted in support of confessional 
Christian religious instruction: “This New Zealand-made resource is a topical, Bible-based 
series created for Kiwi kids and covering topics like being a good friend, caring for the 
environment, resilience, showing love, leadership, and caring for our global neighbours.”249  
 
Figure 5: “Suffer the Children” Cartoon, 2012 
Representing the current debate about religion in schools, a cartoon from the New Zealand 
Herald—published 100 years later than that in Figure 4—constructed a religion teacher as an 
evil figure consciously undermining the child’s autonomy and rationality and threatening dire 
consequences for children who opted out.250 A clear authoritarian secular rationalist discursive 
positioning is evident. In spite of the wide range of discursive strategies employed by 
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participants, the public conversation about religion in schools appears to be being debated in 
almost exactly the same binary terms as it was in 1912. This conversation has been 
institutionally and discursively arrested by the legal construct of school closure enshrined in 
the Education Act of 1964 and the disciplinary techniques of an institutional secular (neo)-
liberal governmentality. 
The Ministry and the NZEI have taken a hands-off approach to the debate, reproducing both 
the status quo of conservative Christian religious instruction in schools and authoritarian 
secular rationalist non-intervention by educationalists.251 Minister of Education Hekia Parata 
has employed a neoliberal discourse to position the problem as one of parental choice: 
“Parents have choice. If they don't want to have their children going to a school that offers 
[Bible-in-Schools], then choose another school.”252 This neoliberal discourse places 
responsibility for avoidance of coercion and discrimination in state schools with parents, 
rather than boards of trustees or the Ministry. This may be interpreted as a conflict-avoiding 
strategy which averted the need for revision of practices around religion in school. This 
approach served to reproduce a conservative Christian status quo of confessional religious 
instruction in state schools and failed to take into account the material constraints on parental 
choice.253  
Religious studies academics, who have attempted to broaden this debate, have been accused 
by members of the SEN of either missing the point or deliberately conflating religious 
instruction and religious education in order to promote religion in schools.254 An article citing 
one of my conference papers in the New Zealand Herald255 and a piece describing my research 
in the Otago Bulletin256 have been met with strong criticism on the SEN Facebook pages, 
including a letter to my head of department in which “intellectual dishonesty” was the least 
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offensive charge. In such ways, the authoritarian secular rationalist discourse continues to 
reproduce the disqualification of education in religions and beliefs from the primary school 
curriculum and to narrow the educational debate.  
Conclusion 
This genealogy has identified and exemplified, in answer to research question two, the 
operative discursive and material constraints on religion in New Zealand schools. It has 
demonstrated the ways in which formational and confessional approaches to religion and 
culture have been able to predominate in the New Zealand education system. They have done 
so, not through any inalienable right or self-evident legitimacy but through contingent 
institutional and discursive constraints and imperatives. Dominant conservative Christian and 
authoritarian secular rationalist constructions of religion and secular education disqualify 
education in religions and beliefs from the curriculum. As I have shown, these discursive 
constructions are institutionalised in legislation, in accommodation by schools, in curriculum 
documents and guidelines. I have shown how the legalisation of school closure in the 1960s 
continues to inform and constrain debate about religion in school, and effectively to preclude 
intervention from educationalists, in a way which was not intended by the Currie Commission. 
In addition, social action liberal, neoliberal, diversity and knowledge age discourses have 
served to position uncritical confessional approaches to teaching about religion and culture as 
educationally progressive, effectively reproducing the status quo of Bible-in-Schools and 
exposing children to conservative and evangelising imperatives. The concurrent positioning of 
religion within the curriculum as educationally regressive has limited opportunities for young 
people in New Zealand to obtain knowledge and discernment in matters of religion. The 
archive suggested that the formational or governmental role of education in general, and 
religious education in particular, appeared to be prioritised over a truth-seeking educational 
role. These factors appear to have precluded educationalists from theorising the subject of 
religion in the curriculum at either primary or secondary school level. 
I have suggested that the above discourses have combined into a secular (neo)-liberal 
governmentality comprising: a secular construction of religion as peripheral, private and 
unimportant; a liberal construction of belief as universal, relative, uncontroversial and socially 
liberal; and a neoliberal construction of religion as a lifestyle choice which enhances 
productivity. This treatment of religion is neither neutral nor inclusive. In the following 
chapter, I provide a critical realist and egalitarian liberal critique of the secondary literature 
which supports this status quo.
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Chapter Five: Review and Critique of Literature and Discourse 
Introduction 
[W]e need to look at practice rather than theory [. . .]. New Zealand will 
need a home-grown approach [. . .].The answers will not come out of 
books. 
Peter Donovan1 
In this chapter, I lay the groundwork which will enable me to answer research question three: 
Is there an alternative to current practices consistent with New Zealand’s status as a secular, 
bicultural and religiously plural liberal democracy? However, in contradistinction to religious 
researcher Peter Donovan’s advice regarding religious education policy formulation, this 
chapter attends to both books and theory to broaden the debate about religion in schools. 
Practices, as Foucault pointed out, are always invested in regimes of rationality.2 Theorising 
exposes these regimes and facilitates informed debate. In this spirit, I begin with an overview 
of critical realist scholars and the liberal theorist whose work informs my analysis. I then 
exemplify the discursive constraints and imperatives operating on religion in New Zealand 
schools with reference to relevant New Zealand and international literature. I demonstrate 
how the New Zealand literature reflects the positioned interests of the authors and often 
overlooks wider social considerations. The constraints of the thesis necessitate a tabular 
summary of these discursive positions, but following each table I present a Foucaultian, 
egalitarian liberal and critical realist critique of the positions described, drawing on additional 
critical literature largely from the New Zealand context. I develop specific criteria through 
which an alternative form of education about religion and beliefs may be proffered. 
In Chapter Two, I explained that a critical realist methodology—in contrast to a post-
structuralist or post-modern approach—must go further than description of a discursive 
terrain and power differentials.3 Critical realism places truth, judgement and corrigibility at the 
heart of any educational or scholarly endeavour and eschews non-realist or relativist 
conclusions. There is, therefore, an imperative to move beyond description and redescription 
towards advocacy of just and equitable policy formulations and best practice in pedagogical 
approach. This chapter considers some ways to make reasoned judgements about normative 
“best” practice in religious education policy through a combination of critical realist and liberal 
theory. 
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Critical Realism and Education 
Critical realism, as described in Chapter Two, makes an important distinction between alethic 
truth—the intransitive dimension—and truth as we perceive and experience it—the transitive 
dimension.4 The critical realist educational imperative is, therefore, to work towards the 
discovery and knowledge of the intransitive dimension by means of enquiry, dialogue, 
comparison with experience, and judgement: a process I have referred to as “judgemental 
rationality”.5 This is advocated on the grounds that human life is ultimately diminished if not 
lived in a way that is consistent with the best possible understanding of truth/reality.6  
This exercise of judgemental rationality is fundamental to the production of academic 
knowledge where “informed communities of practitioners”, “knowing subjects”, or experts 
within different disciplines debate and analyse the legitimacy of claims to conceptual truth.7 
The knowledge produced will always be contingent on the information available at the time 
and in the specific context, and the possibility always exists that new information and new 
perspectives might produce a different or amended judgement. It therefore remains in the 
transitive dimension. While provisional and fallible, such conceptual knowledge may be seen 
as the “best available”, or a “contingent rationality”. For the critical realist, this is the grounds 
of all educational endeavour. Education theorist Leesa Wheelahan explains: 
[T]he pursuit of truth should be a normative goal of curriculum, recognising 
the corrigibility of our knowledge and the need to revise it in light of 
evidence [. . .] [T]he academic disciplines provide access to the natural and 
social worlds even if this access is imperfect.8 
For the critical realist, I contend, grounds for advocation of curriculum policy on religion in 
schools may be predicated on the exercise of judgemental rationality which takes account of 
the plurality of lived experience and the “best that is known” in terms of conceptual 
knowledge within the academic discipline of religious studies. An attitude of openness to 
debate, and corrigibility in the light of better explanation, should be normative in any 
educational establishment or curriculum policy, whatever its stated religious, cultural or 
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ideological commitment. Such an attitude has been described by Cooling as one of “epistemic 
humility”.9  
Allied to the critical realist position, a body of social realist literature, drawing on the work of 
Emile Durkheim and Basil Bernstein in the sociology of education and best exemplified by 
Michael Young, argues for a strong view of conceptual knowledge in the curriculum.10 
Conceptual or disciplinary knowledge is constructed as “powerful knowledge” which is 
necessary for the development of critical reasoning, the ability to think beyond one’s 
immediate experience and “imagine possible futures” and in order to participate in 
democracy.11 Such knowledge is taught primarily in subject disciplines which have been 
developed and critiqued within the academy. Conceptual knowledge permits incremental 
access to the way knowledge is created and recognised within each discipline. It is so powerful 
because it allows for the production of new knowledge. As Wheelahan points out:  
We need practice in “thinking other people’s thoughts” as a condition for 
thinking for ourselves [. . .]. Induction into the disciplines is necessary if 
students are to recognise different voices and to begin to articulate their 
own. This is not an argument for induction into the disciplines as timeless 
truths. The focus is on introducing students to the debates and 
controversies within disciplines and for creating the conditions for active 
agency so students can participate in these debates and controversies.12 
Conceptual knowledge provides access to new ways of thinking and therefore knowledge 
production: ways to better describe and explain truth/reality.13 Conceptual knowledge, it is 
argued, should be an entitlement for all children. Young sums up the purpose of formal 
education for the social/critical realist as: 
To enable students to acquire knowledge that (i) is not accessible to most 
people in their daily lives, and (ii) [to enable] those who acquire it to move 
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beyond their experience and gain some understanding of the social and 
natural worlds of which they are a part.14 
Such knowledge should be accessible to all learners regardless of social class. For Young, the 
defining role of education is the provision of this epistemic access.15 But conceptual 
knowledge is frequently constructed, through prevailing educational discourses, as a politically 
conservative device to reproduce existing power differentials. Young recognises his own role 
in the destabilisation of conceptual knowledge, which he previously characterised as 
“knowledge of the powerful”, representing and privileging the interests of the few.16 He now 
makes a helpful distinction between the conservative defence of the “role of schools as 
institutions with responsibility for knowledge transmission” (powerful knowledge) against 
over-socialised and politicised education models, and the conservative defence of professional 
or majoritarian interests and privileges (knowledge of the powerful) in educational 
institutions.17  
These authors inform my critical realist approach to “best practice” in the selection of 
curriculum content and to the study of religion in the curriculum. I therefore ask of the 
curriculum content proposed within the discourses below, with Young: “Is this curriculum a 
means by which pupils can acquire powerful knowledge?”18 And further: Is this curriculum 
designed to develop judgemental rationality, and is it characterised by epistemic humility? 
 As I have shown above, religion has traditionally been perceived, in the New Zealand 
educational context, to be primarily concerned with formation either of Christian faith or of 
moral character or both. Conceptual knowledge of religions has effectively been disqualified. 
Moreover Western liberal education—at least as far back as the 17th-century writings of John 
Locke—has been widely perceived to be concerned not just with conceptual learning, but with 
character formation: instilling self-discipline, social skills and moral sensibilities into the 
young.19 Recognition of the dual nature of both education and of religion in education 
necessitates a theorisation of educational governmentality: on what basis may a liberal state, 
in a plural context, become involved or intervene in religious and moral formation? My 
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critique of current educational practice is informed by the Foucaultian concept of 
governmentality and the liberal theory of William Galston. 
Governmentality and Egalitarian Liberalism 
In Chapter Two, I introduced Foucault’s concept of governmentality.20 Foucault was interested 
in the disciplinary techniques—persuasive and coercive strategies—employed by the nation 
state in the governance of individuals and the production of self-disciplining, compliant 
subjects, within institutions.21 As previously stated, Foucault noted that liberalism could be 
perceived both as an oppressive governmental technique and a critical tool: a method of 
resistance to governmental techniques. Liberal critique, he states, is characterised by the 
following questions: 
Why, in fact, must one govern? [. . .]. To what extent can [government] be 
done without, and in which cases is it needless or harmful for it to 
intervene [. . .] and what ends should it pursue with regard to society in 
order to justify its existence?22 
The conception of liberalism as critical conscience to governmental activity seems to challenge 
earlier depictions of Foucault as a non-realist or relativist.23 For criticism implies judgement 
against a normative standard or truth of some kind, or at least a normative conception of 
harm. This is consistent with Bhaskar’s advocation of judgemental realism, rather than 
judgemental relativism, and Gouldner’s promulgation of normative objectivity rather than 
non-partisan neutrality.24 Foucault certainly did not advocate moral relativism or neutrality in 
the education of the young, stating: “If I had a kid, I assure you he would not write on the 
walls—or if he did, it would be against my will. The very idea!”25 
For Foucault, the potential for oppression or tyranny in governmental intervention was found 
not in the constraints themselves, which might actually be desirable, but in the inability of 
those under constraint, within a given system, to object, resist and potentially change the 
constraint.26 In other words, a liberal system of governmentality should allow for critique, 
debate and improvement by those affected by it. In this regard a critical realist approach to 
education, which includes the development of judgmental rationality and is characterised by 
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epistemic humility and corrigibility, is compatible with a Foucaultian liberal critique of 
educational governmental techniques. Foucault supplies a second question with which to 
interrogate the discursive positions below: does this curriculum allow for objection, resistance 
and change?  
The question of a normative standard against which governmental intervention should be 
judged is raised, but not answered by Foucault. What ends may be legitimately pursued 
through governmental means? In educational terms, which are the legitimate governmental 
aims of education policy and which aims are oppressive and tyrannical? How does one make 
that judgement? Galston addresses the question of legitimate state intervention in “Two 
Concepts of Liberalism”.27 He differentiates between a liberal autonomy model, based on the 
Enlightenment project, and a liberal diversity model, rooted in the Reformation project.28 The 
former, he notes, tends towards oppressive and coercive governmental techniques which seek 
to eliminate religiously conservative and illiberal ideas and which set up social and religious 
liberalism, rationalism and personal autonomy as the universal bases of the liberal state. This 
form of intervention is, in Galston’s view, illegitimate if the state is genuinely to accept 
diversity. 
 The protection of diversity is, Galston suggests, necessary for a number of reasons the most 
compelling of which, in my view, is that diversity of beliefs and values is an empirical fact of 
Western liberal nation states and to seek to change this would require an unacceptable level 
of state coercion and civil strife.29 This being the case, and regardless of wider instrumental 
arguments for the protection of diversity,30 it would seem desirable to promote “public 
institutions that conduce to the expression, rather than the coercive suppression or covert 
homogenisation” of these necessarily diverse values and standpoints.31  
The liberal autonomy model purports to valorise diversity but tends “toward intervention, 
homogenisation, and the denial of genuine difference”.32 The liberal diversity model, in 
contrast, seeks to hold different religious and cultural conceptions of the good in tension, 
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providing the conditions for mutual flourishing. Galston affirms liberal diversity over liberal 
autonomy but rejects the suggestion that a liberal state must remain neutral, such that it must 
not pursue its own goals, and that the protection of religious pluralism necessitates moral or 
judgemental relativism:33 
Rather, [a liberal state] is properly characterised as a community organised 
in pursuit of a distinctive ensemble of public purposes. It is these purposes 
that undergird its unity, structure its institutions, guide its policies, and 
define its public virtues. In the constitutional context, it is these purposes 
that shape an appropriate understanding of compelling state interests that 
warrant public interference with group practices.34 
He provides three examples of reasonable state intervention in line with the central purposes 
of a liberal state in which diverse groups might thrive:  
[P]rotection of human life—would allow the liberal state to intervene 
against religious worship that involves human sacrifice [. . .]; protection and 
promotion of normal development of basic capacities—would allow the 
state to intervene against communities that bind infants' skulls or 
malnourish them in ways that impede physical growth and maturation; 
[. . .] development of “social rationality” (the kind of understanding needed 
to participate in the society, economy, and polity)—would allow the state 
to intervene against forms of education that are systematically disenabling 
when judged against this norm.35  
These normative criteria apply to all forms of education such that contravention by religious 
or cultural groups would allow, and even necessitate, state intervention. For “[t]he liberal 
state has a legitimate and compelling interest in ensuring that the convictions, competencies, 
and virtues required for liberal citizenship [thus defined] are widely shared”.36 In my view 
these criteria provide a normative conception of harm, against which the state has a 
responsibility to protect its citizens. They provide a measure against which governmental 
interventions may be judged. I therefore adopt them in my critique of education policy in New 
Zealand below. 
Galston is very clear that the promotion of personal autonomy, which is contrary to some 
religious worldviews, “is not among the shared liberal purposes” of the liberal state. Rather it 
is only “one possible mode of existence in liberal societies [. . .] [whose] devotees [. . .] must 
recognise the need for respectful coexistence with individuals and groups that do not give 
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autonomy pride of place”.37 For “liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the 
valorisation of choice”.38 Galston notes that the liberal autonomy model appears able to 
tolerate only forms of alterity which are amenable to reason and to democratic governance. It 
exerts a liberalising pressure on illiberal and socially conservative groups.39 This is the 
oppressive and coercive form of governmentality described above by Foucault, within which 
there is little room for resistance. It is also exemplified by the authoritarian liberal discourse 
described in Chapter Four and below in this chapter. In this regard Galston differs from liberal 
theorists John Rawls and Will Kymlicka, who both affirm that the liberalising imperative is 
intrinsic to democratic liberalism.40 In contrast, Galston’s liberal diversity model “evinces a 
strong system of tolerance” which allows groups to remain “illiberal in their internal structure 
and practices as long as freedom of entrance and exit is zealously safeguarded by the state”.41 
In other words, the state guards against coercion and indoctrination into communities of 
belief and ensures, through educational means, that individuals are equipped to leave a 
community of belief if they undergo a change of mind. This is consistent with Foucault’s 
critical conception of liberalism which facilitates possible resistance and change to forms of 
governmentality.  
Galston insists that, beyond the protection and enforcement of the central purposes of the 
liberal state as described above, the state must neither promote cultural or religious views nor 
promote scepticism about beliefs. Neither religious nor non-religious views may be deemed 
“presumptively invalid” by state institutions.42 Tolerance is therefore characterised by non-
coercion in matters of religion and belief: 
This does not mean wishy-washiness or the propensity to doubt one's own 
position [. . .]. It does not require an easy relativism about the good. [. . .] 
Toleration means, rather, the principled refusal to use coercive state 
instruments to impose one's own views on others, the commitment to 
competition through recruitment and persuasion alone.43 
But this does not mean that discussion of religious and cultural differences should be avoided 
in state schools. With regard to religious education, Galston positions this understanding of 
tolerance as central to the formulation of policy: 
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It is hard to believe that tolerance, so understood, can be cultivated 
without at least minimal awareness of the existence and nature of [ways of 
life different to one’s own]. So the state may establish educational 
guidelines pursuant to this compelling interest. What it may not do is 
prescribe curricula or pedagogic practices that require or strongly invite 
students to become skeptical or critical of their own ways of life.44 
Galston’s liberal diversity model is egalitarian in nature, eschewing the privileging of one form 
of belief over another and opposing all forms of informal and formal cultural or religious 
establishment within state institutions.45 It is consistent with the egalitarian liberal discourse 
described in Table 9, above, and Table 14, below. Galston’s theorising of these two forms of 
liberalism provide a helpful corollary to Foucaultian liberal critique of educational 
governmental techniques adopted in this thesis and the critical realist education literature 
discussed above. His criteria for legitimate state intervention, and his construction of 
tolerance as non-coercion, are adopted as standards of normative objectivity in the following 
critique of New Zealand education policy and practice. In this regard, Galston supplies us with 
three further questions with which to interrogate the discursive positions below: does this 
curriculum use coercive state instruments to impose views on young people? Does this 
curriculum genuinely protect diversity (including illiberal worldviews)? Does this curriculum 
promote social rationality consistent with the requirements of (egalitarian) liberal citizenship? 
From this critical realist, Foucaultian and egalitarian liberal (hereafter, critical liberal) vantage 
point, a critique of the disqualification of education in religions and beliefs in the New Zealand 
context may be mounted. I give an overview of the New Zealand and international literature 
in tabular form and then apply my critique to the discursive positions described.46 
Discursive Terrain and Critical Realist Critique 
Authoritarian and Liberal Secular Rationalist Discourses 
I begin with a critique of the authoritarian secular rationalist discursive constraint on teaching 
about religions and beliefs. As I showed in Chapter Four, a construction of “secular” as 
“nothing to do with religion” has clearly informed New Zealand education policy. This 
construction had considerable currency at the time of my interviews.47 This, I have suggested, 
may be as a result not of a simple misunderstanding of the meaning the word, but may be 
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related, more profoundly, to matters of New Zealand identity and subjectivity.48 It is 
exemplified in the secondary literature as follows. 
Table 11: Secular Rationalist Discourses 
  New Zealand Literature  International Literature 
Authoritarian 
Secular Rationalist 
Colin McGeorge: opposes BiS, spiritual 
education and liberal RE on the grounds 
that it is indoctrinatory.
49
 
Jack Mulheron: opposes BiS and state 
integration of church schools; considers 
religion to be “worthless”.
50
 
Elizabeth Rata: religion is antidemocratic.
51 




Christopher Hitchens: religion 












Tessa Bromwich: BiS amounts to religious 
coercion and discrimination and breaches 
Human Rights. Learning about religion may 
be permissible.
56 




Michael Hand: RE should 




Richard Dawkins: children should 
be religiously literate to 
understand that the Bible is “not a 
moral book”.
59 
At the heart of the authoritarian secular rationalist dissociation of education and religion is an 
ontology of religion as unreal and irrational, anti-educational and politically regressive. 
Addressing the Fabian Society, critical realist and sociologist of education Elizabeth Rata 
appears to exemplify this authoritarian perspective, constructing religious belief as beyond 
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critique. In this respect she mirrors the views of Hardie and Hitchens expressed above.60 She 
reasons: “[B]eliefs by their very nature are not subject to the rules of logic.” Being “immune to 
criticism and rejection” they are “fundamentally antidemocratic”. Rata disqualifies religious 
knowledge on the grounds that it is authorised internally by priests and clerics whereas 
conceptual knowledge is authorised by procedures which, although internal to each discipline, 
allow for external scrutiny and criticism.61 Rata, along with McGeorge and Mulheron in Table 
11, appears to be operating with Galson’s “autonomy” model of liberalism, in which 
heteronomy is presumptively invalid. 
The construction of religion as irrational and invalid is not shared by all critical realists. 
Sociologist and critical realist Margaret Archer asserts that there are rational reasons both to 
believe and to disbelieve. Belief is founded on experience of the transcendent; disbelief is 
founded on the absence of religious experience. “If it is rational for the atheist to disbelieve in 
transcendent reality, then, similarly, it is equally rational for the religious person to believe in 
transcendent reality.”62 For some critical realists, then: “Ontological realism about God in the 
intransitive dimension is consistent with epistemic or experiential relativism in the transitive 
dimension.” God may be considered an ontological reality, an alethic truth, while 
acknowledging that the way believers describe and experience that reality are contingent, 
variable, and open to correction, being in the transitive dimension.63 Wright insists that 
religion itself is a truth-seeking enterprise. Its role, he says, is “to enable religious adherents to 
engage with ultimate reality and to enable them to live flourishing lives in harmony with 
others in the light of that reality”.64 
On this basis it may be argued from a critical liberal perspective that education about religions 
and beliefs within a state school, whose institutional purpose I have constructed as the pursuit 
of truth, is not inimical to educational endeavour. In fact an examination of religious truth 
claims, and the consequences on the ways in which people live their lives, might be positioned 
as foundational for an education premised on the pursuit of truth. Thus religion should not be 
bracketed out of secular education but should be a legitimate focus of investigation. 
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It is the presumptive invalidity of religious belief—the presumed incontestability of disbelief—
inherent in the authoritarian secular rationalist position which fails the test set by Galston 
above for an egalitarian liberal curriculum. A curriculum in which religion is disqualified does 
not protect diversity by recognising difference and ensuring that young people form a broad 
understanding of different worldviews; it does not promote the social rationality required for 
life in a plural and liberal society. On critical realist grounds, the disqualification of religion 
denies young people access to powerful knowledge about religion, without which the 
development of judgemental rationality, or discernment in matters of religion and belief, will 
be impaired. Religion constitutes a null curriculum. To use educationalist Elliot Eisner’s 
definition, the null curriculum represents “the options students are not afforded, the 
perspectives they may never know about, much less be able to use, the concepts and skills 
that are not part of their intellectual repertoire”.65 On Foucaultian grounds the disqualification 
of religion from the school curriculum, and consequent potential for inculcation of a negative 
view of religious belief, appears oppressive and totalitarian, and places rational autonomy and 
atheism beyond critique. This may even be perceived as an intolerant strategy of state 
coercion within Galston’s liberal theory above. 
Just such a charge has been made against the New Zealand Curriculum by liberal Christian 
religious educationalist Terence Copley. He coined the phrase “secular indoctrination” to 
describe the promotion of a secular/atheist world view in New Zealand schools. Alarmed by 
the results of his “Biblos” research, he protested that New Zealand children have “no ability to 
critique this view or to see how it has been so successfully implanted”. Describing this as “a 
sinister capture of integrity” he says the result is a “closed mind, which sincerely believes its 
own programming”.66 Copley’s concern for the child’s impaired critical capacity is in line with a 
critical realist emphasis on epistemic humility and developing judgemental rationality in 
education, a Foucaultian concern to allow for critique and objection, and an egalitarian liberal 
concern to avoid coercion and to educate children about alternative worldviews in order to 
facilitate diversity. However, this thesis argues that it was not atheism but a secular (neo)-
liberal worldview into which youngsters were being programmed at the time of my research. 
It will be evident from the preceding discussion that the liberal secular rationalist position, 
held by Dennis Rose, Michael Hand and Richard Dawkins as shown above, which may permit 
education in religions and beliefs in order to destabilise existing faith or to prove its disvalue, 
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does not withstand critical liberal critique.67 For the state to employ such an approach would 
be profoundly coercive and intolerant, in Galston’s terms. In Foucaultian terms, this is an 
illegitimate form of governmentality because the presumptive invalidity of religious belief is 
non-negotiable and the basis of individual autonomy as a normative standard is not held up to 
critique. In critical realist language, the liberal secular rationalist approach to religious 
education lacks epistemic humility, substituting judgmental rationality with an unreflective 
cynicism or atheism. Neither the authoritarian secular rationalist nor the liberal secular 
rationalist position on education in religions and beliefs withstand the scrutiny of Galston, 
Foucault or critical realist critique as described.  
I now address the Conservative Christian and Evangelising discourses and the literature 
supporting confessional religious instruction in state and integrated church schools. 
Conservative and Evangelising Christian Discourses 
Table 12: Conservative and Evangelising Christian Discourses 




Mary Petersen: in favour of schools 
adopting a religious character and of BiS.
68
 
Patrick Lynch: believes secular education, 




Kevin Kannan: supports BiS in state schools 
to promote spiritual intelligence.
70
 
Paul Rishworth: supports BiS in state 
schools as a human right.
71 
Penny Thompson: supports 
confessional approach to RE 
teaching in the UK.
72
 
Ian MacMullen: teaching other 
religions is useless and may be 







Michael Drake: all New Zealanders should 
become Christians. Other religions, 
including Māori beliefs, are evil.
74 
Louis Bush: founder of 4-14 child 
evangelism movement in the US.
75
 
George Barna: advocates child 
peer evangelism in US schools.
76 
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In the New Zealand secondary literature the conservative Christian discourse is often 
exemplified by those working within an integrated church school framework, such as Patrick 
Lynch and Kevin Kannan, and those associated with the Churches Education Commission 
promoting Bible-in-Schools (since the 1980s), such as Mary Petersen. In the articles above, 
these writers conflate Christian religious instruction with religious education and regard as 
self-evident the importance of instruction in Christian beliefs and values for children in New 
Zealand state schools. They regard the provision of religious instruction as a reflection of the 
wishes of the community and presume that freedom of parental choice, in both attendance at 
BiS and integrated schools, is sufficient to safeguard the rights of children and consonant with 
liberal democracy. They support the status quo of Bible-in-Schools and integrated church 
schools. I address the inadequacy of the current opt-out provision, both for BiS and Integrated 
schools below in Chapter Six.77 Here I apply my critical liberal critique to the literature 
supporting confessional religious instruction as it takes place in New Zealand integrated and 
secular primary schools. 
It has been stated, following Archer, that there is no objection in principle, to the critical 
realist and egalitarian liberal, in living one’s life according to the lights of religious belief. For 
many this will include the desire to bring one’s children up within a faith. In New Zealand this 
may involve home schooling, attendance at a church school (either private or integrated) or 
attending Bible-in-Schools in a secular state school.78 The right to educate one’s children 
according to religious belief is enshrined in Human Rights legislation.79 Significantly, the rights 
of the child to form his/her own views on matters of religion are also protected.80  
The writers draw on this discourse to promote the view that freedom of choice relates to that 
of parents and not of children. It is assumed that parents make an unfettered and informed 
choice regarding their children’s religious education. There is, however, no consideration of 
the need to inform young people about alternative worldviews in this conservative Christian 
literature. Former General Secretary of the Churches Education Commission Petersen, for 
example, refers to BiS as a “partnership between the schools and the local community”.81 
While she discusses the changing nature of New Zealand society, she does not go on to 
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consider how religious education might need to change if it was to genuinely reflect the belief 
traditions of the community.82 Executive director of the New Zealand Catholic Education 
Office Lynch extols the virtues of parental choice and the new acceptance of diversity—but his 
construction of diversity includes only Christian denominations and it is Christian religious 
formation, in line with parents’ wishes, rather than education in religions and beliefs, which 
exercises him.83  
Petersen describes the way in which the “Tomorrow’s Schools” developments in school 
management have facilitated partnership between schools and communities, encouraging 
“religious education” provided by the CEC in state schools.84 She explains that the CEC’s 
programme is “acknowledged and endorsed by the Ministry of Education and the School 
Trustees Association” and is “recognised in law and education policy”.85 In so doing she 
constructs Bible-in-Schools as a public good and reproduces a presumption of validity 
regarding Christian belief. By attributing legal and educational endorsement to BiS she imbues 
the CEC’s programme with institutional power. Her positioning of BiS as Christian religious 
education, “from a perspective which demonstrates sensitivity and awareness of other 
religious beliefs and practices”, differs from the analysis of Maddox.86 In Chapter Four, I 
suggested that one way of accounting for the continued accommodation of BiS within the 
New Zealand education system is the systematic redescription of the programme as the 
promotion of uncontroversial liberal values. Petersen’s chapter exemplifies this redescription 
and thus evidences one way in which the ability of parents to give informed consent or to 
exercise their right to opt out may be discursively constrained. My research indicates that 
matters of freedom of choice, informed consent and opting out regarding Bible-in-Schools are 
much more problematic than is suggested by the conservative Christian literature.87 Indeed, 
Ahdar has cautioned that “social and peer pressure to effect religious conformity is real and it 
is deleterious in the New Zealand school context.88 
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 Both Petersen and Lynch fully endorse the neoliberal agenda of parental choice, the self-
management of schools and the concurrent move to enable secular state schools to adopt a 
special religious character, also exemplified by Jenny Shipley in Chapter Four.89 In these 
circumstances it seems to be the case that the legislation of 1964 and 1877 has been rendered 
irrelevant. Neither the secular curriculum nor the rights of dissenting parents are protected 
within this model. The problems which the secular clause was specifically designed to address 
are overlooked in the neoliberal belief that the market provides just social outcomes. Within 
this model the right of the dissenting parent is exercised by simply choosing a different 
school.90 Invoking the “right to choose” operates as a trump card and appears to render BiS 
unassailable.  
The argument for parental choice, while purportedly egalitarian, overlooks the institutional 
advantage of the CEC as provider of BiS. It also places unwarranted reliance on the neoliberal 
principal of unfettered parental choice in matters of state schooling. There is an unstated 
assumption that parents are free to choose the school best suited to their ideological outlook. 
But such a view does not take account of the material constraints under which many parents 
operate, which effectively limit this choice to that of the local state school.91 My research also 
signals constraints on the information secular schools provide to parents about religion 
programmes.92 As a result, state schools cannot depend upon consensus regarding religious 
and spiritual values or traditions. They must therefore, if they are to meet Galston’s liberal 
criteria of non-coercion and protection of diversity, avoid institutional endorsement of 
religious belief. Petersen, Lynch and Shipley appear to be operating with Galston’s autonomy-
based approach to liberalism, in support of a conservative Christian status quo. In Galston’s 
terms, the adoption of a Christian faith as part of a state school’s special character constitutes 
coercion by means of unofficial religious establishment.93 It is illiberal and intolerant of 
diversity. 
Others problematise the conservative Christian assumption that children should be inculcated 
into the faith of their parents in faith schools. Cooling, who advocates a critical realist (and 
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liberal Christian) form of religious education in the United Kingdom is unequivocal that church 
schools, and those teaching religious instruction classes in schools, need to exercise 
“courageous restraint” in their dealings with children:  
Courageous restraint means that people are willing to stand back from 
what is naturally their first priority in order to respect the integrity of other 
people. It means being willing to let fairness temper one’s advocacy of 
truth as you understand it. [. . .] For the teacher in the classroom it means 
welcoming the expression of points of view by pupils and in the syllabus 
that you think are flawed [. . .]. For curriculum developers it will mean not 
looking simply to champion your own particular view, but being willing to 
introduce a diversity of views into a syllabus.94 
This will involve exposing children to alternative worldviews by making sure that school 
enrolment processes are inclusive so that multiple religious voices are heard within the 
school. It will involve offering education in religions and beliefs alongside any formational 
religious teaching. This is consistent with the critical realist requirement of epistemic humility, 
described by Cooling above.95 
Thus a critical realist form of religious instruction, in any context, would be open to both intra-
religious and inter-religious debate and contradiction. Religious beliefs would not be taught to 
children as if belonging to the intransitive dimension. To do so would be to present children 
with a set of beliefs about the order of reality which are immune from judgemental 
rationality. Such a practice would be detrimental to the shared goal of religion and education: 
to encourage individuals to engage with and pursue truth/reality and to live life according to 
those lights. From a critical realist perspective it is intellectually dishonest to teach children of 
any age that one set of knowledge is incontestable, when this knowledge is manifestly 
contested by others. Such an insult to young people’s rational capacity may reasonably 
preclude their later engagement with knowledge of or about religion.96 This means that 
children in both primary and secondary school should be offered education about a variety of 
religious and non-religious perspectives as part of their education, even in integrated church 
schools.97 
This view corresponds to that of Galston, who, as indicated above, asserts that the liberal 
state has a responsibility to safeguard the right of youngsters to exit an illiberal religious group 
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through their education. While the state may not undermine illiberal or conservative religious 
teachings it may insist that educational institutions provide the conditions required in order 
for the right to leave such a group to be meaningful: 
A meaningful right would seem to include at least the following elements: 
knowledge conditions—the awareness of alternatives to the life one is in 
fact living; capacity conditions—the ability to assess these alternatives if it 
comes to seem desirable to do so; psychological conditions—in particular, 
freedom from [. . .] brainwashing [. . .] and more broadly, forms of coercion 
other than the purely physical [. . .]; and finally, fitness conditions—the 
ability of exit-desiring individuals to participate effectively in at least some 
ways of life other than the ones they wish to leave.98 
Galston’s concerns correspond to the critical realist attention to knowledge of religions and 
beliefs, judgemental rationality and discernment—the ability to weigh things up, defend one’s 
position and sometimes change one’s mind in the light of best evidence—courageous restraint 
in pedagogical approach and respect for the integrity of the child as a seeker of truth. They 
also correspond with the Foucaultian conception of critical liberalism in which forms of 
governmentality must allow for critique, resistance and the possibility of change.  
It has been argued, both by research participants, and within the literature exemplified in 
Table 12, that it is confusing and harmful for primary school children to learn about more than 
one religion. From within the evangelising discourse, exemplified by Christian educator 
Michael Drake above, it is argued that children should not be exposed to religious falsehoods. 
But scholars within the conservative Christian discourse sometimes draw on educational 
discourses to disqualify education in religions and beliefs. Political scientist Ian MacMullen, for 
example, based this argument for Christian religious instruction on an uncritical acceptance of 
a Piagetian model of cognitive development. This model, espoused by religious educationalist 
Ronald Goldman in the 1960s and influential in the development of Agreed Syllabuses in the 
United Kingdom, limits pre-adolescent children to concrete rather than formal or abstract 
operations.99 Within such an educational model, primary school teaching which requires 
children to see things from alternative religious viewpoints is constructed as damaging and 
pointless.100 MacMullen’s view does not take into account critiques of developmental theory, 
such as that of developmental psychologist Margaret Donaldson, which showed how even 
very young children could demonstrate understanding of different perspectives, so long as the 
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examples they were given made “human sense”.101 Julia Ipgrave’s more recent research in 
religious education sees primary school children demonstrating this understanding by 
dialoguing with children from different religious backgrounds about matters of religion and 
belief, via email.102 Such evidence suggests that MacMullen’s imperative to nurture primary 
school children within only one tradition may be founded in his primary conservative Christian 
discourse, rather than empirical research as he asserts. 
It is argued in the primary and secondary literature, and within the interview data, that 
children in New Zealand need Bible-in-Schools in order to understand their Christian heritage. 
This argument seeks to conflate conceptual knowledge of religion with the promotion of a 
majority religious worldview. It cannot be sustained on critical liberal grounds. Conceptual 
knowledge of Bible stories and Christian traditions is required to unlock the meaning inherent 
in much Western literature, music and art, and should therefore be an entitlement for all 
young people. The assertion that BiS provides young people with this powerful knowledge was 
evidenced neither by the Biblos project, the Biblical Literacy Survey nor within my research 
data.103  
It will be evident from this critique that a critical liberal approach cannot endorse evangelising 
and proselytising in state schools. Such practices fail to recognise the distinction between 
transitive and intransitive knowledge, to observe Cooling’s courageous restraint in teaching 
about religion, or to respect the developing judgemental rationality of the child. While a 
critical liberal approach may endorse religious instruction and observances in church schools, 
this should not amount to induction into a closed worldview. Equally objectionable would be 
the uncritical induction of children into a liberal religious or relativist world view. Both 
approaches would be inimical to the purpose of education conceived as the pursuit of truth 
informed by judgemental rationality and characterised by corrigibility. Such coercive practices 
are detrimental to the promotion of diversity and social rationality and against the compelling 
interests of the nation state. Both are illiberal in the terms described by Galston and Foucault, 
above. 
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But “liberal religious education”, exemplified by practices in state schools in the United 
Kingdom, also stands accused of coercion and illiberality.104 Analysis of liberal RE reveals the 
influence of liberal Christian, egalitarian liberal, authoritarian liberal and diversity discourses. I 
treat the liberal Christian discourse first because it may be seen to form the basis of the 
academic discipline of Religious Studies and the subsequent development of RE in the United 
Kingdom. 
Liberal Christian Discourse 
Table 13: Liberal Christian Discourse 
New Zealand Literature International Literature 
Ian Breward: disdainful of BiS. Teaching itself is 




Margaret Reid Martin: BiS has had its day. 
Christian teaching should be in the curriculum 
but include other faiths.
106
 
Enid Bennett: curriculum should include 




Peter Donovan: against multifaith RE but 
believes BiS includes other faiths. Proposes 




Keith Wanden and Lyn Smith: propose inter-
religious education in state schools but 
children should learn about “their own” faith, 
i.e., Christianity as a priority.
109
 
Lorna May Travis: includes “presence of God” 
in analysis of spiritual education and positions 
Māori spirituality as universal.
110
 
Liberal theologians such as Rudolph Otto, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and Paul Tillich 
articulate the concept of faith as a universal 
dimension of human life and “ultimate 
questions” as a focus all faiths.
111
 
Ninian Smart: postulates universal dimensions of 
religion and promotes non-confessional teaching 
about religious beliefs (UK and US).
112
 
The Chichester Project: teaching the importance 
of Christianity without promoting belief (UK).
113
  
Terence Copley and the Biblos Report: New 
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The New Zealand literature, during the late 1960s and 1970s, reflects the influence of a liberal 
Protestant Christian theology popularised by Paul Tillich.115 The liberal Christian discourse is 
characterised by “inclusivity” and a conception of the human being as innately religious, the 
religious dimension of life being universal. In this spirit of inclusivity, scholars of religion such 
as Ninian Smart, in the United Kingdom, sought to theorise religious belief and believers from 
traditions other than Christianity, without intending to make value judgements about them.116 
He did this by describing diverse religions in terms of their commonalities rather than their 
differences. Smart’s Six Dimensions of Faith—doctrinal, mythical, ethical, ritual, experiential 
and institutional—provided a procedural framework for the analysis of religion, distinct from 
the traditional study of theology, which was adopted in new religious studies departments 
and was enormously influential in the development of religious education curricula in the 
United Kingdom.117  
Those exemplifying liberal Christian approaches to religious education often privilege 
Christianity in the curriculum but avoid confessional approaches and seek to be inclusive of 
other religions. However, they presuppose a religious sensibility in children which should be 
developed through religious education.118 Donovan represents a liberal Christian worldview 
which is inclusive of other faiths but does not extend this to comparative religion within the 
curriculum, which he considers a “supermarket”, “mix and match” or “relativistic” approach. 
Donovan rejects any necessity for children to acquire conceptual knowledge of religion, 
presuming that faith communities best provide for children’s religious instruction and 
affirming the CEC’s prioritising of the Christian faith.119 His further assumption, and assertion, 
is that the Churches Education Commission’s programme not only pursues Christian goals but 
also has a responsibility “for advancing the interests of other faiths represented in our 
schools”. Its materials and training programmes “clearly acknowledge religious diversity as an 
important fact of life for today’s children”. The CEC may be seen by some boards of trustees as 
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“a helpful advocate for a pluralistic, multifaith education”. 120 Donovan appears to position BiS 
as educational, liberal, inclusive and balanced in approach. His redescription of BiS and 
endorsement of its role in education may serve to reproduce the status quo of confessional 
religious instruction in New Zealand primary schools and to legitimise BiS as an educational 
governmental technique within a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality. 
Donovan raises some of the problems around religious diversity and religion in schools but the 
solution, he states, “will not come out of books”.121 His “home-grown” solution—to increase 
the CEC chaplaincy provision to include other faiths—is flawed on several levels. Firstly, the 
approach fails to differentiate between everyday or experiential knowledge and conceptual 
knowledge: it does not respect the primary purpose of school which is to provide children 
with learning that they will not receive elsewhere. Donovan’s suggestion limits children to the 
knowledge and truth of the family or community context and does not expand their horizons 
beyond the familiar and local. Secondly, the approach reproduces a confessional approach to 
religious education, which does not respect the need for courageous restraint or epistemic 
humility, and does not address issues of accountability associated with the volunteer-led 
approach.122 Thirdly, the approach reproduces a separation of curriculum and religion, 
maintaining the institutional privileging of Christianity, through the CEC, and preventing an 
adequate social theory of religious knowledge from being developed by educationalists. 
Fourthly, the approach fails to meet Galston’s precondition for the protection of diversity and 
the ability of a person to exit a religion: that children should learn about a variety of 
worldviews as part of their education. 
For Reid Martin, Bennett and Wanden and Smith, listed in Table 13, it was axiomatic that 
children should receive education about other religious beliefs in addition to Christianity, 
within the school curriculum, and that this inclusive approach was in line with progressive 
educational trends.123 But the chief objection to their approach, from a critical liberal 
perspective, is the presumptive validity of liberal Christianity and of religion in general. The 
view that religion is a universal phenomenon, that human beings are innately religious or 
spiritual, and that all religions are inherently benign is promulgated within this approach as 
though alethic truth. The liberal Christian approach to religious education does not respect 
the distinction between transitive and intransitive knowledge, and does not treat its own 
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religious assumptions with epistemic humility. Unless young people are given the opportunity 
to debate differences of belief and practice, to problematise stable and fixed conceptions of 
religion, and to exercise judgmental rationality and discernment regarding religious truth 
claims, there is a likelihood that a liberal Christian approach to religious education could 
promulgate not powerful knowledge but the “knowledge of the powerful”, in Young’s terms: a 
Western Christian interpretation of religion which legitimises the normative status of 
Protestant Christianity and essentialises diverse traditions in order to homogenise and contain 
them within a Protestant religious framework.124 The use of state instruments such as school 
curricula to promote a liberal Christian worldview may be perceived to be intolerant of 
conservative religious views and of non-religious perspectives. It is therefore detrimental to 
diversity in Galton’s terms. To represent all religions as conveyors of ultimate truth and reality, 
and to construct diverse traditions as ultimately the same, may be seen as a totalising form of 
governmentality in Foucaultian terms.  
Egalitarian Liberal, Diversity and Authoritarian Liberal Discourses 
Smart’s work greatly influenced the development of religious education as a curriculum area 
in the United Kingdom. He set up a research and development project with Schools’ Council 
funding through which he was able to promote a phenomenological and non-confessional 
approach to education in religions and beliefs.125 He was a founder of the Shap Working Party 
on World Religions in Education, which brought primary, secondary and tertiary level 
educators together to develop resources and pedagogies for teaching about religion.126 With 
other influential scholars of religion, such as Michael Grimmitt127 and John Hull,128 Smart may 
be seen to have effected a discursive shift in religious education from the normative 
conservative confessional Christian curricula and pedagogy, established in the 1944 Education 
Act, to a more liberal curriculum and pedagogy at all levels of state education. Adopting a 
methodology of procedural neutrality, a range of religions were to be introduced to children 
at all levels of education.129 This was a religion curriculum designed to meet the challenges of 
                                                          
124
 I discuss this post-colonial perspective further below, on page 156. 
125
 Schools Council Working Paper 36: Religious Education in Secondary Schools, (London: 
Evans/Methuen, 1971). 
126
 Shap, “Shap Journal”, Shap Working Party on Education in World Religions, accessed 16 January 
2016, http://www.shapworkingparty.org.uk/journals.html.  
127
 Michael Grimmitt, What Can I Do in RE?, (Great Wakering, Essex: Mahew- McCrimmon, 1973) 
128
 Influential as editor of the British Journal of Religious Education (formerly Learning for Living) from 
1971-1996. See, for example: John Hull, “Editorial”, Learning for Living 15, no. 4 (1976): 122-124. 
129
 Schools Council Working Paper 36, 88-91. The “neutrality” of this curriculum is contested by those 
drawing on conservative Christian and post-colonial discourses, as I show in this chapter. For a critique 
of the neutrality of methodological atheism in religious studies see Michael Cantrell, “Must a Scholar of 
142 
 
an increasingly secular and religiously plural society.130 The changes brought a concurrent shift 
in focus on educational outcomes reflecting these different discursive imperatives. At a time 
when traditional approaches to teaching religion were under critique by educationalists in the 
United Kingdom the phenomenological approach was able to obtain rapid currency.131 The 
changes were achieved largely through permeation of the new recommendations into teacher 
training institutions and local education authority agreed syllabi.  
From 1944, each local education authority in England and Wales had been required to provide 
an agreed syllabus for religious instruction.132 The first to adopt a multi-faith approach, under 
the influence of Birmingham University religious educationalist John Hull and liberal 
theologian John Hick, was the Birmingham Agreed Syllabus of 1975.133 This was followed in 
swift succession by multi-faith syllabuses in other education authorities.134 Christian formation 
was no longer seen as an appropriate aim for religious education in state schools. The 1988 
Education Reform Act formalised the practice of teaching about other religions, alongside 
Christianity, in England and Wales.135 
These changes were mirrored in international curricula, in line with changing patterns of 
immigration and increased religious diversity. Religious educationalist Denise Cush has noted 
that the countries which have been first to adopt this broader-based religious education are 
those with a liberal Protestant ethos and where religious instruction was formerly part of the 
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school curriculum, such as those of Northern Europe.136 This trend is seen in England and 
Wales, Scotland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands. Canada and South Africa 
have also adopted a non-confessional, multi-religious approach to RE.137  
But liberal religious education has continued to be perceived to fulfil a role in social formation. 
There is evidence that it has become co-opted as a governmental technique in the promotion 
of democratic citizenship, social cohesion and tolerance, i.e., the management of diversity. 
Such is the charge of the critics I consider below. 
I outline some of the key literature exemplifying the egalitarian liberal approach to religious 
education in Table 14, below and, in recognition of the discursive imperatives with which 
liberal religious education may be imbued, I include the diversity discourse and the 
authoritarian liberal discourse in this section. 
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Table 14: The Egalitarian Liberal, Diversity and Authoritarian Liberal Discourses 
 New Zealand Literature International Literature 
Egalitarian Liberal Jordan Cox: BiS breaches human rights 
but religion should be taught as a 
social fact in curriculum.
138
 
Paul Morris: religions and beliefs 
should be part of curriculum.
139
 
Jane Simpson: advocates religious 




Catherine Syms: multi-faith education 




Jocelyn Armstrong: has produced the 
first resource for state schools to assist 
in teaching about religious diversity.
142
 
Douglas Pratt: religious education 
should teach understanding and 
discernment of religions and beliefs.
143
 
Westhill Project: combining knowledge 




Michael Grimmitt: “Learning about” 
and “learning from” religions.
145
 
Robert Jackson and Warwick RE 




Andrew Wright: critical realist approach 
to religious education (UK).
147
 




Jean-Paul Willaime: religion should be 
taught as a social fact (France).
149
 
American Academy of Religion: 




Cathy Byrne: advocates secular religion 
and ethics in schools (Australia).
151
 
Toledo Principles (Europe and US): 




REDCo project: religious education as a 
contribution to dialogue (Europe).
153
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 New Zealand Literature International Literature 
Diversity Human Rights Commission: religious 
education should promote tolerance 




UNESCO/Council of Europe: learning to 








DCSF: Requirement to teach social 
cohesion in RE (UK).
157
 
Council of Europe: accepting cultural 
relativism is an important part of 





Paul Satherly: ICCS report.
159
 Tolerance 
and respect for liberalised 
construction of religion appears to be 
encouraged through NZ education. 
 




Andrew McGrady: all religions should 




Home Office: RE should teach correct 
representation of Islam to counter 
“distortions”. (UK)
162 




I discussed in Chapter Four the inability of the egalitarian liberal discourse to obtain currency 
within the education establishment in New Zealand. Those academics in the New Zealand 
context who have supported the introduction of religions and beliefs within either the primary 
or secondary school curriculum are in a small minority. The normative status of BiS “outside” 
the curriculum and exclusion of religious education “within” the curriculum have effectively 
precluded educational theorisation of the subject. It appears to have been deemed 
presumptively invalid by the education establishment.  
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In line with Galston’s conception of liberal diversity and the development of social rationality 
regarding matters of religion and belief, the egalitarian liberal discourse considers the rights of 
children to freedom of religions and beliefs as equivalent to those of their parents. It also 
considers education in religions and beliefs as a precondition to that right. This is not only a 
matter of equity but of the compelling interest of the nation state to protect diversity.164  
This egalitarian liberal discursive imperative has led the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority, in the United Kingdom, to describe religious education as an “entitlement” for all 
children: 
The national framework endorses an entitlement to learning in religious 
education for all pupils, irrespective of social background, culture, race, 
religion, gender, differences in ability and disabilities. This entitlement 
contributes to their developing knowledge, skills, understanding and 
attitudes. These are necessary for pupils’ self-fulfilment and development 
as active and responsible citizens.165 
In this context, the subject of religious education has generated a vast amount of literature of 
which I can only provide exemplars in Table 14. As a curriculum area religious education, 
conceived as education in religions and beliefs, has been gaining international acceptance, 
particularly since the events of September 11, 2001. In France, philosopher Regis Debray 
conducted a review of religion in education in 2002 and reported that France should move 
from a “laïcité of ignorance (in which religion does not concern us) towards a laïcité of 
understanding (where understanding becomes our duty)”.166 Sociologist Jean-Paul Willaime 
affirms that “religious facts” are now included in teacher training and taught in French 
schools.167 Similarly, in the United States, most school district curricula now include education 
in religions and beliefs.168 The American Academy of Religion has developed guidelines to 
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address religious illiteracy, “using a non-devotional, academic perspective, called religious 
studies”.169 
In Australia a similar approach to New Zealand’s voluntary system of religious instruction, 
within a nominally secular education system, is in place. However, at the state and federal 
level, this system has been increasingly brought into question.170 Commentators such as 
Marion Maddox, Cathy Byrne, Anna Halafoff, Gary Bouma, and Pat Loria have challenged the 
social legitimacy of existing practices and advocated education in religions and beliefs within 
the curriculum as more appropriate within a plural context.171  
Influential to some of these developments were the Toledo Guiding Principles, advocated by 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), published in 2007.172 The 
Principles were developed by 18 countries across Europe, including France and with the 
addition of the United States. They are guidelines through which nations may be encouraged 
to develop teaching programmes concerning religion at all levels of schooling. They propose a 
balanced, inclusive, rights-based, consultative and professional approach.173 The Council of 
Europe also issued extensive recommendations to member states, in 2008, advocating an 
approach to teaching about religious and non-religious convictions in the context of 
intercultural education.174 But of relevance to any proposal to introduce education about 
religions and beliefs within the New Zealand Curriculum is the critique of current international 
practices evidenced within the literature. From within a post-colonialist discourse a 
Foucaultian and post-structuralist critique has been mounted against liberal religious 
education itself. 
It is the intolerance of intolerance which sociologist of religion Russell McCutcheon 
characterises as the contradiction inherent in liberal religious education. Liberals, he says, 
dogmatically exclude those whose religious beliefs are not tolerant and construct such 
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intolerant religious beliefs as inauthentic.175 Their “tolerant” approach means that when 
individuals or groups express socially conservative viewpoints or act in extreme ways in the 
name of religion, liberals must redraw the boundaries of religion to exclude the offensive 
behaviour. Since the behaviour is no longer authentically religious, it does not need to be 
tolerated. The redrawing of religious boundaries in this way has the effect of establishing 
liberal, tolerant forms of religion as authentic and normative: 
Those not in favour of these [liberal, tolerant] rules and the social world 
they make possible are understandably, yet in suitably illiberal fashion, 
branded as exclusivists [. . .] radicals, militants, extremists [. . .]. Such name 
calling strikes me as eliminating from serious consideration the very group 
whom liberals claim to include in their pluralist umbrella [. . .].Tolerance is 
therefore part of a normative discourse of dominance and is the trace of an 
ongoing sociopolitical contestation.176 
Religious studies and religious education, McCutcheon asserts, are directly implicated in this 
liberalising governmentality. By accepting “comparison and contrast” of different religions as 
the task of the religious educator, “we are called upon simply to manage and minimalise this 
difference for the benefit of the abstract notion of the nation state; our role as teachers is to 
nurture mutual understanding and religious dialogue across what might otherwise be our 
students’ exclusivistic boundaries” (emphasis in original).177  
Religious studies then becomes a “socially redemptive, existentially salvific exercise”, by which 
religious educators are co-opted into the governmental reproduction of compliant and 
depoliticised subjects, whose first loyalty is to the state and not to religious authority, thus 
promoting the interests of Western capitalism.178 Similarly, critical religion scholar Timothy 
Fitzgerald disqualifies religious education as a liberal governmental technique. In describing 
teaching resources produced for use in secondary schools in the United Kingdom, Fitzgerald 
decries the “essentialisation of religion” which is “detached from historical contextualisation, 
from the power of the state, or from any other kind of discursive domain” and “used to 
persuade young people and their teachers to believe in some modern, ahistorical, theological 
invention”.179 
                                                          
175
 Russell T. McCutcheon, “Our ‘Special Promise’ as Teachers: Scholars of Religion and the Politics of 
Tolerance”, in Critics Not Caretakers, ed. Russell T. McCutcheon (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2001). 
176
 Ibid., 162-63. 
177
 Ibid., 159-60. 
178
 Ibid., 158-59. 
179
 Timothy Fitzgerald, Discourse on Civility and Barbarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 29. 
149 
 
McCutcheon and Fitzgerald may be seen to disqualify religious education on three Foucaultian 
grounds: i) it is nothing more than a governmental technique; ii) it is illiberal and intolerant; 
and iii) the “knowledge” taught effectively essentialises, homogenises, depoliticises and 
decontextualises diverse beliefs and practices, i.e., the religious knowledge taught is not real 
or true, but invested in the governmental interests of the nation state. 
I believe the critical liberal rationale for education in religions and beliefs may be sustained in 
the face of this post-colonial assault. I address the first and second of these points here and 
deal with the third in the following section. The first point is addressed by Foucault’s 
recognition that governmental techniques are not always oppressive and totalitarian but may 
be beneficial and protect the citizenry from harm. I established above, with Galston, some 
compelling state interests which might constitute such legitimate governmentality, of which 
the provision of education in religions and beliefs is one.180 Against the post-colonial critique, 
the egalitarian liberal rationale for education in religions and beliefs rejects discursive 
imperatives which either disqualify religion from the curriculum or sanction the use of state 
instruments to promote particular conceptions of religion, such as those described by 
McCutcheon and Fitzgerald. While knowledge of religions is presumptively valid, within this 
discourse there is no presumption of validity or invalidity regarding any particular religious or 
non-religious worldview, beyond the criteria of compelling state interests stated. 
This is in contrast to both the diversity discourse and the authoritarian liberal discourse. The 
discursive imperatives associated with these discourses may be perceived to be more in line 
with Galston’s conception of liberal autonomy. Within this model the overriding concern is the 
protection of individual choice, rather than diversity. As stated above, this focus has the effect 
of disqualifying conservative or illiberal worldviews because they appear to restrict the 
choices that individuals may make. When these discourses influence religious education 
classes in the United Kingdom, or lessons on cultural diversity in the New Zealand context,181 
there is evidence of a concurrent redescription of diverse religious traditions into a relativised 
liberal universalism and a personalisation and privatisation of religious belief in line with a 
secular (neo)-liberal worldview.182 In the Foucaultian terms described, the lack of transparency 
around, and normative nature of this strategy means that those affected by it have no 
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opportunity to object or change it. It is therefore, just as McCutcheon and Fitzgerald suggest, 
an illegitimate governmental technique. 
McCutcheon and Fitzgerald conflate liberal Christian, egalitarian liberal, diversity and 
authoritarian liberal approaches to religious education and disqualify liberal religious 
education on this basis. From a critical liberal perspective, it is not religious education per se, 
but religious education which has been co-opted by the authoritarian liberal and diversity 
discourses, and informed by an autonomy model of liberalism, which is disqualified. This 
distinction is important in answering the second objection to liberal religious education: it is 
inherently contradictory, being intolerant of intolerance and therefore illiberal. McCutcheon’s 
critique of liberal tolerance actually aligns with that of Galston and others within the field of 
religious education. The difference is that Galston differentiates two different forms of 
tolerance: the first, oppressively governmental, being concerned with the formation of liberal, 
tolerant subjectivities; the second, legitimately governmental, being non-coercive and 
protective of diverse subjectivities. The first, within Galston’s liberal autonomy model, is 
characterised—just as McCutcheon suggests—by a contradictory tolerance of “difference” but 
concurrent intolerance of illiberal or conservative forms of belief. The second, within Galston’s 
liberal diversity model, is characterised by protection and promotion of diversity to the 
greatest degree possible within the aims and purposes of the liberal state. From this 
perspective, as discussed above, there is no moral relativism or neutrality implied and no 
contradiction in the liberal state intervening to protect individuals from harm (as defined 
above) either within, from or against religious groups.183 This is not illiberal but entirely 
consistent with the state’s central purpose of protecting diversity. Far from being a coercive 
strategy to redefine religion or remould religious subjectivities, it is an acknowledgement that 
one’s right to freedom of religions and beliefs is meaningless if a citizen of an alternative 
religious or non-religious persuasion is entitled to commit coercion, physical harm or murder 
in the name of her/his own beliefs. The right for the state to intervene under such 
circumstances is an “institutional precondition” of the protection of diversity.184  
Consistent with Galston’s assessment of the liberal autonomy model, and of McCutcheon and 
Fitzgerald’s assessment of liberal religious education, is the work of Andrew Wright. In a 
critique of liberal religious education in the United Kingdom, Wright characterises liberal 
religious education as promoting the values of freedom and tolerance as ends in themselves. 
Personal freedom of choice, he says, is constructed as the ultimate human good and “any 
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choice will do” for liberal educators, for whom truth is inconsequential. He asserts that 
teachers tend to play down specific truth claims and differences in an attempt to reproduce “a 
naive economy of sameness” or an “ultimately fraudulent economy of mutual identity”.185 
Debate and analysis of truth claims are discouraged in favour of a normative tolerance of 
difference and religious relativism. The liberal Christian assumption that children are innately 
religious is perpetuated in the universal religiosity assumed within liberal religious 
education.186 Wright asserts that teaching children that religious truth is relative, ultimately 
uniform, or otherwise unimportant is a form of indoctrination which is disrespectful to and 
exclusionary of religious believers:187 
The imposition of the truths of (say) Islam or Christianity in such a context 
is no more acceptable than the imposition of a Liberal world-view that—by 
virtue of its abdication of any responsibility to examine different religious 
and secular truth claims—advocates the implicit relativism of fundamental 
beliefs by treating them as little more than private, optional, and hence 
ultimately unimportant, life-style choices.188 
Wright, like Galston, recognises two forms of liberalism. The first represents a “closed 
ontology” or “closed world-view that seeks [. . .] to attract converts into its fold”.189 In line 
with Galston’s liberal autonomy model and the post-structuralist critique of McCutcheon and 
Fitzgerald, this liberal approach operates to establish a normative liberal subjectivity which is 
exclusive of conservative or illiberal worldviews. The second, Wright’s preferred form of 
liberalism, is one which operates instead as an “interim ethic” or “open heuristic tool for 
exploring cultural diversity”.190 This liberal approach resists the liberalising imperatives of the 
former, acknowledging that truth claims are incommensurable, and insisting on open lines of 
communication and debate between diverse groups.191 Being more procedural than 
ontological, it is the latter form of liberalism which is consistent with a critical liberal approach 
to religious education, validating Young’s powerful, conceptual knowledge and discernment of 
religion and exemplifying Cooling’s epistemic humility and courageous restraint. It is the 
former, and not the latter, approach to liberal religious education against which I believe 
McCutcheon and Fitzgerald are pitted. 
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Robert Jackson has raised questions about the target of Wright’s critique, wondering who his 
“unnamed generalised liberal” might be. He does not recognise Wright’s account of liberal 
religious education—the promotion of liberal relativism—in his own publications or in those 
of others in the field.192 This is, perhaps, to misunderstand the nature of Wright’s criticism 
which targets the unacknowledged governmental nature of the delivery of religious education 
—the discursive constraints and imperatives of the classroom—rather than programmes of 
study or specific academic approaches. In the United Kingdom, some of these forms of 
governmentality in religious education are more explicit than others. An egregious liberalising 
social agenda is evident, for example, in the co-option of secondary school RE teachers into 
the government’s Prevent Strategy, to counter terrorism and violent extremism, through the 
RE-silience project.193  
The Prevent Duty, to ensure young people are not drawn into extremism, is now incumbent 
upon all schools and staff in the United Kingdom.194 Extremism is defined as “vocal or active 
opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual 
liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.195 Some primary 
schools with majority Muslim populations are being asked to pilot questionnaires designed to 
identify candidates with extreme views. The questions indicate that young people are being 
assessed on their beliefs and social attitudes and on questions of identity, in ways which 
intentionally stigmatise both religious and socially conservative views and validate a 
normative liberal relativist worldview.196 Commentators, such as religious studies scholar 
Douglas Pratt, have highlighted the potentially radicalising effects of conflating socially and 
religiously conservative or fundamentalist views (an exclusive religious identity) with 
extremism and anti-Britishness (religious exclusivism).197 And as Grimmit points out, young 
people who perceive disrespect for their community’s conservative religious beliefs reflected 
in the values of secular liberalism promoted at their school may be as likely to re-affirm a 
conservative religious standpoint, or even to succumb to radicalising influences, as to conform 
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to a tolerant and liberal worldview.198 It is perhaps of interest that the former head teacher of 
Mohammed Emwazi or “Jihadi John”, the British Muslim who performed atrocities in the 
name of IS in Syria, stated that her majority Muslim school promoted “intolerance of 
intolerance”.199 
Pratt notes that this radicalisation appears to be working in two directions. Policies which 
stigmatise Muslims operate to engender fear and hostility towards Muslims—Islamophobia—
amongst the wider community, resulting in an increase in violent attacks and “reactionary 
extremism”. In a process termed “reactive co-radicalisation”, Pratt notes that both groups 
begin to act in ways which are contrary to their habitual values resulting in a normalisation of 
intolerance on both sides.200 In reaction to just such a perception of growing intolerance there 
is further evidence that imperatives of the diversity and authoritarian liberal discourses are 
gaining currency in religious education, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Religious 
studies scholars Liam Gearon and Philip Barnes have both noted ways in which RE curriculum 
and pedagogy in the United Kingdom promote a liberal Protestant view of the essential unity 
of religions in the service of social policy.201 Research commissioned by the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families examined materials used to teach about world religions in 
schools in England, with a particular focus on the promotion of community cohesion, which 
was made a requirement of the curriculum.202 The findings signalled problems of 
misrepresentation of religious groups, misinformation and superficiality of coverage, Christian 
bias, avoidance of controversial issues between religions and prioritisation of moral 
development and values rather than learning about religions. These factors may be the result 
of poor teacher subject knowledge and lack of consultation with subject specialists in 
preparation of teaching resources, as Jackson et al. suggest. However, they may also be 
influenced by the liberalising discursive imperatives of the diversity and authoritarian liberal 
discourses described above. In such ways the imperatives to promote social cohesion, 
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tolerance and relativism impact on the content and pedagogy of RE such that the subject itself 
may be co-opted as a governmental technique in the interests of the nation state. 
History of religions scholar Tim Jensen, in Denmark, has also noted this trend pointing out that 
the Toledo Principles lean towards the selection of curriculum content that reinforces 
tolerance, respect and caring for others and, far from being neutral and objective, actively 
promote a positive attitude towards liberal forms of religious belief and arguably rule out 
alternative views.203 The International Religion in Education: Contribution to Dialogue (REDCo) 
research project report, in 2009, drew attention to the fact that schools in the study 
frequently prioritised the development of abstract or passive tolerance in their work, and 
focussed on homogeneity rather than accentuating religious differences. In order to promote 
practical or active tolerance, which might be borne out not just in young peoples’ stated 
attitudes but in their friendship choices, it was recommended that schools value and engage 
with differences in religious and non-religious worldviews.204 Does RE Work?, a three year 
investigation into outcomes of RE in the United Kingdom, concluded in 2011 that while RE 
could be very effective in promoting intercultural understanding, this was often prevented by 
an over-riding relativism in RE teaching. Researchers David Lundie and James Conroy 
identified a widespread “predetermined aim of nurturing uncritical tolerance” in RE lessons. 
They have termed this process “intoleration” and contrast this governmental approach with 
that of “entoleration”, a “transformative encounter with others’ beliefs”.205 Entoleration is a 
process by which young people are encouraged to enter into the lived experience of religious 
adherents in order to develop “sympathetic discernment of the merit” in their beliefs and 
practices, and which facilitates intercultural encounter. In contrast, intoleration, they argue, 
precludes any such encounter and may actually foster intolerant attitudes. By focussing on 
uncritical acceptance of the strange and different “other”, without equipping young people 
with the tools to understand their thinking and evaluate truth claims, reductive and 
stereotypical views may be reproduced rather than challenged:206  
[W]hat emerges is a curatorial mindset that creates a kind of “cabinet of 
curiosities for ordinary people”. These “cabinets of curiosities” are not 
infrequently to be seen in the material conditions of the classroom [. . .]. 
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There is something of a consequent failure to ignore the “rough edges” of 
religion and a consequent elision of difficult questions.207 
I would argue that intoleration—the development of uncritical and passive tolerance—is a 
product of the diversity discourse and consistent with Galston’s liberal autonomy model. In 
contradistinction to this, entoleration—the development of knowledge and discernment in 
matters of religion and belief, leading to active tolerance promoting diversity and no-
coercion—is consistent with Galston’s liberal diversity model and inheres within the 
egalitarian liberal discourse. I apply these concepts to the way matters of religion and culture 
are treated in the New Zealand curriculum and in my case study schools, in Chapter Seven.208 
The literature exemplifying the diversity and authoritarian liberal discourse in the New 
Zealand context is scant, partly due to the curriculum area’s disqualified status and partly 
because, as I have intimated above, governmental techniques are sometimes employed at the 
level of practice more than the level of theory. However, the New Zealand results from the 
International Civic and Citizenship Survey signal that diversity and authoritarian liberal 
discursive imperatives may be informing teaching on diversity and forming secular liberal 
subjectivities. The survey report demonstrates that while students with higher civic knowledge 
scores displayed more tolerant (liberal) attitudes to (other people’s) religion they were less 
likely to see the relevance of religion on a personal, ethical or societal level.209 This may 
support my research finding, in Chapter Seven, that tolerance and respect for a liberalised 
secular (personal and private but irrelevant) construction of religion are reproduced through 
New Zealand pedagogical practices. 
As described above, in a further critique, McCutcheon and Fitzgerald use post-structuralist 
analysis to argue that the very subject matter of religious education is an illegitimate Western 
construction. In the next section I address this post-colonial critique. However, I treat the New 
Zealand post-colonial literature in a subsequent section where I consider Māori culture in the 
curriculum. 
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Table 15: Post-colonial Discourse: International Literature 
International Literature 




Gayatri Spivak: Colonisation has privileged Western forms of knowledge, science and rationality 
and disqualified indigenous knowledge.
211
 




Talal Asad: religion, as primarily concerned with belief, is a Protestant Christian construct.
213
 
Timothy Fitzgerald: teaching religion legitimises Western constructs of “religious” (as private and 
personal) and “secular” (as rational, political and economic) reproducing the ideology of Western 
capitalism.
214 
Russell McCutcheon: religious educators are “caretakers”. They reproduce a compliant, uncritical 
and tolerant citizenry in service of the capitalist interests of the nation state.
215




In his 1975 article “Map is not Territory” historian of religion Jonathan Z. Smith describes 
“World Religions” as a “dubious category”: 
A world religion is a religion like ours; but it is, above all, a tradition which 
has achieved sufficient power and numbers to enter our history, either to 
form it, interact with it, or to thwart it. All other religions are invisible [. . .] 
they may as well not exist.217 
Here Smith points out the power relations at work in the use of the term, which serves to 
define the beliefs and practices of others through a colonial lens. The history of religious 
studies is constructed as not only colonial but as profoundly theological in origin and bearing 
no resemblance to the object of study. Smith is unequivocal on this point: “Religion is solely 
the creation of the scholar’s study. It is created for the scholar’s analytical purposes by his 
imaginative acts of comparison and generalisation. Religion has no independent existence 
apart from the academy.”218 
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Fitzgerald makes the point that even the distinction between “religious” and “secular” is a 
modern Western construct and makes little sense in analysing pre-modern cultures. In 
teaching religion in this way, he claims, educators are further legitimising the colonial view 
that “secular” ideals such as rationality or self-interest and the non-religious state are the 
“natural” state of affairs. Treating religion as a universal, autonomous and self-evident 
dimension of life, as sui generis, separate from politics and economics, relegates religion to 
the personal and private sphere and elevates the secular aspect of life, namely government 
and the state, to a higher status category. It derives this status by dint of being non-religious, 
neutral and value-free:219 
[O]nly by inventing an illusory and separated arena of “religion” and 
“religions”, so assiduously pump-primed by the modern religion industry, 
could the rhetorical construction of politics and economics have been 
made to seem like inescapable commonplaces, as if they are inscribed into 
the nature of things.220 
Fitzgerald posits that in presenting religion as a personal and private matter, separate from 
the important business of politics and state, schools and academies are colluding with a 
Western colonialist and capitalist agenda.  
For McCutcheon the scholar of religion should be critic, not caretaker. The role should be one 
which challenges the constructed nature of religion and the function that such constructions 
accomplish in society, including the way that scholars of religion have constructed the 
discipline.221 He dismisses the descriptive and comparative approach to the study of religion as 
an act of mere translation, appreciation and nostalgia. He advocates “redescription” and 
theorising of power dynamics as a more appropriate critical approach.222 He suggests that 
religious studies academics should not get involved in debates about what kinds of religious 
education are appropriate in schools, regarding this as rhetorical match-playing.223 In such 
ways, as stated in point iii) above, it is asserted that religion is entirely a social construction 
and therefore of no intrinsic value or interest beyond the discursive imperatives and 
governmental practices which reproduce it.  
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From a critical realist perspective it may be argued that the post-colonialist critique appears to 
have fallen prey to the epistemic fallacy, as defined by Bhaskar: it does not distinguish 
between the transitive and intransitive dimensions and operates with an ontological 
relativism.224 It assumes that, because perceptions and descriptions of religion differ according 
to context and are socially and discursively constructed, religion itself does not exist. In 
Young’s language, all conceptual knowledge of religion is discredited as “just another set of 
social practices”,225 as “knowledge of the powerful”, implicated in the preservation of 
privilege.226 The critical realist accepts the socially constructed nature of religion, but 
maintains that, while these constructions exist in the transitive dimension, they are based 
upon and are constructed in reference to alethic reality—that of the intransitive dimension.227 
Conceptual knowledge cannot be abandoned, because it is essential in order to generate new 
knowledge and improved understanding of religions and beliefs.228 
Within the international field of religious studies Kevin Schilbrack presents a critical realist 
defence of the concept of religion against the post-colonialist critique using slightly different 
language.229 Schilbrack agrees that religion is a social construction but insists it is nonetheless 
a reality. He explains this by distinguishing between “socially independent facts” that would 
exist whether or not human beings ever lived and “socially dependent facts” whose existence 
depends upon human behavior, for example by tradition, covenant or agreement:230 “The 
point is that socially dependent facts are nonetheless facts. They are ‘out there’ in the world 
[…]. With social realities, if people find the term useful and live in its terms, this agreement is 
all that is needed for the alleged thing to exist.”231 
Schilbrack’s critical realist analysis recognises the validity of the post-colonial critique: that the 
concept of religion has been ideologically driven and is based on European perceptions and 
self-interests. But he equally insists that those perceptions were nonetheless based on 
observations of social practices and thus the concept of religion is not devoid of content.232 
Schilbrack acknowledges the historical misuse of the term—but points out that this need not 
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determine its future use.233 The problems with the term “religion” should not be overlooked 
but dealt with as part of the study of the subject.234 As a critical realist it is important to 
Schilbrack that scholars of religion concern themselves precisely with “the ontological 
question about what kind of thing religion ‘is’”.235 This task becomes impossible without some 
form of nomenclature. Since all labels and terms come with the baggage of history and 
ideology, Schilbrack argues for the retention of the word “religion”, “though now conscious of 
the shadow it casts”.236 
In a critique of McCutcheon’s position it is his extreme anti-realism and normative atheism 
which philosopher of religion Michael Slater finds most problematic. Slater points out that 
while protesting that scholars should not be interested in what religion “really is”, 
McCutcheon makes clear metaphysical claims about religion, describing it as “a thoroughly 
human activity, with no mysterious distillate left over”.237 Slater wonders why scholarship 
which assumes the falsity and disvalue of religious beliefs and practices should be more 
objective than scholarship which is concerned with matters of truth and value in religion.238 
Slater makes the point that McCutcheon’s personal views on religion are driving his views on 
the study of religion. McCutcheon is therefore hoist with his own petard, since this is precisely 
his critique of the “caretaking” approach to scholarship.239 Post-structuralist analysis does not 
incontestably render religious belief presumptively invalid, as perhaps McCutcheon and 
Fitzgerald imply. John Milbank demonstrates that the same tools can equally be employed, 
from a conservative Christian perspective, to position religion as “fundamental”, beyond 
description and providing “the only alternative to a nihilistic outlook”. 240 
Critical liberal analysis must concur that the body of knowledge accumulated within the field 
of religious studies will need to be reassessed in the light of post-colonial critique. Education 
in religions and beliefs will need to include the development of critical awareness of the ways 
in which worldviews are constructed and promoted. An awareness of the partiality and 
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contingent status of current knowledge becomes part of the curriculum. Both dystopian and 
utopian constructions of religion must be presented.241 Education about religions and beliefs 
then ceases to reproduce knowledge of the powerful and becomes an empowering 
opportunity for young people to begin to understand the lenses through which they and 
others see the world.  
Wright has responded pro-actively to the post-colonial/post-structuralist challenge. His critical 
realist approach specifically identifies and teaches the characteristics inherent in the 
worldviews of secular atheism, universal religiosity and post-modern relativism, alongside 
those of more traditional religious beliefs. This enables young people to analyse topics from a 
range of religious and secular perspectives and to exercise discernment regarding the implicit 
messages of the wider curriculum.242 Following Wright, religious educationalist Susan 
Hookway describes the way in which this “critical religious education” offers a hermeneutic of 
resistance to prevailing governmental approaches to teaching religion, spirituality and liberal 
values, but equally offers a hermeneutic of transformation enabling young people to use 
discernment to envisage alternative ways of living life with integrity in a diverse community.243 
This critical liberal approach offers a more emancipatory role for education in religions and 
beliefs than does the post-colonial disqualification and destabilisation of religion. 
From a critical liberal perspective, while it is illiberal to enculturate young people into 
acceptance of religion, atheism, scepticism, universalism or relativism, it is imperative to 
promote religious discussion and to inform young people about religions and beliefs as a 
precondition to the protection of diversity. In disqualifying education in religions and beliefs, 
the post-colonial/post-structuralist critique restricts young people’s epistemic access to 
conceptual knowledge, understanding and discernment in matters of religion. As Wheelahan 
points out: “Induction into the disciplinary structures of knowledge is important even if we 
wish to overturn elements of those structures, because understanding those structures is a 
necessary condition for revolutionising them.”244 
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But the transmission of disciplinary knowledge is directly challenged by the knowledge age 
discourse, which appears to accept the post-structuralist/post-colonial analysis of religion as 
unstable, corrupted by vested interests and unnecessary for children. 
Knowledge Age Discourse 
Table 16: Knowledge Age Discourse 
New Zealand literature International Literature 
Jane Gilbert: knowledge is something we do, 








Bernie Trilling and Paul Hood: we need a paradigm 
shift from industrial age to knowledge age learning 





The knowledge age discourse effectively redefines the purpose and function of education 
from knowledge transmission to “building the capacity for knowledge production”(emphasis in 
original). 248 As explained in Chapter Four, the focus within this discourse is no longer on 
reproducing or storing knowledge which is positioned as regressive and old fashioned. In line 
with rapid changes in technology and work patterns, it is posited that new ways of thinking 
need to be developed in schools. The curriculum focus is on problem-solving and innovation, 
learning information “just-in-time” to put it to use, and on developing skills and competencies. 
The emphasis is no longer on people, things or ideas, but the connections between them.249 It 
valorises procedural and experiential forms of knowledge over that of conceptual: “know-
how” rather than “know-what”.250 
The critical realist and social realist literature specifically addresses the problems inherent for 
learners and for the status and future of conceptual knowledge of the widespread currency of 
this discourse in Western education systems. Education scholar Kathryn Ecclestone notes the 
contempt with which conceptual knowledge, and the truth-seeking subject, appear to be held 
in the education academy:  
At worst, humanist subjectivity and knowledge are seen, especially in 
academic discourse, as oppressive, offensive, ridiculous and reactionary 
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and as a sign, whether implicit or overt, of class, gendered and cultural 
elitism. In philosophical and political thought, the idea of a universal 
rational, externally-seeking human subject is now widely held in contempt 
as an oppressive Western, white, male social construct, an anachronistic 
myth. 251 
In New Zealand, education scholars Bronwyn Wood and Mark Sheehan have raised concerns 
about the “unchallenged orthodoxy” of the knowledge age discourse in New Zealand’s 
education system. They describe a blurred curriculum-pedagogy distinction which potentially 
leads to a “very superficial and over-socialised encounter with knowledge in secondary 
schools”.252 Critical and social realist authors argue that the knowledge age discourse fails to 
distinguish between school knowledge (conceptual/disciplinary knowledge), experiential or 
everyday knowledge (including cultural and religious values and dispositions) and procedural 
knowledge (skills and competencies). As Young explains, since both experiential and 
procedural knowledge are tied to specific social or practical contexts and everyday concerns, 
they do not have the same “explanatory power or capacity for generalisation” attributed to 
conceptual knowledge.253 The knowledge age discourse falls into the error of treating 
conceptual knowledge as “just another set of social practices” .254 Rata, Young and Wheelahan 
agree that while conceptual knowledge is emancipatory, enabling young people, to some 
degree, to transcend their social and cultural contexts, experiential and procedural knowledge 
may be socially restrictive and disempowering when substituted as a basis for curriculum 
content. 255 Student-led or inquiry approaches based on pupils’ interests and experiences may 
be motivational, but they fail to adequately differentiate the curriculum content from the 
means of delivery, and place too great an emphasis on students’ everyday or prior knowledge. 
This can disadvantage those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale whose personal 
experiences and prior knowledge is often more restricted. Likewise, topic-led curricula may 
not differentiate adequately between subject disciplines, and often fail to respect the 
incremental nature of conceptual learning: knowledge introduced may omit important stages 
of learning, rendering the knowledge inaccessible—particularly to those with less resourceful 
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or supportive family backgrounds. Equally, curricula which replace conceptual knowledge with 
skills and competencies based on the criteria of employers and the workplace are critiqued by 
Young.256 These approaches to curricula, far from being progressive and empowering can 
actually deny access to conceptual knowledge to young people. As Wood and Sheehan 
suggest: 
Approaches that favour “doing” rather than “knowing” may actually serve 
to increase educational inequalities between those schools which retain 
“powerful knowledge” and those which rarely include such knowledge in 
their curriculum options. This potentially [. . .]reinforces inequality by 
fostering powerful knowledge among the elite schools and shutting out 
students from non-elite schools who do not generally have access to this 
knowledge.257  
The absence of a strong social theory of conceptual knowledge in the education academy, 
Young states, has opened the curriculum up to political and instrumental imperatives.258 In 
Foucaultian terms, an illiberal form of governmentality which reproduces a skilled and 
competent—but uncritical and compliant—workforce, in the service of the economic interests 
of the nation state, may be the result.259 In Galston’s terms, the imperatives of the knowledge 
age discourse are consistent with the autonomy model of liberalism because of the coercive 
governmental techniques they facilitate. The utilitarian nature of such a curriculum effectively 
subverts the goal of education as the pursuit of truth. Far from learning conceptual knowledge 
from experts, children are constructed as knowledge producers and their teachers as 
facilitators. 
In the United Kingdom religious education scholars Clive and Jane Erricker exemplify just such 
an approach to religious education. Asserting that “all knowledge is relative” and that “the 
idea of subject matter is wrong in itself” they advocate a constructivist narrative pedagogy, 
emphasising the children’s own experiences.260 Teachers are asked to:  
yield their position of power and authority within the classroom. We are 
suggesting that children can be allowed to know as much or even more 
than the teacher, can publicly claim the position of the repository of that 
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knowledge and have it acknowledged by the former holder of that exalted 
rank—the teacher.261 
In such ways the transmission of conceptual knowledge is discursively positioned as 
educationally regressive. This discourse uncritically validates cultural and experiential 
knowledge and the autonomy of the child as knowledge producer. The child’s cultural and 
religious perspectives are not an appropriate subject of investigation or analysis, but are 
simply (but relatively) correct. In Young’s terms the legitimately conservative nature of 
education in the transmission of conceptual knowledge has been conflated with the 
illegitimate preservation of power and privilege. The democratisation of knowledge itself is 
positioned as progressive and emancipatory.262Against such an approach, Wright insists: 
[K]knowledge [. . .] needs to be actively pursued [. . .]. Knowledge is not 
something we are free to create for ourselves; rather we discover and 
generate knowledge through our interaction with that reality which, on the 
one hand we are intimately related to, and yet on the other always appears 
to be one step beyond our present horizon of understanding.263  
Wright’s critical realist approach begins with the horizon of the child but then assists young 
people in identifying the ways in which their ideas have been influenced by religious 
narratives or other worldviews. By learning to identify the sources of their ideas about 
religions and beliefs young people develop the discernment required to develop informed 
opinions on religious matters, rather than being constrained by childhood conceptions.264 
Such an approach is more consistent with Galston’s liberal diversity model which valorises the 
development of social rationality and education about diversity. It is consistent with Foucault’s 
conception of liberalism as critic, enabling young people to understand the influences which 
inform their own thinking, and that of their peers, and enabling them to make future 
judgements about such governmental strategies. 
In a former colony such as New Zealand, with a de facto policy of state biculturalism, the 
differentiated nature of knowledge takes on even greater significance in curriculum policy. In 
the next section I formulate a critical liberal response to the uncritical promotion of Māori 
spirituality in New Zealand schools. 
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Post-colonial (New Zealand) and Social Action Liberal Discourses 
Table 17: Post-colonial (New Zealand) and Social Action Liberal Discourses 
 New Zealand Literature International Literature 
Post-colonial  Russell Bishop: indigenous people are subject 




Graham Hingangaroa Smith; teaching Māori 




George Salter/Brendan Hokowhitu: the co-




Alison Jones: including Māori culture in the 
Curriculum merely assuages the colonisers’ 
guilt and does not address inequality.
268 




Russell Bishop: education should be culturally 




Graham Hingangaroa Smith: Education should 
promote self-determination for Māori.
271
 
Ranganui Walker: policies of multiculturalism 
relegate Māori to one minority among many.
272
 
Will Kymlicka: affirmative action is 
legitimate as a precondition to 
effective participation of national 
minorities in public life.
273
 
James Banks: liberal multicultural 
education does not challenge 




Stephen May and Christine 
Sleeter: multicultural education 
should address social and political 
constraints on minorities (UK).
275
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Academics who draw on the post-colonial and social action liberal discourses are concerned to 
address the ongoing impact of colonisation on the indigenous Māori community in New 
Zealand and the social disadvantage of minority groups in other plural democracies. In New 
Zealand, these authors often advocate affirmative action education policies designed to 
promote redistribution of power and resources to Māori communities including establishing 
schools with an entirely Māori ethos and pedagogy. Consistent with a de facto policy of state 
biculturalism, public education policy reflects an imperative to make Māori culture visible by 
including elements of mythology, language and protocol within the curriculum.276 This 
dominant institutional discursive imperative has driven prioritisation of training and resources 
for cultural inclusion, and “culturally responsive” curricula and pedagogy in the New Zealand 
educational context.277  
 Hingangaroa Smith, Bishop and sociologist of education Alison Jones are critical of efforts to 
include Māori culture in the state school curriculum, identifying a form of re-colonisation of 
Māori knowledge by the state. Simply accommodating the teaching of an approved form of 
Māori culture in state schools, they argue, does not challenge existing power differentials and 
the interest-laden nature of the Western curriculum is not addressed.278 For Māori academics 
George Salter and Brendan Hokowhitu the inclusion of hauora within the curriculum, in 1999, 
was a case in point.279 They suggest that the hauora model supplied by Mason Durie as part of 
Te Whare Tapa Pha, for the Health and Physical Education Curriculum, presents a sanitised 
and Westernised version of wellbeing far removed from any Māori understanding of the term, 
which is deeply bound up in mythological and theological tradition.280 Indigenous studies 
scholar Chris Andersen and Hokowhitu have elsewhere described the way that Pākehā public 
policy authenticates one version of “traditional” Māori culture—as pre-modern, tribal and 
static rather than evolving and dynamic.281 From a critical liberal perspective, this construction 
of Māori culture and spirituality fits within a secular (neo)-liberal worldview in which religions 
and beliefs are personal, private, innocuous and therefore politically safe. Māori subjectivity is 
constructed as innately and authentically spiritual, consistent with colonial conceptions of the 
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“noble savage”.282 Thus it is possible that, while ostensibly promoting progressive bicultural 
policies, the state engages in an illiberal form of governmentality which seeks to manage and 
“liberalise” subjectivities in line with its own interests.283 
Commentators such as Rata and critical education scholar Roger Openshaw, politics academic 
Bryce Edwards and educationalist John Moore and social anthropologist Erich Kolig have 
suggested that biculturalism itself has become an oppressively illiberal form of 
governmentality: a worldview which is positioned as progressive and socially just and 
therefore immune from critique. To seek to analyse or criticise bicultural policy is to be 
accused of racism.284 Others, such as Bromell and education researcher Paul Callister, reflect 
on the problem of basing public policy on ethno-cultural criteria when such identities are not 
singular but plural. Māori are not a homogeneous group but have mixed ethnicity and hold a 
wide number of religious affiliations.285  
Rata is concerned that the localisation of knowledge, and concurrent re-ethnicising of a 
section of the community, disadvantages the children of this cultural group.286 She operates 
with a critical realist understanding that one role of education is to enable an individual to 
stand apart from everyday conceptions of life in order to develop a capacity for abstract 
thought, or judgemental rationality. If school knowledge only reinforces one’s local and 
cultural knowledge this separation does not occur. She asserts: “Children who do not acquire 
the cognitive processes and dispositions of abstraction and objectification, that ability to 
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separate from the subjective world of their own experience, are restricted from moving into 
the world of critical reasoning and, hence, from the world of educational achievement.”287 
Rata’s critique is directed at both kaupapa Māori schools and wider initiatives to promote 
culturally responsive pedagogy and recognition of the Māori knowledge-base in education.288 
But her perceptions are relevant to spiritual and religious education in particular. For if only 
one form of spiritual education—an authorised version of Māori culture—is given explicit 
recognition within the school curriculum, is considered presumptively valid and is therefore 
exempt from critique it is legitimate to ask how young people are to develop powerful 
knowledge and a capacity for judgemental rationality or discernment in matters of religion 
and spirituality. An egalitarian liberal approach to Māori spirituality must be to learn about the 
diversity of Māori traditions as part of a wide ranging study of religions and beliefs, not to 
endorse or embody those traditions within the curriculum. In line with a Foucaultian critique 
there must be an opportunity to discuss, resist and object to constructions of Māori culture 
(and other worldviews) as part of one’s education. This is particularly important for Māori 
youngsters themselves, given the critique that a Māori worldview is neither uniform nor static. 
From a critical realist perspective, to teach such contestable knowledge as either transitive 
knowledge (the best we can know about Māori spirituality) or intransitive knowledge 
(ultimate reality) would seem to be disingenuous no matter how honourable the state’s 
intentions in promoting recognition of Māori culture. It is another example of the 
governmental role of education taking priority over its primary role: the quest for truth.289 
A secular form of spirituality is explicitly promoted within the research literature and the 
interview data. It is common for Māori spirituality to be co-opted within a Spiritual Secularist 
discourse as universally appropriate for all children in New Zealand.  
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Spiritual Secularist Discourse 
Table 18: Spiritual Secularist Discourse 
New Zealand Literature International Literature 
Richard Egan: spiritual education should not 
provide answers but ask meaningful questions.
290
 
Alison Sewell: spirituality is a sense of identity, 
authenticity and connection with others.
291 
Deborah Fraser: spirituality is connectedness with 




Anne Kennedy: seeks to broaden religious 
understanding of spirituality into a “spirituality of 
ordinary life in the classroom” 293 
Jane Bone: explores an “everyday spirituality” in 




David Hay and Rebecca Nye: spiritual awareness is 
universal and “massively present in the lives of 




Clive Erricker et al: advocate educating the “whole 




The spiritual secularist discourse is less interested in established belief and dogmatic religious 
adherence than in personal spiritual experience and development.297 In educational terms, the 
importance of the development of the “whole child” and attending to a child’s “spiritual 
needs” is stressed. There is some overlap here with the liberal Christian discourse and an 
assertion of a universal spiritual dimension. However, this discourse draws on post-modern 
ideas which not only detach spirituality from religion but allow for development of an 
individualised spirituality which may draw on many aspects of religious or indigenous 
traditions or on notions of relational connectedness, personhood, wellbeing, experiences of 
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awe and wonder and personal involvement in a search for meaning.298 Within this discourse, 
religion is positioned as dogmatic and constraining in contrast to a more liberalising, authentic 
and self-actualising spirituality.299  
In New Zealand a notable characteristic of the spiritual secularist discourse is the valorisation 
of indigenous spirituality over mainstream religion. For theologian Lorna May Travis, Māori 
spirituality is “universal”.300 And for early childhood educationalist Jane Bone, Māori are the 
“spiritual guardians” of New Zealand.301 Religion is omitted from education scholar Alison 
Sewell’s definition of spirituality in the curriculum but Māori terminology is appropriated, 
secularised and included: 
Spirituality is used here to mean a deep sense of identity and authenticity 
[. . .] from which individuals connect with others, both unselfconsciously 
and selflessly. Spirituality, or wairuatanga, as it is referred to by indigenous 
New Zealanders, becomes a connecting force to create a sense of 
wholeness or oneness.302 
In such ways the discourse disqualifies education about religions and beliefs and places the 
relational, emotional and psychological child at the centre of spiritual education. The inclusion 
of spiritual wellbeing in the Health and Physical Education Curriculum, in 1999, was not widely 
perceived to legitimise the introduction of education in either spiritual or religious matters to 
children.303 Having interviewed health lecturers at the six colleges of education in New 
Zealand, spirituality researcher Richard Egan concluded : “Generally, most College of 
Education staff involved in Health Education and the relevant Ministry of Education staff do 
not think that the literal teaching about or the explicit facilitating of students’ spiritual well-
being is justified by the new Health and Physical Education Curriculum.”304 
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This is consistent with my research findings as I discuss below.305 The emphasis is, once again, 
on governmental strategy within the curriculum—regulation of the internal development or 
subjectivity of young people—rather than development of conceptual knowledge and 
judgemental rationality in religious matters. There is an emphasis on individual meaning-
making (constructivism) over an educational quest for truth. In Young’s terms this is to 
substitute everyday or social knowledge for school knowledge—an abdication of the 
responsibility of education itself. 
Ecclestone has noted that the emphasis on internal and emotional wellbeing of young people 
and the positioning of these as potential barriers to learning, in Western curricula, serves to 
divert attention away from economic, structural and institutional constraints which might also 
impede progress.306 She draws a direct link between emotionally-based pedagogy and 
curricula and self-seeking imperatives of neoliberal educational agenda.307 She also makes a 
connection with the constructivist imperatives of the knowledge age and post-colonial 
discourses discussed above.308 These discursive imperatives destabilise “external” conceptual 
knowledge as untrustworthy, substituting a more “authentic”, “internal” emotional and 
experiential content in its place. 
For the critical realist the separation of the emotional and rational is inimical to the process of 
knowledge construction, which is dependent upon an active relationship between the 
individual and the knowledge pursued. The knowledge product is not that of unalloyed fact 
but one which contributes to, and is constitutive of, the child’s self-development. This is 
known as Bildung: a German term used to describe the process by which intellectual 
endeavour informs one’s judgement and therefore improves one’s character.309 Intrinsic to 
this is the ability to separate oneself and self-interest from the object of knowledge. This 
process, described by Rata, is constitutive of education itself.310 Consonant with the 
development of epistemic humility and judgemental rationality, Bildung is equated with 
“critical wisdom” by Wright.311 These terms may be used to denote the way in which “our 
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striving after realistic knowledge runs hand in hand with our striving for self-formation”.312 
From a critical realist perspective, a spiritual self-formation which positions the self as both 
object and subject would appear to militate against the very development it purports to 
promote. 
A further ground of concern, for Wright, to the secular and personal approach is that this 
approach is devoid of transcendental, communal or historical associations.313 It eschews all 
links with traditional conceptions of spirituality, which most usually take the search for truth 
beyond the self and towards the transcendental.314 The approach does not take into account 
the prevalent understandings of spirituality in the locality or their historical and cultural 
roots.315 It assumes the child is a blank slate with no prior experience or preconceptions of 
spiritual truth. As Wright says: “It seems difficult to deny that our spiritual lives are, for good 
or ill, shaped by our history, and that this ought to be reflected in any effective form of 
spiritual education.” 316 
Being devoid of conceptual content, the spiritual secularist approach cannot develop a 
vocabulary of religions and beliefs or equip young people to exercise judgemental rationality 
with regard to either their own or others’ conceptions of spirituality. By avoiding all 
controversy and encouraging young people uncritically to rely on their emotions and cultural 
knowledge, an opportunity is missed to contribute to spiritual and religious identity formation. 
The spiritual secularist approach to spiritual education confirms the normative status of 
religion/spirituality as uncontroversial, personalised, private and a lifestyle choice with no 
intrinsic importance. Religion is a non-essential or optional element of spiritual wellbeing. The 
critical liberal does not deny the need for values/social/emotional/spiritual education. But to 
treat these issues in isolation from the religious and non-religious traditions within which they 
inhere is neither religiously neutral nor uncontroversial, but reproductive of a secular (neo)-
liberal worldview. 
 In Foucault’s terms this form of spiritual education is illiberal and oppressive because there is 
no opportunity within the curriculum to critique the worldview promoted and no 
consideration of alternative perspectives. In Galston’s terms, a spiritual secularist form of 
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spiritual education fails to satisfy the compelling interest of the liberal state to educate its 
citizens in matters of religion and belief. The spiritual secularist approach to spiritual 
education instead positions self-actualisation—a sense of identity, agency, autonomy and 
personal fulfilment—at the centre of the project of personal development, consistent with a 
neoliberal discourse. 
The Neoliberal Discourse 
Table 19: The Neoliberal Discourse 
New Zealand Literature International Literature 
Roger Douglas: education is improved by 
privatisation, competition, increased choice and 
meeting the demands of the labour market.
317
 
New Zealand Business Round table: advocates 
school choice. Students should leave bad schools 
and go to better ones.
318
 
Mary Petersen: constructs BiS as a model of 




Patrick Lynch: religious schools are not divisive but 
offer choice. Parents know best. No single form of 
education can be seen as superior to others.
320
 
Economic theories such as those of Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman adopted in the UK by 
Margaret Thatcher and in the US by Ronald 
Reagan. Education positioned as a commodity in 
the marketplace. Increased parental choice and 
competition will improve educational outcomes. 
Education should reflect needs of workplace.
321
 
DfES on the expansion of faith schools: “The 
evidence shows that schools with a distinct 
identity perform best” (UK).
322
  
The neoliberal educational reform agenda valorises choice and competition as a means to 
improve education outcomes. In Chapter Four I discussed the impact of these reforms on the 
education system in the 1990s. The more recent introduction of National Standards is in line 
with this discourse, with a drive towards accountability and quantifiable outcomes. The 
concurrent introduction of partnership schools is framed as maximising parental choice and 
flexibility in school management.323 
As indicated in Chapter Four, the neoliberal discourse promotes an uncritical approach to 
confessional religious or cultural curriculum and pedagogy.324 This is on the utilitarian grounds 
that schools which unite around a special character, identity or religious commitment appear 
to perform better than those without a clear ethos. The right for parents to choose a school 
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whose ethos they share is a fundamental neoliberal premise, as former Minister of Finance 
Roger Douglas explains: 
Choice is the basis of flexibility, innovation and variety; and the most 
important autonomy of all is parent/student autonomy. Choice links 
consumer and provider directly, with consequential incentives on schools 
[. . .]. Choice gives low-income families and the middle-class the same 
options . [. . .] Parents could “shop around” for the best school for their 
children.325 
These policies are positioned as socially progressive and emancipatory as choice is available to 
all, not just those able to afford a private education. I discussed, in Chapter Four, the way that 
such policies have contributed to the reproduction of a normative conception of religious 
education as religious instruction in church schools, and as Bible-in-Schools in secular schools. 
These teaching approaches are neither progressive nor emancipatory in critical liberal terms, 
promulgating compliance—in the name of productivity—over truth-seeking, judgemental 
rationality and critique.326 Shopping around for religious values implies a laissez-faire approach 
to religion in New Zealand schools. For the critical liberal, the liberal state cannot be neutral 
and “hands-free” but has a compelling interest in the formation of its citizens. A state which 
does not ensure that young people develop social rationality and the ability to participate in 
democratic citizenship is abdicating its responsibilities. Children who attend schools with 
religious or cultural affiliations (or special religious character) should also be offered a broad 
education in alternative worldviews. 
Education academic John Codd contrasts the difference in emphasis between economic and 
socially-oriented education systems in the New Zealand context. While the former prepares 
young people for the labour market, the latter “seeks to promote the concepts, capabilities 
and knowledge required for testing truth claims and justifying beliefs”.327 This mirrors Young’s 
critical realist analysis, that the school curriculum should provide epistemic access to 
“powerful knowledge” rather than the procedural information and skills characteristic of the 
neoliberal and knowledge age curriculum. It is in line with the critical realist assertion that 
education is primarily a quest for truth and meaning and not compliance with dispositions and 
skills needed to maximise productivity. 
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Philosopher of education James D. Marshall adopts a Foucaultian critique of the neoliberal 
influence on the New Zealand education system: 
Business values, masquerading as facts, penetrate the rational planning 
and delivery of education as determiners of standards, pedagogy and 
curricula. Busnocratic rationality is then a totalising form of rationality that 
[has an] over-riding and over-arching end concerned with the development 
of autonomous choosers [. . .]. It is this totalising view of culture which is 
being promoted in New Zealand.328 
For Marshall, freedom of choice is a fiction which serves economic interests to the detriment 
of social and communal goals.329 He disputes the assumption, within the neoliberal project, 
that it is part of human nature to “both make and want to make consumer-style choices [and] 
that such choices are the student’s (or chooser’s) own and that they have not been 
manipulated or imposed in some way upon the chooser”.330 He suggests: “The enlightenment 
ideal of personal autonomy as a fundamental notion of human being has become the 
dehumanised notion of the autonomous chooser imprisoned in the choices offered by the 
enterprise society.”331 
This autonomous chooser evolves without commitments or social obligations, primarily 
concerned with his/her own well-being, self-interest and self-actualisation:  
If there is no need to consider the other, to converse and to consult, to 
enter into dialogue, then the independent autonomous chooser is further 
cut off from a shared community form of life and more liable to be “picked 
off” by the information systems, consumer products and media, through 
which individual choices increasingly come to be exercised.332 
The critical liberal might concur that a form of spiritual education with an unreflective focus 
on the actualisation of the autonomous self, in isolation from community and tradition, fails to 
equip young people to exercise judgemental rationality and may result in increased 
susceptibility to the evangelical approaches of religion and consumerism alike. Aligned to this, 
critical realists assert that the best approximations to truth/reality are achieved not in 
isolation but in dialogue with others. 
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Education academic Ivan Snook has gone so far as to say that any attempt to teach children 
values in schools may be significantly compromised by the market values undergirding the 
education system of which the children are a part.333 He suggests that any legitimate 
programme of values must raise awareness of the influences of economic and social policy, 
school practices, advertising and media and expose young people to a variety of worldviews 
and traditions in order that they should recognise the complex nature of morality. Anything 
less is not values teaching but rather an indoctrinatory tool “for producing passive 
conformists”.334 Values teaching must facilitate the transformation of both the school and 
wider society.335 There is a high degree of synchronicity between Snook’s proposals for values 
teaching in New Zealand and Wright’s proposal for a critical religious education which raises 
young people’s consciousness of the influences which may inform their beliefs and values.336 
Both are consonant with a critical liberal approach to education in religions and beliefs. 
 Wright is right to assert that educators do our youngsters a disservice by allowing them to 
believe that there is no higher purpose to education or society than the promotion of freedom 
of choice and that, at the end of the day, one choice is as good as another: 
If we wish our children to live rich and fulfilled lives we must help them to 
make responsible choices. According to critical realism, such choices are 
dependent upon a willingness and ability to wrestle with questions about 
the actual nature of reality. We can, I think, make the point a little 
stronger: because our children are infinitely valuable, we should teach 
them to make not just responsible choices but excellent ones. It is at this 
point that the search for truth and struggle for truthful living coincide: if a 
choice is to be genuinely excellent, then it ought to be in harmony with the 
ultimate order-of-things.337 
 Wright points out that secular approaches to spiritual education and values teaching are 
purportedly designed to respect freedom of belief in plural contexts. However, by failing to 
address traditional conceptions of spirituality, to recognise children’s existing religious and 
non-religious commitments, or to develop in young people an appropriate spiritual or 
religious vocabulary with which to engage with others in the subject this approach effectively 
“disenfranchises” pupils. Imposing a relativist ontology in which ultimate truth does not exist 
and “the only truth is the truth expressed by the individual pupil” excludes young people from 
the quest for ultimate truth/reality which this thesis positions as the focus of educational 
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endeavour. 338 From a critical liberal perspective, the absence of epistemic humility in the 
inculcation of secular liberalism and neoliberalism, and the absence of explicit opportunity for 
either young people or their parents to exercise judgemental rationality over the worldview 
into which they are being enculturated, confirm this as a confessional form of instruction, 
constitutive of a form of secular (neo)-liberal governmentality. 
A logical conclusion of my critical liberal analysis might be the recommendation of mandatory 
critical education in religion and worldviews, with no opt-out provision, at all levels of 
education. The UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner Bielefeld 
asserts the legitimacy of this approach.339 However the history of religion in schools, described 
in Chapter Four, might caution against imbuing one solution to the religion problem with 
permanence through legislation. An attempt to do so in Canada resulted in parents 
challenging the legitimacy of Quebec’s Ethics and Religious Culture programme in the 
Supreme Court.340 In other contexts, religious studies scholar Benjamin Schonthal and others 
have shown how legislation intending to protect the right to freedom of religions and beliefs 
can itself be the cause of religious tension leading to the “hardening of boundaries and a 
sharpening of antagonisms”.341 Political theorist Alison Braley has argued, in the light of the 
Quebec experience, that while education in religions and beliefs should be offered to all age 
groups there is a case for an opt-out provision in the primary phase only. She bases this on the 
pragmatic premise that it is “less likely to stoke the hostility of parents” who perceive the 
programme to be contrary to their family’s beliefs.342 This is perhaps in keeping with Galston’s 
view that the nation state should allow exemptions and remove “as many contested issues as 
possible from the sphere of national legislation or regulation” in the protection of diversity.343 
For more pragmatic than theoretical reasons, then, I am inclined to advocate offering critical 
education in religions and beliefs at all ages and in all school types, but mandating the 
programme within the curriculum only at the secondary phase. This is not an entirely 
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unproblematic concession, due to the inherent difficulties with opting out of normative 
programmes.344 But it may be the most realistic means of implementation.  
Conclusion 
A search of the primary and secondary literature in Chapters Four and Five indicates that the 
New Zealand educational context appears to be characterised by a disqualification of 
education in religions and beliefs and a concurrent facilitation of uncritical confessional 
approaches to cultural difference, Bible teaching and secular values teaching. I have suggested 
that this state of affairs is neither axiomatic nor part of the natural order of things but is 
constituted within the constraints and imperatives of prevailing educational and political 
discourses. 
I have demonstrated that, when viewed from Foucaultian, critical realist and egalitarian liberal 
perspectives, informed by the analysis of Michael Young, Andrew Wright and William Galston 
among others, the discursive constraints on teaching about religions and beliefs which I have 
identified do not withstand critique. In each case, the presumptive invalidity of religious 
education appears rather to be informed by governmental and disciplinary techniques 
intended to mould individual subjectivities. Rather than developing knowledge and 
understanding of religions and beliefs, essential for the protection of diversity within the 
liberal nation state, a combination of discursive imperatives construct such education as 
regressive and unnecessary while driving policies which are formational, confessional and 
reproductive of the status quo. These policies do not respect the right of the individual to 
make informed and educated judgements about matters of belief. They narrow the range of 
options available to New Zealand’s young people to the worldview presented by the religious 
proclivities of boards of trustees, an authorised Māori conception of spirituality and/or a 
secular (neo)-liberal worldview. This is characterised by a privatised, personalised, 
depoliticised construction of religion: just one lifestyle choice among many, of which one must 
be uncritically tolerant. 
In answer to research question three I suggest, in line with Wright and Snook, that a corrective 
to this illiberal form of governmentality would be the creation of a space within the New 
Zealand Curriculum where religions, beliefs and worldviews could be analysed and discussed. 
This would not essentialise religious and secular traditions but would induct young people into 
the language, concepts and ongoing debates within the subject discipline of religious studies. 
It would not presume the validity of a religious perspective, but neither would it preclude such 
                                                          
344
 See below, page 215. 
179 
 
validity. Following Wright, it would need to introduce liberal and secular perspectives such as 
universal religiosity, post-modern relativism and secular atheism as specific worldviews. And 
following Snook and Marshall, in the New Zealand context, it would need to include analysis 
and critique of the neoliberal worldview. While in-depth debate and analysis may be more 
appropriate to the upper end of primary school and secondary level, the literature shows that 
there is no legitimate developmental reason for denying children in the lower years of primary 
school education about different religious worldviews and teaching them to see things from 
different perspectives, even in schools with a religious character. To do so does not preclude 
formation within a (liberal or illiberal) religious community but it is in the compelling interest 
of the nation state. I concede that, at primary school, this programme may need to be 
optional to facilitate implementation. 
I suggest that confessional religious instruction in state schools where plurality of religious 
perspectives must be assumed is, in Galston’s terms, inimical to the protection of diversity and 
tolerance which is a central purpose of the liberal state. In Young’s critical realist terms it fails 
to differentiate between powerful conceptual knowledge and the promotion of a religious 
worldview. It does not treat religious knowledge with epistemic humility and fails to respect 
young people’s developing judgemental rationality. I evidence this further in the following 
chapter. I also suggest, with Wright, that the critical realist pursuit of truth does not preclude 
religious belief. It is therefore consistent with a critical realist approach to endorse religious 
instruction in integrated religious primary schools. However, in Galston’s terms, the liberal 
state must ensure that young people of all ages know and understand about alternative 
worldviews alongside the faith in which they are enculturated. And, in Cooling’s terms, schools 
must teach children with courageous restraint, acknowledging the transitive nature of 
religious knowledge.  
In the next chapters I present a critical liberal account of the way discursive constraints 
operated in case study schools, and in interviews with key stakeholders, to disqualify 




Chapter Six: Confessional Religious Instruction 
Introduction 
I've never thought of drawing the distinction between teaching religion and 
teaching about religion [. . .]. That has never crossed my mind.  
Frank: Principal of Takahe School, Southland 
As a principal of 18 years’ standing, and a teacher for many more, Frank had never had 
occasion to differentiate confessional Christian religious instruction from education in 
religions and beliefs. Nothing in his training or teaching experience had caused him to 
question the self-evident nature of religious formation as the normative construction of 
education in religion. This construction was evident in interview data from key stakeholders 
and participants in case study schools in each region. Many participants appeared to be 
almost unable to conceive of a form of religious education that was not confessional in nature, 
so dominant was the perception of “Bible-in-Schools” as the conventional model for teaching 
religion in primary school. Equally, I was told by the great majority of teachers, parents, 
principals and several key stakeholders that teaching about religions and beliefs would be 
indoctrinatory, illegal, unimportant, undesirable, unproductive, and otherwise unnecessary in 
New Zealand primary schools: education about religions and beliefs appeared to be 
inconceivable. 
Chapters Six and Seven constitute a report of the case study and interview research data.1 
Research question two, regarding constraints on religion in school, was initially answered from 
a study of the archive of policy documents in Chapter Four, and further exemplified from the 
research literature in Chapter Five. Chapters Six and Seven provide an opportunity to show 
how these same discursive and material constraints were operational within contemporary 
interview data. The purpose of the data report is both to evidence these discursive constraints 
and to problematise their self-evident and common-sense nature. I seek to show how 
dominant discourses reproduce normative approaches to religion in school, fix definitions of 
terms and constrain curriculum content and policy. The constraints of this thesis do not permit 
the full inclusion of the raw interview data or case study reports. However, I have provided a 
summary of research findings in Appendix 3 and an overview of perspectives on religious 
instruction, spiritual education and teaching about religions and beliefs in Appendix 4. 
Appendices 4A, 4B, and 4C evidence the key constraints which appeared to prevent children in 
the case study schools from obtaining knowledge about religious diversity. Appendix 4D 
identifies the perspectives of the key stakeholders interviewed. 
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My findings destabilise three apparently commonly-held views: that the system of voluntary 
religious instruction, with the right to opt out, is equitable and fair and that there is no need 
for a review of current practice; that New Zealand primary schools already “do enough” about 
religious diversity; that the current approach to treatment of religious diversity is religiously 
neutral. 
Interview questions addressed three separate areas: religious instruction, spiritual wellbeing 
and teaching about cultural and religious diversity.2 In practice, many participants conflated 
the three. In this chapter and the next, I draw on participants’ responses across the case study 
data and across the three interview areas. I exemplify the two governmental approaches to 
teaching religions and beliefs described, namely Christian religious instruction and secular 
(neo)-liberal instruction. I apply a critical realist methodology to pinpoint aspects of 
embodiment, materiality and institutional power which functioned to reproduce these forms 
of confessional instruction and to constrain development of education in religions and beliefs.  
Chapter Six has two parts. In Part One, I demonstrate the ways in which confessional 
approaches to religion and values teaching were taking place in case study schools. In Part 
Two, I examine the ways in which confessional Christian instruction was reproduced. 
Part One: Following Jesus in State Primary Schools 
Confessional Christian instruction was taking place, to varying degrees, in six of my seven case 
study schools, although this appeared to be made explicit to parents only at the two Catholic 
schools visited. A conservative Christian discourse was in evidence in these six schools. 
Catholic Religious Education 
At St Margaret’s and St Joseph’s schools, religious education took the form of a 40-minute 
class, three times a week. In addition, I was informed by principals and teachers that Catholic 
religious teaching would infuse the whole curriculum and that each day would be punctuated 
with religious observances such as prayers and genuflection, both in class and in religious 
assemblies. Prayer corners were a feature of school classrooms. Children would attend Mass 
at frequent intervals during the year, to which parents were invited. Parents were also 
involved in the religious education homework, which formed part of the religious education 
programme booklet.  
Within religious education at St Margaret’s school, there was an intention to “encourage 
children to be committed to the truth of the Gospel, to sharing it and to living Gospel values” 
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made explicit in the Learning Area Statement.3 And at St Joseph’s the Religion Curriculum 
Statement expressed a similar intention: “Religion involves learning about the teachings of 
God and the church, and to adopt those inherent values for day to day living in relationship 
with others.” A conservative Christian construction of religious education was evident, in 
which children were to absorb Christian truths and embody them both through religious ritual 
and through the values by which they lived. The government of belief and behaviour were 
intentionally combined. The interdependence of Christian beliefs and values was explicit in 
school charters, policies, displays and interview data as the foyer display from St Joseph’s in 
Figure 6, which had the heading “God is Love”, exemplifies. The values of this school were 
derived from the truth of the love of God and the commandment to love others. In both 
schools it was made explicit in policy and interviews that children were expected to develop a 
relationship with God through the religious education programme, but that this should be a 
“free faith response”.  
 
Figure 6: Beliefs and Values Foyer Display at St Joseph's School 
Children in Catholic primary schools followed a religious education programme authorised by 
the New Zealand Catholic Bishops’ Conference. An examination of a Year Three children’s 
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 I am unable to provide citations to school documents without compromising the anonymity of case 
study schools. All case study school documents cited are held by the author. 
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activity book used in Catholic primary schools supported the view that, in tone and emphasis, 
the teaching presumed that children either had or were developing a Catholic faith.4 The six 
strands covered were: God, Jesus Christ, The Holy Spirit, Church—Community of Disciples, 
Sacrament and Communion of Saints. The curriculum made explicit reference to church 
teachings and liturgy and included Bible readings and suggestions for prayer. There were 
activities designed for homework with family and also independent class work. The books 
travelled between home and school every day. Activities for children included crosswords, 
cloze procedure, maze puzzles, drawing, word searches, memorising Bible verses, matching 
beginning and ending of sentences, scrambled words, secret messages to discover and 
true/false quizzes—all pertaining to Bible verses or words of Catholic liturgy. The faith 
imperative was established through statements of Christian belief in page headings such as 
“God—te Atua—Io Matua Kore—‘The Father Almighty’” and “Jesus Christ—Hehu Karaiti—‘His 
only Son, our Lord’” and also through the use of the word “we” to signify membership of the 
faith group, e.g.: “At Eucharist we gather to remember.” The children and their families were 
expected to embody the “fruits of the Holy Spirit”.5 Children were required to “respond to the 
call of Jesus” by indicating that statements such as “I am a disciple of Jesus” and “Jesus is the 
best way to come to know God” were either true or false.6 The right answers were self-
evidently those which confessed a positive response to the call of Jesus. There was no 
discussion of alternative religions and beliefs in this programme or recognition of the 5% of 
children in each school whose families did not belong to the Catholic faith. 
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 Ibid., 1, 10, 14, 22. 
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Figure 7: Example from Catholic Religious Education Yellow Book (Year 3) 
This was a confessional, conservative Christian form of religious instruction. It was a highly 
structured teaching approach which was designed to encourage compliance with the beliefs of 
the church rather than independent enquiry in matters of religion. This was in contrast to 
policies on enquiry learning, which applied to other curriculum areas in both Catholic schools 
visited. However, there was evidence of a liberal theological stance on the Bible and the 
Creation. While the Bible was constructed as “God’s Word to people” and “Holy”, the booklet 
also stated: “More than 35 people wrote the Bible.”7 Equally, children learned that “God is the 
source of all Creation” but were also told: “Most cultures have stories about how the world 
was created and how God is active in it.”8 The Māori story was here compared with the 
Genesis account, with the teaching focus being one of environmental concern rather than 
Biblical literalism. The following activity was “We show respect for all cultures”,9 reinforcing a 
liberal theological perspective. While acceptance of the Catholic faith was expected, if not 
required, a belief in the inerrancy and sufficiency of the Bible was not. This was reinforced by 
critical discussion of Biblical texts as described, in interview, by the principal at St Margaret’s 
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School. She described discussing some of the problems of the Genesis accounts and 
encouraging children to query a literalist approach: 
Could this be a story that, because most people were not educated, that 
they were trying to get across to people that God made . . . the world, 
made us? [. . .] Does it matter? Do you have to believe this? Or could it be 
that?  
In this way a critical dimension to the teaching was introduced at St Margaret’s school, but the 
discussion was restricted to the discursive boundaries of the Catholic faith and therefore 
remained confessional in content. This liberal approach to Biblical study was in particular 
contrast to the theological perspective of the BiS materials observed in state schools and the 
teaching of one BiS volunteer interviewed, as I discuss below.10  
These findings were perhaps to be expected in a form of schooling with an explicit intention—
as stated by St Margaret’s school policy statement on its Catholic special character—“To 
provide a faith environment for children to experience Catholic life and to be evangelised and 
catechised.” Parents of children at Catholic schools could not fail to be aware of the 
confessional nature of teaching and even those who were not Catholic signed a form to 
confirm that their child would participate in all activities associated with the special character 
of the school. A more surprising finding was the extent to which BiS classes in secular state 
schools, and attended by children of diverse religious and non-religious backgrounds, mirrored 
the intentions of the confessional Catholic programme. 
Bible-in-Schools 
As stated above, Bible-in-Schools usually took place during the school day, in secular state 
schools, although the school or classroom in use was deemed to be legally “closed” for the 
duration of the lesson. The programme was led by volunteers and usually lasted for half an 
hour a week. Parents could withdraw children from BiS but, as I argue below in this chapter, 
there were significant constraints on this process and very few children at Pukeko or Kereru 
School did so. At Korimako School where the Muslim children formed a sizeable group—one 
third of the school—these children opted out by staying at home for the duration of the class, 
while the Hindu and Sikh children appeared to attend. In practice, the positioning of the 
programme during normal school hours and the default policy of attendance meant that 
children of diverse religious and non-religious backgrounds attended BiS classes. I argue below 
that their attendance should not reasonably be taken as either adherence to Christian belief 
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or consent to receiving confessional Christian instruction, although this appeared to be the 
basis upon which schools and BiS volunteers operated. 
From lesson observations in Pukeko and Kereru schools, interviewing BiS volunteers at 
Pukeko, Kereru and Korimako schools, looking at the materials used and interviewing David 
Mulholland at the CEC, I formed an impression of the nature of the teaching and the discursive 
imperatives operating within the BiS programme. An examination of teaching materials 
routinely in use in New Zealand schools revealed a confessional teaching approach which was 
not designed to take account of other faith perspectives, presumed a Christian faith and 
uncritically promoted a conservative/evangelising Christian theology. 
At Pukeko School I was given sample copies of the children’s CRE workbooks Trek 1 and 
Search 1. Trek, Search and Quest resources, published by Access Ministries in Melbourne, 
Australia were the main material approved by the Churches Education Commission for use in 
state school classrooms. An alternative curriculum, Life Choices, was designed and approved 
by CEC for assembly-style delivery with larger school groups. The CRE workbooks were in use 
at Pukeko, Kereru and Korimako Schools and the Life Choices curriculum was used for older 
children at Korimako School. 
The activities in the CRE workbooks were less formally religious than those in the Catholic 
workbooks. Where the Catholic workbooks concerned themselves with Catholic liturgy and 
sacrament alongside matters of belief, the CRE workbooks attended to Christian belief and 
behaviour. However, the CRE activities were equally confessional in content: they assumed a 
Christian consensus and adopted the first person plural “we” to indicate membership of the 
same faith. This was evidenced by the following activity used in the lesson observed at Pukeko 
primary school: 
What can help us learn more about God? Circle the correct word in the 
sentence: 
We can pray/play to God. 
We can read/ride the Bible. 
We can ask/eat other people for help.11 
Such an activity would inhere within conservative and evangelising Christian discourses. 
Within these discourses it is self-evident that children need to learn more about God and that 
praying and reading the Bible are activities they should undertake. Children were required to 
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 Access, “Trek 2 (Blue Series)” (Victoria: Access Ministries, 2008), 5. 
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read and complete confessional statements such as: “Jesus is Amazing! He is the Son of 
God!”;12 “Jesus is God’s Son. He showed God’s power when He healed the man.”;13 “Jesus 
turned the water into wine. Only God’s son could do this!”;14 “Don’t worry about anything but 
pray about everything.”;15 “Make a mini-poster advertising how to behave as Jesus wants us 
to.”16 Figure 8 exemplifies these teaching activities.17 
 
Figure 8: Example of BiS Resources 
Lessons for Easter taught the children about Jesus dying on the cross and gave a 
conservative/evangelical Christian theological interpretation of this event: “When we upset 
our friends we need to ‘make it up’ with them. At Easter, Jesus made it up for us with God.” 18 
Subsequent sessions clearly implied that children should follow Jesus as a result of this event. 
Activities included a puzzle to help the disciples find their way to Jesus, and writing a prayer to 
God.19 Older children completed a section on “Choosing to join” where they considered the 
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 CEC, “Search 1” (Wellington: Churches Education Commission, 2008), 7. 
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qualities of a good leader and completed a crossword puzzle which combined questions about 
disciples following Jesus with questions about child-oriented clubs and activities.20  
 Unit 4 Session 1 of the Search 1 resource was entitled “The Bible is Amazing”.21 A 
conservative Christian interpretation of the conversion of Māori, through the dissemination of 
the Gospel of Luke in te reo, was here presented. There was an implied assumption that just 
as some Māori “became followers of Jesus and learned to live God’s way”, so should the 
children hearing this story. In Trek 1, young children were required to indicate whether the 
following statements were true or false: “Jesus ran in the Olympics; Jesus turned water into 
wine; Jesus helped a blind man to see; Jesus went shopping at supermarkets; Jesus told the 
waves and storm to stop.”22 Here the truth of these miraculous events was presented as self-
evident. The true/false dichotomy was no more seriously explored in this activity than in that 
presented above in Figure 7, from the Catholic religious education booklet. 
The Life Choices curriculum resource (Year 3) observed at Korimako primary school, gave 
suggestions for a class prayer and praise choruses to sing in each lesson.23 Furthermore, it 
encouraged children to believe that the Bible was the Word of God, contained no 
inconsistencies, was reliable and should be followed like a manual.24 This construction of 
Biblical inerrancy inhered within an evangelising Christian discourse and positioned the 
teaching outside of that of the mainstream Christian denominations in New Zealand, whom 
CEC claim to represent.25  
David Mulholland, at the CEC, referred to resources in use in schools in New Zealand which 
were much stronger in tone than the Access or Life Choices resources. “Connect” resources, 
produced in Sydney, Australia, warn children of the “consequences of turning away from God” 
in introductory lessons.26 At the time of the interview these resources were “approved” by 
CEC. A survey undertaken by a member of the SEN in 2012 indicated that at least 57 schools 
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were using the resources.27 Under Simon Greening’s leadership of the CEC approval of 
Connect materials was withdrawn, but Wanganui Council for Christian Education is run 
separately from the CEC and remains committed to teaching with this material in the 
Wanganui region.28 
From a critical liberal perspective, in their promotion of a conservative/evangelical Christian 
worldview and their neglect of other faith perspectives, the resources approved by CEC 
materially undermined the protection of diversity in New Zealand schools. By encouraging 
children to make personal decisions about faith and requiring embodied acts of faith, 
irrespective of family background, the resources equally undermined the right of children and 
parents to freedom of religions and beliefs. Presenting one form of religious belief as alethic 
truth did not respect the developing judgemental rationality of young people present. My 
assessment of the Access Ministries resources is in accordance with those of Maddox and 
Zyngier, in the Australian context, in which the authors identified a strongly evangelical 
message and limited educational value within these materials.29 A recent report by Paul 
Morris confirms the assessment that activities and resources involving prayers are 
“inappropriate and likely objectionable” to parents in state schools.30 
It will be noted that the Catholic teaching resources presented a more liberal theology of the 
Bible than did the materials routinely used in secular state schools. While the Catholic 
booklets went home with children every night the BiS booklets were retained by the 
volunteer, and were not routinely seen by parents, restricting the information parents had 
about the programme.  
Further evidence of a teaching approach characterised by an assumed and unquestioned 
religious consensus was supplied by the lesson observations and interviews. At Pukeko School, 
in Dunedin, BiS co-ordinator Sarah positioned the programme as promoting liberal values of 
tolerance and inclusion and resisted any construction of BiS as evangelising or coercive, in 
interview. However, it was self-evident to Sarah that all children should have the opportunity 
to form a relationship with God and that this was important for their wellbeing: 
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What we are teaching is that, um a recognition that there is more to life 
than just . . . little human ants scurrying about on the surface of the earth 
. . . that they can have a relationship with God [. . .]. And that that love 
from God, and of God, can drive all the other relationships—all the other 
good and positive relationships—with their friends, with their family, with 
home and school, with themselves. 
The BiS lesson I observed here contained no prayer but did have an evangelising message. 
Sarah, following the Access resources, told a complicated story from Acts Chapter 10. The 
stated Curriculum values of “community and participation” and “care and compassion” 
covered in this lesson were deeply embedded in a more dominant message about listening to, 
and obeying God. A Biblical text on the children’s workbook stated: “Come near to God and 
He will come near to you (James 4:8).” The message Sarah wanted the children to take away 
from her lesson was that both Cornelius and Peter listened to God and obeyed him. She 
finished the lesson with an appeal for children to apply this teaching to their own lives: 
Because they both listened, and they both did what God asked them to do, 
amazing things happened to both of them that changed their lives. 
Sometimes we can hear things. You can hear something amazing and if you 
listen to it and do what you’re asked to do, even though it doesn’t make 
sense sometimes, your life can be changed too. Amazing things can 
happen. 
Here, Sarah suggested to the children that they listen to God and change their lives. This 
inhered within the evangelising Christian discourse within which children are intended to 
make a personal commitment to faith. It was confessional Christian instruction within which 
believing in, listening to and obeying God were normalised. 
At Korimako School in Auckland, Martha, the BiS co-ordinator, was frustrated that so many 
Muslim children opted out of BiS at this school. She believed that the programme was suitable 
for children of any faith background: 
Does the curriculum become amended at all around children of other 
faiths?  
Well it's a general . . . no, it doesn't change for any faith, or for any person. 
[. . .] [J]ust like churches, they're all multicultural, there's no . . . I don't 
know of any churches actually that have just got one particular race there, 
they’re multicultural, so therefore all the material . . . I mean the Bible is 
multicultural: it's for everybody!  
Within a conservative/evangelising Christian regime of rationality there was no need to adapt 
this programme to make it appropriate for children of other faiths. It was already appropriate, 
because the Bible was for everybody. Martha’s comparison of a BiS class with a church 
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community revealed an underlying assumption that the assembled children either were 
already, or were potentially, Christian believers. The presumptive validity of Christian belief 
over families’ existing faith perspectives did not inhere within a liberal Christian or egalitarian 
liberal discourse. It was inconsistent with the protection of diversity and with the rights of 
parents and children to freedom of religion and belief.  
While all the BiS teachers interviewed were clear that it was not their role to evangelise, all 
intimated a hope that children would come to belief in God at a later stage and that their role 
in school was to sow a seed of faith. In interview David Mulholland, then National Advisor for 
BiS at the Churches Education Commission, stated this explicitly: 
We talk in terms, on the training programme, of : “You're sowing a seed.” 
Whether it grows and fertilises and develops is not our concern, and it’s 
not. We can't . . . do that . . . but we can sow the seed. And unless the seed 
is there, well there's never going to . . . nothing is ever going to happen. 
[. . .] So if we can sow some seeds [. . .] hopefully the children will . . . think 
about it? Maybe not always then, sometimes later on in life.31 
Sowing a seed of Christian faith in a secular school, where children of different faith 
backgrounds were present, was self-evidently appropriate within a conservative or 
evangelising Christian discourse.32  
At Kereru Primary School, in Southland, I was able to observe a BiS lesson and interview the 
BiS co-ordinator. The lesson focus, based on a passage from Philippians, was on “working 
together to solve problems”. While such a topic would inhere within the secular rationalist 
and egalitarian liberal interpretation of values teaching, this class reinforced the message that 
working together is what Jesus wants “us” to do. The characters in the story from Philippians 
are engaged in spreading the news about Jesus, “So it was important that they could work 
together well, wasn’t it?” Just as was noted at the Catholic schools, the value being taught was 
unreflectively embedded in Christian belief. The song, “Jesus loves me this I know, because 
the Bible tells me so”, and the expectation that all children assent to the prayer, below, 
inhered within both a conservative Christian and an evangelising Christian discourse: 
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Ok, can we just close our eyes please? [whispered] 
Dear Lord, thank you that Paul and Barnabus worked together, and that 
others were prepared to help them, and work with them. We just pray that 
you will help us to work together and to do a much better job than we 
could on our own. And I just thank you for this wonderful group of 
children. And I just pray that the children and Miss [name] have a great 
weekend, a safe and happy weekend. In Christ's name. Amen 
Children and teacher: Amen 
The class teacher sat at the back of the room marking books throughout the lesson but during 
the song she came to sit at the front of the class with her work, joining in the song and prayer. 
In this way she, as representative of both the school and education system, may be seen to 
have imbued the evangelising Christian message at the end of the lesson with institutional 
power. The expectation of whole class participation in an explicitly Christian prayer, and the 
participation of the class teacher, evidenced a required and institutionally endorsed 
embodiment of Christian belief through religious observance in this lesson. 
An interview with Wayne, the BiS co-ordinator in Kereru School, confirmed that teaching 
children to have a relationship with God was imperative to his work: 
This is to give the children a basis in spirituality [. . .]. It's not teaching faith 
so much as a relationship with God [. . .]. Many people say: “I'm going to 
leave it ‘til the children are older, and adults, and can make their own 
decisions.” OK—what are they going to make that decision on? Unless 
they've been exposed to it? 
But Wayne was unequivocal that what children needed to be exposed to was a form of 
Christianity which involved belief in Biblical inerrancy and Creationism: 
We've had some really interesting . . . debates, generally, about 
Creationism [. . .] and how, well . . . when you consider the number of 
scientists that say evolution is so flawed . . . that it actually—and it is, too—
Evolution is actually a religion [. . .]. 
So what would you be saying to the children about that? 
I say: “Well, look—in the Bible I believe we've got an eye-witness account. 
And this is what I believe.” And I explain what an eye-witness account is, 
and start talking about how God created everything. 
Hmm. . . 
And, even though it might sound difficult to believe that this could happen, 
we have to remember that God is all-powerful.  
 Wayne also explained his approach to Muslim children in his Bible class: 
With the Muslim children, when they stay in class, I do not show disrespect 
to what they've already been exposed to, but try and get them to 
understand that Isa is perhaps more than what the Qur’an contains. 
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Wayne’s assertion that he was not disrespectful to other religions was undermined by his 
acknowledged attempts to persuade Muslims of the truth of the Bible over the Qur’an. He 
voiced strong opinions about Islam, stating that the teachings of Islam and Christianity are 
“totally opposed” to each other. Such comments position Wayne within an evangelising 
discourse, in which children are strongly encouraged to accept the beliefs being promoted 
even though they may conflict with the beliefs of their family or the child’s developing 
judgemental rationality.  
Wayne had been teaching religious instruction classes in Kereru School since 1988. While he 
admitted that some parents have challenged his ideas, the school had never done so. Wayne’s 
teaching approach arguably breached the CEC’s own Code of Expectations which required 
volunteers to: 
Accept that the purpose of CRE is to educate children about Christian 
beliefs and values; a CRE teacher must not use their position to engage in 
evangelism [. . .]. Respect the variety of experiences and beliefs 
represented among the students in the class (and their 
parents/caregivers).33  
  
While the CEC, David Mulholland and all the BiS volunteers interviewed fervently denied any 
evangelising intention in Bible-in-Schools lessons, they appeared to be resisting an evangelical 
Christian construction of evangelism, in which children might be encouraged to make an on-
the-spot confession of faith in order to be “saved”. However, the commonly-stated intention 
to sow seeds of faith in state schools would inhere within the evangelising Christian discourse 
as defined in Chapter Four. There was a clear intention and assumption in resources and 
lesson plans that children would develop a Christian faith, in due course, as a result of this 
teaching. From a critical liberal perspective, this was evangelism and faith formation and not 
conceptual knowledge of Christianity. 
As has been stated, many of the interviewees were anxious to resist any association of Bible-
in-Schools with an evangelising intention but several offered examples of volunteers in other 
schools where they felt this line had been crossed. For example Janet, a parent at Pukeko 
School, mentioned that she knew of “a school [in Christchurch] where ‘Hell-fire and 
damnation’ was being preached. And the parents became very aware of that and got very ‘up 
in arms’.” Also, at Pukeko School, teacher Rosalind described teaching that her own children 
had experienced: 
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We had problems in Nelson, in a school that they went to where one of the 
teachers was Hell and damnation [. . .]. This particular lady [. . .], she had 
been doing it for years. The school itself didn’t have the heart to take her 
out. But she was upsetting a lot of children, and she was talking about the 
End of the World, and what was going to happen—and they had to make a 
decision now! [. . .] They were going home with these horror stories. And 
that lady was doing a few schools. 
 
 Beverly, the principal at Korimako School recounted similarly inappropriate teaching in a 
previous school: 
In past years, I have seen things where you have had kids coming out of 
lessons being completely terrified and out of their minds because the Holy 
Spirit was coming to get them. The Holy Spirit was going to turn them into 
boiling water and all this sort of carry on: “You’re going to burn in Hell.” All 
this sort of thing. 
These examples indicate that, whatever the stated intentions of the Churches Education 
Commission, the system of volunteer teachers operating in New Zealand has left children 
exposed to teaching which is manifestly inconsistent with the protection of diversity and 
which fails to respect freedom of religions and beliefs. But an in-house programme at another 
case study school may indicate that an acceptance of confessional forms of religious 
instruction is even more widespread. 
Values at Takahe School 
Takahe school was recruited for my research because it was one of the few in Southland that 
did not have a BiS programme. However in interview, Frank, the principal, and Grace, the 
deputy principal, were clear that Christian values and beliefs were implicit in the work of 
Takahe school. The principal stated that he was active in a local evangelical church, as were 
several families in the school. Although BiS had not taken place at Takahe for years, a 
fortnightly values class was run by Jack, a teacher aide and former church youth leader, 
throughout the school. A primary conservative Christian discourse informed the thinking of 
the senior management of this school, restricting the conceptualisation of both religious 
education and spiritual education to religious instruction, the aims of which, I was told, were 
covered by the Values class. But both Grace and Frank were anxious to point out that, as a 
secular school, they could not teach about religious beliefs. As Grace stated: “We don’t 
address . . . God issues.” 
Both Grace and Frank constructed personal belief and behaviour as more authentic than 
institutional religion. But for both it was axiomatic that children should learn to embody 
Christian values either through the modelling of behaviour of Christians on the staff—
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described as a “fifth column” by Frank—or through making implicit links to faith through the 
values programme, as Grace described: 
Here's the other interesting thing too that happens, and it doesn't even 
need to be talked about. The children themselves will start to, I guess, 
relate these values to their own lives and their own beliefs and what's 
happening with them [. . .] and they connect it with the God aspect, 
without you having to even say it. And I can honestly say in my class there 
are children that have just come out with uh, what it means to them, and 
their relationship with God and what Jack has said—they've connected up 
all the dots: values—God—them.  
Another teacher aide and parent, Jane, described how Jack wove matters of faith into his 
values class: 
And it’s all about respect and responsibility. So . . . and he does all the core 
values and he brings God into it all the time. . . 
Does he? 
in a . . . in a very round-about way, but he does. Yes, he . . . he does. And 
sometimes um, if they can bring God into it—um through a story and 
stuff—then they do, yeah. So the kids are getting it without getting it, 
anyway. 
Jack declined the opportunity to be interviewed but provided some of his resources for me to 
look at. Jack drew on materials largely from United Kingdom-based assembly resource 
websites for images, video clips, stories, activities and worksheets on specific values. The 
resources were certainly far less confessional in nature than BiS resources observed 
elsewhere. But there was an implicit, rather than explicit tone of faith, such as in one lesson 
on health in which examples from Christian cultural heritage such as Michelangelo, the Sistine 
Chapel and the sculpture of David were used to encourage children to think of themselves as 
created beings, a work in progress. 
More telling was the effusive way Grace described the effect of these classes in terms of the 
developing religious beliefs of all the children in the school. She explained how Jack’s work, 
without explicitly promoting Christian belief, was implicitly facilitating such conversations. 
This, she felt, was a more effective way to deal with religion in school than a BiS programme: 
I had a wee girl say to me yesterday, [. . . ] “You know what Miss B?” she 
said, “I prayed to God last night to really help me with my work.” And I said 
“That is absolutely awesome.” And she said, “Do you know? I know he'll 
listen to me.” So I think what happens here is, through this values 
programme it begins to open up that spiritual aspect of a child [. . .]. So if 
that spiritual aspect is tied up with Christianity it just starts to unravel it, 
and unlock it more and more and more [. . .]. Even a child that has not had 
such experiences with church, with God, it's incredible how they start to 
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think about things—and they hear other kids talking about it, and so 
automatically they're drawn to ask questions about it [. . .]. So it's not as if 
you have to stand up there and hammer God and the Bible—because 
actually you don't. I think it happens when you have the right sort of 
foundation in a school. 
 
Here, Grace appeared to acknowledge a kind of hidden curriculum where children were 
encouraged to make connections between the Christian faith and the values teaching in class. 
The values programme was grounded in the implicit and unstated Christian beliefs of the 
senior management and teaching assistant running the lessons. There was a prevailing 
conservative/evangelising Christian discourse within this secular state school into which 
children from non-church families may have been drawn. The school did not mention the 
values class in policy, in the school charter or on the website. No parental consent was 
requested for the programme and there was no opt-out procedure. Frank informed me that 
this was a deliberate measure to avoid unnecessary discussions with ill-informed parents. 
Grace insisted that there was no need for an opt-out provision: “Everybody, everybody agrees 
with Christian values, or values. I don't think there's any parent that would say, ‘I don't want 
my child to be respectful.’” The assumption, by senior leadership, that Christian values (and 
implicitly, beliefs) were appropriate for all the children positioned policy at Takahe school 
within a conservative/evangelising Christian discourse. 
From a critical realist perspective there were clear material constraints on freedom of 
religions and beliefs in Takahe School. The lack of transparency over the programme content 
and implicit evangelising intention meant that parents in this state school were completely 
uninformed about this aspect of the curriculum. The positioning of the programme as secular 
values teaching, rather than religious instruction, led the senior management of the school to 
assert that there was no legal requirement for opt-out provision. This positioning also meant 
that the primary conservative/evangelising Christian discursive imperatives, evident in the 
interviews with the principal, deputy principal and teacher aide could exercise influence over 
the teaching programme in the school and were immune from any form of critique from 
parents, board members or other staff members. In Galston’s terms, the promotion of 
Christian belief irrespective of family background constituted coercion: a form of intolerance 
inimical to the promotion of diversity within the liberal nation state. A concurrent prohibition 
of teaching about other religious perspectives potentially impeded the development of both 
social and judgemental rationality in matters of religion at this school. From a Foucaultian 
perspective, an illiberal form of governmentality was in operation with no opportunity for 
parents or youngsters to critique or challenge proceedings. 
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There is no way of knowing, from my research, how widespread such home-grown values 
programmes are in New Zealand primary schools.34 What this case study does demonstrate is 
that the secular clause of 1877 offers little or no protection to children from the contingent 
discursive imperatives of school principals and boards of trustees when school programmes, 
embedded in religious belief, are presented to parents as educational values teaching. This is 
one of the key ways in which confessional religious instruction appears to be reproduced in 
the New Zealand education system, as I discuss below. 
Part Two: Institutional Reproduction of Religious Instruction 
Confessional Christian instruction was accommodated and reproduced, in the New Zealand 
educational context, in statute and through longevity of practice. As Sonia Glogowski at the 
Ministry of Education stated: 
This Act has been in place for quite some time. [. . .] And we're not in the 
. . . well it's not my particular . . . at the moment to seek a change in the Act 
[. . .]. I’m not aware of, and I've probed quite significantly and I've also 
contacted Legal, and they've said, well they haven't had any strong 
evidence to say that the Act is not working in its current form. 
 As discussed in Chapter Four, the legislation and practice were established in a time of much 
greater religious consensus. Yet it seemed, from my research, that there was no willingness to 
revisit the issue either by the Ministry, the NZEI or other educationalists interviewed. In this 
section I explore the ways in which religious instruction was reproduced and maintained. 
Catholic Schools 
The principals in the Catholic schools interviewed saw their role as one not only of religious 
formation of the children but, to a significant degree, of parents who would be drawn back 
into church life through their children’s participation in religious activities. The school was 
positioned at the heart of the Catholic community and instrumental in the reproduction of the 
institution of the Catholic Church. But, to a large degree, parents were complicit in the 
governmental techniques employed as part of the children’s education. In each school, 5% of 
the roll had no Catholic affiliation. This meant that 95% were drawn from families with 
Catholic connections. In order to further legitimise confessional instruction and religious 
observances all parents were required to sign a form on enrolment to give permission for their 
child to participate in such activities, such as this one at St Margaret’s: 
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I/we the undersigned, accept as a condition of enrolment that the herein 
named pupil will participate in the general school programme that gives St 
Margaret’s Primary School its special character.  
Parents who were not prepared to sign the form could not enrol their child at the school.35 
This approach was staunchly defended by Catholic parents, such as Kathryn at St Margaret’s: 
When we do the New Parents' Morning Tea, I've had people say to me: 
“How do I get them out of the religious bit of it?” [. . .] And I just say, “Well, 
I'm sorry, you just should not be here because that is not going to happen!” 
Neil Laurenson, Manager of Catholic Education Services, confirmed in interview that this was 
standard practice in Catholic schools in New Zealand. By enrolling children from Catholic 
families and enforcing the participation of those whose motivation for enrolment was not 
Catholic religious belief, these schools reproduced a school environment in which confessional 
religious instruction alone was considered appropriate even when the school was situated in a 
very diverse area. Alternative educational or religious discourses could obtain no currency at 
all in the subject area of religion. Teaching about other faiths was positioned as inappropriate 
in this environment. Opting out of religious instruction or observances was effectively 
prohibited. In neither of the schools were parents informed about their right of withdrawal 
under the Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975. There was broad agreement that 
the child’s right to freedom of religions and beliefs was overruled by the will of their parents 
that they receive a Catholic education. As the principal at St Margaret’s stated: 
No child can make an adult decision. Our parents would say you bring their 
children into faith, but when they're an adult they can make their own 
mind up. But they want them to have that [. . .]. I'm not a big believer in 
your rights as a child [. . .]. I just think it's too PC for me. 
Secular State Schools 
My research indicates that, in the schools with BiS, a narrative of social consensus either 
within the whole community or the host Pākehā community was in evidence. I was told by 
each of the three principals that there was considerable support for the programme in the 
school. David Mulholland, at the CEC, indicated that this support was widespread. He was 
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explicit that there was more demand for volunteers from schools across the country than 
could be met. Evidence of a wider perception of social consensus came from interviews with 
Sonia Glogowski at the Ministry, Ian Leckie at the NZEI and Joris de Bres at the HRC who each 
recognised the legitimacy of the programme with reference not just to the Act of 1964, but to 
the programme’s support within a school community. Indeed, the perceived widespread 
support for the programme was frequently given as a reason not to revise the legislation. In 
this way the perception of community consensus imbued the programme with a social 
legitimacy, through which it was further reproduced. Legitimacy for confessional religious 
instruction in a religiously plural community appeared to be derived from institutionalised 
policies and practices constituted within a conservative Christian discourse. 
Christian Values and Heritage: Conservative Christian Discourse  
The conservative Christian discourse was evident in the way in which the programme was 
described by the principals of the three schools running BiS. There was a strong sense in which 
Christian values were seen to be universally appropriate for children in these state schools. 
The self-evident aim of such teaching was the governmental reproduction of Christian 
morality and civil society. At Kereru School in Southland, the Religious Education Policy 
explicitly stated that the purpose of BiS was: 
To ensure that all children have an opportunity to obtain a guided 
understanding of Biblical principles, Christian values, standards and beliefs, 
within a structured environment. 
In interview, principal Penny was clear that: 
This is around teaching those kids good Christian values which is part of my 
belief system as well. So I like that [. . .]. I think they have a lovely time, 
with lovely people teaching them good values [. . .]. I just think the 
principle of having good Christian values is great to have within a school. 
At Korimako Primary in Auckland, while there was no policy document on religious instruction, 
Beverly, the principal was equally supportive of the Bible programme, again drawing on her 
own religious background to justify the teaching of Christian values in her school: 
The programme is very values-based all those beautiful, beautiful stories 
that came out of the Bible that I grew up with, because I grew up Anglican 
and going to Sunday School and learning all these Bible stories. 
At Pukeko School in Dunedin, principal Francis invoked the conservative Christian construction 
of Christian heritage as a rationale for BiS: 
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We are a Christian-based society. All of our rules and laws within our 
society are based on Christianity. And the guidelines, I would think, were 
probably fairly consistent, actually, with what we would expect in the 
playground or classroom . . . as to what we would be teaching about in 
[BiS]. 
Such views were also reflected amongst many of the parents interviewed in these schools. 
Within this discourse, it was axiomatic that it was good for all children to develop Christian 
values and learn about the Christian heritage of New Zealand and that this had widespread 
support. Bible-in-Schools was unreflectively constructed as the only appropriate way to 
achieve these ends and was uncritically positioned as a “public good”, i.e., as presumptively 
valid. This view appeared to have considerable currency in New Zealand, evidenced by media 
coverage of the debates surrounding the SEN campaign, which frequently constructed BiS as 
self-evidently beneficial to New Zealand children and concurrently positioned dissenting 
voices as unreasonable, extreme and misguided.36  
The difficulty for the critical liberal in accepting the narrative of social consensus is in the 
discursive disjunction between the “commonsense” conservative Christian promotion of 
values and heritage (which may indeed have broad appeal) and the evangelising Christian 
imperatives of seed planting, introducing children to a relationship with God, and expectation 
of uncritical acceptance of the truth of the Bible, as evidenced in the materials and interviews 
with CEC volunteers. As I have shown, the material reality of the BiS resources and lessons is 
that they do not primarily promote values or Christian heritage, but a form of Christian belief 
which does not have broad currency even within the major Christian denominations. Indeed, 
my research indicated that the system of volunteers did not safeguard against fundamentalist 
and Creationist teaching. It would be hard to make a case for widespread support for such 
religious instruction amongst the general population. For this reason, I have positioned the 
“perception of social consensus” as a part of, and evidence for, the conservative Christian 
discourse itself rather than a self-evident material reality. 
 This being the case, there is a pressing need to account for the apparently widespread 
endorsement of BiS and its continued accommodation within the education system in New 
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Zealand. My research indicates that there are discursive, institutional and material constraints 
on the information that parents receive about the BiS programme which they appear to 
support. These constraints undermine the conception of social consensus and cast doubt upon 
the programme’s social legitimacy. 
Redescription as New Zealand Curriculum Values Teaching 
My research indicates that one way in which confessional religious instruction in secular New 
Zealand schools was reproduced was through redescription of the programme as teaching 
which is consistent with secular Curriculum Values, with educational content, and therefore 
appropriate to children of all backgrounds. This gave the programme increased legitimacy 
from a parental perspective. 
The language of “Christian values-based education for kiwi kids” was used on CEC materials 
for BiS.37 Simon Greening repeatedly stated in radio and television interviews, in 2012, that 
the programme taught Bible-based values which link to the eight core values of the New 
Zealand Curriculum.38 Promoting Christian values as Kiwi values, the CEC positioned its 
programme as mainstream and inclusive. Promotional material for parents emphasised the 
“educationally sound” curriculum. Christian values teaching would begin with students’ 
“interests and experience [. . .] allowing them to learn by exploration and discovery” and assist 
in developing “critical skills”.39 
David Mulholland explained, in interview, that the “Life Choices” curriculum was designed 
precisely with New Zealand Curriculum values and key competencies in mind, and that the 
CEC supplemented the Australian-based CRE materials with additional information to match 
the teaching to New Zealand Curriculum expectations. These are known as MYTR sheets: 
Making Your Teaching Relevant (to the New Zealand Curriculum). In such ways the CEC may 
be seen to position its “unashamedly Christian” approach to religious instruction as 
“acceptable to New Zealand State Schools” and “very appropriate for non-Christian children in 
the school environment”.40 By co-opting educational discourses the CEC was able to imbue its 
programme with social legitimacy. But the construction of confessional religious instruction as 
general values teaching was also used by the three principals of schools with BiS to redescribe 
                                                          
37
 CEC, CRE in New Zealand State Schools (Auckland: Churches Education Commission, 2010), 6. 
38
 Such as interviews on Radio Live on 13 July 2012 and Breakfast on TV1, 18 July 2012.  
39
 CEC, CRE in New Zealand State Schools. 
40
 CEC, Life Choices: Purple Manual Introduction (Auckland: Churches Education Commission, 2013), 3, 
accessed 17 July 2014, http://www.cectoolbox.org.nz/Download+Curriculum.html.  
202 
 
the programme in interview. This was mirrored by Maria, the principal of Kakariki School in 
Auckland, which ran BiS: 41 
And when I am enrolling people I do say that this is Christianity, but it's—I 
say, “It's very generic and it's good values” and all of those types of things. 
Ian Leckie, at the NZEI, also redescribed confessional religious instruction as general values 
classes, and could see no reason to review the practice: 
It would be broadly informative, values-based, and as a result of that uh, 
you know, my personal experience was even the people who had non-
religious beliefs actually were happy for their kids to be included. Because 
everybody liked what was being talked about and saw that as being general 
life-type skills and thinking. 
A Hindu teacher at Korimako School, Anisha, whose children attended BiS, redescribed this 
confessional Christian programme as teaching liberal values. She implied that the Muslim 
children who opted out, at this school, were too conservative in their beliefs; that it was their 
religion rather than Bible-in-Schools which was dividing the school community: 
And it's more values-based than in pushing the whole: “This is the only 
religion.” . . . Which is why I said to my boys, “No, do it, because it's not 
saying there's only one religion.” [. . .] [The Muslims] are quite strong about 
their belief. Whereas I see all the other . . . some . . . I don't know what 
their beliefs are but um . . . Indian children are still doing “Bible”. 
By constructing the teaching as liberal and inclusive, and encouraging her sons to attend, 
Anisha positioned herself as liberal-minded and her family as integrated into liberal New 
Zealand society. If attendance at BiS had become a marker of integration for some immigrant 
communities, this may have been serving to reproduce confessional religious instruction in 
religiously plural, secular schools. In this way, attendance at BiS may have operated as a 
disciplinary technique within a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality. 
At Pukeko School, in Dunedin, the policy for Bible-in-Schools reflected a liberal Christian 
discourse, redescribing confessional religious instruction as spiritual education: 
Rationale: This school believes that the spiritual dimension is a worthwhile 
part of the educative process. 
Purposes: To provide an opportunity to cater for the spiritual dimension of 
children. 
To introduce the children to the link between a spiritual heritage and the 
values society upholds. 
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To acknowledge the importance of the spiritual dimension in history and 
for many people today. 
Guidelines: [. . .] 2. The Religious Instruction offered will be Christian 
education with information on other mainstream religions. 
 
The construction of religious instruction as spiritual education may serve to position this 
teaching as liberal and perhaps less dogmatic in the eyes of the intended readership. The 
universalising construct of the spiritual dimension appears inclusive and child-centred, rather 
than religion-centred and confessional. The redescription of the teaching as introducing 
heritage, values, and history served to inscribe the teaching with educational legitimacy. The 
statement indicating that mainstream religions would be taught reflects the inclusive 
imperatives of the liberal Christian discourse espoused by Sarah, the CRE co-ordinator. These 
imperatives were not reflected in the programme materials, which dealt exclusively with 
Christian teaching. This redescription effectively served to mislead parents about the content 
of the BiS programme. 
In the schools with BiS, a confessional Christian approach to teaching religion appeared to be 
self-evidently appropriate and beneficial to the children, whereas information about other 
religions and beliefs was disqualified. But in all three cases (Pukeko, Korimako and Kereru) —
five including the values class at Takahe School and BiS at Kakariki School, mentioned above—
classes were promoted to parents by school staff as education in “good values”, rather than 
religious formation classes promoting Christian beliefs. In each case, the stated institutional 
intention of BiS—upon which its presumptive validity was based—was different from the 
intention of the CEC. The institutional governmentality in operation was one in which young 
people should absorb messages about compliance to normative standards of behaviour and 
liberal dispositions towards others: a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality. But by positioning 
BiS as educational, rather than confessional in approach, educationalists at Pukeko, Kereru, 
Korimako and Kakariki Schools effectively endorsed and reproduced Christian religious 
instruction and formation classes and facilitated the CEC’s conservative/evangelising Christian 
governmentality in these secular state schools. Indeed, some principals, teachers and boards 
of trustees were clearly in sympathy with the CEC’s intentions. The redescription of BiS, in 
which schools and educationalists were complicit, may have placed material constraints on 
the ability of parents to give informed consent to their children’s attendance. I discuss this 
further below. 




Parents don't seem to be aware of what is being taught [. . .]. And the 
Churches Education Commission is often ambiguous about this [. . .]. I was 
told it was a programme that was designed for all pupils that is non-
confessional, but when you have a look at any of the teaching materials 
this just isn't true. 
Joris de Bres, at the HRC, agreed that the CEC were “pretty disingenuous about what goes on. 
It's quite a slick operation.” And Peter Harrison of the SEN raised the same concerns: 
They were sold as teaching . . . what I considered “secular” values: you 
know—love, tolerance, um, understanding, multiculturalism [. . .]. It's 
about, you know, teaching kids all these wonderful things . . . that you’d 
have to be pretty insane to want to disagree with. The problem is, is that 
they get into the class and the actual syllabus—yes, it kind of touches on 
those things, but the main focus is teaching about God.  
The lack of clarity over the nature of the teaching was of concern to Karima, a Muslim parent 
interviewed in Dunedin. She denied that all parents would consider Christian values to be 
appropriate for their children and suggested that the kinds of values promoted in schools 
should not be specific to any religion:  
But then they are values like discipline, manners, which I think are across 
no matter what religion you are [. . .]. So those values [. . .] are not 
Christian. Those values should be, like, values for everybody! 
Mark, an atheist and opponent of BiS at Pukeko primary school, was clear that confessional 
Christian religious instruction was not what he expected at his children’s secular state school: 
They consider their job to be more one of religious formation and this just 
seems to me to be quite inappropriate in an education system that by law 
was meant to be free, compulsory and secular. 
From egalitarian liberal and secular rationalist perspectives the concerns of parents who do 
not wish their children to receive confessional religious instruction in a secular school are 
legitimate. However, for the principals involved and key stakeholders from the MOE, the NZEI 
and the HRC, the sufficiency of the current legislation to protect religious rights of parents and 
children appeared to be self-evident. Their uncritical approach to current policy served to 
further reproduce confessional religious instruction in New Zealand schools. 
Restricted Consultation  
A shared assumption of the representatives of the NZEI, the MOE and the HRC interviewed 
was that secular schools which chose to run Bible-in-Schools programmes did so on the basis 
of regular consultation with the parents at the school:  
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[A School] must, under the Act, consult with its community around this. So 
in fact, the decision for inclusion of religious instruction, actually, is the 
result of consultation [. . .]. It's ultimately on behalf of the school 
community, and the school and board of trustees make a decision. And 
then it moves on from there to the next review time. So it's a fairly . . . I 
think it's a fairly set process. Ian Leckie, NZEI  
It's actually the school board of trustees and principal who are agreeing, or 
not agreeing—whatever the case may be—to have the group in school 
[. . .]. They have an obligation to ensure that the community has been 
consulted and parents have the right to withdraw their child during that 
time. Sonia Glogowski, MOE 
The fundamental thing really has to be that the school has to make a 
democratic, consultants decision about it [. . .]. I think the programme 
should only run if there's a consent of the school community, that's my 
fundamental premise [. . .]. Um if a majority want something, but a 
minority don't, they have a right for their decision to be respected.  
Joris de Bres, HRC     
However, there are currently no ministerial guidelines for schools on how frequently such 
consultation should take place, the form it should take, or the level of support which might 
constitute a sufficient majority for the programme to run. The CEC has recently suggested a 
three-year cycle is appropriate.42 My research indicates some of the material constraints on 
this consultation process. 
In Southland, at Kereru School which ran a BiS programme, Penny, the principal admitted that 
she did not consult parents very frequently about the continuation of the programme: 
It's probably a good thing to do annually. And I guess I don't. Yeah, it's not 
something that I have . . . . It's not something that's there that I should do 
every year . . . and I would be disappointed if . . . I mean, it just kind of goes 
on. . . . I don't really want to ask them because I think it's a good thing to 
happen. So if you start asking them, then what do you do? Then you're left 
with a dilemma. 
Penny, operating within a conservative Christian discourse, considered the programme to be 
good for the children at her school. While she knew she should consult the parents, it was 
simpler to avoid any undesirable outcome of consultation and to allow the programme to roll 
on each year. From a critical realist perspective, the principal may be seen to place a material 
constraint on the right of parents to be consulted about religious instruction. 
Similarly at Korimako School, in Auckland, Bible-in-Schools had been running since the 1950s. 
The school reportedly had a high proportion of evangelical Christians on the board of trustees 
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but, at the same time, a significant proportion of Muslim children on roll. Approximately one-
third of the school stayed at home for the first half-hour on a Friday morning while religious 
instruction took place. The principal, Beverly, recognised the potential divisiveness of the 
current provision. She had attempted to instigate a more egalitarian approach to teaching 
religion—in line with policies of cultural inclusion in the school—by requesting volunteers to 
teach religious instruction from other religious communities. The conservative Christian board 
of trustees had emphatically overruled this, employing a conservative Christian form of 
governmentality, over both the principal and children, to ensure that the Christian faith alone 
was promoted at Korimako School. Beverly admitted, in interview, that she would rather stop 
the programme altogether than only have Christian instruction, but as principal she felt she 
must operate as the “mouthpiece of the board”. She was under a material constraint to 
maintain the status quo: 
To a large extent [. . .] I would, as principal, have said “Enough! I am 
canning the whole lot!” And I am still very tempted to do that, except that I 
would probably lose my job! 
Beverly avoided answering my question about how often the community were consulted on 
this issue, insisting that the majority of the parents wanted the programme to run.  
Numerous attempts were made to interview members of the Muslim community at Korimako 
School, but the repeated message (via the principal) was that no one was prepared to go on 
record—even anonymously—as appearing critical of the current system. This may indicate a 
material constraint on consultation exercises that might take place at this school. It was 
clearly difficult for this minority religious group to be seen to criticise a programme with the 
ostensible endorsement of the board, the principal and the majority Pākehā community. 
When I described this situation to Race Relations Commissioner Joris de Bres, he was clear 
that the rights of this Muslim Community had not been respected by the board of trustees and 
that this case should have been brought to the Human Rights Commission. It was evident to 
me, however, that the same material constraint which prevented Muslim parents from 
participating in my research would have prevented parents from “rocking the boat” for their 
children and community by formally complaining to the HRC. While the parents could silently 
exercise their right to withdraw their children from the classes, as an immigrant community 
reluctant to draw attention to themselves or to appear to be critical of the “host” community, 
these parents were materially unable to voice a complaint about confessional Christian 
instruction classes being run during the school day, with no alternative provision for their 
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children. This school therefore exemplified two further forms of material constraint on 
parental consultation. Firstly, the conservative Christian perspective of the board of trustees 
appeared to have constrained the more egalitarian liberal imperative of the principal to 
respect the needs of the whole school community. Secondly, the imperative within the 
Muslim community to protect itself from censure by the wider community appeared to have 
constrained any imperative to protect its own rights as a religious minority. This, potentially 
loud, dissenting voice may not have been heard in any school consultation process as a result. 
At Pukeko School, in Dunedin, the policy document on religious instruction stated that 
consultation took place every three years. This was confirmed by the principal and BiS co-
ordinator. A parent, Mark, was a vocal critic of Bible-in-Schools and raised an issue which he 
felt the school, at the time, was not addressing: 
I did suggest to Frances [the principal] that it might be good to—if people 
were going to have a consultation about this, as the school does 
regularly—to have an evening at which, you know those who teach the 
course, could actually tell us what they’re doing, because, in fact, we don’t 
get given any information by the school. I would have had to go and search 
it out . . . so I’ve just relied on what the girls have told me.43 
Mark indicated that a further material constraint on parent consultation procedure may be a 
lack of information for parents, upon which to base a decision.  
The constraints on parental consultation identified at Kereru, Korimako and Pukeko schools 
served to destabilise the self-evident legitimacy for BiS, and protection of religious rights, 
secured—in the view of key stakeholders above—by the consultation process. These material 
constraints on the consultation process served to reproduce confessional religious instruction 
in these secular state schools in line with either an institutional secular (neo)-liberal 
governmentality or the conservative/evangelising Christian discursive imperatives of principals 
and boards of trustees and the CEC, rather than the informed consent of the parents.  
Restricted Information 
In contrast to the Catholic primary schools visited, none of the four case study schools running 
BiS/values classes provided any information about the classes on their websites or school 
charters. Neither was BiS covered in their ERO inspection reports. It would have been quite 
possible for new parents to begin an enrolment process for their children at these schools 
without any knowledge of the programme running.  
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At schools with BiS, principals informed me that the programme was mentioned in the 
enrolment interview and parents were told that they may opt out. As previously discussed, 
principals and teachers often gave their own interpretation of the programme to parents, 
sometimes apparently based more on their own intentions for the programme than on first-
hand knowledge of the materials in use in their school. None of the four principals 
interviewed who ran Bible-in-Schools programmes appeared to know the name of the 
booklets or resources used in their school.44 It was left to the parents themselves to seek out 
information about the programme.  
One parent, Sam, interviewed at Kereru School could not remember having been given any 
information, at any stage, about Bible-in-Schools and was surprised to learn that her child had 
attended: 
How much do parents know about what happens? 
Well you don't. Well, see, the only way I knew he was going to be doing it 
was because it came home on his school fees [. . .]. I can't remember 
seeing anything about it. Or him saying he had to have permission or 
anything . . . and then it was just like, “Oh . . . it's started!”45  
A teacher, Annette, who positioned the programme co-ordinated by Wayne, at the same 
school, as “harmless”, “important” and “really valuable” did not think it was necessary for 
parents to have specific information on Bible-in-Schools any more than on the rest of the 
curriculum: 
Do you think [parents] have a good idea of what takes place? 
Possibly not the content of the programme. I guess there's an element of 
trust. So, just as they don't necessarily know every part of the curriculum 
that we deliver, as teachers of the New Zealand Curriculum, I guess there's 
a curriculum for Bible-in-Schools and I guess there's an element of trust. 
The same imperatives—either secular (neo)-liberal or conservative Christian—which informed 
the principals’ and boards’ decisions not to consult parents about running the programme, at 
least at Kereru school, may also have informed a decision not to give parents information 
about BiS. Parents should suspend their judgemental rationality and put their trust in the 
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 In David Hines’ 2012 survey, mentioned above, 41 of the 578 schools who were running religious 
instruction classes stated that they did not know which programme was used in the school. 
Additionally, 80 schools had not supplied the name of the resources used although they had religious 
instruction classes. A further 18 schools apparently did not know which organisation provided the 
religious instruction in their school. See Hines, “Wesleyschair.net”.  
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 Secular state schools are free but “voluntary donations” are regularly requested to assist with school 
expenses, including the cost of BiS resources. 
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school to act in the children’s best interests. But, for Sam, without any information there was 
nothing upon which to base her trust: 
So, do you know, it’s that whole trust thing with people? You don't even 
know who's teaching your kids this stuff. You have no idea who they are. 
[. . .] You don't have any background information on them . . . You have no 
idea. 
Perceived Institutional Endorsement  
In all three schools running BiS, parents who expressed support for the programme (and 
sometimes criticised those who opted out) also stated that they had neither been given nor 
sought out, information on the content of the programme itself. For most this was not a 
problem because, like Janet at Pukeko School, “I trusted them that it would be appropriate 
and suitable.” Sometimes this trust was based on a complacency derived from the longevity of 
BiS. Beverly, the principal at Korimako School, stated her understanding of parents’ attitudes 
as: “‘Well I went to this school, we have always had RE and you learn about God and Jesus so 
it won't be any different.’ That is their feeling and sort of their take on it.” At Kereru School in 
Southland, teacher Annette agreed that parents gave their consent without much thought: 
I don't think they really think twice about it. I guess it's probably been part 
of their culture when they were at school. And it's not doing any harm. I 
think that's what some of them think: “It's not harming my kid to have this 
stuff.” 
Sometimes it was based on a not unreasonable assumption that a programme running during 
school hours, having been operating with the consent of the teaching profession, must have 
educational value. The materiality of institutional accommodation appeared to reproduce a 
perception of the programme’s legitimacy. Obfuscation around the construct of school 
“closure” may have contributed to this. 
Educationalists perceived the school to be “closed” during religious instruction, thus 
protecting the secular clause of the 1877 and 1964 Acts and resisting any suggestion of 
endorsement or approval by the school. As Ian Leckie put it: 
The state system closes down to allow religious instruction to occur and 
then reopens at the conclusion of that to carry on again with the school’s 
curriculum. So it's seen as outside the school's curriculum, um in terms of 
its delivery. 
But from a critical realist perspective, it was evidently the discursive construction and not the 
material reality of closure which was important in the preservation of the secular clause. The 
closed classroom differed in no respect from any other open classroom in the school. To any 
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parent or researcher—indeed to the children themselves—the classroom was manifestly 
open. The school was neither required to document the closure nor keep records of the hours 
that classrooms had been closed for religious instruction, for inspection. This closure was of a 
fundamentally different nature to school closures of any other kind, which must be accounted 
for under Section 65 (2) of the 1989 Education Act. Parents, who had permitted their children 
to attend the BiS lessons I observed, would have had no way of knowing that the classroom 
was closed. They were entitled to assume that the teaching taking place had been subject to 
the usual scrutiny and approval associated with the New Zealand Curriculum. The construct of 
school closure functioned to protect the secular clause but manifestly failed to prevent 
children from being exposed to teaching which would have been considered inappropriate in 
terms of the protection of diversity, of the right to freedom of religions and beliefs and of the 
integrity of the child as truth-seeker. As I show below, the construct of school closure was 
used precisely to position responsibility for both the monitoring of BiS resources, and the 
provision of information to parents, as beyond the remit of secular educationalists. However, 
it was common for parents to assume, by dint of its institutional accommodation, that the 
programme carried the endorsement of the Ministry, principal, staff and/or board. This 
perceived endorsement served to reproduce the prevailing construct of Bible-in-Schools as a 
public good. 
Sue, at Kakapo School in Auckland (speaking about Bible-in-Schools in her children’s previous 
school), appeared to assume that the programme had been approved for use in a secular 
school: “I always felt very comfortable with [it] knowing that this material has been passed 
and has been acceptable.” Others made the assumption that the programme had government 
approval. Alan, a board member at Korimako School in Auckland, suggested as much in an 
email to the principal relating to a complaint from a parent: 
The government has also instructed in the curriculum, that it is a 
requirement for schools to teach principles and values of mercy, trust, 
respect, patience, tolerance, love and many others, to our children. Correct 
me if I am wrong, but the CEC curriculum is the government approved 
mechanism, model and structure, and it is what the Bible so accurately and 
emphatically describes and shows us how to live these values and virtues if 
you like a roadmap for living in a society like ours[sic]. 
Alan’s argument for Christian religious instruction reflected conservative Christian discursive 
imperatives, but additionally attributed the institutional endorsement of the government and 
state to the Bible-in-Schools programme.  
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Simon Greening, at the CEC, also credited the programme with Ministerial approval when he 
spoke on a Breakfast TV programme in 2012:46 
We use a curriculum which has already been approved by the Ministry of 
Education, it’s been approved by school boards. And this curriculum is 
linked with the New Zealand Curriculum. 
In this way he imbued the BiS programme with the institutional power of the Ministry, the 
school and the New Zealand Curriculum. Such institutional power served to reproduce a 
perception of educational validity and legitimacy. 
Parents had good reason to believe that their principal and school board had inspected and 
approved the programme. Statements to this effect appeared in school policies such as the 
one at Pukeko School, which stated: “The syllabus used will be that approved by the board of 
trustees.” The policy at Kereru School equally stated: “The curriculum followed will be a 
recognised religious education publication and shall be approved by the board of trustees for 
the beginning of each school year.” The CEC website stated: “The principal and board approve 
the teachers and the teaching material.”47 Representatives of the NZEI, the HRC, and the 
Ministry all stated in interview their belief that programme resources and volunteers were 
checked and approved by the principal and board of trustees.  
Such assurances could account for the very high level of complacency in evidence among 
parents who allowed their children to attend the classes and who did not feel it necessary to 
request to see the resources. Parents were justified in believing that the school and/or 
Ministry was responsible for ensuring that the religious instruction their children received was 
appropriate to a secular school setting. My research indicates that the trust parents appeared 
to place in the educational authorities to monitor BiS resources may have been misplaced. 
There was evidence that the complacency of parents appeared to be mirrored in the approach 
of the trustees. At Kereru School, for example, Penny described her board’s approach to 
monitoring resources: 
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And it's like: who is taking responsibility for that? Because I would have to 
say to you that our board doesn't take great responsibility around it either. 
It's something historic that's happened, so: “Yeah, good, fine.” 
And David Mulholland at the CEC had reservations about the level of attention that boards of 
trustees gave to some of the resources in use in schools: 
I think, a lot of board of trustees, I'm not so sure they actually sit down and 
look at it with any degree of carefulness! And they should. And I say they 
should [. . .]. As a CEC we approve of it as our national offering, but at the 
end of the day, it's the board of trustees who say: “Yes, these teachers can 
come and this is the material.” 
For some board of trustee members, like Alan at Korimako School, Bible-in-Schools was 
understood to have ministerial or governmental approval. Under those circumstances, a close 
inspection of resources would be unnecessary. For others, such as the board at Kereru School, 
the programme appeared to be waved through each year without close inspection, because it 
had always run at the school and had general support. In both instances the institutional 
power of statute, education establishment and longevity of practice, constituted within a 
conservative Christian discourse, served to imbue Bible-in-Schools with a self-evident 
legitimacy which was uncritically reproduced by boards of trustees. Concurrently, a dominant 
authoritarian secular rationalist discourse placed a discursive constraint on teaching 
professionals in a way which severely limited the accountability of the CEC and its volunteers.  
“Don’t Touch It”: Authoritarian Secular Rationalist Discourse  
Analysis of interview data of principals and teachers indicated that responsibility for 
monitoring the BiS material was constrained by an authoritarian secular rationalist 
construction of “secular” which meant “nothing to do with religion”. This maintained the 
binary logic of secular education versus religion, discussed above.48 The construct of school 
closure operated within this discourse to protect the “secular” school staff and curriculum 
from the taint of religious indoctrination. This construction informed a “hands-off” approach 
by teachers, principals, the Ministry and the NZEI to both the monitoring of teaching 
programmes and to the provision of information to parents. The 1912 advice to the education 
minister portrayed in the cartoon in the frontispiece: “Don’t touch it! Don’t play with edged 
tools!” appeared to still be applied by educationalists.49 This appeared to shield the CEC and 
its programme from educational scrutiny. 
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Constraints on Information and Accountability 
For example, Ian Leckie at the NZEI was clear that his organisation did not have any 
responsibility to monitor BiS materials: 
Can I ask you about the level to which your organisation has had the 
opportunity to look at the resources? 
No. No we haven't . . . and . . . it's . . . because it's not part of the official 
curriculum because, as I say, schools are closed at that time. You know, 
NZEI has backed the free public secular education system that's been in 
place since the late '30s. 
And Sonia Glogowski was clear that this was not within the remit of the Ministry: 
Has the Ministry actually looked at the resources which are being used?  
No [. . .]. By and large we don't have the time, um, nor do we have the 
mandate to, I guess look at, and give feedback on materials [. . .]. I mean, 
schools are closed during that time, so therefore it's not seen as part of the 
curriculum. 
Representatives of the Ministry, the NZEI and the HRC were clear that it was the responsibility 
of schools to make sure parents were informed about the nature of the BiS programme. But at 
Korimako and Kereru Schools both principals and staff positioned this as either unnecessary or 
inappropriate. 
Teacher Annette, at Kereru School, evidenced the way in which the authoritarian secular 
rationalist construct of school closure could demarcate responsibility for the provision of 
information to parents: 
I think officially the school is closed during Bible-in-Schools time. So that 
means that we don't have any responsibility around that . . . I think. But it's 
a fairly open door. Anyone's welcome into any of our classes at any time. 
Penny, at Kereru School, recognised that parents did not have sufficient information about the 
BiS programme:  
Parents do sign up for it. But how informed are they? I'd say they definitely 
are not. We've got a little pamphlet that we put in our information pack 
and, yeah, I mean I don't ever get into any debate around that, because I 
clearly do not think that's my place to do that. If they asked me, I could tell 
them that's my personal opinion. But I don't see that as part of my job as 
leader of this school. But no, I think people do it very unknowingly! They 
wouldn't have a clue what happens! 
 Penny drew a line between her remit, as principal, to provide secular education in the school 
and the self-evident impropriety of providing information about the religious instruction 
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classes (which she nonetheless accommodated and endorsed). Her reasoning evidenced an 
authoritarian secular rationalist discursive construction of secular education. Later in the 
interview, Penny admitted that parents may not always approve of the lessons taking place in 
her school: 
And then we've got a couple of, you know sort of older ladies who are not 
so confident and much more structured, and that's just pretty heavy at 
times and sometimes I see stuff and I think “Oh, far-out! What are those 
kids learning from that?” It's just too Godly. And that sounds terrible 
doesn't it? [. . .] Well, it's just too far removed from where these kids are. 
And I'm sure they're following the curriculum, there's nothing about that. 
But the way it's presented and kids. . .learning Bible verses . . . and being 
rewarded for that sort of thing [. . .]. And I think “Well, hang on! . . . What is 
that about?” And “Would these kids’ parents be happy if they knew that's 
what their kids were doing?” 
These BiS classes and those delivered by Wayne carried, for parents, the institutional power of 
the school. The school policy on religious instruction stated that the curriculum was 
“recognised” and “approved by the board of trustees”. The volunteers were “preferably 
accredited” and participated in “ongoing training and development programmes”. Such 
assurances lent legitimacy and perceived endorsement to this evangelising Christian teaching 
and may have materially constrained the right, or perceived need, of parents to withdraw 
children from the classes. 
Operating under discursive constraints, Penny chose not to address her concerns either with 
the volunteers or with the CEC. She may have been constrained by an authoritarian secular 
rationalist discourse which would preclude her involvement, as secular principal, in matters of 
religion. She may also have been reflecting a primary conservative Christian discourse within 
which Christian values and beliefs were perceived to be good for the children, in spite of the 
teaching methods employed. Alternatively, an institutional secular (neo)-liberal form of 
governmentality may have informed a belief that the programme’s social role in reproducing 
conformity to liberal social norms was more beneficial than harmful. From a critical liberal 
perspective Penny’s inaction, whatever its cause, may be seen to reproduce the status quo in 
which parents at her school continued to allow their children to attend inappropriate lessons, 
the board continued to approve the programme without inspecting it, and no-one was held 
accountable for the teaching that took place. 
When I suggested to Ian Leckie, at the NZEI, that parents may not know enough about the BiS 
programme, he rejected the idea out of hand: “Well I'd be surprised if they didn't, and if they 
don't, they should.” His defensive stance, mirrored by that of Sonia Glogowksi at the Ministry, 
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may be seen, from a critical realist perspective, to further reproduce a status quo which did 
not protect the right of parents to give informed consent.50 
Institutional Vested Interest 
Providing a further example of institutional accommodation leading to a lack of accountability 
Ian Leckie described how, in his experience, many schools made use of the Bible volunteer to 
provide release time for classroom teachers:  
Can I just mention to you though, I think there's another little driver for 
schools and religious instruction and closing schools that you haven't 
mentioned? And that is that when a school closes and a teacher is released 
from teaching their class, because somebody else is doing the religious 
instruction, that provides the teacher with an opportunity to either work 
on their preparation or work individually with their children [. . .]. So the 
motives, though, for saying “yes” to the inclusion of religious education in 
this class or in the whole school, sometimes isn't driven by religious beliefs. 
It's driven by “This is a great opportunity”—however that might be 
perceived. 
Ian constructed Bible-in-Schools as a “great opportunity” for schools, once again conferring on 
the programme the status of public good. In providing what he considered to be an 
educational justification for the continuation of religious instruction, Ian alerted me to the fact 
that it was often the case that teachers left the room during BiS, and the volunteer may have 
been unsupervised with the children. He also highlighted schools’ vested interest—in terms of 
teacher release time—in continuing the programme each year. This may have acted as a 
further material constraint on consultation with parents and served to further reproduce the 
status quo of BiS in state schools. From a critical liberal perspective, it may be argued that the 
President of the NZEI’s legitimate concern with teacher release time might have been better 
exercised through addressing the material insufficiency of non-contact provision (in 
comparison with practice in other OECD countries) than through the validation of confessional 
religious instruction in state schools.51 It also demonstrated another way in which BiS has been 
co-opted into an institutional secular (neo)-liberal governmentality.  
Disincentives to Opting Out 
The prevailing belief among representatives of the teaching profession, the CEC, the MoE, the 
NZEI and the HRC, that the opt-out provision allowed for freedom of choice and protected the 
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rights of those who did not wish their children to receive religious instruction, is 
problematised by my research data. The accommodation of one form of religious teaching by 
the education system, as I have shown, is open to interpretation as institutional endorsement 
or approval. By running the programme during school hours attendance was certainly 
normalised so that a child opting out of this class may be the exception.  
As parent Mark, at Pukeko School, put it: 
It’s presented as just regularly part of the school programme, therefore 
you have to make a real effort to opt out. One of my feelings is . . . if you 
have such a programme—which I’m not in favour of—but if you were to, it 
ought to be an opt-in, not an opt-out. Because . . . whenever it’s the 
default position, naturally people are just going to go along with it.  
The policy at Kereru School, for example, stated that while parents may withdraw their 
children: 
Supervision of the above children is the responsibility of the 
parent/caregiver. The school is happy for children to go to the Library, but 
will not be directly supervised. 
This policy made clear that children were generally expected to attend the BiS class and that 
no special provisions would be made for those who opted out. There was clear and intentional 
disadvantage for children who had been withdrawn, through material lack of supervision and 
educational programme during school time. The guidelines may have acted as a disincentive 
or material constraint, upon working parents, against withdrawing their children from 
religious instruction. They represented a coercive strategy to normalise attendance at Bible-in-
Schools. 
At the same school a parent, Sam, felt that while she disagreed with Bible teaching in schools 
withdrawing her son would lead to certain victimisation: 
Because as soon as I say, “No. He's not coming.” Um . . . it's yeah . . . All the 
other kids: “Michael doesn't have to come to lesson on a Friday!” 
And then he's going to get hell in class [. . .]. It's easier to just go with it. 
 
 Sam was frustrated that dissenting parents felt that they had no choice but to allow their 
children to attend BiS: 
Anyone that's got something to say about it, it’s like “Oh yeah, we've got to 
do it. We've got no choice in the matter.” But we do have a choice in the 
matter [. . .].They shouldn't just be: “Oh yeah we've got to do it.” And if 





In such ways the normalisation of attendance at Bible-in-Schools entailed embodiment of a 
majority Christian identity. To opt out of this perceived social consensus was to embody an 
identity other than the norm. This “other” may be atheist or another religious identity. But the 
“othering” process in a school environment can have material consequences for a child’s 
wellbeing. Mark, a parent at Pukeko School, described his daughter’s experience of rejecting 
the embodiment of Christian identity in a BiS class and marking herself as different within the 
class unit: 
Wendy got quite annoyed one day when the teacher was praying with the 
class, or asking the class to pray with her . . . Um . . . and . . . interestingly 
she just felt this wasn’t on, and she just wasn’t interested and she didn’t 
want to have any part of it at this point [. . .]. Wendy did get a bit of flack 
from a few other kids, you know, she was told she wasn’t going to go to 
heaven, because she didn’t believe in God and that sort of thing. 
Wendy appeared to have been able to brush off these comments from her peers, but this is 
just one example of material disadvantage or discrimination suffered by children who are 
withdrawn from BiS and therefore positioned as “different” by their peer group. There are 
numerous accounts on on-line forums and Keep Religion out of School/Secular Education 
Network Facebook pages of parents who report victimisation from children and school staff 
when they attempted to withdraw their children. These include being made to sit at the back 
of the class, or the “naughty corner”, being given menial tasks such as litter-picking or 
washing-up, or parents simply having their wishes ignored and their children placed in the 
class. Some of these parents have obtained media coverage as part of the SEN campaign and a 
subsequent court case.52 Parents who have publicly complained have found themselves 
criticised and marginalised.53 
Mike, a Jehovah’s Witness and parent at Kereru School, was certainly alert to this problem: 
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From a parent’s point of view . . . um . . . It's not easy, I guess, to stand out 
as being a little bit different. There’s always a certain amount of 
trepidation as to whether or not um . . . while your request might be 
respected . . . whether or not you as a person will be looked at as, you 
know, “What's your problem?”. . . sort of thing. 
The potential for being labelled a trouble-maker at the start of one’s child’s school career may 
act as a material constraint on parents’ willingness to either withdraw their child or complain 
about the programme. Peter Harrison at the NZARH confirmed that this was a real issue for 
parents who contacted his organisation with their concerns. At Kereru School, dissenting 
parents may also face the further disadvantage of inquisition from Wayne, the BiS co-
ordinator. Wayne appeared to reflect an evangelising Christian discourse, positioning parents 
who chose to withdraw their children as having unresolved personal issues to do with their 
lack of faith: 
If I was to discuss it with that particular parent, I would ask them as to why 
they've come to that decision. And there may be something in their own 
background, which—either subconsciously, or consciously—has brought 
them to that place.  
Such inquisition, which Wayne admitted had caused embarrassment to parents, contravened 
both the Act of 1964 and Human Rights legislation, and could conceivably place an additional 
material constraint on the willingness of parents to opt out of BiS at Kereru School.54  
A further material disadvantage, described by parents in on-line forums, was that of 
withdrawn children being alienated from the class unit and being excluded from the 
“benefits” of social approval, rewards of gifts and sweets, and fun of communal singing and 
other activities. Penny, the principal at Kereru School, recognised how difficult a decision it 
would be for a parent to withdraw their child: 
It's not easy. It's not. Yeah. It's peer group pressure around that. It's as 
simple as that I'd say, Helen! [. . .] It's hard. You've got to be quite strong. 
Because your children are alienated. 
 
A Muslim parent, Karima, interviewed in Dunedin, suggested that while opting out would be 
difficult, the alienation this might inflict on her child would be good preparation for life as a 
Muslim in New Zealand: 
And if it means feeling isolated and ostracised that's something 
unfortunately, you know, you live with on a regular basis [. . .]. It would be 
very difficult for my daughter, but for me it would just be preparing her for 
things to come. 
                                                          
54
 Wayne began our interview with a similar interrogation of my beliefs. 
219 
 
But Karima recognised the dilemma for immigrant families who want their children to be 
happy in school and in the wider community: 
Because we chose to come into this country. We chose to . . . you know . . . 
um have this environment for them to grow up, and so I think it's our 
responsibility to ensure that they're as comfortable as possible in this 
environment and that they don't feel isolated or secluded from things. It is 
very, very hard. 
This constraint might operate both to dissuade Muslim parents from withdrawing their 
children from BiS and to prevent them from voicing their concerns about this programme. 
Either outcome would serve to reproduce a mistaken perception of BiS as having the support 
of the school community. 
When I described to Karima the situation at Korimako School where the Muslim children 
stayed at home on a Friday morning during Bible-in-Schools, and the unwillingness of the 
Muslim community to register a complaint about this, Karima identified a further constraint 
on this community’s freedom to stand up for their rights: 
And I think this is part of the problem, is that being a minority you're so 
used to being excluded that you just learn to grow a thick skin and try not 
to be offended by it. Whereas if it happened to a majority . . . 
Karima identified a normalisation process within which the Muslim community in New 
Zealand had become so accustomed to feeling ostracised that they were now inured to the 
offence that this should cause, offence which would not be tolerated by the “host” 
community. While in policy and documentation New Zealand educational institutions 
subscribed to an egalitarian liberal discourse and positioned themselves within human rights 
and social action liberal discourses, from this minority perspective the prevailing religious 
discourse was exclusionary and majoritarian. The apparent institutional endorsement of 
confessional Christian instruction may have reproduced this perceived exclusion. 
At Korimako School, a parent who wished to complain about the exclusion of the Muslim 
community on Friday mornings, during BiS, concealed her identity in an email, calling herself 
Jane Doe. The principal allowed me sight of the email exchange and comments from the board 
of trustees. The following sequence of events ensued: Jane was informed that her forthright 
comments had been sent to the Ministry; the Ministry responded with a statement affirming 
the legal position regarding school closure and the secularity of the school; Jane was invited to 
attend a meeting with the board chair; Jane declined, in order to preserve her anonymity; 
Jane’s views were disqualified—she was positioned by a board member as “misinformed, 
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confused or unaware of the nature and content of the curriculum,” which was “government 
approved”. In consequence, Jane’s anonymous complaint served only to reproduce the status 
quo of BiS at Korimako School. This incident exemplified the material constraint, for parents, 
of complaining about a programme with perceived majority and institutional endorsement, 
when social disadvantage may be the result. 
A critical liberal interpretation of the practice of “opting out” of religious instruction points 
towards potential harm for children, for parents, for the school and for the cohesion of the 
wider community. This harm was inherent in a system which normalised one form of religious 
belief in secular state primary schools, conceivably making non-attendance at Bible classes a 
marker of difference, dissention, atheism, non-integration and/or illiberalism. Constraints on 
individuals and communities were potentially more powerful than any de jure right to 
withdraw a child from religious instruction. And when members of the school community felt 
so compelled to withdraw from a part of the school week that they were willing to face 
potential opprobrium and social exclusion, New Zealand Curriculum principles of inclusion, 
and cultural diversity and the Curriculum value of equity were inevitably undermined. 
When interviewed, representatives of neither the Ministry, the NZEI nor the HRC appeared to 
recognise the potential for discrimination or disadvantage in the current opt-out 
arrangements. They believed in the sufficiency of the legislation and representation of parents 
by boards of trustees to protect the rights of children and parents. When asked about the 
potential for discrimination in the opting out process, Sonia Glogowski, the Ministry 
representative, constructed discrimination as a matter of perception. This was a “not 
drowning but waving” approach to discrimination, reflecting a post-structuralist 
epistemology.55 Sonia’s argument, which also co-opted both the institutional power and 
longevity of the legislation in support of current practice, effectively reproduced a 
conservative Christian status quo: 
I think that's an opinion. People. . . whether it's, you know, perceived 
discrimination, um I mean everything is about perceptions in those sorts of 
things. Um, you know, this Act has been in place for quite some time. 
Sonia went on to suggest that, given sufficient evidence of the need for a review, the Ministry 
may revisit the issue: 
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Um if there was compelling evidence to show us that it wasn't working the 
way that it was intended, then it may be cause for consideration. And I 
think . . . that's what we are open to . . . in the Ministry. 
However, an unwillingness to recognise the social disadvantage a complaint, or opt-out, may 
bring and a “hands-off” policy, both at the Ministry and the HRC, appeared to militate against 
such an outcome. A default policy of referring all parents’ complaints back to school boards to 
resolve may have acted as a material constraint on revision of policy on religious instruction 
on two levels. Firstly, a constraint was placed on the likelihood of a just resolution of the 
complaint: it was often the actions of the board about which parents were complaining, and a 
confrontation with the board and principal which the parent was attempting to avoid when 
they contacted the Ministry or HRC. This action was therefore likely to result in the complaint 
being dropped and the continuation of the status quo. Secondly, a constraint was placed on 
the likelihood of the Ministry and HRC themselves giving due attention to the body of 
compelling evidence that the opt-out procedure in the Act was not working. In such ways, the 
policy adopted by the Ministry and the HRC served to reproduce confessional religious 
instruction in New Zealand schools. 
Self-managing Schools and Special Character 
Both Sonia Glogowski and Ian Leckie defended the non-interventionist approach of the 
Ministry and NZEI respectively, with reference to the 1989 legislation introducing self-
managing schools and the right of each school community to promote its special character, 
including religion, through its teaching programme.56 For Sonia, religious teaching would be 
the result of a “collective agreement” of the parents. Ian Leckie stated: 
It's absolutely every school's right to create its own character in whatever 
ways it may do. And where it includes and reflects their community, and 
the community belief, it’s important that every school develops [a 
transparent] process. 
These key stakeholders appeared to assume that parents at the schools with BiS had chosen 
to be there because of its special character and were fully aware of the implications of this 
character on the teaching programme. My research indicates, as I have shown throughout this 
chapter, that this is an unwarranted assumption. Furthermore, none of the schools offering 
Bible-in-Schools in the study made reference to the programme in their charters, on account, I 
believe, of an authoritarian secular rationalist discursive constraint which constructed religion 
as separate from the secular school curriculum. My research, therefore, does not support the 
assertion that parents of children at schools running Bible-in-Schools programmes may be 
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assumed to be in a state of “collective agreement” or participating in a shared “community 
belief”.  
The neoliberal imperative of parental choice, implicit in the remarks of these representatives 
of the Ministry and the NZEI, effectively served to disqualify the right of parents and their 
children to freedom of religions and beliefs or to a secular education in New Zealand primary 
schools. The adoption of a special religious character implied that religion was no longer 
“outside” the curriculum when the school is “closed”, but was intrinsic to the school itself and 
therefore institutionally endorsed. The prioritisation of choice over diversity regarding religion 
in school, in a context where the CEC was already the main provider, effectively reproduced 
the status quo of BiS, but simultaneously reconstituted confessional Christian instruction as 
culturally responsive and progressive. As I have shown above, this positioning was not based 
on analysis of the BiS programme but on instrumental and governmental imperatives. 
Conclusion 
My research indicates that the accommodation of confessional religious instruction in secular 
state schools had profound implications for the protection of diversity in New Zealand. The 
normalisation of one form of religious belief in secular state primary schools served to mark as 
“different” those children whose family beliefs precluded attendance, with potential 
consequences for social inclusion. Coercive social imperatives and limitations on information 
and consultation effectively constrained the rights of parents to withdraw their children or to 
complain about the programme. And when large numbers of a school community did 
withdraw from this part of the school week, the school’s efforts to promote the Curriculum 
principles of inclusion and cultural diversity, and the Curriculum value of equity, were 
significantly undermined.  
There appeared to be two forms of governmentality in operation through the implementation 
of BiS. Two different sets of aims were accomplished through the same set of disciplinary 
techniques which ensured that, where a school ran the programme, most of the children 
would attend. These techniques, as described above, included: holding the lessons during 
school hours; redescribing the programme in secular terms; restricting consultation with 
parents; restricting the information given to parents; allowing parents to believe that the 
programme had educational approval; and effecting significant disincentives to opting out and 
making complaints. On the state level what appears to have been intended, through the 
governmental reproduction of BiS, was the promotion of “good values”: the constitution of 
young people as compliant, productive subjects who adhered to a secular liberal worldview, in 
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which religion was confined to the uncontroversial role of personal wellbeing and value 
enculturation, and did not impact on the wider economic interests of the nation state. In this 
way, BiS appeared to have been co-opted into a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality within 
New Zealand’s education system. However, the authoritarian secular rationalist constraints on 
accountability, described above, facilitated an additional form of governmentality through the 
CEC. This organisation was able to employ precisely the same disciplinary techniques, in 
apparent collusion with the education establishment, with the evident intention of 
constituting young people as Christian subjects who had a relationship with God, who 
believed in the Bible and who knew that Jesus was amazing. In the Catholic schools visited, the 
Catholic Christian governmentality in operation was made explicit to parents and was 
undertaken with their express permission. In contrast, the disciplinary techniques employed 
within the secular state schools with BiS were formulated precisely to obfuscate parents’ 
understanding of the nature of the programme, on the assumption that attendance was in 
their child’s best interests. For Foucault, such a form of governmentality is illiberal and 
oppressive since there is no means for either parents or children to critique or resist it.57 In 
Galston’s terms, the presumptive validity of BiS as a general school programme endowed 
Christianity with the status of unofficial establishment in these state schools. For Galston this 
signals a coercive and intolerant form of governmentality, inimical to the protection of 
diversity intrinsic to the flourishing of the liberal state. Both forms of governmentality 
identified sought to position education in religions and beliefs as unimportant and 
unnecessary, and to position critical approaches to teaching about religion and culture as 
controversial and regressive. In Chapter Seven I discuss the discursive imperatives which 
contributed to these findings.
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Chapter Seven: Disqualification and Redescription of Religions and 
Beliefs 
Introduction 
 I won’t tell you that you are wrong. Just don’t bring it up: Let’s talk about 
something else. 
Hon Bill English MP, 20051 
Bill English’s statement describing New Zealander’s attitudes to religious diversity reflects 
some of the major constraints identified in my data on teaching about religion in schools. In 
Appendix 4, I have provided an outline of the key constraints operating on case study schools 
and key stakeholders. I show, in this chapter, the ways in which my data evidenced both 
disqualification and redescription of religion in the primary school context. In Part One, I 
demonstrate the ways in which the “don’t bring it up” approach was discursively maintained 
to exclude conceptual knowledge of religions and beliefs from all the primary schools visited. 
In Part Two, I show how the “let’s talk about something else” approach facilitated a 
redescription of religion in terms amenable to a secular (neo)-liberal form of governmentality. 
Part One: “Just Don’t Bring It Up”—Disqualification of Education about Religion 
Conservative Christian Disqualification of “Other” Religions and Beliefs 
The Catholic primary schools in the study did not consider it their responsibility to teach about 
other faiths. Neither their curriculum documents nor school charters made mention of other 
religions. Carol, the director of religious studies (DRS) at St Margaret’s School in Auckland, 
would have been pleased to discuss other religions with years 5 and 6 but, as she stated: “It 
isn't set out for us anywhere to talk about that.” Both principals explained that the secondary 
school curriculum dealt with other religions, and they appeared to rely on conservative 
Christian discursive imperatives to defend their right to instruct primary children from all 
backgrounds in the Catholic faith. As Dee, the DRS at St Joseph’s, explained:  
I think that if we try to do that here, during the juniors, that would just be 
very confusing. Because the mystery of God is sometimes confusing for 
them at the best of times, let alone try to introduce someone else's faith 
values. 
The positioning of other religious viewpoints as confusing and harmful to young children was 
common among interviewees in the Catholic schools but also in state schools, as I discuss 
below. Such positioning inhered within the conservative Christian discourse.2 
                                                          
1
 See above, page 1. 
2
 See above, Table 9 on page 67 and Table 12 on page 131. 
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Neil Laurenson, at the Catholic Schools Office, confirmed that a religions unit was commonly 
taught in Year 12, in Catholic schools. His description of this teaching appeared to reflect 
liberal Christian discursive imperatives, highlighting similarities and differences between 
religions in comparison to the Catholic faith. Teaching about religions at primary level was not 
prohibited, he said, but: “It's not part of the curriculum [. . .]. I personally think it's better left 
until later, unless it happens to come up.” While cultural festivals, such as Diwali, might be 
recognised at primary level, this would not include teaching about religious beliefs. A policy of 
“inculturation”—teaching about cultural difference and diversity through the lens of the 
Catholic faith—was in operation.3 This was most evident in the treatment of Māori spirituality. 
While the children’s workbooks contained Māori language headings, use the word whanau for 
family and displayed a koru motif throughout, this was used entirely in support of a Catholic 
worldview. Principals and teachers in both schools described teaching about diversity within 
the Catholic faith, rather than beyond it. As June, principal at St Margaret’s, stated: 
The children will do their prayers sometimes in church in their own 
languages . . . um so, whenever we can, we will include “How is the faith 
celebrated in other countries?” and then you can also, a little bit, do “Now 
what would you do?” [. . .]. You can do a lot about tolerance, but you don't 
do a great deal about other major faiths, religions or what they do, because 
of the way that they come to the schools and they sign on the enrolment 
application, that they agree with their child’s participation in the school’s 
religious education programme and the religious life of the school. 
June’s focus on uninformed tolerance was notable, signalling the liberalising imperatives of 
the diversity and authoritarian liberal discourses in her Auckland school, but the dominance of 
the conservative Christian discursive imperative was most evident. While both schools’ 
charters mentioned promoting and learning about cultural diversity, the dominant 
conservative Christian discourse—supported by the institutional power of the Bishops’ 
Religious Education Programme in these schools—ensured that teaching about religion would 
be of a confessional Christian nature. 
Bob, principal at St Joseph’s school, identified the Bishops’ Curriculum as a material constraint 
on teaching about other faiths: 
[The]Bishops of New Zealand direct this school to teach the programme 
that they have designed and resourced. And that's what we must do as 
part of our programme, first and foremost. 
Is there any flexibility within that? Can you adapt things? 
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We've got to be careful about . . . because when people are employed 
within a Catholic school, we must be seen to not have interests which are 
in conflict with the Catholic Church. Otherwise we end up in reasonably 
serious trouble because you've got, I don't know what to call this . . . um 
“freethinking” that may work against the teachings of the church. 
Teaching about alternative worldviews was here positioned as a potential threat to the work 
of the school in promoting the Catholic faith. However, children of other faiths were perceived 
to be “free” to pursue their own beliefs as Carol the DRS at St Margaret’s School described: 
 We've got a little boy that wears the turban. And it's absolutely . . . We're 
not saying, “Don't”. You know? We're not saying that he has to not be a 
Muslim, or not show that he's a Muslim. So, in that sense, there is a 
freedom there.  
And June, the principal, talking about the same child, agreed: 
 Um, our Hindu family are Punjabis and all their children have come here. 
And the little boy [. . .] he's got his little wee turban on. So we don't adapt 
our programme, but we include them in the things, by saying for example, 
this is why . . . the significance . . . We acknowledge the significance but we 
do not teach about it. 
From a critical liberal perspective, the respect that these educationalists intended to 
demonstrate for the freedom of religious belief of this child was undermined by the fact that 
they have not recognised that he was a Sikh. There was, in fact, evidence that enculturation 
into Catholic beliefs and practices was non-negotiable for children of other faiths. At St 
Joseph’s school, a “devout” Muslim family enrolled their daughter, who had now been 
baptised a Catholic, as DRS Dee explained: 
Is there any problem around following the [Catholic] education curriculum 
with that [Muslim] child? 
No. We had a discussion with [the father] . . . um . . . before his older child 
was enrolled and just discussed what his needs were for her and we set out 
what our expectations were and [. . .] it might have been a bit different if 
there was a Muslim church that he goes to [. . .]. Because there isn't a 
church for him, for his own religion, here and so he just joins ours. It made 
it a lot easier. 
Yes, and he has no objection to her attending mass and everything? 
No. No, and she has actually been baptised a Catholic, so she is being 
brought up with the Catholic upbringing.4 
Neil Laurenson insisted that the conversion of non-Catholics was not the intention of Catholic 
education: 
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 The DRS at St Joseph’s appears to be unaware of the nomenclature for a Muslim place of worship. 
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It's not our aim to proselytise, so it's not our aim to convert children, but it 
is . . . but they are . . . um, they do follow the same teachings. If children 
later on decide that they want to convert to, um, Catholicism, well that's 
their own choice, but it'll never be forced on them. 
From a critical liberal perspective, the absence of epistemic humility and the lack of 
opportunity to develop judgmental rationality within the Catholic religious education 
curriculum, combined with an unwillingness to allow parents of different faiths to withdraw 
their children from religious observances, undermined the assertion that freedom of religious 
belief was protected in Catholic schools. The absence of education in alternative worldviews 
did not promote judgemental or social rationality, or protect diversity. The disciplinary 
techniques of omission of curriculum content, inculturation of other cultures with a Catholic 
worldview, and uncritical enculturation of children into the Catholic faith signalled an illiberal 
form of governmentality in operation in the schools visited. 
A strong conservative Christian discourse was also in operation within some of the state 
schools. This discourse constructed education in religions and beliefs as confessional and 
therefore harmful to the promotion of Christian faith and values endorsed by the school. 
Despite repeated attempts to describe the kind of informative, rather than formational, 
education about religions and beliefs that I was interested in, most interviewees conflated the 
two and disqualified them both from the secular curriculum lest impressionable children 
should be inadvertently influenced. 
Marie, a principal at Kakariki School in Auckland, recognised that the children in her school 
were not learning about other religions, and justified this position with an argument which 
would inhere within a conservative Christian discourse: 
I personally don't, because I am a Christian and I wouldn't want my children 
being taught other values and . . . of other religions, until they were . . . I'd 
rather teach them when they were younger—and then, when they're 
older, they're hearing the different things, that's fine. 
This view was repeated by Grace, the deputy principal at Takahe school, in Southland: “I 
wouldn't want my child being taught about Hinduism . . . I wouldn't.” And similarly, teacher 
Fiona at Kakapo School in Auckland was very clear on this point: 
[W]ould I want my children to learn about Buddhism? 




No. Not particularly. As adults, I'd be . . . happy's the wrong word, but . . . if 
as adults they wanted to learn about that faith, that would be for them to 
make that decision. 
 Wayne, the BiS coordinator at Kereru school, explicitly warned against exposure of children to 
other religions, in line with an evangelising Christian discourse: 
When we look at other religions: Islam, Hinduism, Sheikhs [sic] etc. have 
come in and we find that . . . they're not pro-children, pro-family as . . . in 
the same way that Jesus is. And I . . . personally, I feel we have to be very 
careful as to what we expose our children to. It's not that I'm afraid to 
expose them to it. It's just that I feel there's got to be caution there. 
The assumption that, in order to teach about other religions, volunteers from different 
religious communities would need to be found was evident in all three regions. This was 
frequently raised as a further objection to education in religions and beliefs, exemplified here 
by Wendy, a teacher at Takahe school in Southland: 
How would they get all the people in to actually teach it? With what 
they're believing in? Because it's becoming so diversified. . . . How would 
they? [. . .] How do you monitor what is being taught? 
Within the conservative Christian discourse, it was appropriate for voluntary Christian 
religious instruction to be accommodated into the school day, but not for children to learn 
about other religious beliefs. Jane, a parent and teacher aide at Takahe School, evidenced a 
preference for formational, over conceptual, knowledge of religion: 
I think—because the interesting thing is that you said about the teachers 
teaching the . . . all the different cultures—and my first thought was: “Well, 
that's all just head-knowledge; there's no heart-knowledge in that.”  
The additional argument was made, frequently at the Catholic Schools, by David Mulholland at 
the CEC and by Wayne at Kereru School, that children need to be taught to operate within one 
faith before they can decide whether to accept or reject it, and should not, therefore, be 
exposed to other faiths at primary school. 
The conservative Christian discourse appeared to resist all efforts to reconstruct religious 
teaching as non-confessional education about religions, in the interview data. Instead it 
continually re-endorsed and reproduced confessional religious instruction in primary schools. 
The disciplinary techniques of omission of religions and beliefs from the curriculum, and 
redescription of such teaching as harmful and indoctrinatory—as presumptively invalid—are 
constitutive of a conservative Christian form of governmentality. 
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Authoritarian Secular Rationalist Disqualification of Education about Religions and 
Beliefs  
Concurrently, a dominant authoritarian secular rationalist construction of the secular 
curriculum was evident in the secular schools in all three areas, and in key stakeholder 
interviews at the Ministry and NZEI. Although I was at pains to make clear, in interview, that I 
wanted to discuss participants’ views on teaching about diverse religions within the 
curriculum, a frequent response was to conflate this with confessional religious instruction 
and to state that teaching religion was not allowed in state schools. I was told that it was not 
the responsibility of schools, that it was not part of the curriculum and that children should be 
protected from indoctrination. Many interviewees including principals, teachers and parents 
appeared to be unable to conceive of a classroom teacher planning and teaching lessons 
about religion. It was evident that the difference between religious instruction and religious 
education had been made clear neither during initial teacher training nor ongoing professional 
development for teachers. For most, like Frank with whom this data report began in Chapter 
Six, the distinction had never crossed their minds.  
Religious studies professor Paul Morris believed this phenomenon was widespread and 
certainly had hindered his attempts, at the time of the last national curriculum review, to 
persuade those involved that religion should be a part of primary and secondary education: 
The legal adviser within the Ministry, [. . .] the meeting I had with [name of 
person] was amazing, in that their interpretation of the Education Act was 
that no school could teach religion. And this was the top legal adviser for 
the Ministry of Education. 
When you say no school could teach religion, is that religious instruction? 
It was absolutely adamant: they weren't aware of the distinction.  
Paul Morris also described a “most fruitless” meeting with Education CEO Anne Sewell, in 
which “she was absolutely adamant that the advice she had received was to leave religion 
alone”. 
Once again, the 1912 advice to the Ministry: “Don’t touch it!” appeared to be informing 
Ministerial policy. But this time the advice was being applied not only to BiS, but to a broader 
treatment of religion in the curriculum: religious instruction and religious education were 
conflated and jointly disqualified. Sonia Glogowski, at the Ministry of Education, confirmed the 




I think there was potentially [. . .] more risk by putting the word “religion” 
in the curriculum than using words like values and ethics and um, I don't 
think even morals is used in there, for that very reason. 
Right. So it's a deliberate choice? 
Yes. Just because I think it can actually conjure up quite a narrow 
interpretation, maybe a narrow Christian interpretation. 
Sonia’s understanding appeared to confirm a perceived widespread construction of “religion” 
as pertaining to Christianity, and therefore “religious education” as pertaining to Christian 
religious instruction. The legal advisor to the ministry and the CEO herself, as described by 
Paul Morris, appeared to be operating with a construction of “secular” which meant “nothing 
to do with religion”. Such constructions, when used to disqualify religion from the curriculum, 
inhere within an authoritarian secular rationalist discourse. These constructions were 
prevalent throughout my interview data, as I discuss below. My research indicated that these 
discursive constraints impacted on policy and practice in New Zealand primary schools, 
limiting the content of the curriculum with regard to religion.  
Teaching about Religion Is Illegal 
A number of interviewees indicated that they either thought it was illegal to teach lessons on 
religion in the secular state school curriculum under the Education Act, or were very unsure 
about the legality of doing so. Examples included the principal at Kereru School in Southland; 
the principal and deputy principal at Takahe School, Southland; the DRS at St Joseph’s School, 
Southland; the BiS co-ordinators at both Pukeko School, Dunedin and Korimako School, 
Auckland; the manager of Catholic Education Services and several other parents and teachers 
interviewed across the case study schools. As Janet, a parent at Pukeko School in Dunedin, put 
it: 
You’d have to have a complete change of the curriculum in the state 
system to allow for that, and I think that the naysayers would probably, 
um, put the kibosh on it. 
Martha, a BiS teacher at Korimako School in Auckland, concurred: 
Well I mean it obviously is . . . the syllabus and the curriculum is directed 
from . . . our government . . . um. They can't just suddenly decide it would 
be a nice idea, you know to be nice and kind and friendly, and start 
teaching everyone about else's faith. [. . .] No, that was my understanding, 




The institutional power accrued to the Act of 1964, which legalised religious instruction by 
volunteers “outside” the curriculum, appeared, to a considerable degree, to operate de facto 
to position teaching about religion (in any way) as unlawful “within” the curriculum. Thus, an 
authoritarian secular rationalist construction of secular education was embedded in the 
legislature and informed educational practice as Sarah, BiS coordinator at Pukeko School, 
exemplified: 
What’s your understanding about teaching world religions within the 
curriculum? 
There is no basis for that, within the Education Act, as far as I am aware.  
This perceived illegality operated as a material constraint on religious education through a 
pursuant lack of curriculum guidelines, teacher training, professional development, teaching 
resources and teacher subject knowledge. This latter constraint was acknowledged by 
Frances, principal at Pukeko School: “[W]e don’t have that kind of grounding ourselves as 
educators,” and by Barbara, principal at Kakapo School:  
There's been this er . . . er . . . Islam family. Who're quite devout, you know, 
and that's a lot of learning for us, because it’s the first time we’ve had such 
a . . . a devout family come in to the school, I mean, you know, [N] goes out 
on Friday afternoon, for prayer, if he wants to, with Dad. You know, so . . . 
that's been a lot of learning for us, because we didn't know. So there's a bit 
of ignorance as well. 5 
Both Barbara and Frances made the point that, as far as they were concerned, there was no 
curriculum requirement to teach about religion and since ERO neither inspected nor reported 
on this area it was unlikely to be a priority. In her 16-year career as principal, Penny, at Kereru 
School, had never thought of religion as important enough to include in school topics and 
enquiries: 
I would say generally through my leadership, this school and other schools, 
it has not . . . the religious aspect has not been well covered. And I guess it 
is because . . . um a lack of thought around the importance of that. 
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 Sonia Glogowski at the Ministry, and numerous other interviewees, restated the problem of teacher 
subject knowledge. It was common for educationalists interviewed, even in senior leadership roles, to 
evidence difficulty in talking about religions and beliefs due to a lack of familiarity with the vocabulary 
of religion. A low level of religious literacy signalled by confusion of terms (e.g. Muslim/Islam, 
Hindu/Hindi) and religious practices were in evidence. At Takahe School in Southland, the principal 
displayed not just a lack of knowledge but a measure of disrespect for religious difference: “So we have 
one wee lass here now who could be, don't know whether she's Muslim or Hindu. I haven't seen the 
single smallpock anyway (L).” The authoritarian secular rationalist discursive constraint appeared to 
preclude the recording of religious affiliation of children’s families on enrolment.  
232 
 
Religious Education as Indoctrination 
In every school visited the risk of indoctrination, or unduly influencing the beliefs of children, 
was given as a reason for extreme caution around the subject of religion in secular state 
schools. Frances, principal at Pukeko School in Dunedin, was explicit on this point: 
The temptation would be to actually um . . . inadvertently I’m sure, but . . . 
put . . . values and judgements in place, which wouldn’t be intended, I’m 
sure, but would be there. The hidden curriculum can be powerful. 
The fear of inadvertently influencing children was given as a reason for only touching briefly 
and lightly on matters of religion, and usually only if the children themselves brought the 
subject up. Rosalind, a teacher at Pukeko School, expressed the fear that unless teachers 
taught about religion in a very “superficial” way there was a risk of “people trying to convert 
people in class”. Parent and ex-teacher Valerie, at Kakapo School in Auckland, was one of 
several who thought this problem was resolved by the volunteer system: 
 It's a really fine line. And if you're getting children questioning you . . . how 
easy is it to cross that line and not really realise that you have? And that's 
where I wonder if it's asking too much of the classroom teacher. 
Chris, a parent at Kereru School in Southland, where the principal and a teacher interviewed 
also urged caution around teaching about religious matters, clearly conflated religious 
education with religious instruction, constructing this as a potential source of indoctrination 
and conflict with parents, such teaching being best left to volunteers: 
How about if, in the classroom, they wanted to explain the Christmas story 
or the Easter story: are the class teachers allowed to do that, do you think? 
What's your understanding? 
Um—I would say that they're probably not because that would be . . . um, 
putting their personal beliefs on the children. But I think if there was a 
child-led discussion, that they could carry on with that. But I think that's 
why the outside organisation comes in because . . . to stop that [. . .]. I 
suppose it can get a bit dodgy with teachers . . . um, well their viewpoints 
. . . not being forced on the children . . . but then they can get in conflict 
with parents and things of “Why are you saying this to my children?” and 
yeah. 
Teacher Fiona, at Kakapo School in Auckland, felt highly constrained in what she could teach 
the children about Christian festivals: teaching about religion, here conflated with religious 
instruction, just wasn’t her responsibility: 
I will go as far as saying that Easter is about Jesus, and Jesus dying on the 
cross, and that's why we have hot cross buns. But I'm just very careful not 
to go further than that. Because I know that . . . that I don't have the 
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mandate to do that. [. . .] So I don't actually think it's my role. I think it's 
part of my life. It's who I am. But I don't think it's part of my job.  
 Beverly, principal at Korimako School, informed me that religion was “included in day to day 
things that come up occasionally”, but resisted the suggestion of providing further 
information within the curriculum, through an authoritarian secular rationalist discourse 
which constructed information about religion as religious instruction: 
Do you think children are getting enough information [about religion], 
would you say? 
I personally believe that I don't have a right to answer that question 
because I personally believe that it is up to the family to make that decision 
[. . .]. I don't feel that I ever have a right to put my thinking onto someone 
else. 
Ian Leckie, at the NZEI, thought schools could deal with religious matters in curriculum time, 
but again urged caution about overstepping the line and highlighting the “de-emphasis” on 
religion within the curriculum:  
In the New Zealand context, teachers just have to be careful where it's . . . 
it's fine as part of our work and our discussions [. . .] but if there's a 
predominance of religion now being reflected in my classroom, um, you 
know that I am potentially overstepping what we would say would be not 
recognising the balance, the place and the emphasis or the de-emphasis 
really that religion has, as part of New Zealand's Curriculum. Right? It's not 
there as an explicit part and it's not there as a focus. So how it is included 
in the various elements, though, is where schools do tread a fairly careful 
line and try not to overstep it. 
There was a real sense—as a result of the widespread conflation of religious education and 
religious instruction—of trepidation regarding the handling of religious matters. Education 
concerning religion was frequently conceived as beyond the remit of the school or Ministry 
and positioned as the responsibility of parents, volunteers and boards of trustees and the 
children themselves. As a curriculum area it was presumptively invalid. 
The authoritarian secular rationalist discourse resisted all attempts to reconstruct religion in 
school as education about religions and beliefs. It continually re-positioned the teaching of 
religion as confessional religious instruction, outside the curriculum. The effect of this, I 
contend, has been to immunise BiS from educational discursive critique and influence and—
ironically—to reproduce confessional religious instruction in New Zealand schools. But what, 
in Foucaultian terms, is accomplished by this disqualification? Positioning religion as “beyond 
the curriculum” enabled the state to reconstruct religion firstly as BiS, then to redescribe it as 
harmless liberal values teaching which was beyond critique. Thus depoliticised, religion posed 
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no threat to the interests of the nation state and did not interfere with the constitution of 
young people as neoliberal subjects or autonomous choosers. In this way the reproduction of 
BiS and concurrent disqualification of education in religions and beliefs may be seen as 
disciplinary techniques in line with a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality. This form of 
governmentality drew on additional educational discourses to endorse confessional 
instruction and disqualify education in religions and beliefs. 
Knowledge Age Destabilisation of Religious Knowledge 
A newly prevalent knowledge age discourse, influencing curriculum policy and design, was 
evident in interviews with Sonia Glogowski at the Ministry, with Frank and Grace, the principal 
and deputy principal at Takahe School, with Bob, principal of St Joseph’s School, Penny the 
principal at Kereru School and with Barbara, the principal at Kakapo School.  
Within this discourse, conceptual knowledge of different religions was constructed as less 
important than adopting the key competencies and dispositions of the New Zealand 
curriculum. Barbara at Kakapo School explained: 
I think the New Zealand Curriculum very much . . . holds . . . the knowledge 
explosion, and the whole . . . aspect of globalisation we all recognise that 
our kids need to be aware of [. . .]. I think we all struggle with fitting things 
in and it's about, I mean, of course we know there's so much knowledge 
out there we can't possibly teach it all, which is why [we have our] 
dispositions and we talk about our “KS Learner” [Kakapo School Learner] 
based around our competencies. [. . .] So the key competencies in the 
Curriculum—we've adopted it. All about that “awareness, empowering, 
connectedness” because that's where that comes through, and so you're 
equipped for learning, and those are the core things. 
For Barbara, teaching dispositions and competencies was positioned as a pragmatic solution 
to the overloaded curriculum. Children needed to be taught the skills to pursue their own 
enquiries rather than be taught all the conceptual knowledge that was available. For Frank, 
Grace and Sonia conceptual knowledge itself was destabilised and positioned as unimportant 
in comparison to skills and competencies. For Frank and Grace, knowledge had to serve a 
purpose. As Frank stated bluntly: “[T]he point of learning is 'What difference are you going to 
make with it?’ It's not enough just to know stuff to know stuff.” And Grace elaborated: 
I guess really this philosophy, ties in with our school-wide philosophy, our 
enquiry philosophy which is you never do anything for the sake of doing it. 
It's always “just-in-time” learning so you don't teach it for the sake of 
teaching it. I wouldn't learn how to scuba-dive, because what's the point? 
I'm not going to scuba-dive. You know, why would I teach somebody how 
to scuba-dive? So you take something, and you teach it when the kids are 
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ready to use it [. . .]. It's not just taking something and teaching it, and 
that's the end of it . . . There’s no action . . . there has to be that action. 
The implication of this discourse was that teaching about religion served no immediate 
purpose and was, like teaching about scuba diving, pointless or presumptively invalid. For 
Grace, the Takahe School values programme, combined with the school enquiry philosophy, 
equipped children with the values, dispositions and skills that they needed in life. These were 
clearly prioritised over conceptual knowledge within the curriculum. 
The knowledge age discourse sometimes combined with post-colonialist and social action 
liberal discursive imperatives within which curriculum content may be defined as useful only if 
constructed around the children’s own context and experiences, relevant to and valuing their 
cultural knowledge-base. Such discursive imperatives made it possible for two principals, in 
religiously homogeneous Southland, to position knowledge of other religions as unimportant. 
Frank, at Takahe school, implied such teaching would be more relevant in Auckland than 
Southland. Bob, principal at St Joseph’s School, was quite clear that curriculum content should 
be appropriate to the context of the school: 
This is why New Zealand Curriculum has been given such wide parameters 
for the choice of its topics. Because you look at the group that you're with. 
Now teaching about Diwali, here in [Southerton] with these children, could 
be interesting . . . but it is not number one on the curriculum. 
And Penny, at Kereru School, agreed that the material lack of cultural and religious diversity in 
the area made it hard for her to justify as a curriculum topic within educational discursive 
constraints, although she thought such teaching would be of value: 
But it's difficult to come across those people, because as you say, there's 
not a lot out in the community [. . .]. It is a challenge. And real contexts as 
well. You sort of don't want to be studying “the different people”. You 
need to have a reason to be interacting with those people.  
The discursive imperatives identified by Penny—the requirement to study “real contexts”, and 
to avoid stereotyping and essentialising “the different people”—inhered within the post-
colonialist discourse. Equally the “need to have a reason” inhered within a knowledge age 
discourse within which knowledge cannot be acquired for its own sake, but must serve some 
immediate purpose. These imperatives, as Penny conceded, were not easily satisfied in an 
area where there was little religious diversity in evidence. They effectively served to reinforce 
a status quo where religions and beliefs were disqualified from the curriculum.  
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In Young’s terms, an inadequate social theory of conceptual knowledge within the curriculum 
allowed utilitarian governmental goals to dictate curriculum content, denying young people 
powerful knowledge of religions and beliefs. In Galston’s terms an inadequate conception of 
liberal education resulted in a failure to recognise the social importance of teaching about 
alternative worldviews for children’s developing social rationality.  
At the Ministry, Sonia Glogowski appeared to invoke post-colonial and knowledge age 
imperatives, to match learning to the cultural and religious knowledge-base, in a way which 
reproduced confessional religious instruction in preference to introducing education in 
religions and beliefs. Conflating religious instruction and religious education, she asserted that 
teaching about religion was a matter neither for the curriculum, nor the Ministry, but for 
individual school communities: 
So I think rather than mandating um “You must do this or you must do that 
in the curriculum,” I think what we're trying to encourage schools to do is 
to be responsive to the community which um their students come from. 
And if I think of some of our secondary schools that do have prayer rooms 
and things like that. [. . .] And no matter how much you can prescribe or 
how much you don't prescribe, curriculum is always interpreted and it's 
always interpreted by the person who is in the classroom with the kids, it's 
always interpreted by the school as a whole [. . .]. And um I would imagine 
for some teachers themselves, they will experience conflicts, um in terms 
of their own worldviews, whether they're religious or not religious, there's 
the human element there. So I guess in terms of the Ministry we, you 
know, we try to be as permissive as possible so that, you know, those 
conversations with communities and teachers and staff can happen at that 
level. Rather than us coming in and saying, “This is how you do it.” 
Sonia insisted that it would be inappropriate for the Ministry to prescribe content concerning 
religious beliefs, as the curriculum should reflect the wishes and context of the community—
by implication—through voluntary religious instruction. This positioning inhered within: a 
conservative Christian discourse in which children should receive religious instruction 
consistent with their family backgrounds or the religious majority; an authoritarian secular 
rationalist discourse which suggests teachers are incapable of being objective in their 
treatment of other faiths; post-colonial and knowledge-age discourses in which existing 
contextual and experiential knowledge are substituted for conceptual knowledge; and a 
neoliberal discourse within which schools reflect community beliefs and are self-managed by 
boards of trustees with limited Ministry involvement. Sonia strongly resisted my suggestion 
that children should be entitled to information about religions as part of their education and 
that this should not be dependent on the proclivities of principals and boards of trustees. She 
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disqualified this view as a “value judgement”. For this Ministry representative, such a 
curriculum would be inconceivable. 
But from a critical realist perspective, Sonia appeared to position BiS as an appropriately 
“responsive” approach to education in matters of religion, further imbuing it with institutional 
power. In so doing she gave educational validation to reproduction of the “community” 
religious knowledge base, in preference to the opportunity to expand children’s conceptual 
knowledge development in religions and beliefs. An “over-socialised curriculum”, which failed 
to provide learning opportunities beyond the social context of the child, appeared to be the 
result.6 By positioning confessional approaches as progressive and child-centred, the Ministry 
gave social and educational legitimacy to a construction of religion which was private, 
personal, and not a matter for critique or debate consonant with a secular (neo)-liberal 
governmentality. But in so doing, it also imbued conservative and evangelising Christian 
religious instruction with equal legitimacy. By such means, confessional instruction appeared 
to be reproduced in New Zealand schools while children were denied the powerful conceptual 
knowledge of religion. My research suggests that the unwillingness of the Ministry to engage 
with matters of religion, and the Ministry’s unwarranted assumption of religious consensus in 
state schools, had consequences for both the protection of families’ rights to freedom of 
religions and beliefs, the development of social and judgemental rationality of young people 
and for the protection of diversity within the nation state. 
Sonia sought to further destabilise conceptual knowledge of religion. Her arguments reflected 
the imperatives of the post-structural, knowledge age and authoritarian liberal discourses. 
Prioritising the disposition of tolerance over knowledge of religion, the latter being 
constructed as a matter of personal perspective, she again positioned religious education as 
an inappropriate subject for study. It is worth quoting her reasoning process at length: 
It's about where do you get that knowledge from? Whose um 
interpretation of that religion are you using? [. . .] What would [the 
Ministry] be using as our sources of information? And I think, maybe it is a 
default position, but I think we're much more confident in being able to 
talk about tolerance for different beliefs, rather than making active 
statements about: “This person believes this, in this way.” Because that is 
very, very um . . . well you have individual interpretation as well. [. . .] If 
you're wanting to engage with another individual who has a different belief 
system . . . um because of individual differences around practices it's far 
better to engage with a person that you're wanting to find out about and 
have those skills to do that, rather than having a whole lot of assumptions 
                                                          
6
 See above, pages 122 and 162. 
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about: “Well, you’re Muslim, therefore you do this, this, this and this,” 
because that carries risks as well, in the same way that cultural 
stereotyping carries risk. So in some ways our position is more about the 
skills and dispositions that allow people to better engage with diverse 
others rather than having prescriptive sets of knowledge that people need 
to have. 
Sonia appeared to assume that in order to prescribe a religious education curriculum the 
Ministry would need to endorse one particular version of truth in each tradition. It could not 
do this, she said, because there was no way of knowing which religious perspective was true. 
Demonstrating a post-structuralist and post-colonial concern to avoid misrepresenting or 
essentialising religious belief, Sonia appeared to deny the possibility of conceptual knowledge 
of religion and the academic discipline of religious studies upon which it is based. From a 
critical realist perspective, Sonia appeared to fall prey to the epistemic fallacy. She conflated 
epistemic relativism with ontological relativism, finding no grounds to judge between sources 
of religious knowledge, conflating experiential and conceptual knowledge, and disqualifying 
them all as equally unreliable. A post-structuralist “ethical practice of undecidability”, applied 
to education policy, here served to maintain the status quo.7 In place of conceptual knowledge 
of religion, the dispositions of unreflective cultural and religious relativism and uninformed 
tolerance were arguably promoted. The knowledge age discourse therefore legitimised both 
confessional Christian instruction and a secular (neo)-liberal worldview. When incorporated 
into “liberal and progressive” educational policy, post-modernist arguments appear to 
become immune from critique. The diversity discourse adopted similar positioning as it 
excised Christian cultural references from curriculum and school life and promoted “inclusion” 
by avoiding the potentially divisive subject of religion. 
Diversity Discourse: Religion as Socially Inappropriate 
Inclusion, integration, tolerance and conflict avoidance are discursive imperatives which 
inhere within the diversity discourse. While cultural differences may be celebrated, discussion 
of religions and beliefs—positioned either as a potential source of unresolveable conflict or as 
an emblem of Christian majoritarianism—is conceived as embarrassing and socially 
inappropriate.  
Disqualification of Majority Christian Culture 
A number of interviewees including David Mulholland at the CEC, Neil Laurenson at the 
Catholic Schools office, June the principal at St Margaret’s School, teacher Annette at Kereru 
School and teacher Rosalind at Pukeko School, observed that it was now perceived to be more 
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 Lather, “Getting Lost”, 227. See above, page 32. 
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socially acceptable in New Zealand schools and wider society to discuss and accommodate 
minority religious festivals than those associated with Christianity. A discursive constraint 
appeared to be in operation within which, as Rosalind, at Pukeko School pointed out: “We can 
discuss other people but we can’t discuss Jesus.”8 For David Mulholland the outworking of this 
in school policy might even amount to discrimination against Christians: 
Well, they've put a room aside for the Muslims in a school—but they won't 
provide a chapel for the Christians. You know we could say that we're 
discriminated against, if you wanted to. I look for an even playing field. 
Reflecting a diversity discourse, Barbara, the principal at Kakapo School in Auckland, was clear 
that, in such a diverse school, promoting the values and culture of one religion over another in 
a Bible-in-schools class would be inappropriate.9 The imperative to promote inclusion and 
affirm an integrationist rather than assimilationist approach to pluralism, consonant with a 
diversity discourse, appeared to produce a disqualification of majority culture and religion 
here. This manifested itself not only in the absence of BiS, but through a strategic removal of 
references to Christian festivals and culture in the life of the school. While Chinese New Year 
and Diwali were recognised and celebrated, references to Christian festivals appeared to have 
been expunged from school life. Within this discursive constraint, Christian culture and 
religion were constructed as majoritarian, exclusive and even offensive in a secular plural 
context. There was a real sense of grievance, in interviews with parents Valerie and Sue and 
teacher Fiona, that New Zealand’s Christian heritage was being denied to children at the 
school. As Fiona described it: 
The general feeling at Christmas time is “But what about the other, what 
about the other cultures?” So we sing Christmas songs, as opposed to 
Christmas carols, because “What about the other cultures which don't get 
a look in?” And I always want to go “Well actually, just a second . . . let's 
look at that word . . . Christmas. There actually would be no Christmas 
without Christ . . .” Actually, “Away in a Manger” wouldn't be a bad thing. 
At least. 
 Barbara, the principal, explained her justification for changing the name of the school 
Christmas (Summer) Party: 
Initially it was about . . . er it was a Christmas end of year party, but I . . . 
didn't want to exclude . . . different groups because it wasn't talked about 
in terms of a Christmas get-together, so we went with a . . . very . . . non . . . 
I don't know what the word is . . . a very neutral title because it was about 
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 See below, page 245. 
9
 A view partly reflected in data for the coverage of BiS programmes. See above, Table 2 on page 15. 
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community coming together. Because we felt that, if it had been called a 
Christmas party, then our Chinese Hindus would've not necessarily come. 
And Barbara described how it had become “very un-P.C” to teach children about Easter and 
Christmas, because it might cause offence to those of other religions, or be perceived as 
majoritarian. The Kakapo School charter was the only one of the secular state schools studied 
to mention the word “religion”. It did so, in the following context, to affirm religion as an 
aspect of identity which should be understood and respected: 
Cultural Diversity: We are intent on valuing and celebrating each person’s 
individuality. We aim to promote a strong sense of pride in one’s own 
cultural identity. We promote an understanding of, and sensitivity towards, 
the cultural, spiritual and religious beliefs of students. We strive to find 
ways to value, respect and champion the diverse groups within the school 
to ensure an inclusive community. 
It was not clear from my research at this school how either pride in cultural identity including 
religious beliefs, or understanding of religious beliefs, could be fostered when references to 
the Christian religion were disqualified from school life and, as discussed below, conceptual 
knowledge about religions and beliefs were constructed as unimportant in comparison with 
the disposition of tolerance.  
Conflict Avoidance and Disqualification of Religions and Beliefs 
The secular schools in both Auckland and Southland appeared to be interpreting the 
requirement to teach about cultural diversity from within a diversity discourse within which 
differences were minimised, diversity was “celebrated” but conflict and controversy were 
avoided. At Korimako School, where one third of the children were Muslim, the whole school 
had recently started a topic on “Celebrating Differences”. Each classroom displayed a topic 





Figure 9: Class Topic Web 1 
 
 
Figure 10: Class Topic Web 2 
As may be seen, the topic webs made no mention of differences in religion or belief. While 
culture and cultural celebrations were included, the word “religion” was notably absent. 
Teacher Anisha explained this phenomenon: 
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We wrote this whole topic together, but like, we didn't talk about the 
religious beliefs. It was um, celebrations; it was clothing; it was food; it was 
living. But . . . I suppose it's a bit of a . . . you know . . . especially in such a 
multi-cultural school . . . Would you be stepping on someone's toes?  
In this instance, the risk of causing offence appeared to operate as a discursive constraint on 
both teacher and children, excluding the subject of religion from the class topic and refocusing 
the conversation onto less controversial aspects of difference. Subject avoidance (Don’t bring 
it up) appeared to operate as a disciplinary technique which served to prevent conflict in the 
classroom. 
Anxiety over causing offence was not unique to Auckland schools. Penny at Kereru School, in 
Southland, insisted that the subject was not deliberately or consciously avoided but, in fact, 
was rarely mentioned because of “sensitivity” around the issue. Another teacher at Kereru 
School, Annette, went further when asked about the likelihood of including teaching about 
religious belief in cultural diversity topics: 
No. I think we're nervous. I think we're nervous to offend people. Those 
conversations uh, we're just nervous, I guess we're politically correct, 
rightly or wrongly, we're nervous to talk about that stuff [. . .]. I don't think 
I am [prohibited], but we never do! [. . .] Because . . . for that reason. It's 
just kind of a taboo thing. It's a bit scary. 
In a rush to avoid potential conflict, the diversity discourse appeared to overlook religious 
difference and redescribe religious diversity as “cultural celebrations”, promoting religious 
relativism and affirming uncontroversial and universal dimensions of community life. A further 
intention of this redescription was to promote tolerance—or uncritical acceptance of 
difference—as a disposition, as Sonia Glogowski affirmed above. This discursive imperative 
may be seen to have operated as a disciplinary technique within a secular (neo)-liberal form of 
governmentality. 
Discursive Prioritisation: “There’s not enough time” 
Additional material constraints mentioned included the lack of energy, resources and time for 
a new curriculum area. This was often attributed to the all-consuming neoliberal curriculum 
imperatives of National Standards, here expressed by Fiona at Kakapo School: 
We feel absolutely crunched. Really crunched. [. . .] I think, “Yet another 
thing that I'm not going to be able to do well, because I can't give it the 
time or energy that I should be able to.” . . . And in the meantime National 
Standards say I must get my “below” readers to this point, by this time. 
There's the move towards um, you know . . . [payment by results]. So 
243 
 
where will I end up focussing? Reading, writing and arithmetic. [. . .] It’s not 
what I signed up for. 
The lack of curriculum time, associated with government priorities, was raised in each of the 
case study schools. Sometimes these priorities were perceived to be coming from parents as 
Barbara, principal at Kakapo School, pointed out: 
All I get is: " You're doing too much sport, because what about the reading, 
writing and maths?" [. . .] Or we did, um, a big Art focus two years ago[on 
Matariki] and we ended up doing a whole school production at the end of 
the year, and I got criticised for the fact that we were doing too much Art. 
[. . .] But they're very. . . they want their kids in the core subjects. 
 A dominant social action liberal curriculum imperative to teach Māori culture was also a focus 
for all the schools, as previously described. These discursive imperatives were driving 
curriculum priorities and effectively disqualifying education in religions and beliefs. From a 
critical liberal perspective, it is not self-evident that young people should be denied 
conceptual knowledge of religion at school. My research demonstrates that current practices 
are discursively maintained and reproduced, and founded on an inadequate social theory of 
religious knowledge in the curriculum. While this subject avoidance was frequently positioned 
as progressive and liberal—preventing the imposition of religious views on children and 
preserving the neutrality of the curriculum—it effectively reproduced a conservative Christian 
status quo and inhibited the potentially emancipatory development of knowledge and 
discernment in matters of religion and belief. Concurrently—and perhaps ironically—a specific 
set of values and beliefs about religion were uncritically promulgated within the curriculum, as 
I discuss in Part Two. 
Part Two: “Let’s Talk about Something Else”—Secular (Neo)-Liberal Redescription 
In Part Two, I aim to demonstrate the ways in which prevailing discursive imperatives served 
to promote a secular (neo)-liberal worldview in the secular state schools visited. Recalling Bill 
English’s description of New Zealanders’ attitude to religion, “Let’s talk about something else”, 
I argue here that the “something else” which was introduced, in place of religious education in 
the curriculum and forming an implicit rather than an explicit curriculum, was a set of 
normative attitudes comprising: an unreflective cultural and religious relativism and 
universalism; the disqualification or liberalising of conservative religious views; an uncritical 
tolerance of and “celebration” of difference; promotion of the construction of 
religion/spirituality as personal, private and “cultural”; uncritical acceptance of neoliberal 
curriculum imperatives and values; and an unexamined promotion of Māori cultural beliefs 
and practices. This secular (neo)-liberal worldview drew variously on secular rationalist, liberal 
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Christian, authoritarian liberal, social action liberal, spiritual secularist, knowledge age and 
neoliberal discourses, as I show below. This worldview was never set out in policy for parents 
to consider, and thus was never subjected to critique or held to account.  
 Liberal Redescription of Religious Difference  
Representatives of the Ministry, the NZEI, school principals and some teachers and parents 
informed me that sufficient opportunities were provided for children to learn about religious 
differences within the New Zealand Curriculum. Examples given were topics such as Festivals, 
Celebrations or Great Leaders. School principals in Auckland described special school events 
where the children’s cultural diversity was celebrated by eating traditional foods and wearing 
traditional clothes. However, it was evident that while all schools taught cultural aspects of 
Diwali, Chinese New Year and Matariki, such as dances and lantern-making, religious beliefs 
and practices were not a focus of these topics. Indeed, I was repeatedly assured that the 
teachers never went into any “depth” in such lessons. As Rosalind, a teacher at Pukeko School 
in Dunedin, explained: “[W]e can celebrate their festivals, [. . .] but only in a very superficial 
way. You certainly wouldn’t get into any strong study.” And Fiona, a teacher at Kakapo School 
in Auckland, agreed: “They know [Diwali is] an Indian festival, but there is a religious 
significance behind that festival. But that's not gone into.”  
 In the secular schools in all areas, it was clear that the aspects of religious difference which 
had curriculum validation were those which were uncontroversial, which pointed towards 
universal human experience (e.g. parties, food and celebrations) rather than 
incommensurable truth claims, and those which gave opportunities to promote Western 
liberal values. This was apparent from school library resources, where few books on religions 
seemed to be available but books on celebrations and festivals were sometimes more 
prevalent.10 The emphasis on “celebration”, rather than understanding of religious difference, 
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 The library at St Margaret’s school contained over 120 books on Christian themes, and over 30 books 
on Māori/Pacific Island culture and mythology, only three books on festivals of other religions were in 
evidence. Similarly at St Joseph’s school there was a wide selection of books on Christian themes and 
Māori culture but only five books pertaining to other religions. Secular school libraries reflected the 
discursive imperatives of the social action liberal discourse and the diversity discourse. While there 
were many books evident on Māori myths and customs, and a wide selection on cultural celebrations of 
different kinds, information books on specific religions and beliefs were far fewer in number. The 
widest selection was found at Kakapo School, in Auckland, where a regular “Celebrations” topic had 
encouraged the librarian to purchase around 60 books on diverse cultural and religious celebrations and 
practices including eight on specific religions. However, the librarian informed me that while the books 
on festival and celebrations were well-used, the books about specific religions were not. This accords 
with interview data at the school suggesting that cultural/religious festivals were covered in class, but 
religious aspects of belief and practice were neglected. In this instance, even though some books were 
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appeared to operate to reproduce an uncritical religious and cultural relativism in which 
differences between, and within, traditions were smoothed over. The “surface level” 
approach elided differences between worldviews in a way which appeared to imply that those 
differences and truth claims were unimportant and perhaps simply a matter of personal or 
family preference. Any notion that the actions of religious adherents may be driven by 
religious imperatives, and informed by profoundly-held convictions about the nature of 
truth/reality, appeared to be absent from the lessons described.  
A thoroughgoing redescription of diverse religious worldviews into a universalised and 
personalised form, consistent with secular (neo)-liberalism, was in evidence. The replacement 
of religion with the apparently less contentious term “culture” in New Zealand Curriculum 
documents—contested by Paul Morris at the time of the curriculum review—is one example 
of this redescription. Interviewees frequently substituted the word “religion” with “culture”, 
as did Beverly, at Korimako School: 
I don't know how you go about letting other people know about the 
different cultures without maybe having programmes in schools when 
children have opportunities to learn about different cultures and teachers 
prepared to talk about other cultures. 
This was the one attempt Beverly made, throughout her interview, to conceptualise teaching 
about religion within the curriculum, and her avoidance of the term was notable. At Pukeko 
School, in Dunedin, a topic on great leaders was of interest. Rosalind did describe teaching 
about some religious differences but her description was filtered through an authoritarian 
liberal discourse and appeared to be in service of the promotion of liberal universalism: 
But we were looking at Gandhi, and [. . .] of course we had to look at the 
caste system, because he believed everyone had God in them . . . and 
everyone was identical—and that was his big thing. And it was just such a 
new thing for the Hindus at the time. And then he tried to bridge that gap 
with the Muslims and the Hindus. And his mother’s religion was Jainism 
which was different again—but very much was his belief in non-violence 
that came through [. . .]. The way to get something done is to be non-
violent. And actually we looked at a lot of people, and the only one I was 
really careful about, and we discussed very briefly, was Jesus. Because I 
thought “Isn’t it funny that we can discuss other people, but we can’t 
discuss Jesus?” [. . .]. Anyway, so I mentioned him, as somebody else that 
talked about non-violence because, of course, he aligned with Gandhi. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
available, discursive constraints appeared to militate against their use. At the other extreme, at Takahe 
school, neither the principal nor I could find a section on religion in the school library at all. 
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It was not possible to establish the degree to which the children investigated the religions 
mentioned by Rosalind, since there was no children’s work available. From her description, 
the teaching goals appeared to be directed towards validating the unifying personal qualities 
and values of Gandhi and Jesus. The endorsement of a liberal worldview, in which the 
similarities between religions were emphasised and liberal democratic values of tolerance and 
non-violence/conflict-avoidance advocated, was evident. Rosalind’s implicit endorsement of 
Gandhi’s universalism arguably disqualified a conservative Hindu worldview. This is consistent 
with the authoritarian liberal discourse and Galston’s autonomy model of liberalism. 
Discursive constraints and imperatives associated with the promotion of inclusion and 
avoidance of controversy served to actively reproduce a secular (neo)-liberal worldview in 
which tolerance, rather than understanding of difference, was advocated. 
Intoleration 
The term intoleration as described by Lundie and Conroy from their research in the United 
Kingdom, discussed above, is equated with a form of enculturation into uncritically tolerant 
attitudes.11 My research indicates that a similar intoleration process, in operation in the New 
Zealand context, was a constituent of a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality in the secular 
state schools visited. 
At Korimako School, Topic Web 1, in Figure 9 above, was to form part of a display on 
celebrating differences. Figure 11, below, indicates that the range of images selected may 
have accentuated the strange and extraordinary, arguably reproducing orientalist pathologies 
and cultural stereotypes. There was no evidence, from Topic Web 1, that the worldviews 
evidenced in the images displayed were going to form part of the classroom discussion on 
differences. 
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Figure 11: Celebrating Differences Display 1 
Equally Topic Web 2, Figure 10, was going to form part of a larger wall display on the topic of 
celebrating differences, shown in Figure 12. The teaching aim was displayed in the centre: 
“WALT [We are learning that]: We are all different but we can still be friends.” This liberal 
maxim was presented as the goal of the topic. It seemed clear that examination of differences 
would be secondary to the promotion of the disposition of tolerance and acceptance of 
difference. In other words, an uninformed and unreflective tolerance of difference was 




Figure 12: Celebrating Differences Display 2 
On another display board at Korimako School, shown in Figure 13, differences were reduced 





Figure 13: Celebrating Differences Display 3 
The following statement, shown bottom-left on the display board above, reinforced the 
secular (neo)-liberal worldview that differences are a matter of personal choice, autonomy or 
individual personality and are therefore not a matter for examination, critique or judgement:  
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We all have unique personalities. Sometimes we have the same ideas and 
opinions and sometimes we don’t agree. We are all the same in some ways 
and different in others. 
The same approach was evident at Kakapo School, where teacher Fiona described her class 
rule or Treaty agreement: 
We do the whole Treaty thing at the beginning of the year [. . .]. What my 
class has said this year is that “We're all different and it's really important 
that we accept that we're all different.” 
And principal Barbara, at Kakapo School, positioned tolerance of difference as the priority for 
her children over religious knowledge which did not need to be “embraced”. The use of this 
word may indicate that Barbara was conflating religious instruction and religious education in 
this instance, and resisting the imposition of religious belief on children: 
So there's that thing about respecting—and I think our children do respect 
the cultural diversity within our things. I don't know whether they need to 
necessarily embrace it [. . .].They just know that : “Yeah that's fine, you're 
blond haired and blue-eyed, and I'm Pacific, I've got dark skin.” And, you 
know, that's what it is. 
Grace, the deputy principal at Takahe School in Southland, was unequivocal on the same 
point: 
How are children to be introduced to the different religious beliefs and 
practices, that actually inform the lives and motivations and decisions of 
other people, if it's not dealt with in the classroom? 
I don't think it's based on religion, though, that's the thing. It's based on 
acceptance of others which brings it back to our values programme. So, if 
you look at diversity again, the foundational . . . I suppose the crux of it is 
. . . acceptance of others. It's not about, “This is your religion”, or “You eat 
this” or “You're that colour.” It's actually acceptance. That's what it's based 
on . . . and so if you can teach your kids to be accepting of others, you 
know, all of those other things will happen. 
In each case religion-blindness was advocated, within which religious relativism was promoted 
over differentiation and discernment, and uncritical tolerance was promoted over conceptual 
understanding. This is precisely the process of intoleration described by Lundie and Conroy, 
above. These inclusive discursive imperatives inhered within the diversity, authoritarian liberal 
and knowledge age discourses and were constitutive of the secular liberal (neo)-liberal 
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governmentality described in this chapter and evidenced in the views of Sonia Glogowski at 
the Ministry, in Part One, above.12 
From a critical liberal perspective, the substitution of conceptual religious knowledge with the 
procedural disposition of tolerance conflated the school’s educational purpose of knowledge 
transmission, with its governmental role of values transmission. In contrast, critical liberal 
theory understands knowledge of religion to be a prerequisite to religious understanding and 
respect. The promotion of conceptual religious knowledge would induct young people into the 
vocabulary, conversation and controversies of an academic discipline and develop the 
judgemental rationality required both for personal identity construction and for discernment 
regarding truth claims. This would facilitate the process of genuine “entoleration” described 
by Lundie and Conroy. In Galston’s terms, such education is in the compelling interest of the 
liberal nation state whose primary goal is the protection of diversity. In Foucaultian terms, it 
was the inability of either parents or young people to critique the worldview promoted that 
made this teaching authoritarian rather than liberal, and confessional rather than educational. 
The promotion of the disposition of liberal tolerance appeared to function to suppress and 
disqualify both discussion of incommensurable differences of worldview, and conservative 
religious beliefs following a utilitarian pedagogical agenda, in the service of the institutions of 
the school and state. 
Disqualification of Conservative Religious Views 
Constitutive of the secular (neo)-liberal worldview was an authoritarian liberal discursive 
imperative which actively disqualified more conservative forms of religious belief, substituting 
them with an approved liberal interpretation of faith. At Korimako School, for example, Anisha 
described how she felt obliged to correct the conservative Muslim position of a child, in her 
class of five year olds, with a more relativist liberal discourse: 
I find, um, like the Muslim belief. They're quite strong. So, even when we 
talk about things in class, it's like: “No! [Bangs table in imitation of child] 
This is the way it is!” And it's really hard explaining that, “No, there are lots 
of different beliefs, and lots of different religions out there, and everyone is 
different.” 
This child appeared to receive the message that her version of truth was disqualified through 
not being sufficiently liberal and she was encouraged to accept the legitimacy of all religious 
perspectives. In an educational context where little information about religion was provided, 
the uncritical imposition of religious relativism and tolerance onto young children may be 
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 See above, pages 236 and 237. 
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considered a secular (neo)-liberal disciplinary technique and, as Wright points out, as 
confessional an approach to religious education as that of Christian religious instruction.13 
At Korimako School, the principal worked very hard to provide an inclusive environment often 
meeting with different ethnic groups, in her own time, to discuss their cultural needs within 
the school. However, a religion-blind policy which was tolerant of all but, in practice, 
demanded conformity with the secular (neo)-liberal status quo—in line with authoritarian 
liberal discursive imperatives—appeared to be in operation. Within the constraints of a 
conservative Muslim discourse, Muslim girls were unable to wear swimming costumes and 
swim while boys were in the pool. This effectively resulted in a loss of curriculum entitlement 
to swimming lessons for these girls. Anisha described this problem: 
I've got one Muslim girl in my class. And the first swimming day she came 
in the pool, and the mum turned up. She hasn't been in the pool since! And 
I thought “That's really strange!” and I said, “Why not?” And she just said, 
“No,” and I asked her older sister, and she said, “Oh. Mum didn't realise 
there were going to be boys in the pool too.” And she had so much fun on 
that first day! Actually it's happened before. We've had Muslim children 
that said “We don't have togs”, and we've had other parents have said 
“You can have these!” But no [. . .]. She sits on the side, now. It's so sad. 
It seemed, from the way this situation was described, that neither the school nor the parents 
were able to communicate effectively with the other about this matter. On one level, the 
conflict-avoiding diversity discourse appeared to operate to close down the conversation. On 
another, there was a material lack of knowledge and understanding on the part of school staff 
about the religious constraints under which the girls operated. But, for Anisha, the matter was 
self-evidently unresolveable unless the Muslim parents complied with secular (neo)-liberal 
school expectations and allowed their girls to swim with the boys. No one had suggested 
having separate swimming lessons for Muslim girls, in spite of the large number potentially 
affected in the school. An authoritarian liberal discourse, within a secular (neo)-liberal 
governmentality, appeared to resist any such accommodation or validation of conservative 
religious beliefs in school policy. Indeed, the principal elsewhere redescribed constraints on 
Muslim women’s clothing as a matter of unfettered personal choice rather than a religious 
imperative or decision to live one’s life according to religious truth:  
And what is interesting with Muslims, they don't have to wear the hijab. 
They choose to wear it. It is not a rule in the Qur’an at all. It is something 
they just choose to do.  
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 See above, page 150. 
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Although she was evidently not talking about swimming in this context, it is possible that this 
secular (neo)-liberal redescription of a religious imperative as a matter of inconsequential 
personal choice—the act of an autonomous chooser—may have informed her general 
approach. For if parents may arbitrarily “just choose” for their girls not to swim, these parents 
may (perhaps should) just as easily change their mind on the subject. Certainly, through the 
lens of this authoritarian liberal discourse, the school could not be expected to change its 
swimming timetable on these grounds. 
At Korimako school, while in policy and cultural matters an inclusive egalitarian liberal 
discourse was in operation, in matters of religion this was undermined by the uncritical 
promotion of “liberal” forms of religious belief and the concurrent presumptive (and 
undiscussed) invalidity of alternative (conservative) religious perspectives. The school’s 
unwillingness to accommodate the needs of the Muslim girls arguably signalled neither 
respect nor tolerance for their beliefs, or those of their families, but a form of governmentality 
characterised by an authoritarian imposition of secular (neo)-liberal values. This is an 
approach consistent with Galston’s conception of liberal autonomy which seeks to undermine 
the legitimacy of heteronomous worldviews. In contrast, Galston’s liberal diversity model is 
characterised by “an accommodationist, pro-exemption understanding of free religious 
exercise”, limited only by compelling state interests.14 Such a model would have enabled 
Muslim girls, who were materially disadvantaged at Korimako school, to receive their 
curriculum entitlement without compromising their beliefs. 
Embodied Māori Beliefs and Practices as a Marker of Liberalism 
The requirement to teach about cultural diversity in the New Zealand Curriculum was 
frequently interpreted through a dominant social action liberal discourse promoting 
recognition, and often embodiment of Māori culture. This appeared to reflect a binary, rather 
than plural approach to cultural issues. For some interviewees, like Frank, principal at Takahe 
School in Southland, teaching cultural diversity appeared largely to equate to teaching about 
Māori culture. Māori culture was certainly given priority in terms of resources, staff training, 
and curriculum time. There was far less evidence of professional development, resources or 
classroom teaching about other cultures, as would be consonant with a multicultural 
approach. In the secular state schools, books on Māori and Pacific Island culture far 
outnumbered books on festivals and religious beliefs and practices. Neil Laurenson at the  
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 Galston, “Two Concepts”, 529. 
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Catholic Education Office was clear that Māori culture, both in secular and Catholic schools 
should be prioritised: 
Well, yes, they should be looking at those cultures, but they also need to 
address the fact that we live in a bicultural country, and Māori must always 
come first. 
All schools were concerned to observe Curriculum requirements to promote tikanga and te 
reo. While the Catholic schools did so largely through their religious education programme, in 
a process of inculturation as mentioned above, the secular state schools ran extra-curricular 
kapa haka groups where children learned waiata, poi and haka.15 Classrooms in all schools 
had labels and displays in Māori language, such as that in Figure 14, from Korimako School in 
Auckland. 
At Korimako School, the principal gave professional development to other staff on Māori 
culture and language which was appreciated by teacher, Anisha: 
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 Waiata are traditional songs in the Māori language; poi are objects with the appearance of balls on 
lengths of string, which are twirled by women/girls in rhythmic patterns; haka are ritualised warrior 
chants generally performed by men/boys. 
Figure 14: Māori Culture and Language Display 
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And we've got a whole big book where she gives us hand-outs and what 
the correct way of pronouncing the words is; and then we teach it to the 
children. And like [. . .] we had no idea, you know like you can't just go out 
and collect the flax. You have to go at a certain time of the day. You know if 
I was doing weaving with the children, I would probably just go and snip 
some [. . .]. So we do the whole: “No, it's tapu to sit on tables. We don't sit 
on tables.” We tell the children: “It's where we put our food and our books 
and things. We don't sit there.” I reckon there's more Māori than spiritual 
or religious teaching in this school.16 
At Pukeko School, in Dunedin, a schools advisor was brought in to give advice on a school 
concert: 
We were doing a karanga to start off our performance,17 um which was 
really interesting, so we brought in [Name of Māori advisor], and she 
helped the two little girls that I’d picked, but she said “In Māoridom, two is 
a bad number” and “Spiritually, two is a bad number, so you should have 
three.” And then she saw our reserve was a little Pākehā girl and she said 
“Perfect—It’s very important in Māoridom that we’re not seen as 
exclusive—you must include her, and you must have three, because three 
is a strong spiritual [number].” [. . .] And we had to instantly have a 
change—and it was like the day of the production! 
At Kereru School the issue of subject knowledge was being addressed through outside support 
which Penny, the principal, hoped would be transformational within the school: 
What we are trying to do is embed Māori beliefs into curriculum and, when 
you've got staff that don't know a lot about Māori culture, that's difficult. 
They don't actually know what it is . . . and there's not a . . . it's not that 
there's a lack of will—there's a lack of knowledge. And I include myself in 
that as well. So one of the things we are doing later in the year we've got 
[Names]and they're doing a Nationhood course, which will talk about the 
whole origins of the Māori culture you know, right from the very 
beginning—which I think will give us that foundational belief of . . . why 
things need to be different. 
It may be argued, as in the Curriculum Review draft discussed above, that foregrounding 
Māori culture in the curriculum in this way, and raising awareness of cultural differences, 
serves the broader aims of multicultural education.18 But this intention was not clear from 
case study data, where bicultural imperatives were explicitly emphasised. What was notable, 
from a critical liberal perspective, was that the interventions made to support teaching Māori 
culture all conflated teaching about culture with teaching children to observe Māori protocol, 
i.e., enculturation. Teachers and children were expected to amend their behaviour, and 
sometimes their beliefs, in line with this discursive imperative. Recognition of Māori culture 
                                                          
16
 Tapu and noa are concepts, meaning sacred and non-sacred, around which much protocol exists. 
17
 A karanga is a call, given by a woman, which forms part of a Māori welcoming ceremony. 
18
 See above, page 91. 
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appeared to frequently involve embodiment of that culture, rather than improved knowledge 
and understanding or critical appraisal. The teaching approach may be perceived to be 
confessional in the embedding of a particular worldview into the education system and in the 
way this teaching was exempt from critique. It signalled a presumptive validity, indicative of 
institutionally established belief.19 Parents who expressed opposition to their children 
receiving this teaching were frequently positioned as either ignorant, intolerant or racist, i.e., 
illiberal, by educationalists. Acceptance of the teaching appeared to be perceived as a marker 
of the progressive and liberal attitudes promoted within the curriculum, and resistance from 
parents positioned as a problem to be managed. 
At Kereru School, Penny evidenced the way in which prioritisation of time, energy and 
resources, to the promotion of a social action liberal educational discourse within both school 
and parent community, effectively placed a material constraint on the development of 
education in religions and beliefs: 
How well [are the children] equipped for life, living amongst people of 
different religions? 
Well I'd say these children, right at this moment are not [. . .]. And I guess 
it's first things first, the barriers and the hurdles around dealing with our 
Māori community, you know, where that is . . . 20% of our school family, 
and there's that sort of resistance. Well it's underlying resistance. It needs 
to be managed and I'm very conscious around it. People’s tolerance levels, 
around anything different than what they know and do, is very low. 
Penny recognised that children in her school were not learning about other religions and 
beliefs, but she was aware of the potential for parental resistance to anything other than BiS. 
A prevalent confessional construction of religious teaching made teaching about other 
religions highly controversial and unlikely to be tolerated.20 Parents may have feared that their 
children would be converted to another faith. Penny foresaw the difficulties she might face in 
introducing teaching about religions and beliefs. Her more urgent priority, however, was to 
manage the resistance she already faced from parents regarding the teaching of Māori 
language, protocol and beliefs to their children. A normative confessional approach to 
education in beliefs, in which beliefs needed to be unreflectively “embedded” in the 
curriculum, combined with the discursive imperatives of a redistributional social action liberal 
educational discourse within which “things need to be different”, was met with parental 
resistance which needed to be “managed” at Kereru School. This management process signals 
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 Social action liberal discursive imperatives would assert the importance of both learning about and 
observing Māori protocol. 
20
 See above, page 227. 
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that promotion of Māori culture formed part of a secular (neo)-liberal governmentality in 
which beliefs and values of children and parents were amended and corrected in New Zealand 
schools. 
This governmentality extended, at Takahe School in Southland, to the requirement to 
participate in karakia.21 For Grace, the deputy principal, an important role of the school was to 
develop taha wairua—the spiritual dimension of education—as promoted through the Te 
Whare Tapa Wha model of wellbeing in the Health and Physical Education Curriculum. This 
spiritual dimension was reflected through the values programme at the school, the kapa haka 
classes and as part of a daily routine of beginning the day with karakia: 
We also look at it in our classroom, the spiritual again, because I think it's 
really important. So we start off every morning with a karakia or prayer in 
Māori. And again I just think it's really addressing the spiritual side of 
things, for our Māori children, but also for other children, too. 
Māori spirituality was here perceived as having universal applicability. Within this discourse 
Māori prayers became non-negotiable in the state school classroom. An authoritarian liberal 
disciplinary technique was evidenced when I asked about the response of parents to this 
practice: 
 I did actually have some Brethren parents complain about starting with 
karakia, and having karakia, and they came to me and they complained 
about it. And I said to them, “OK,” I said “That’s fine,” I said, “Who do you 
pray to?” and they said, “Our God.” “Oh,” I said, “That's really interesting 
because that's exactly what we're doing.” I said, “We're praying to the 
same God.” I said, “So what are your issues in us praying to the same God 
as you have?” [. . .]. And I said, “So what would you have me do with your 
child? Would you have me sit your child outside the classroom while we do 
that? That’s your choice.” And often, they'll go away and think about it, 
come back and say, “No, no, no. It's fine for my child to be a part of it.” 
Grace’s approach to teaching spiritual education manifestly breached the right of parents and 
children to freedom of religions and beliefs. Parents appeared to be coerced into giving 
permission with the threat of their child’s social exclusion. Children were either required to 
embody a Māori spiritual worldview—or at least a universalist liberal theological worldview—
through participation in prayer to a universal God, or risk embodiment of a dissenting identity 
which marked them as “different” from the rest of the class. Again, a conservative religious 
worldview was disqualified and supplanted by a more liberal and relativist ideology. The 
unqualified and uncritical endorsement of both tikanga Māori and taha wairua within the 
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 Karakia are prayers or blessings in the Māori language. 
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New Zealand Curriculum enabled Grace to invoke the institutional power of the Ministry to 
justify this practice: 
And I mean it is, it's all there in our Curriculum. So the karakia is part of the 
Māori culture and so, it just goes with it, it's a package deal, and I'm not 
going to cut out the karakia. And so I would need to explain this to parents, 
and really and truly, if they had issues with it, I'd then direct them to Frank, 
who would then probably direct them to the Minister, and the Minister 
would have to explain it. Because this is a New Zealand-wide Curriculum. 
We can't change it. It's what's been implemented in New Zealand 
Schools.22 
However, numerous other interviewees, even in the same school, attested that there was no 
requirement to perform karakia as part of the delivery of tikanga Māori or of teaching about 
spiritual wellbeing within the curriculum. A “hands-off” policy on the part of the Ministry 
permitted contradictory policies on karakia to operate in state schools in a way which must 
have caused confusion to parents. For parents of children in Grace’s class, a form of coercion 
by unofficial establishment was in operation. As Galston points out, such establishment is 
illiberal, intolerant and inimical to the protection of diversity. Binary approaches to culture, 
values and spiritual wellbeing in this classroom precluded the development of a broader form 
of spiritual education which respected the integrity of all the children. 
 Certainly, for Muslim parents, there could be no assumption that karakia or Māori spirituality 
were appropriate in a state school. But as a minority group in a bicultural context there were 
discursive and material constraints which may prevent a parent from complaining or 
withdrawing a child, as Karima explained: 
That's a very difficult thing for me. Because I feel like now, I'm treading on 
eggshells, you know: taboo. I don't want to disrespect New Zealand, but . . . 
I'm thinking, “That's not what we do.” [. . .]. You feel like you will be 
ostracised if you say anything. But it is treading on eggshells. It’s very 
difficult [. . .]. Like sometimes, especially when my children were in pre-
school and the karakia was part of the pedagogy and you know like at meal 
times they used to sit there and do it. And my children would be involved, 
you know. I found that very, very hard [. . .]. At the time I didn't raise the 
issue, only because my children were the minority amongst about 20 other 
kids, and I thought they're too . . . they just have no comprehension [. . .]. 
Because two-year-olds obviously are very . . . they can't comprehend why 
I'm left out. So I just let it slide, you know? 
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 Karakia are not mentioned in the New Zealand Curriculum. However, this curriculum update does 
encourage schools to use karakia as part of tikanga and in keeping with the Treaty partnership: MOE, 
“Treaty of Waitangi Principle”, 1. Sonia Glogowski stated that the Ministry was divided over the use of 
karakia. The HRC recommends parents should be given the chance to opt out of such observances, but 
none of the schools in my study were aware of these guidelines: HRC and Morris, “Religion in New 
Zealand Schools”, 9. 
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As a citizen of New Zealand, Karima had a right to freedom of religions and beliefs, the right to 
bring up her children according to her beliefs and the right not to be coerced into religious 
observances. However when religious observance was implemented as a part of pedagogy, 
with apparent state and institutional endorsement, it became very difficult to assert these 
rights without embarrassment or possible social disadvantage for herself or her children. In 
this instance normalised religious observances, employed as liberalising disciplinary 
techniques, resulted in a clear infringement of religious rights. 
But as Galston points out, the formal or informal establishment of cultural beliefs may be 
equally constraining for the privileged culture, setting up an expectation of “authentic” beliefs 
and practices and co-opting that culture for governmental interests. When a pupil did not 
conform to expected behaviour during the class karakia at Takahe school, Grace, the teacher, 
constructed the incident as a contravention of authentic Māori identity, rather than of social 
norms or class rules: 
Last week, in my classroom this Māori boy was being very disrespectful 
during our karakia and I went up to him and said to him “I am really upset 
by this. This is your culture and you are being really disrespectful, Why?” So 
it's quite good, because they can relate to that because it is part of their 
culture and who they are. 
In critical liberal terms the re-ethnicising of the Māori pupils through the assumption of a 
normative cultural spiritual identity is an oppressive form of governmentality, detrimental to 
the development of judgemental rationality.23  
The two interviewees most vehemently opposed to confessional religious instruction, namely 
Peter Harrison at the NZARH and parent Mark at Pukeko School, both self-identified as 
atheists and secularists. While both reflected the imperatives of a social action liberal 
discourse in support of institutional recognition of Māori culture, neither approved of the 
institutional use of karakia. However, both identified a discursive constraint which prevented 
them from publicly criticising such practice. Mark stated: 
In particular contexts, there are reasons why I wouldn’t kick up a fuss. But 
that doesn’t mean I approve in principle, it’s just . . . you know. . . you pick 
your fights. 
And Peter said:  
It would be one of a number of areas here where . . . um . . . it would be 
politically difficult to take on and not necessarily well-advised (L). 
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A dominant social action liberal discourse, operating at an institutional level in New Zealand, 
appeared to constrain secular rationalist, human rights and conservative religious objections 
to required participation in Māori (and often Māori Christian) religious beliefs, protocols and 
observances. Thus immunised from critique, such practices appeared to be reproduced in 
policy and practice. As an institutionalised marker of liberalism in New Zealand society, the 
embodiment of Māori culture and beliefs appeared to be another constituent of a secular 
(neo)-liberal governmentality in operation in case study schools.  
Promotion of Secular Spirituality 
As previously discussed, it was common for interviewees to conflate the teaching of spiritual 
wellbeing with Catholic RE and BiS, or to align it with curriculum imperatives giving recognition 
to tikanga Māori and wairua, including karakia. However, the teaching of spiritual wellbeing 
was also frequently described in purely secular terms, addressing personal development, 
values and dispositions, in line with spiritual secularist and neoliberal discourses. In fact, none 
of the interviewees constructed spiritual education in a way which might include learning 
about religions and beliefs. Some principals, like Penny at Kereru School and Beverly at 
Korimako, indicated that that the word spiritual was not used at all in their schools. Anisha, a 
teacher at Korimako school, expressed shock and surprise that spiritual education was meant 
to be in the curriculum. It had never been mentioned to her before. 
A teacher at Kereru School in Southland, Annette, associated spiritual wellbeing with a sense 
of self-esteem, connectedness and relationships with others, in line with a spiritual secularist 
discourse: 
Spiritual wellbeing for our kids and for us staff: We . . . we work really hard 
to create a strong sense of community for our kids, as strong sense of 
identity . . . they own our school. They own being here: this is their place 
and connectedness is really important. Um, we work hard as teachers to 
build strong relationships with our kids. We go further. . . and spiritual 
wellbeing for me looks like a balanced um relationship with a kid. It looks 
like a child who has hope for the future, who is proud of themselves, they 
have self-esteem [. . .] and because they've got that self-esteem and that 
sense of self they can accept that others are different. 
Equally, at Kakapo School in Auckland, the principal Barbara constructed spirituality in spiritual 
secularist terms. While she struggled to articulate her understanding of the word, she was 
clear that it was a meaningful expression without a specific religious content: 
 So defining “spirituality” is . . . yeah, I don't know how to define it—it's just 
that genuine respect and understanding about yourself and the place that 
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you have, so that you can . . . actually genuinely respect . . . others, as well, 
and so it’s . . . just a way you are. 
Here the relational, emotional and psychological child was placed at the centre of spiritual 
education in place of conceptual religious knowledge. The positioning of the dispositions of 
tolerance and acceptance of difference as inherent to spiritual wellbeing were notable in 
these descriptions. Kakapo School had included “nurturing the human spirit” in its charter, 
intrinsic to which was the promotion of secular values derived from a consultation exercise 
with parents. Barbara believed that these values were promoted in the school without the 
need for a Christian programme or any teaching about religious beliefs.  
From an egalitarian liberal perspective, such as that espoused by Galston, the failure to 
educate children in matters of religion and belief is inimical to the promotion of genuine 
tolerance and the protection of diversity, consistent with the governmental principles of the 
liberal nation state. From a critical realist perspective, this secular and purportedly neutral 
approach to spiritual education as personal development, devoid of reference to religious 
traditions and communities of belief and practice, and without an operational theory of 
conceptual knowledge in spiritual and religious matters, was open to the influence of 
dominant secular (neo)-liberal imperatives. Thus a particular form of subjectivity may have 
been moulded with normative secular ( neo)-liberal dispositions regarding, for example: 
religion as an optional extra, rather than intrinsic to spirituality; religion as uncontroversial 
and personalised or reduced to cultural celebrations; and uncritical tolerance and religious 
relativity as non-negotiable. From a Foucaultian perspective, the psychologising of spiritual 
education was constitutive of a governmental rather than critical approach. The focus on self-
esteem, identity, autonomy and personal fulfilment—the self-actualisation at the root of the 
spiritual secularist approach—was highly amenable to, and embedded in, the neoliberal 
discourse. 
Promotion of Neoliberal Values 
At Kakapo School the values selected by parents appeared to have been largely informed by 
this discourse. The values of resilience, perseverance, humility, pride, integrity, ambition, 
bravery, innovation, service, caring, self-belief and compassion were to be promoted 
throughout the curriculum. As Barbara stated: 
[I]t's a part of what we do all the time, so it's not seen as anything specific, 
it's just how we talk, and what we expect from our children . . . the whole 




While humility, service, caring and compassion arguably have a basis in New Zealand’s 
Christian heritage, the values of resilience, perseverance, ambition, bravery, pride, innovation 
and self-belief may have owed more to a neoliberal educational discourse within which young 
people were expected to emerge as successful entrepreneurial subjects and agents within the 
market economy. These latter values were presented as religiously neutral within a spiritual 
secularist construct of spiritual wellbeing, described as “nurturing the human spirit”, in the 
Kakapo School charter. But the spiritual resources to be developed were embedded in, and 
constitutive of, a worldview arguably contrary to religious perspectives with a more 
transcendent focus. Like the Catholic values and beliefs promoted in the integrated schools 
visited, the explicit beliefs promoted in BiS and the implicit Christian beliefs encouraged 
through Takahe School’s values classes, this worldview was exempt from critique and 
presented as normative and presumptively valid: as “a natural part of the programme”. In a 
context where broader conceptions of spirituality were disqualified, such teaching was at risk 
of confining the educational quest for spiritual truth to, what Marshall calls, “the 
dehumanised notion of the autonomous chooser imprisoned in the choices offered by the 
enterprise society”.24 
Conclusion  
In answer to research question two, the data report further evidences the operation of 
discourses identified in Chapter Four and exemplifies the consequences of these for New 
Zealand as a plural liberal democracy, for religion in the curriculum and for young people 
themselves. My data indicate that significant discursive, institutional and material constraints 
appeared to be in operation to construct education in religions and beliefs as illegal, 
unimportant, undesirable, unproductive, and unnecessary in the case study schools. 
Concurrently, confessional instruction of different kinds was accommodated into the 
education system in ways which were not always made explicit to parents in the study. The 
replication of these findings in very different educational contexts, and in the comments of 
representatives of the Ministry and NZEI, lead me to conclude that they may have a wider 
applicability to the New Zealand education system in general. My findings clearly indicate that 
the distinction between educating children about beliefs and practices, and enculturating 
them into forms of belief, has not been sufficiently well made within New Zealand primary 
schools. The blurring of this boundary has been shown to serve functions within both the 
conservative Christian and secular (neo)-liberal governmentalities operating within the 
education system. 
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The irony of these findings is that policies and practices, purportedly designed to protect 
children from indoctrination into religious belief, appeared to be themselves co-opted as 
illiberal governmental techniques promoting uncritical acceptance of very specific worldviews. 
The “Don’t touch it!” approach, which positioned religion outside the curriculum, seems to 
have induced a laissez-faire attitude to the voluntary system of religious instruction by New 
Zealand’s education establishment. This, in turn, has expedited the enculturation of children 
into a Christian worldview in an uncritical and unreflective manner, exposing some to 
indoctrinatory practices. Concurrently, the “Don’t bring it up” and “Let’s talk about something 
else” approaches were intended to engender tolerance and social cohesion, democratise 
knowledge, be responsive to community beliefs and promote self-actualisation. However, my 
research indicates that these approaches reproduced illiberal confessional approaches to 
religion and culture and effectively served to impose a secular liberal and relativist worldview 
onto New Zealand children, which was neither acknowledged nor held to account. These 
practices were embedded in an understanding of liberal policy based on the valorisation of 
choice rather than the protection of diversity: autonomy liberalism rather than diversity 
liberalism.25 
In consequence, none of these policies or practices equipped young people with the 
knowledge to debate or analyse beliefs and worldviews, or to exercise discernment over truth 
claims. They did not develop in young people the social rationality, or entoleration, required 
for active participation in the democratic liberal nation state. In fact, matters of truth and 
truthful living appeared to be bracketed out of the education process. An opportunity to 
contribute to genuine character formation—Bildung—through the development of 
knowledge, understanding and discernment in matters of religion appeared to have been 
missed.  
In the concluding chapter of this thesis I draw together the findings of my genealogical 
research, literature survey and data report to make key recommendations for changes in the 
treatment of religion in New Zealand Primary schools.
                                                          
25
 See above, page 124. 
264 
 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Question 1: Is New Zealand’s cultural and religious diversity influencing the 
practice of, and attitudes toward, teaching about religion and spirituality in 
state and integrated primary schools?  Question 2: What are the key 
discursive and institutional constraints which maintain current 
arrangements for voluntary religious instruction and restrict curriculum 
development in the area of religion and beliefs? Question 3: Is there an 
alternative to current practices consistent with New Zealand’s status as a 
secular, bicultural and religiously plural liberal democracy? 
The preliminary research question with which I commenced this research yielded answers, but 
raised many further lines of enquiry. Case study and interview data indicated that, on the one 
hand, the curriculum and pedagogy of BiS and of religious instruction in integrated schools 
was not amended for different contexts. In both Auckland and Southland the state schools 
with BiS and Catholic integrated schools adopted confessional approaches which presumed 
children present were developing a Christian faith. Additionally, education about religions and 
beliefs was disqualified as a curriculum subject in both areas. In this regard, the first research 
question is answered in the negative. On the other hand, research participants in both areas 
cited increased diversity as an additional reason not to teach about religions and beliefs at 
school. In other words, curriculum imperatives around the management of diversity appeared 
to further render the controversial subject of religion non grata: for some, religion was simply 
taboo. The first question may therefore be answered in the affirmative. The major task of this 
thesis has been to answer questions two and three: to analyse the ways in which this situation 
has arisen and was being reproduced, and to theorise the subject of religion in schools for the 
New Zealand context. Research question three required a formulation of alternative policy 
solutions, which I further address in this chapter. 
Thesis Summary 
An iterative Foucaultian approach to the interview data, primary sources and secondary 
literature revealed a range of discourses which appeared to operate to constrain curriculum 
development in the field of religions and beliefs, and to maintain the status quo of Bible-in-
Schools. I have demonstrated how an interpretation of secular as “nothing to do with religion” 
obtained currency and became embedded in the national identity, constraining the 
development of religion as a curriculum subject area, ceding responsibility for religious 
education to the churches and limiting opportunities for young people in New Zealand to 
obtain knowledge and discernment in matters of religion. I have shown how current dominant 
educational discourses, evident in curriculum and policy documents, have served to position 
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uncritical confessional approaches to teaching about religion, values and culture as 
educationally progressive, effectively reproducing the status quo of Bible-in-Schools and to 
disqualify education in religions and beliefs. I have evidenced the ways in which governmental 
techniques operated through the co-option of discourses which promoted compliance, 
personal autonomy and personalised constructions of religion in the service of economic state 
interests. 
 Through an egalitarian liberal and critical realist analysis of the discursively-based objections 
to education in religions and beliefs, I have shown how these objections are often based upon 
constructions of religion, knowledge, education and liberalism which are not stable and self-
evident but are contingent upon historical, political and cultural discursive contexts. I have 
demonstrated that these dominant constructions are contestable and that alternative 
constructions of religion in education are not only possible, but, from my objectively partisan 
standpoint, educationally imperative. 
 My data report provided case study evidence of the discursive constraints and governmental 
strategies identified in my genealogy and review of literature. An under-theorised conception 
of knowledge in general, and religious knowledge in particular, within the New Zealand 
curriculum allowed dominant discourses, evident in case study schools and in interviews with 
key stakeholders, to promote confessional and community-based forms of religious, spiritual 
and cultural education and disqualify conceptual knowledge of religions and beliefs in state 
schools. But the legally embedded construct of school closure, and apparent institutional 
endorsement of BiS, appeared to operate as material constraints on information for parents, 
informed consent and accountability regarding the resources used and teaching methods of 
volunteers. The construct of school closure protected the secular clause, but did not protect 
young children from teaching which was coercive, intolerant, inimical to the protection of 
diversity and detrimental to the development of judgemental rationality. Concurrently, a 
secular (neo)-liberal form of governmentality appeared to be in operation in state schools 
promoting a construction of religious belief which was socially liberal, autonomous, personal, 
private, universalised, relative, uncontroversial and a matter of lifestyle choice. The ubiquitous 
redescription of Bible-in-Schools as universally appropriate values teaching appeared to form 
part of this governmentality. However, concurrent discursive constraints on accountability 
operated to facilitate a conservative and evangelising Christian form of governmentality 
through the accommodation of BiS in New Zealand state schools. Interview data evidenced a 
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widespread uncertainty about the use of religious vocabulary, indicating low levels of religious 
literacy among both educationalists and parents interviewed. 
An autonomy-based conception of the liberal nation state, in which freedom of choice (for 
parents) was prioritised, permitted Catholic integrated primary schools to enculturate children 
into one faith without introducing them to other perspectives. However, there was evidence 
that parents (including non-Catholics) were not informed of their right to withdraw their 
children from religious observances. An apparent absence of epistemic humility and 
courageous restraint made this a potentially coercive and illiberal form of religious education. 
However, in the explicit nature of its provision of information for parents about religious 
education in terms of policy documents, school charters, parental access to teaching 
resources, and in some of the teaching content in evidence, the Catholic schools’ approach 
was more liberal and transparent than those of schools running BiS and one running an in-
house values programme. 
In summary, and in explicit answer to research question two, a “secular nationalist” national 
identity, an autonomy-centred rather than diversity-centred model of the liberal state, 
combined with an absence of an operational social theory of religious knowledge in the 
curriculum, appeared to facilitate the discursive reproduction of the status quo: volunteer-led 
Bible-in-Schools, compulsory religious instruction in Catholic schools, and the presumptive 
invalidity of education about religions and beliefs within the primary school curriculum. 
To address research question three, I have suggested that an alternative form of education in 
religion and beliefs for the New Zealand context could be framed with the following critical 
liberal emphases : epistemic access to conceptual knowledge of religion; the development of 
judgemental rationality ; a pedagogical approach characterised by epistemic humility; a 
curriculum which allows for objection and resistance; a non-coercive approach; the genuine 
protection of diversity; and the development of social rationality consistent with the 
requirements of liberal citizenship. I explain below how a critical education in religion and 
worldviews might meet these critical liberal criteria and better equip young people for 
participation in a secular, bicultural and religiously plural liberal democracy. 
Limitations 
It will be noted that the fieldwork undertaken is necessarily limited in scope and to specific 
contexts in New Zealand. However, I have argued that corroboration of the discourses 
267 
 
identified in case study interview data with those in primary and secondary sources, and with 
those in interview data with key stakeholders, gives the research findings wider applicability. 
 As noted in Chapter Three, there were difficulties in recruitment of schools and of interview 
participants and in the cancellation of a lesson observation, attesting to the controversial 
nature of the subject for school communities. Assumptions about the nature of my research 
may have affected the recruitment of interviewees by principals.  
Playing With Edged Tools: Recommendations 
In Figure 1, the advice of the Chief Justice to the Minister for Education in 1912 regarding 
religion in schools was, “Don’t touch it! Don’t play with edged tools! Let sleeping dogs lie!” 
This policy, which appears to have been the default Ministerial strategy whenever the subject 
has subsequently been raised, can no longer be justified in the plural context in which New 
Zealand’s children are currently being educated. Solutions to the religion problem, reflecting 
the religious homogeneity of the 19th century to the mid-20th century, are now due for 
revision. The sharp tools must be handled and the dogs awakened. Fear of criticism from 
those with vested interests is not a legitimate rationale for education policy. 
Bible-in-Schools 
In line with my egalitarian liberal analysis I have suggested that the unofficially established 
nature of the Christian faith, through voluntary Bible-in-Schools classes in New Zealand 
primary schools was coercive, intolerant, and detrimental to the protection of diversity. In line 
with my critical realist analysis, I have indicated that the teaching did not respect the 
developing judgemental rationality of children, treating one religious worldview as alethic 
truth. On these grounds and concomitant with the additional problems of accountability, 
informed consent and opting out associated with the construct of school closure, Bible-in-
Schools may be considered, in Foucaultian terms, an illegitimate governmental technology in 
secular state primary schools. I believe that the relevant sections of the Act of 1964 should 
therefore be repealed and voluntary religious instruction in school hours and on school 
property should cease.1  
However, the current legality of confessional religious instruction is not in question and, until 
such time as the legislation of 1964 may be revisited, my research findings indicate that the 
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following urgent changes should be made to current practices. Of primary importance would 
be the provision of guidelines from the Ministry to boards of trustees, including reminders of 
legal requirements and recommendations for good practice in line with parents’ and 
children’s right to the freedom of religions and beliefs. I recommend that: 
1.  The programme is moved to after school hours to limit the potential for 
perceived institutional endorsement or coercion. 
2. Where programmes continue during the school day, parents should opt in, rather 
than out, to reduce potential for perceived institutional endorsement and 
coercion. 
3.  Boards of trustees are reminded that the Ministry does not endorse, approve, 
evaluate or monitor religious instruction programmes: this is the legal 
responsibility of boards of trustees. 
4. Schools are reminded that it is their responsibility to state explicitly in school 
charters, on websites, in newsletters and in school policy that religious instruction 
takes place and that attendance is optional. 
5. Parents are surveyed every two years. 
6. Schools are reminded that it is their responsibility to provide accurate information 
to parents, prior to any survey and prior to their child’s enrolment, about the 
programme, its intended contribution to the school, and the volunteers including: 
a. Access to course materials  
b. Information about the religious organisations to which the volunteers are 
affiliated 
c. Information about the CEC or programme provider 
d. School policy document on religious instruction 
7. Boards of trustees are reminded that it is their responsibility to monitor 
resources, and volunteers on an annual basis.  
8. Schools are given criteria by which to assess materials, provided by CEC/other 
providers, used at any time on school premises including that: 
a. The material does not require children to make confessions of faith  
b. The material does not require religious observances such as prayer or 
songs of worship (Songs of worship make confessions of belief such as 
“Jesus loves me” and value judgements about religion, such as “The best 
book to read is the Bible”) 
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c. The material does not presuppose religious membership by the use of 
“we” and “us” 
d. The material does not require children to make judgements about truth 
and falsehood where the “true” answer is a contestable statement of faith  
e. The material and teaching do not apply the contestable beliefs of the 
programme providers universally, e.g. “we are all sinners”, “Jesus wants 
us to . . .”, “God made the world in six days” 
f. The material teaches about the religion, recognising that beliefs and 
practices differ within a faith 
g. The material teaches about the importance of belief to a believer, but 
does not imply that children should adopt religious belief. 
9. Schools are reminded that it is their responsibility to provide adequate 
supervision and educational activities to children who have been withdrawn from 
religious instruction. Every effort should be made to ensure that they do not incur 
any form of social disadvantage. 
10. Primary school teachers should be provided with non-contact time in line with the 
OECD average.2 This would limit the apparent tendency of schools to 
unreflectively endorse BiS, on the contingent grounds of the provision of vital 
release time. 
Integrated Church Schools 
Integrated church primary schools, along with schools with Designated (religious) Character, 
Kura Kaupapa and Partnership Schools with a religious foundation are necessary for the 
protection of diversity in the liberal nation state. Religious and cultural communities are 
entitled to bring up their children within their tradition, to live according to the lights of their 
faith and culture. The social legitimacy of such schools is contingent upon the provision of 
explicit information for parents about the religious or cultural basis of the educational 
approach. But children attending these schools also have rights to freedom of religions and 
beliefs and are capable of more than passive induction into one tradition. Children of different 
religious backgrounds attend Catholic and other Christian or religious schools and their 
integrity and rights should be respected. It is also in the interest of the liberal nation state that 
every child should develop both social and judgemental rationality by learning about 
alternative worldviews. The following recommendations would apply to these schools: 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix 5. 
270 
 
1. Integrated primary schools must allow children, whose parents request it, to opt out 
of religious observances in line with Section 32(2) of the 1975 Conditional Integration 
Act.  
2. An opt-out provision should also be in place for children attending partnership or 
other special character schools where religious instruction and observances take 
place.  
3. Religious instruction should be taught with epistemic humility and courageous 
restraint: acknowledging the transitive nature of religious knowledge and recognising 
that religious propositions are contestable. 
4. Schools with a religious character or foundation should offer children the opportunity 
to learn about a range of alternative worldviews in a way which respects the diversity 
of religious belief represented in New Zealand. 
Education in Spirituality, Religions and Beliefs 
Current curriculum guidelines for educating children about spirituality, religions and beliefs in 
New Zealand primary and secondary schools are inadequate. Practices observed in case study 
primary schools were detrimental to the protection of diversity and the promotion of 
tolerance, defined as non-coercion. Additionally they prioritised community-based 
confessional approaches over the development of conceptual knowledge and discernment in 
matters of religion and belief. Within the curriculum, the avoidance of controversial religious 
matters, the promulgation of relativism and the promotion of a universal secular (neo)-liberal 
version of spirituality and religious belief were in evidence. Teachers appeared to lack the 
knowledge and confidence to assist young people to debate and discuss religious matters and 
sometimes believed they were legally precluded from doing so. The following 
recommendations would address the findings of my research: 
1. The Ministry of Education takes responsibility for education about religions and beliefs 
as a curriculum matter at all levels of education. 
2. Knowledge, understanding and discernment in matters of religion is considered 
essential to a young person’s education by the Ministry. 
3. A stronger social theory of conceptual knowledge is reintroduced to future curriculum 
development as a precondition to the introduction of conceptual knowledge of 
religions and beliefs. 
4. A form of critical education in religions and worldviews is developed which, 
incrementally through the school system: 
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a. Introduces young people to the vocabulary, concepts and debates of the 
discipline of religious studies (religious literacy) 
b. Explores diversity within and between religious and non-religious traditions 
c. Explores the diversity of Māori cultural and spiritual practices, and debates 
pertaining to colonisation 
d. Informs young people about the elements of the Biblical narrative upon which 
the Christian calendar is based 
e. Allows for the validity of religious truth and truthful living 
f. Includes consideration of the characteristics of, and values inherent in, secular 
atheism, universal religiosity, post-modern relativism and neoliberalism as 
specific worldviews 
g. Enables youngsters to discuss and debate substantive matters of religious 
difference  
h. Encourages young people to reflect appropriately on their own 
beliefs/spirituality and worldviews and the range of influences which inform 
them 
i. Assists young people with identity formation and discernment in matters of 
religion and belief 
5. Training, resources and curriculum guidelines are devised and provided. 
6. Parents should be able to withdraw their children at the primary school stage only. 
Future Research 
To test the replication of findings in New Zealand secondary schools: 
1. Case study research based in areas of contrasting religious diversity and including 
state secondary schools with and without religious affiliation  
To assist the future development of critical education in religions and worldviews: 
2. School-based action research could involve a pilot scheme trialling resources designed 
to develop knowledge of religious and non-religious worldviews specific to the New 
Zealand context  
3. Activities to assist young people in primary and secondary schools to apply these 
different critical lenses to specific situations could be developed and trialled in the 
pilot scheme.  
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4. These resources could be adapted and trialled in other contexts such as Australia, 
Canada and the United Kingdom. 
During the research process a number of issues pertaining to evangelisation of children in 
New Zealand’s schools came to my notice. Applying the same critical realist, egalitarian and 
Foucaultian critique to the following areas may be pertinent to the protection of diversity and 
the right to freedom of religions and beliefs: 
5. Replication of the current research with a particular focus on parents’ and schools’ 
perceptions of BiS in the Wanganui region, which uses Connect resources no longer 
approved by the CEC because it is evangelical. 
6. Research on the use of curricula founded in a narrow religious worldview such as the 
Accelerated Christian Education (ACE) curriculum which, reportedly, has over 35 years 
been “successfully used by 1000s of students in NZ”,3 either through home-schooling 
or through private Christian schools.4 
7. The CEC’s provision of school chaplains for secular primary and secondary schools in 
New Zealand. In 2012 there were 186 chaplains in New Zealand’s schools.5 
8. The expansion of American-style after school clubs, such as the Good News Club, 
using school resources and facilities to evangelise children. In 2012 there were eleven 
such clubs running in New Zealand schools “reaching 202 children of whom 24 were 
counselled for salvation”.6 
Critical Education in Religions and Worldviews: an Emancipatory Programme 
More generally, a need for a critical liberal analysis of schools’ provision of epistemic access—
conceptual and disciplinary knowledge—in comparison with provision of a more localised, 
culturalised, personalised and utilitarian curriculum, is compelling. This brings me back to 
research question three, which I now address more fully: Is there an alternative to current 
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 HENZ, “The A.C.E. Curriculum”, Home Education New Zealand web page, accessed 3 March 2016, 
http://www.homeeducationnz.co.nz/about-us/what-is-a-c-e.  
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 SCEE, “Christian Schools in New Zealand Using ACE Materials”, Southern Cross Educational Enterprises 
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5
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Affairs/Perseus Books Group, 2012).  
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practices consistent with New Zealand’s status as a secular, bicultural and religiously plural 
liberal democracy? 
 It is my view that critical education in religions and worldviews might provide, not just a 
viable alternative to current practices, but an emancipatory programme within the New 
Zealand curriculum. What is proposed is that a space is created to promote not just an 
awareness of religious and non-religious worldviews but a consciousness of the prevailing 
influences on the education process in which young people are participating. This 
consciousness-raising process must do more than simply offer a deconstructive tool within 
which all conceptions of truth or meaning are subsumed into a post-modern relativism or a 
simple scepticism. Conceived within the critical liberal framework that has been described, 
critical education in religions and worldviews must offer the tools of judgemental rationality 
and discernment: it must equip young people to make informed judgements in matters of 
religion and belief. This emancipatory strategy releases them from the constraints of a 
curriculum informed by neoliberalism, within which the freedom to choose becomes 
sacrosanct, and by ontological relativism, in which “any choice will do”.  
Wright asserts that in order to live well, in harmony with others, young people at secondary 
school will benefit from the acquisition of spiritual and religious literacy marked by “the ability 
to take part in an informed, critical, sensitive and ideologically aware conversation about the 
nature of ultimate reality and of their relationships to this reality”.7 Within this critical realist 
framework the acquisition of religious literacy involves: learning to describe and articulate 
one’s own beliefs and values; to recognise how these beliefs and values have been formed in 
relationship with family, tradition and other influences; to learn about other religious and 
secular perspectives, developing a conceptual vocabulary appropriate to the discipline of 
religious studies; to dialogue with others across boundaries of difference, developing critical 
thinking methods; learning to argue from different perspectives; and to rearticulate one’s 
beliefs and values in the light of these discussions.8 This teaching approach would equip young 
people with the knowledge and discernment to make informed decisions about matters of 
religion and belief. 
If children are to develop religious literacy at secondary school, they need to have 
opportunities to learn about religions and worldviews at primary school. They need to do so in 
a way which enables them to understand religions as distinct but diverse traditions with very 
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different truth claims. They also need to do so in a context of epistemic humility and with the 
development of judgemental rationality as a normative objective. Younger primary school 
children will benefit from an early introduction to the vocabulary and concepts of religious 
belief, which will assist them in identity formation and enable them to begin to understand 
the practices of those living and learning either alongside them, or in other parts of New 
Zealand. This would include a range of Māori beliefs and practices. Even in the younger years 
of primary school a critical liberal approach can be developed by encouraging children to 
consider familiar situations and problems from the different perspectives to which they have 
been introduced. Helping children to understand the implications of religious belief (or 
unbelief) in daily life, for many New Zealanders, will form a basis for the further acquisition of 
knowledge, understanding and discernment during their school life. Critical education in 
religions and worldviews at all levels of schooling will therefore promote genuine and active 
tolerance—entoleration—which is required for the mutual flourishing of religious diversity: 
the central purpose of the liberal nation state. 
Conclusion 
Previous generations have sought binary explanations of the problems of religion and culture 
in New Zealand, for example: the secular state versus Christian church; Māori versus Pākehā. 
The Immigration Act of 1987 has transformed the cultural and religious make up of New 
Zealand such that policy and practice now need to reflect these changes. Young New 
Zealanders will need to develop more nuanced conceptualisations of culture, spirituality and 
religion and to be able to draw on a much broader vocabulary to express these new ideas. 
They need practice, not just in celebrating diversity but in discussing matters in ways which 
recognise, and hold in tension, the conflicting truth claims and worldviews now co-existing in 
New Zealand society. In a context where many young people align themselves with not one 
but multiple cultural and religious perspectives, the acquisition of religious literacy could 
greatly assist in the process of identity formation. The provision of space within the curriculum 
to explore difficult and controversial matters of culture and religion could promote debate 
and disagreement in a safe environment. It is by learning to wrestle with different ideas, to 
strongly disagree but to understand the other’s point of view and her/his right to hold it, that 
understanding and respect for difference is engendered. It would give young people an insight 
into the religious and non-religious worldviews which inform the lives of the communities in 
which they live. The ability to identify and locate the values and imperatives to which they are 
exposed within particular worldviews, whether secular, cultural or religious, would equip 
them with the resilience, confidence and discernment required for democratic participation. 
275 
 
As future global citizens they will need to understand, not overlook, the religious imperatives 
which drive human behaviour at the local and international level. 
In contrast to the governmental strategies of confessional Christian instruction and secular 
(neo)-liberalism apparently facilitated by the New Zealand education system, critical 
education in religions and worldviews would respect the right of families to maintain 
conservative beliefs and give young people opportunities to examine and defend their beliefs 
in this space created within the curriculum. It would provide a means by which conservative 
beliefs and practices and more liberal conceptions of belief could enter into dialogue in order 
to promote a genuine and active tolerance of difference. Critical realism values the quest for 
alethic truth. The openness to the possibility of the truth of religion is therefore maintained in 
critical education in religion and worldviews. To enable young people to recognise, state, 
affirm and reflect upon their assumptions and convictions, and the influences that have 
formed them, is to encourage them in the pursuit of truth and truthfulness rather than in 
acceptance and compliance. This I have positioned as the goal of religion and the ultimate aim 
of education itself. In their entry in the Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education, James 
Conroy and Robert Davis concur:  
Critical realist methods propose religious education as part of a shared 
intellectual framework for debate and interaction in a plural society, 
endorsing the mainstream liberal view that learners from diverse religious 
and non-religious backgrounds ought to be encouraged to pursue rival 
versions of the good life in conditions of mutual toleration. Authentic 
toleration then demands, however, that religious education fully 
acknowledges the divergence of belief and conviction, enabling learners to 
describe, celebrate, rationalise, and defend beliefs, even up to the point of 
irreconcilability on the basis that it is a morally vital, and educationally 
defining, end in itself to search for and live by the truth derived from an 
apprehension of the ultimate order of reality.9 
In consideration of the problems with existing practices in religious education in New Zealand, 
and in the light of Foucaultian, critical realist and liberal theory, I contend that critical 
education in religion and worldviews therefore represents the “best available” approach to 
religious education at both primary and secondary school level.  
These recommendations will be unpopular with most stakeholders of Christian religion and 
secular education in the New Zealand context. Firstly, the territory gained in the hard-won 
battles over religion in schools of the past will not be readily relinquished. But this research is 
                                                          
9
 James C. Conroy and Robert A. Davis, “Religious Education”, in The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of 
Education, ed. Richard Bailey et al. (London: Sage, 2010), 463. 
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not alone in calling into question the social legitimacy of Bible-in-Schools in the increasingly 
secular and religiously plural social context of New Zealand. The Ministry may come under 
increasing pressure to address the issue, as publicity around the SEN court case raises public 
awareness of the issues at stake. Secondly, my recommendations to introduce a new subject 
area require a commitment of time, resources and energy which remain “inconceivable” 
within the constraints and imperatives of dominant educational discourse. To this it may be 
argued that time, resources and energy are already expended in unreflectively governmental 
ways on forms of religious, spiritual and values instruction teaching and topics on cultural 
celebrations in New Zealand schools. Some of this expenditure may be harmful to the 
protection of diversity, illiberal in outcome, damaging to identity and character formation and 
detrimental to democratic participation. 
 From a critical liberal perspective, what is required is a discursive shift: a retreat from 
conservative Christian and authoritarian secular rationalist constructions of religion and 
secularity, and secondary discourses which collectively disqualify religion from the curriculum, 
and the adoption of an egalitarian liberal and critical realist construction of religious 
education. This would allow a subject which has been considered presumptively invalid to be 
reconstructed as an essential precondition both to the protection of diversity in the liberal 
nation state and to the child’s right to freedom of religions and beliefs. Critical education in 
religions and worldviews thus becomes imperative to identity formation, to the development 
of knowledge and discernment essential for democratic participation, and the locus of 
educational endeavour: an emancipatory quest for ultimate truth and truthful living. For such 
a matter of national significance—from this objectively partisan perspective—time, resources 
and energy might be legitimately prioritised. 
The New Zealand Education Act of 1989 casts the academy as the “critic and conscience of 
society” asserting “the freedom of academic staff and students, within the law, to question 
and test received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and to state controversial or unpopular 
opinions”.10 It is in this spirit that I offer this controversial, unpopular, but potentially 
emancipatory doctoral thesis.
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Appendix 4: Summary of Case Study and Key Stakeholder Data 
Appendix 4A: Case Study Schools in Southland 
School Bible in schools/Religious 
Instruction/Values 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in BiS/RI/Values 
Education in spiritual 
wellbeing 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in spiritual 
education 
Teaching about religions 
and beliefs in the 
curriculum 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in curriculum 
Southland       
St Joseph’s  NZ Bishops’ RE programme 
is followed. Includes 
Catholic formation, 
participation in Mass and 
liturgies and prayer. Strong 
emphasis on values and 
behaviour: WWJD?  
School must follow Catholic 
Religious Education 
Programme which does not 
include other religions at 
primary level. 
 
Spiritual wellbeing and 
education are equated with 
Catholic religious belief and 
understanding. Promoted 
through the curriculum, 
daily prayers and in “Mind, 
Body, Spirit” awards. 
Spirituality constructed 
within conservative 
Christian discourse as 
Catholic religion. 
Positioned as secondary 
school level topic. 
Cultural diversity, including 
Māori culture, is taught as 
diversity within Catholic 
faith. 
Principal: Not part of 
curriculum. Might conflict 
with Catholic teaching. 
Principal and parent: Not 
important in Southland 
context. 
DRS: Too confusing. 
Two parents: Parents might 
complain. 
Kereru  BiS is widely supported: 
promotes Christian values, 
faith and provides 
framework for living. Some 
parents feel obliged to 
allow their children to 
attend. 
BiS coordinator has 
negative views of other 
faiths: caution about 
introducing “our children” 
to other ideas.  
Principal: Catered for 
through building 
relationships esp. around 
Māori families. Restorative 
behaviour management. 
BiS teacher: About being in 
a relationship with God. 
Parent and teacher: BiS 
helps spiritual wellbeing. 
Spirituality constructed 
within spiritual secularist, 
social action liberal and 
conservative Christian 
discourses which do not 
include wider religions and 
beliefs. 
Principal: Main focus is 
Māori culture. Religion is 
sensitive issue. Occasional 
use of parent to explain a 
religious practice. “Not 
deliberately avoided” but 
not taught. 
Teacher: Taboo. Never 
teach it.  
Principal: Religion not seen 
as important. Not sure of 
law. Avoidance of 
indoctrination. Lack of 
subject knowledge. 
Teacher: Might cause 
offence so avoids subject. 
Fear of being accused of 
indoctrination. 
Takahe School has not run BiS for 
ten years, but runs an in-
house values class led by 
Christian teaching 
assistant. Promotes 
Christian values with some 
Christian references but 
not described as religious 
teaching. No opt-out. 
Classes designed to 
promote values not 
conceptual knowledge of 
religion. Indication of 
conservative/evangelising 
discourse which privileges 
Christian beliefs. 
Principal constructs 
spirituality in Christian 
terms. Christian staff in 
school model Christian 
living. Describes people 
praying for school and over 
child with behavioural 
problems. 
DP: Spirituality includes 
Māori culture and karakia. 
Construction of spirituality 
within Christian and social 
action liberal discourses 
precludes teaching about 
other religions. 
Māori culture is prioritised.  
Conflation of RI and RE. 
Not part of curriculum. 
Can discuss things brought 
up by children but not plan 
to teach about religion. 
Principal: Never before 
thought of difference 
between learning religions 
and learning about religion. 
Not important in 
Southland. 
DP: Religious knowledge is 
not useful. No right to 
teach religion. We teach 




Appendix 4B: Case Study Schools in Auckland 
School Bible in schools/Religious 
Instruction/Values 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in BiS/RI/Values 
Education in spiritual 
wellbeing 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in spiritual 
education 
Teaching about religions 
and beliefs in the 
curriculum 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in curriculum 
Auckland       
St Margaret’s  NZ Bishops’ RE programme 
followed. Aims to help 
children to develop a 
personal relationship with 
God within the Catholic 
faith. Evidence of liberal 
Christian theology. 
RE involved in re-
evangelising parents. 
School must follow 
Programme which does not 
include other religions at 
primary level. 
 
Spirituality closely related 
to Catholic faith and rituals 
of prayer. Also concerned 
with values and beliefs, 
social justice and pastoral 
care. Spiritual wellbeing 
includes knowledge that 
the child is made in the 
image of God. 
Spirituality constructed 
within largely conservative 
Christian discourse as 
Catholic religious belief and 
practice. 
Māori culture and language 
included in RE. Cultural 
diversity within global 
Catholic Church is 
celebrated. 
Occasional references to 
other religion instigated by 
children in class. 
Principal: Teaching about 
other religions is “too PC”. 
Teach tolerance and own 
faith. 
DRE: Teach tolerance. 
Children should be 
immersed in their own 
faith. Parents: leave till 
children are older. 
Korimako Board and Principal 
support BiS but nearly 1/3 
school opt out by staying at 
home until 9.30 a.m. on 
Fridays, because they are 
Muslim. Children of other 
religious backgrounds 
attend. 
Programme described as 
good values teaching and 
Bible stories. 
A separate Muslim 
programme was suggested 
by Principal but prohibited 
by Board. 
BiS teacher believes should 
not be adapted to include 
other faiths because “the 
Bible is multicultural: it’s 
for everybody.” Learning 
about other faiths is not 
important. 
Spirituality linked to Māori 
culture, observing 
protocols of tapu and noa. 
Also to personal integrity, 
resilience, identity and 
values. 
BiS perceived as key 
provider of spiritual 
education. One teacher did 
not know spiritual 




Christian, social action 
liberal and spiritual 
secularist discourses which 
do not include other 
religious beliefs. 
Authoritarian secular 
rationalist anxiety about 
using word spiritual in 
school. 
Whole school topic on 
celebrating difference. 
Cultural aspects of 
Ramadan and Diwali are 
covered. Religious subject 
matter is avoided in case of 
causing offence. Teaching 
tolerance is prioritised. 
Some evidence that 
conservative Muslim 
beliefs are discouraged. 
Principal: Constantly 
conflates RE and RI and 
disqualifies both from 
curriculum time. 
BiS teacher: Believes 
teaching about religion is 
illegal within curriculum 
Teachers: Avoid subject to 
avert risk of indoctrination 
or causing offence. 
Kakapo Principal considers BiS 
inappropriate in such a 
diverse area. Too many 
would opt out. Parents 
would not support use of 
time. Values are embedded 
in general teaching and not 
taught separately. 
 
No separate class taught. 
Parent/Trustee and teacher 
would like a BiS class in 
school but motivation 
would be to teach Christian 
values and Biblical truths. 
School charter includes 
references to spiritual 
wellbeing, Hauora and 
nurturing the human spirit. 
Principal defines it as 
“respect and 
understanding” for self and 
others. Parent thinks 
charter might open way to 
BiS. 
Spiritual wellbeing 
constructed largely within 
spiritual secularist 
discourse promoting values 
and personal development. 
 
“Cultural intelligence” in 
charter includes 
understanding religion.  
Cultural festivals such as 
Diwali and Chinese new 
Year are taught but not 
religious beliefs. 
Christmas and Easter are 
no longer part of the 
curriculum. 
Principal and teacher: Lack 
of teacher subject 
knowledge and resources. 
We do enough. 
Teacher: No mandate to 
teach about religion. Fear 
of indoctrination. 






Appendix 4C: Pilot Study School in Dunedin 
Pilot Study: Pukeko 




Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in 
BiS/RI/Values 
Education in spiritual 
wellbeing 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in spiritual 
education 
Teaching about 
religions and beliefs in 
the curriculum 
Constraints on including 
elements of religious 
diversity in curriculum 
      
BiS is generally 
supported: good 




Christianity and other 
“mainstream” religions 
(It does not). Some 
parents disapprove of 
BiS. 
BiS teacher would like to 
include comparative 
religion but it’s not in 
Access materials. She 
stated that those who 
fund BiS would not 
approve. 
BiS is positioned as 
catering for the 
“spiritual dimension of 
children” in policy doc. 
BiS teacher: Involves a 
relationship with God. 
Principal: Involves sense 
of identity, place and 
purpose. Includes Māori 
culture. 
Spirituality is defined 
within discourses 
promoting Christian or 
Māori cultures. A 
further discourse 
promoting general 
values does not include 
input on values of other 
religions. 
Cultural aspects of some 
festivals are covered, 
but not religious beliefs. 
Great Leaders topic 
includes Gandhi. 
Occasional use of child’s 
parent to talk about a 
festival/practice. 
Principal and parent: no 
curriculum requirement; 
lack of teacher subject 
knowledge and 
resources 
Principal and teacher: 
Concern about 
indoctrinating children 
CRE teacher and parent: 
Illegal in curriculum. 
 
Appendix 4D: Summary of Key Stakeholder/Informant Interviews 
Key stakeholder Catholic Religious Education Bible in Schools in state 
schools 
Spiritual wellbeing Teaching about religions and 
beliefs 
Neil Laurenson: 
Manager of Catholic 
Education Services 
Catholic schools teach whole curriculum 
from Catholic point of view, not just RE. 
Can teach the real meaning of Christian 
festivals. Grief and dying covered well. 
Importance of social justice, stewardship, 
pastoral care. Religion not forced on 
children but all must attend RE and 
religious observances. 
Programme depends on calibre 
of volunteer. Biggest problem is 
that teaching can’t be integrated 
through school day like at 
Catholic school. Children need to 
understand Christian heritage of 
NZ. 
In Catholic school would come 
under “pastoral care” of whole 
community. Involves Catholic 
perspective on health but also 
prayers for community. 
Secular schools deal with safety 
of students as part of spiritual 
wellbeing.  
Might come up in a social studies topic 
but not in any depth. Festivals such as 
Diwali might be celebrated. More usual 
to celebrate cultural diversity within 
Catholic faith, such as saying prayers at 
Mass in the different languages and 
costumes of children. 




Key stakeholder Bible in Schools Opting out of BiS Monitoring BiS Spiritual wellbeing Teaching about religions and 
beliefs 
Sonia Glogowski: Ministry of 
Education representative 
Act of 1964 means schools may 
choose to have RI but school is 
officially closed. Ministry does 
not have a position on BiS. A 
matter for parents and Boards  
Parents have right to withdraw 
child. Act has been in place for a 
long time and seems to be 
working. “Opting in” would 
require a change to the Act. 
Positions Ministry as open to 
persuasion on reviewing policy. 
Ministry has neither time nor 
mandate to look at resources 
used. Ministry can’t say “this is 
right and this is wrong” in 
matters of religious belief. 
Teaching religion is a community 
decision. Boards approve 
resources. Complaints referred 
back to Board. 
Uncertain of definition. A way of 
including Māori culture in 
schools. Alerts teachers to think 
broadly about children’s 
wellbeing. 
“Religion” omitted from 
curriculum in case of “narrow 
Christian interpretation”. 
Opportunities in the 
“permissive” curriculum to 
discuss religious diversity e.g. 
Diwali, Matariki. Religion is a 
matter of perspective and 
Ministry can’t specify religious 
knowledge to be taught. Must 
be matter for school Boards. 
Curriculum focuses on 
dispositions and competencies 
not “prescriptive” knowledge. 
Tolerance is more important. 
Joris de Bres: Race Relations 
Commissioner , Human Rights 
Commission 
A bit odd that a school can 
close. An anachronism. Believes 
school “completely changes its 
hours” to run BiS, (It does not). 
Problems caused by evangelical 
teaching. But school Boards can 
resolve any problems. It would 
be a lot easier if it wasn’t there! 
Parents must be consulted and 
informed about programme be 
able to opt out without suffering 
discrimination. “Opting in” is a 
waste of time if parents have 
already been consulted and 
majority are in favour.. 
Boards are responsible for 
making sure teaching does not 
require children to pray or take 
part in religious activity. 
When shown CRE resources 
stated that he would not 
recommend them for use. 
Uncertain of how schools might 
teach spiritual wellbeing. But it 
must have regard for diversity 
and not impose a worldview. 
Religion is a fact of life and 
schools are failing in their duty if 
they do not teach about 
religions. 
Assumes religions are 
mentioned in curriculum 
documents. Believes it is taught 
as part of cultural diversity 
Those who say it can’t be done 
under secular curriculum are 
“wrong”. 
Paul Morris: 
Professor of Religious Studies, 
Victoria University of 
Wellington 
Problematic due to legal 
anomalies, default programme 
in schools, untrained volunteers 
and evangelical approaches. 
Lack of attention to human 
rights. Not good materials and 
not well taught. Probably hasn’t 
done much harm. 
Instigated a Human 
Rights/Ministerial report on 
issue of opting in/out. But 
recommendations (change to 
opt-in) were rejected by 
churches. Became a “button 
issue” which closed debate 
down. 
Knows Ministry don’t approve 
materials and CEC approves its 
own. 
Believes CEC are “ambiguous” 
over description of materials 
and deliberately misrepresent 
Ministerial approval. Parents 
misinformed. 
Spiritual development is 
essential component—a 
dimension of human life. In 
curriculum as a way to 
acknowledge tikanga Māori. 
About a moral sense, 
relationships that are beyond 
the familial or the local. 
Religion not in curriculum 
because Ministry believed it was 
illegal in secular curriculum and 
wouldn’t touch issue. Morris 
told by CEO that religion is an 
aspect of culture. Refutes this. 
Highly critical of UK model of RE 










Children need to be 
informed about Christianity 
in order to make a choice 
later on. CEC’s role is to sow 
a seed. Presenting secular 
school values but from a 
Biblical perspective. 
Matched to key 
competencies of NZ 
curriculum. Teaching 
Christian heritage. Parents 
sign up for Christian 
education classes. Demand 
outstrips volunteers 
available. 
States he hasn’t given the 
opt-in/opt-out problem a lot 
of thought. Law states 
parents can opt out, but 
some have opt-in. CEC 
doesn’t insist on opt-out, but 
it could. 
Complaints are acted on by 
team leaders. Needs to be 
dialogue between principal 
and team leader. Resources 
approved by CEC but should 
be checked by Boards of 
trustees. Recognises that this 
sometimes doesn’t happen 
and that evangelical material 
is in use. Believes parents 
have enough information. 
BiS helps to teach spiritual 
dimension of life. Missing in 
secular curriculum without 
BiS. 
School chaplains may pray 
with pupils. Prayer in CRE 
lessons should be optional. 
It is alright to mention other 
religions in curriculum but 
not to mention Christianity. 
Christianity is discriminated 
against. Would like a “level 
playing field”. 
It is more suitable for older 
children to learn about 
different beliefs. School 
teachers would not be 
impartial in presenting 
material. Better for Church 
volunteers to model faith for 
children. Volunteers would 
struggle to teach about 
different beliefs. 
Ian Leckie: President of 
NZ Educational Institute 
NZEI does not have position 
on BiS. BiS is outside school 
time. Personal view is that 
programme is good values 
and “general life-type skills 
and thinking”. Schools are 
responsible if teaching 
inappropriate. 
It is good because it gives 
teachers relief time. 
Parents have enough 
information. Not a problem 
for children of other faiths to 
attend. Opting out can be a 
problem if too many do it. 
Might cause school to stop 
programme. 
Boards frequently consult 
parents and regularly review 
BiS. Schools are responsible 
for reviewing resources. 
Believes ERO check 
consultation process and 
that it is included in school 
charters. NZEI don’t look at 
resources because it’s 
outside the curriculum. 
Assumes schools interpret 
though values education. 
Promoting teaching about 
ways pupils “think, act and 
do”. Recognising right to 
hold different beliefs. 
Schools probably avoid 
religion as way to teach it. It 
is not part of teacher 
training. 
School can and should 
mention religions but not in 
any depth. Teachers tread 
carefully. NZ curriculum has 
a “de-emphasis” on religion. 
Peter Harrison: 
NZ Association of 
Rationalists and 
Humanists (Keep Religion 
out of School campaign) 
School effectively endorses 
Christian belief. Promoted as 
secular values but is religious 
indoctrination. Children can’t 
differentiate between RI 
volunteer and real teacher. 
Disingenuous. Christian 
values are intolerant and in 
opposition to secular values. 
Does real harm to families. 
Doesn’t work. School closed 
but children obliged to be 
there. Opting out is 
segregation, punishment and 
ostracism. Easier for parents 
to let children attend. 
Parents don’t want to 
complain in case of further 
ostracism. 
Parents should be given 
accurate information by 
schools. 
Didn’t know spirituality in 
curriculum. Thinks there’s a 
danger of depreciation of 
Māori culture by including in 
curriculum. 
Can and should study 
religions of world within 
social studies at secondary 
level. Doesn’t care how this 
might be taught. Not 
interested in an educational 
debate on subject. Young 
children are already tolerant 




Appendix 5: OECD Comparison of Teaching Hours per Year 2013 
The graph shows contractual teaching time, including the OECD average of 772 hours at primary school level.1 
                                                          
1
 Used with permission: OECD. (2015), Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2015-en. 
